First Published in 1999. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

"Its publication should be a major event for cognitive linguistics and should pose a major challenge for cognitive science. In addition, it should have repercussions in a variety of disciplines, ranging from anthropology and psychology to epistemology and the philosophy of science.... Lakoff asks: What do categories of language and thought reveal about the human mind? Offering both general theory and minute details, Lakoff shows that categories reveal a great deal."—David E. Leary, American Scientist.

This book is Dewey's most fully developed treatment of logic as the theory of Inquiry. It is a later work which reflects, in part, Dewey's readings of C.S. Peirce during the 1930's. -/- Reprinted in Series: The collected works of John Dewey / ed. by Jo Ann Boydston, 3,12.; The later works, 1925 - 1953, Vol. 12.

This treatise on aesthetics criticizes various psychological theories of art, offers new theories and interpretations, and draws important inferences concerning ...

This book reformulates the sociological subdiscipline known as the sociology of knowledge. Knowledge is presented as more than ideology, including as well false consciousness, propaganda, science and art.

In this book, Newell makes the case for unified theories by setting forth a candidate.

This is a classic volume in the "library of Living Philosophers" and includes a collection of essays on Dewey's work by his contemporaries at the time of the volume's publication. It also includes a biographical essay on Dewey and his replies to the assembled essays.

Sandberg and Wielinga argue in their paper, "Situated Cognition: A paradigm shift?" that "there are no strong reasons to leave the traditional paradigm of cognitive science and AI." They are certainly correct that we should not "disregard evidence and achievements of Cognitive and Instructional Sciences." But they fail to appreciate the implications of the storehouse view of knowledge, which suggests that learning is like putting tools in a shed. Situated cognition arguments against traditional views of learning transfer suggest that human (...) memory does not consist of stored facts and procedures. Perhaps because of the difficulty of this connection—and imagining what the alternative could be—Sandberg and Wielinga also misconstrue cognitive apprenticeship. They misunderstand the idea of effectively relating formalized subject material to everyday practice, believing Collins et al. to be against the teaching of theories and generalities altogether, when in fact they favor AI applications to education. The practical implication of cognitive apprenticeship is to refocus instructional research on the design process itself: We should design computer systems in partnership with students, teachers, and practitioners in the context of use, so we can produce programs that people can afford and want to use, that promote creativity, and that relate in an honest, pragmatic way to everyday life. (shrink)

On the occasion of a first conference on Cognitive Science, it seems appropriate to review the basis of common understanding between the various disciplines. In my estimate, the most fundamental contribution so far of artificial intelligence and computer science to the joint enterprise of cognitive science has been the notion of a physical symbol system, i.e., the concept of a broad class of systems capable of having and manipulating symbols, yet realizable in the physical universe. The notion of symbol so (...) defined is internal to this concept, so it becomes a hypothesis that this notion of symbols includes the symbols that we humans use every day of our lives. In this paper we attempt systematically, but plainly, to lay out the nature of physical symbol systems. Such a review is in ways familiar, but not thereby useless. Restatement of fundamentals is an important exercise. (shrink)

This is a new release of the original 1949 edition.

Artificial Intelligence as a discipline has gotten bogged down in subproblems of intelligence. These subproblems are the result of applying reductionist methods to the goal of creating a complete artificial thinking mind. In Brooks (1987) 1 have argued that these methods will lead us to solving irrelevant problems; interesting as intellectual puzzles, but useless in the long run for creating an artificial being.

Representations are created and given meaning in a shared perceptual space, where they are spoken, written, and drawn in the context of social activity. Consequently, problems in science education cross the boundaries of traditional modularization of the mind into separate perceptual, representation, and communication components that act at distinct times, in distinct domains. We illustrate these issues with a case study of physics learning using a simulation program. The learners are initially uncertain about what aspects of motion to see, where (...) the representations are on the screen, and how to express the relationship between vector notation and motion. At a local level, the students jointly coordinate conversational and perception-action processes to maintain a mutually intelligible stream of activity. At a slightly broader level, they use perception, language, and gesture to construct a shared understanding of what the notation on the computer screen means. Even more broadly, the students use their understanding of the notation to relate their activity to ways in which scientists address similar situations. We conclude that learning to make sharp distinctions from a repertoire of fuzzy, everyday descriptions requires simultaneous, coordination of perception, gesture, and language; one cannot assume competence in two areas and analyze only the third. (shrink)

The author takes the reader on a tour that covers such topics as computers, evolution, Descartes, Schrodinger, and the nature of perception, language, and invididuality. He argues that biology provides the key to understanding the brain. Underlying his argument is the evolutionary view that the mind arose at a definite time in history. This book ponders connections between psychology and physics, medicine, philosophy, and more. Frequently contentious, Edelman attacks cognitive and behavioral approaches, which leave biology out of the picture, as (...) well as the currently fashionable view of the brain as a computer. (shrink)