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(3 other versions)Change in View: Principles of Reasoning.Gilbert Harman - 1986 - Studia Logica 48 (2):260-261.details
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(3 other versions)Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.details
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Conditionals.Angelika Kratzer - 1986 - Chicago Linguistics Society 22 (2):1–15.details
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Belief is weak.John Hawthorne, Daniel Rothschild & Levi Spectre - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (5):1393-1404.details
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Dynamics of Epistemic Modality.Malte Willer - 2013 - Philosophical Review 122 (1):45-92.details
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A note on Gibbard’s proof.Justin Khoo - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (S1):153-164.details
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Embedding Epistemic Modals.Cian Dorr & John Hawthorne - 2013 - Mind 122 (488):867-914.details
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(2 other versions)Epistemic Modals in Context.Andy Egan, John Hawthorne & Brian Weatherson - 2005 - In Gerhard Preyer & Georg Peter (eds.), Contextualism in philosophy: knowledge, meaning, and truth. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 131-170.details
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(1 other version)``The Paradox of the Preface".D. C. Makinson - 1964 - Analysis 25 (6):205-207.details
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Rational Self-Doubt and the Failure of Closure.Joshua Schechter - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (2):428-452.details
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Nonfactualism about epistemic modality.Seth Yalcin - 2011 - In Andy Egan & Brian Weatherson (eds.), Epistemic Modality. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Epistemic modals are assessment-sensitive.John MacFarlane - 2011 - In Andy Egan & Brian Weatherson (eds.), Epistemic Modality. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Pragmatics.Robert C. Stalnaker - 1970 - Synthese 22 (1-2):272--289.details
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Epistemic Modals.Seth Yalcin - 2007 - Mind 116 (464):983-1026.details
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Indicative conditionals.Robert Stalnaker - 1975 - Philosophia 5 (3):269-286.details
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Knowledge and certainty.Jason Stanley - 2008 - Philosophical Issues 18 (1):35-57.details
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(3 other versions)Elusive knowledge.David Lewis - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):549 – 567.details
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Single premise deduction and risk.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 141 (2):157 - 173.details
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Epistemic possibilities.Keith DeRose - 1991 - Philosophical Review 100 (4):581-605.details
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(1 other version)The paradox of the preface.David C. Makinson - 1965 - Analysis 25 (6):205-207.details
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Inquiry.Jon Barwise - 1986 - Philosophical Review 95 (3):429.details
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A Uniform Theory of Conditionals.William B. Starr - 2014 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (6):1019-1064.details
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A Counterexample to Modus Tollens.Seth Yalcin - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (6):1001-1024.details
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A Flexible Contextualist Account of Epistemic Modals.Janice Dowell, J. L. - 2011 - Philosophers' Imprint 11:1-25.details
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Beliefs, Degrees of Belief, and the Lockean Thesis.Richard Foley - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of belief. London: Springer. pp. 37-47.details
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Ifs and Oughts.Niko Kolodny & John MacFarlane - 2010 - Journal of Philosophy 107 (3):115-143.details
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Contextualism about justified belief.Ralph Wedgwood - 2008 - Philosophers' Imprint 8:1-20.details
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Defaults in update semantics.Frank Veltman - 1996 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 25 (3):221 - 261.details
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Logic Informed.Justin Bledin - 2014 - Mind 123 (490):277-316.details
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On truth-conditions for if (but not quite only if ).Anthony S. Gillies - 2009 - Philosophical Review 118 (3):325-349.details
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New surprises for the Ramsey Test.Malte Willer - 2010 - Synthese 176 (2):291 - 309.details
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Reason and the grain of belief.Scott Sturgeon - 2008 - Noûs 42 (1):139–165.details
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Epistemic possibility.Paul Teller - 1972 - Philosophia 2 (4):303-320.details
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Stick to what you know.Jonathan Sutton - 2005 - Noûs 39 (3):359–396.details
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(1 other version)Selected Works.Jan Łukasiewicz & L. Borkowski - 1973 - Synthese 26 (1):165-171.details
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Closure principles.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 1 (3):256–267.details
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(3 other versions)Probability and the Logic of Rational Belief.Peter Krauss - 1961 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 35 (1):127.details
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Possibility.Ian Hacking - 1967 - Philosophical Review 76 (2):143-168.details
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A Review of the Lottery Paradox.Gregory Wheeler - 2007 - In William Harper & Gregory Wheeler (eds.), Probability and Inference: Essays in Honour of Henry E. Kyburg, Jr. College Publications.details
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Modus Ponens Defended.Justin Bledin - 2015 - Journal of Philosophy 112 (2):57-83.details
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(2 other versions)Inquiry.Robert Stalnaker - 1984 - Synthese 79 (1):171-189.details
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(3 other versions)Change in View: Principles of Reasoning, Cambridge, Mass.Gilbert Harman - 1986 - Behaviorism 16 (1):93-96.details
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