- Do great minds really think alike?Christopher Willard-Kyle - 2017 - Synthese 194 (3).details
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The Uniqueness Thesis.Matthew Kopec & Michael G. Titelbaum - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (4):189-200.details
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Transformative Choices.Ruth Chang - 2015 - Res Philosophica 92 (2):237-282.details
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Uniqueness and Metaepistemology.Daniel Greco & Brian Hedden - 2016 - Journal of Philosophy 113 (8):365-395.details
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(1 other version)No Exception for Belief.Susanna Rinard - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (1):121-143.details
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How Degrees of Belief Reflect Evidence.James M. Joyce - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):153-179.details
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Credal Dilemmas.Sarah Moss - 2014 - Noûs 48 (3):665-683.details
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Immoderately rational.Sophie Horowitz - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (1):41-56.details
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Uniqueness revisited.Igor Douven - 2009 - American Philosophical Quarterly 46 (4):347 - 361.details
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(1 other version)Permission to Believe: Why Permissivism Is True and What It Tells Us About Irrelevant Influences on Belief.Miriam Schoenfield - 2012 - Noûs 48 (2):193-218.details
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Grounding practical normativity: going hybrid.Ruth Chang - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (1):163-187.details
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On “Epistemic Permissiveness”.Anthony Brueckner & Alex Bundy - 2012 - Synthese 188 (2):165-177.details
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Higher Order Evidence.David Christensen - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):185–215.details
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Not enough there there evidence, reasons, and language independence.Michael G. Titelbaum - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):477-528.details
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(1 other version)Nominalism, Naturalism, Epistemic Relativism.Gideon Rosen - 2001 - Noûs 35 (s15):69 - 91.details
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The Case against Epistemic Relativism: Reflections on Chapter 6 of F ear of Knowledge.Gideon Rosen - 2007 - Episteme 4 (1):10-29.details
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(1 other version)Epistemic permissiveness.Roger White - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):445–459.details
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Immodest inductive methods.David Lewis - 1971 - Philosophy of Science 38 (1):54-63.details
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The possibility of parity.Ruth Chang - 2002 - Ethics 112 (4):659-688.details
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Epistemic subjectivism.Roger White - 2007 - Episteme 4 (1):115-129.details
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In defense of epistemic relativism.Ram Neta - 2007 - Episteme 4 (1):30-48.details
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(1 other version)Commitments, Reasons, and the Will.Ruth Chang - 2013 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 8.details
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Impermissive Bayesianism.Christopher J. G. Meacham - 2013 - Erkenntnis 79 (Suppl 6):1185-1217.details
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A Combinatorial Argument against Practical Reasons for Belief.Selim Berker - 2018 - Analytic Philosophy 59 (4):427-470.details
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Can Beliefs Wrong?Rima Basu - 2018 - Philosophical Topics 46 (1):1-17.details
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Rational endorsement.Will Fleisher - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (10):2649-2675.details
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Permissivism and the Arbitrariness Objection.Robert Mark Simpson - 2017 - Episteme 14 (4):519-538.details
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Permissive Rationality and Sensitivity.Benjamin Anders Levinstein - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (2):342-370.details
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Conciliation, Uniqueness, and Rational Toxicity.David Christensen - 2014 - Noûs 50 (3):584-603.details
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Defusing epistemic relativism.Duncan Pritchard - 2009 - Synthese 166 (2):397-412.details
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(1 other version)The Theory of Epistemic Rationality.Richard Foley - 1987 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.details
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Disagreement, evidence, and agnosticism.Jason Decker - 2012 - Synthese 187 (2):753-783.details
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