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Propositional Justification and Doxastic Justification.Paul Silva & Luis R. G. Oliveira - 2024 - In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton Littlejohn (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence. New York, NY: Routledge.details
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Pritchard Versus Pritchard on Luck.Job De Grefte - 2019 - Metaphilosophy 50 (1-2):3-15.details
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Epistemic justification and epistemic luck.Job de Grefte - 2018 - Synthese 195 (9):3821-3836.details
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The generality problem for reliabilism. E. Conee & R. Feldman - 1998 - Philosophical Studies 89 (1):1-29.details
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Insights and Blindspots of Reliabilism.Robert B. Brandom - 1998 - The Monist 81 (3):371-392.details
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Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge.Laurence Bonjour - 1980 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5 (1):53-73.details
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Why the generality problem is everybody’s problem.Michael A. Bishop - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 151 (2):285 - 298.details
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The Problem of Knowledge.Alfred Jules Ayer - 1956 - New York,: Harmondsworth.details
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Naturalistic Epistemology and Reliabilism.Alvin I. Goldman - 1994 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1):301-320.details
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Knowledge and practical interests.Jason Stanley - 2005 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Postscript to truth in fiction.David Lewis - 1961 - In John Langshaw Austin (ed.), Philosophical Papers. Oxford, England: Clarendon Press. pp. 276-280.details
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What is Justified Belief?Alvin I. Goldman - 1979 - In George Pappas (ed.), Justification and Knowledge: New Studies in Epistemology. Boston: D. Reidel. pp. 1-25.details
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On the relationship between propositional and doxastic justification.John Turri - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (2):312-326.details
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How to Be A Reliabilist.Christoph Kelp - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2):346-374.details
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Four arguments for denying that lottery beliefs are justified.Martin Smith - 2021 - In Douven, I. ed. Lotteries, Knowledge and Rational Belief: Essays on the Lottery Paradox (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).details
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The inescapability of Gettier problems.Linda Zagzebski - 1994 - Philosophical Quarterly 44 (174):65-73.details
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Luck, knowledge and value.Lee John Whittington - 2016 - Synthese 193 (6):1615-1633.details
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Stick to what you know.Jonathan Sutton - 2005 - Noûs 39 (3):359–396.details
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Knowing Full Well.Ernest Sosa - 2010 - Princeton University Press.details
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Knowledge Is Belief For Sufficient (Objective and Subjective) Reason.Mark Schroeder - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 5.details
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In Defense of the Kantian Account of Knowledge: Reply to Whiting.Mark Schroeder - 2015 - Logos and Episteme 6 (3): 371-382.details
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Easy possibilities.R. M. Sainsbury - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (4):907-919.details
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The Modal Account of Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2014 - Metaphilosophy 45 (4-5):594-619.details
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Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2004 - Journal of Philosophical Research 29:191-220.details
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Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2004 - Journal of Philosophical Research 29:191-220.details
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Fake Barns and false dilemmas.Clayton Littlejohn - 2014 - Episteme 11 (4):369-389.details
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Philosophical papers.David Kellogg Lewis - 1983 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Counterfactuals.David K. Lewis - 1973 - Malden, Mass.: Blackwell.details
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Doxastic Justification is Fundamental.Hilary Kornblinth - 2017 - Philosophical Topics 45 (1):63-80.details
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Why Every Theory of Luck is Wrong.Steven D. Hales - 2016 - Noûs 50 (3):490-508.details
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Epistemic justification and epistemic luck.Job Grefte - 2018 - Synthese 195 (9):3821-3836.details
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Strong and weak justification.Alvin Goldman - 1988 - Philosophical Perspectives 2:51-69.details
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Epistemic Entitlement and Luck.Sandy Goldberg - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (2):273-302.details
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Epistemology and cognition.Alvin I. Goldman - 1986 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.details
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Discrimination and perceptual knowledge.Alvin I. Goldman - 1976 - Journal of Philosophy 73 (November):771-791.details
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Is epistemic luck compatible with knowledge?Mylan Engel - 1992 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 30 (2):59-75.details
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Between Probability and Certainty: What Justifies Belief.Martin Smith - 2016 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.details
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A Theory of Epistemic Justification.Jarrett Leplin - 2009 - Springer.details
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Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.details
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The Problem of Knowledge.A. J. Ayer - 2006 - In Ted Honderich (ed.), Ayer Writings in Philosophy : A Palgrave Macmillan Archive Collection. Palgrave-Macmillan.details
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Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge.Alvin I. Goldman - 2000 - In Sven Bernecker & Fred I. Dretske (eds.), Knowledge: Readings in Contemporary Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 86-102.details
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Knowledge and Practical Interests.Jason Stanley - 2006 - Critica 38 (114):98-107.details
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Reliabilist Epistemology.Alvin Goldman & Bob Beddor - 2021 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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