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Embodied Language Comprehension Requires an Enactivist Paradigm of Cognition.Michiel van Elk, Marc Slors & Harold Bekkering - 2010 - Frontiers in Psychology 1.details
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Consciousness, colour, and content. Michael Tye.Bill Brewer - 2001 - Mind 110 (439):869-874.details
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Physicalism and phenomenal concepts.Daniel Stoljar - 2005 - Mind and Language 20 (2):296-302.details
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Using phenomenal concepts to explain away the intuition of contingency.Nicholas Shea - 2014 - Philosophical Psychology 27 (4):553-570.details
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Where's the Beef? Phenomenal Concepts as Both Demonstrative and Substantial.Robert Schroer - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):505-522.details
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Taxonomising the Senses.Fiona Macpherson - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 153 (1):123-142.details
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A Taste of Words: Linguistic Context and Perceptual Simulation Predict the Modality of Words.Max Louwerse & Louise Connell - 2011 - Cognitive Science 35 (2):381-398.details
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Phenomenal States (Revised Version).Brian Loar - 2004 - In Yujin Nagasawa, Peter Ludlow & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Philosophical Perspectives. MIT Press. pp. 219.details
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Nagel vs. Nagel on the nature of phenomenal concepts.Janet Levin - 2007 - Ratio 20 (3):293–307.details
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Science and the phenomenal.Jenann Ismael - 1999 - Philosophy of Science 66 (3):351-69.details
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There Are Fewer Things in Reality Than Are Dreamt of in Chalmers’s Philosophy. [REVIEW]Christopher S. Hill & Brian P. McLaughlin - 1999 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (2):445-454.details
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Imaginability, conceivability, possibility and the mind-body problem.Christopher S. Hill - 1997 - Philosophical Studies 87 (1):61-85.details
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What memory is for: Creating meaning in the service of action.Arthur M. Glenberg - 1997 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):1-19.details
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Introspecting phenomenal states.Brie Gertler - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2):305-28.details
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The unity of haptic touch.Matthew Fulkerson - 2011 - Philosophical Psychology 24 (4):493 - 516.details
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A Posteriori Physicalism and Introspection.Andreas Elpidorou - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (1):474-500.details
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