- Permissivism, Underdetermination, and Evidence.Elizabeth Jackson & Margaret Greta Turnbull - 2023 - In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton Littlejohn (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 358–370.details
|
|
A Permissivist Defense of Pascal’s Wager.Elizabeth Grace Jackson - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (6):2315-2340.details
|
|
A Defense of Intrapersonal Belief Permissivism.Elizabeth Jackson - 2021 - Episteme 18 (2):313–327.details
|
|
Permissivist Evidentialism.Elizabeth Jackson - forthcoming - In Scott Stapleford, Kevin McCain & Matthias Steup (eds.), Evidentialism at 40: New Arguments, New Angles. Routledge.details
|
|
Seeking confirmation: A puzzle for norms of inquiry.Jared Millson - 2020 - Analysis 80 (4):683-693.details
|
|
How should your beliefs change when your awareness grows?Richard Pettigrew - 2024 - Episteme 21 (3):733-757.details
|
|
A Combinatorial Argument against Practical Reasons for Belief.Selim Berker - 2018 - Analytic Philosophy 59 (4):427-470.details
|
|
(1 other version)Interpretations of probability.Alan Hájek - 2007 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
|
|
(1 other version)Disagreement.Jonathan Matheson & Bryan Frances - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
|
|
Epistemology without guidance.Nick Hughes - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (1):163-196.details
|
|
Living on the Edge: Against Epistemic Permissivism.Ginger Schultheis - 2018 - Mind 127 (507):863-879.details
|
|
Suspension of Judgment, Rationality's Competition, and the Reach of the Epistemic.Errol Lord - 2020 - In Sebastian Schmidt & Gerhard Ernst (eds.), The Ethics of Belief and Beyond: Understanding Mental Normativity. Abingdon, UK: Routledge. pp. 126-145.details
|
|
On the Independence of Belief and Credence.Elizabeth Jackson - 2022 - Philosophical Issues 32 (1):9-31.details
|
|
When Rational Reasoners Reason Differently.Michael G. Titelbaum & Matthew Kopec - 2019details
|
|
Epistemic Existentialism.Laura Frances Callahan - 2021 - Episteme 18 (4):539-554.details
|
|
Conditional Probabilities.Kenny Easwaran - 2019 - In Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg (eds.), The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology. PhilPapers Foundation. pp. 131-198.details
|
|
Withhold by Default: A Difference Between Epistemic and Practical Rationality.Chris Tucker - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-24.details
|
|
Bayesian Epistemology.William Talbott - 2006 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
|
|
Epistemic Value and the Jamesian Goals.Sophie Horowitz - 2018 - In Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij & Jeff Dunn (eds.), Epistemic Consequentialism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Permissive Situations and Direct Doxastic Control.Blake Roeber - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (2):415-431.details
|
|
Uniqueness and Logical Disagreement (Revisited).Frederik J. Andersen - 2023 - Logos and Episteme 14 (3):243-259.details
|
|
Logical Disagreement.Frederik J. Andersen - 2024 - Dissertation, University of St. Andrewsdetails
|
|
Doxastic Voluntarism.Mark Boespflug & Elizabeth Jackson - 2024 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
|
|
Unacknowledged Permissivism.Julia Jael Smith - 2020 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101 (1):158-183.details
|
|
Doxastic permissiveness and the promise of truth.J. Drake - 2017 - Synthese 194 (12):4897-4912.details
|
|
Suspension of Judgement: Fittingness, Reasons, and Permissivism.Michael Vollmer - 2023 - Episteme:1-16.details
|
|
A deference model of epistemic authority.Sofia Ellinor Bokros - 2020 - Synthese 198 (12):12041-12069.details
|
|
The Self-Undermining Arguments from Disagreement.Eric Sampson - 2019 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 14:23-46.details
|
|
A puzzle about fickleness.Elise Woodard - 2020 - Noûs 56 (2):323-342.details
|
|
(2 other versions)Problems of Religious Luck: Assessing the Limits of Reasonable Religious Disagreement.Guy Axtell - 2018 - Lanham, MD, USA & London, UK: Lexington Books/Rowman & Littlefield.details
|
|
Belief gambles in epistemic decision theory.Mattias Skipper - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (2):407-426.details
|
|
Permissive Divergence.Simon Graf - 2023 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 53 (3):240-255.details
|
|
Reconciling Enkrasia and Higher-Order Defeat.Mattias Skipper - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (6):1369-1386.details
|
|
Reasons, Competition, and Latitude.Justin Snedegar - 2021 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 16. Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Weighing and aggregating reasons under uncertainty: a trilemma.Ittay Nissan-Rozen - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (9):2853-2871.details
|
|
Vindicating the verifiability criterion.Hannes Leitgeb - 2024 - Philosophical Studies 181 (1):223-245.details
|
|
Expressivism and Crossed Disagreements.Javier Osorio & Neftali Villanueva - 2019 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 86:111-132.details
|
|
The Nature and Rationality of Faith.Elizabeth Jackson - 2019 - In Kevin Vallier & Joshua Rasmussen (eds.), A New Theist Response to the New Atheists. New York: Routledge. pp. 77-92.details
|
|
On the Nature and Relationship of Individual and Collective Justification.Simon Graf - 2024 - Dissertation, University of Leedsdetails
|
|
The imprecise impermissivist’s dilemma.Clinton Castro & Casey Hart - 2019 - Synthese 196 (4):1623-1640.details
|
|
Misleading higher-order evidence, conflicting ideals, and defeasible logic.Aleks Https://Orcidorg Knoks - 2020 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 8:141--74.details
|
|
Concepts of Existential Catastrophe.Hilary Greaves - 2024 - The Monist 107 (2):109-129.details
|
|
Alleged Counterexamples to Uniqueness.Ryan Ross - 2021 - Logos and Episteme 12 (2):203-13.details
|
|
The Surprising Truth About Disagreement.Neil Levy - 2020 - Acta Analytica 36 (2):137-157.details
|
|
The explanatory role of consistency requirements.Marc-Kevin Daoust - 2020 - Synthese 197 (10):4551-4569.details
|
|
Non-Measurability, Imprecise Credences, and Imprecise Chances.Yoaav Isaacs, Alan Hájek & John Hawthorne - 2021 - Mind 131 (523):892-916.details
|
|
Epistemic Uniqueness and the Practical Relevance of Epistemic Practices.Marc-Kevin Daoust - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (4):1721-1733.details
|
|
Disagreement and Religion.Matthew A. Benton - 2021 - In Matthew A. Benton & Jonathan L. Kvanvig (eds.), Religious Disagreement and Pluralism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 1-40.details
|
|
A Rational Agent With Our Evidence.Dominik Kauss - 2024 - Erkenntnis 89 (7):2803-2824.details
|
|
Arbitrariness and Uniqueness.Christopher J. G. Meacham - 2021 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 102 (4):665-685.details
|
|