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Naturalizing the Mind.Fred Dretske - 1995 - Philosophy 72 (279):150-154.details
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What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 1979 - In Mortal questions. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 435 - 450.details
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The intrinsic quality of experience.Gilbert Harman - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:31-52.details
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Biosemantics.Ruth Millikan - 2007 - In Brian P. McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford handbook of philosophy of mind. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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The Phenomenology of Cognition, Or, What Is It Like to Think That P?David Pitt - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (1):1-36.details
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The Significance of Consciousness.Charles Siewert - 1998 - Princeton University Press.details
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The psychology of folk psychology.Alvin I. Goldman - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):15-28.details
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Intentionalism defended.Alex Byrne - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (2):199-240.details
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Between instrumentalism and brain-writing.Christopher Peacocke - 1983 - In Sense and Content. Oxford University Press.details
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The extended mind.Andy Clark & David J. Chalmers - 1998 - Analysis 58 (1):7-19.details
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Phenomenal Consciousness.Peter Carruthers - 2001 - Mind 110 (440):1057-1062.details
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Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness.Alex Byrne - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (4):594-597.details
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Intentionalism Defended.Alex Byrne - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (2):199-240.details
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On a confusion about a function of consciousness.Ned Block - 1995 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.details
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Perception and representation.William Alston - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):253-289.details
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Perception and Representation.William Alston - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):253-289.details
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Epiphenomenal qualia.Frank Jackson - 1982 - Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136.details
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The Intentional Structure of Consciousness.Tim Crane - 2002 - In Aleksandar Jokic & Quentin Smith (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 33-56.details
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Consciousness and content.Colin McGinn - 1989 - In McGinn Colin (ed.), Proceedings of the British Academy, Volume 74: 1988. pp. 225-245.details
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Critical Notice.Michael Tye - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):245-247.details
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The silence of the senses.Charles Travis - 2004 - Mind 113 (449):57-94.details
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The Problem of Consciousness by Colin McGinn. [REVIEW]William Seager - 1994 - Journal of Philosophy 91 (6):327-330.details
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Consciousness, explanatory inversion and cognitive science.John R. Searle - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):189-189.details
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Consciousness, explanatory inversion and cognitive science.John R. Searle - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (1):585-642.details
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Sense and Content: Experience, Thought and Their Relations.Christopher Peacocke - 1983 - Oxford University Press.details
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Phenomenal states.Brian Loar - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:81-108.details
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Phenomenal Intentionality Meets the Extended Mind.Terence Horgan & Uriah Kriegel - 2008 - The Monist 91 (2):347-373.details
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Is intentionality dependent upon consciousness?Uriah Kriegel - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 116 (3):271-307.details
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The Problem of Consciousness.Andrew Jack & Colin McGinn - 1992 - Philosophical Quarterly 42 (166):106.details
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Mind and World.Huw Price & John McDowell - 1994 - Philosophical Books 38 (3):169-181.details
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Supervenient qualia.Terence Horgan - 1987 - Philosophical Review 96 (October):491-520.details
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Functionalism, qualia, and the inverted spectrum.Terence Horgan - 1984 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 44 (June):453-69.details
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Mary Mary, quite contrary.George Graham & Terence E. Horgan - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 99 (1):59-87.details
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Mary Mary, Quite Contrary. [REVIEW]George Graham, Terence Horgan, Mary Mary & Quite Contrary - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 99 (1):59-87.details
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Consciousness: Creeping up on the Hard Problem.Uriah Kriegel - 2005 - Mind 114 (454):417-421.details
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Review of P sychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning In the Philosophy of Mind. [REVIEW]Jay L. Garfield - 1991 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (1):235-240.details
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Why nothing mental is just in the head.Justin C. Fisher - 2007 - Noûs 41 (2):318-334.details
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Appearance properties?Andy Egan - 2006 - Noûs 40 (3):495-521.details
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Explaining Behaviour: Reasons in a World of Causes.Andy Clark - 1990 - Philosophical Quarterly 40 (158):95-102.details
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The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory (2nd edition).David J. Chalmers - 1996 - Oxford University Press.details
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Psychology From an Empirical Standpoint.Franz Brentano - 1874 - Routledge.details
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Action in Perception.Alva Noë - 2004 - MIT Press.details
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A Theory of Content and Other Essays by Jerry A. Fodor and Holism: A Shopper's Guide by Jerry A. Fodor and Ernest Lepore. [REVIEW]Akeel Bilgrami - 1995 - Journal of Philosophy 92 (6):330-344.details
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The Psychology of Folk Psychology.Alvin I. Goldman - 1993 - In Alvin Goldman (ed.), Readings in Philosophy and Cognitive Science. Cambridge: MIT Press. pp. 347-380.details
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Biosemantics.Ruth Millikan - 1989 - Journal of Philosophy 86 (6):281--297.details
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Phenomenal intentionality as the basis of mental content.Brian Loar - 2003 - In Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. pp. 229--258.details
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Biosemantics.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 1989 - Journal of Philosophy 86 (July):281-97.details
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The representational character of experience.David J. Chalmers - 2004 - In Brian Leiter (ed.), The Future for Philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 153--181.details
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Phenomenal states II.Brian Loar - 1997 - In Ned Block, Owen Flanagan & Güven Güzeldere (eds.), The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates. MIT Press.details
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