- Experience and Reason.Fabian Dorsch - 2011 - Rero Doc.details
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XX Congrés Valencià de Filosofia.Tobies Grimaltos, Pablo Rychter & Pablo Aguayo (eds.) - 2014 - Societat de Filosofia del País Valencià.details
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The sensitivity of legal proof.Guido Melchior - 2024 - Synthese 203 (5):1-23.details
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The New Evil Demon Problem at 40.Peter J. Graham - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.details
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Pragmatic accounts of justification, epistemic analyticity, and other routes to easy knowledge of abstracta.Brett Topey - forthcoming - In Xavier de Donato-Rodríguez, José Falguera & Concha Martínez-Vidal (eds.), Deflationist Conceptions of Abstract Objects. Springer.details
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Moral Principles: A Challenge for Deniers of Moral Luck.Anna Nyman - 2024 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 11 (7).details
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Countering Justification Holism in the Epistemology of Logic: The Argument from Pre-Theoretic Universality.Frederik J. Andersen - 2023 - Australasian Journal of Logic 20 (3):375-396.details
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Deepfakes, Fake Barns, and Knowledge from Videos.Taylor Matthews - 2023 - Synthese 201 (2):1-18.details
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We Forge the Conditions of Love.Georgi Gardiner - 2023 - In Abrol Fairweather & Carlos Montemayor (eds.), Linguistic Luck: Safeguards and Threats to Linguistic Communication. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)A Modal Criterion for Epistemic Argumentation.Job de Grefte - 2022 - Informal Logic 42 (2):389-415.details
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¿Están las teorías de la conspiración epistémicamente justificadas? Una aproximación desde el externismo contemporáneo.Guillermo Marín Penella - 2022 - Dilemata 38:103-117.details
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The Lottery Paradox, the No-Justification Account, and Taiwan.Kok Yong Lee - 2023 - Episteme 20 (2):459-478.details
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Proper Functionalism and the Organizational Theory of Functions.Peter J. Graham - 2023 - In Luis R. G. Oliveira (ed.), Externalism about Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 249-276.details
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Moral Worth, Moral Awareness, and Virtuous Motives.Fabian Lorentzon - unknowndetails
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Safety, Evidence, and Epistemic Luck.Michael J. Shaffer - 2022 - Acta Analytica 37 (1):121-134.details
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Epistemic Luck and Knowledge.Michael J. Shaffer - 2022 - Acta Analytica 37 (1):1-6.details
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Sensitivity, Safety, and Epistemic Closure.Bin Zhao - 2022 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 30 (1):56-71.details
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The Cake Theory of Credit.Jaakko Hirvelä & Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2021 - Philosophical Topics 49 (2):347-369.details
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Can Arbitrary Beliefs be Rational?Mattias Skipper - 2023 - Episteme 20 (2):377-392.details
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Justification and the knowledge-connection.Jaakko Hirvelä - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (6):1973-1995.details
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Lying: Knowledge or belief?Neri Marsili - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (5):1445-1460.details
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Evidence, Epistemic Luck, Reliability, and Knowledge.Mylan Engel - 2021 - Acta Analytica 37 (1):33-56.details
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Virtue epistemology and the Gettier dilemma.Ian M. Church - 2021 - Metaphilosophy 52 (5):681-695.details
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Knowledge from Falsehood, Ignorance of Necessary Truths, and Safety.Bin Zhao - 2022 - Philosophia 50 (2):833-845.details
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Making a difference in virtue epistemology.Fabian Hundertmark & Steven Kindley - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):11213-11229.details
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Knowing how as a philosophical hybrid.Chad Gonnerman, Kaija Mortensen & Jacob Robbins - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):11323-11354.details
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A Dilemma for Globalized Safety.Bin Zhao - 2022 - Acta Analytica 37 (2):249-261.details
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Fragile Knowledge.Simon Goldstein - 2022 - Mind 131 (522):487-515.details
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Close Error, Visual Perception, and Neural Phase: A Critique of the Modal Approach to Knowledge.Adam Michael Bricker - 2021 - Theoria 87 (5):1123-1152.details
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Lucky Ignorance, Modality and Lack of Knowledge.Oscar A. Piedrahita - 2021 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly (3).details
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Thinking about Progress: From Science to Philosophy.Finnur Dellsén, Insa Lawler & James Norton - 2022 - Noûs 56 (4):814-840.details
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Gaṅgeśa on Epistemic Luck.Nilanjan Das - 2021 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 49 (2):153-202.details
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Kant’s Philosophy of Moral Luck.Samuel Kahn - 2021 - Sophia 60 (2):365-387.details
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(1 other version)Knowledge as Justified True Belief.Job de Grefte - 2021 - Erkenntnis (2):1-19.details
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Counterfactual Contamination.Simon Goldstein & John Hawthorne - 2022 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (2):262-278.details
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The normality of error.Sam Carter & Simon Goldstein - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (8):2509-2533.details
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The Serendipity Mindset: The Art and Science of Creating Good Luck.Christian Busch (ed.) - 2020 - New York, USA: Penguin.details
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Becoming Attuned.Christian Busch - 2020 - In The Serendipity Mindset: The Art and Science of Creating Good Luck. New York, USA: Penguin. pp. 1-45.details
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Experimental philosophy and the method of cases.Joachim Horvath & Steffen Koch - 2020 - Philosophy Compass 16 (1):e12716.details
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(1 other version)Social Knowledge and Social Norms.Peter J. Graham - 2018 - In Markos Valaris & Stephen Hetherington (eds.), Knowledge in Contemporary Philosophy. London, UK: Bloomsbury Publishing. pp. 111-138.details
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The Self-Hollowing Problem of the Radical Sceptical Paradox.Changsheng Lai - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (5):1269-1288.details
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Epistemic Internalism and the Challenge from Testimony.Felix Bräuer - 2019 - Rivista Italiana di Filosofia del Linguaggio 1 (13):82-98.details
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Luck: An Introduction.Ian M. Church & Robert J. Hartman - 2019 - In Ian M. Church & Robert J. Hartman (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy and Psychology of Luck. New York: Routledge. pp. 1-10.details
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(1 other version)Losing Confidence in Luminosity.Simon Goldstein & Daniel Waxman - 2020 - Noûs (4):1-30.details
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The neural and cognitive mechanisms of knowledge attribution: An EEG study.Adam Michael Bricker - 2020 - Cognition 203 (C):104412.details
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(4 other versions)The value of knowledge.J. Adam Carter, Duncan Pritchard & John Turri - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Knowledge is Believing Something Because It's True.Tomas Bogardus & Will Perrin - 2022 - Episteme 19 (2):178-196.details
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Relevance and risk: How the relevant alternatives framework models the epistemology of risk.Georgi Gardiner - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):481-511.details
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The “She Said, He Said” Paradox and the Proof Paradox.Georgi Gardiner - 2021 - In Jon Robson & Zachary Hoskins (eds.), The Social Epistemology of Legal Trials. Routledge.details
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(1 other version)On Luck and Modality.Jesse Hill - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (4):1873-1887.details
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