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  1. The Concept of Well-Being.Stephen M. Campbell - 2015 - In Guy Fletcher (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Well-Being. New York,: Routledge.
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  • (1 other version)Aristotle on Eudaimonia.J. L. Ackrill - 1980 - In Amélie Rorty (ed.), Essays on Aristotle's Ethics. University of California Press. pp. 15-34.
    Originally published in Proceedings of the British Academy 60 (1974), 339-359.
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  • How Should We Aggregate Competing Claims.Alex Voorhoeve - 2014 - Ethics 125 (1):64-87.
    Many believe that we ought to save a large number from being permanently bedridden rather than save one from death. Many also believe that we ought to save one from death rather than a multitude from a very minor harm, no matter how large this multitude. I argue that a principle I call “Aggregate Relevant Claims” satisfactorily explains these judgments. I offer a rationale for this principle and defend it against objections.
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  • A Fresh Start for the Objective-List Theory of Well-Being.Guy Fletcher - 2013 - Utilitas 25 (2):206-220.
    So-called theories of well-being (prudential value, welfare) are under-represented in discussions of well-being. I do four things in this article to redress this. First, I develop a new taxonomy of theories of well-being, one that divides theories in a more subtle and illuminating way. Second, I use this taxonomy to undermine some misconceptions that have made people reluctant to hold objective-list theories. Third, I provide a new objective-list theory and show that it captures a powerful motivation for the main competitor (...)
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  • Classifying theories of welfare.Christopher Woodard - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (3):787-803.
    This paper argues that we should replace the common classification of theories of welfare into the categories of hedonism, desire theories, and objective list theories. The tripartite classification is objectionable because it is unduly narrow and it is confusing: it excludes theories of welfare that are worthy of discussion, and it obscures important distinctions. In its place, the paper proposes two independent classifications corresponding to a distinction emphasised by Roger Crisp: a four-category classification of enumerative theories (about which items constitute (...)
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  • Deliberation Is of Ends.Aurel Kolnai - 1962 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 62:195 - 218.
    Aurel Kolnai; XI—Deliberation is of Ends, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 62, Issue 1, 1 June 1962, Pages 195–218, https://doi.org/10.1093/arist.
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  • (1 other version)Me and My Life.Shelly Kagan - 1994 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 94:309-324.
    In this paper I take some initial steps toward exploring and motivating the suggestion that quality of life and level of well-being do not come to the same thing.
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  • Human Nature and Conduct: An Introduction to Social Psychology.John Dewey - 1922 - Henry Holt.
    In Human Nature and Conduct, first published in 1922, Dewey brings the rigor of natural sciences to the quest for a better moral system.
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  • The Varieties of Intrinsic Value.John O’Neill - 1992 - The Monist 75 (2):119-137.
    To hold an environmental ethic is to hold that non-human beings and states of affairs in the natural world have intrinsic value. This seemingly straightforward claim has been the focus of much recent philosophical discussion of environmental issues. Its clarity is, however, illusory. The term ‘intrinsic value’ has a variety of senses and many arguments on environmental ethics suffer from a conflation of these different senses: specimen hunters for the fallacy of equivocation will find rich pickings in the area. This (...)
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  • (2 other versions)Modern Moral Philosophy.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1958 - Philosophy 33 (124):1 - 19.
    The author presents and defends three theses: (1) "the first is that it is not profitable for us at present to do moral philosophy; that should be laid aside at any rate until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology." (2) "the second is that the concepts of obligation, And duty... And of what is morally right and wrong, And of the moral sense of 'ought', Ought to be jettisoned if this is psychologically possible...." (3) "the third thesis is that (...)
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  • "Utility".John Broome - 1991 - Economics and Philosophy 7 (1):1-12.
    “Utility,” in plain English, means usefulness. In Australia, a ute is a useful vehicle. Jeremy Bentham specialized the meaning to a particular sort of usefulness. “By utility,” he said, “is meant that property in any object, whereby it tends to produce benefit, advantage, pleasure, good, or happiness or to prevent the happening of mischief, pain, evil, or unhappiness to the party whose interest is considered”. The “principle of utility” is the principle that actions are to be judged by their usefulness (...)
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  • Aristotle on eudaimonia.J. L. Ackrill - 1975 - London: Oxford University Press.
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  • Introduction.Ruth Chang - 1997 - In Incommensurability, incomparability, and practical reason. Cambridge, MA, USA: Harvard. pp. 1-34.
    This paper is the introduction to the volume. It gives an argumentative view of the philosophical landscape concerning incommensurability and incomparability. It argues that incomparability, not incommensurability, is the important phenomenon on which philosophers should be focusing and that the arguments for the existence of incomparability are so far not compelling.
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  • Facts and Values.Peter Railton - 1986 - Philosophical Topics 14 (2):5-31.
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  • Needs-centered ethical theory.Gillian Brock & Soran Reader - 2002 - Journal of Value Inquiry 36 (4):425-434.
    Our aims in this paper are: (1) to indicate some of the many ways in which needs are an important part of the moral landscape, (2) to show that the dominant contemporary moral theories cannot adequately capture the moral significance of needs, indeed, that the dominant theories are inadequate to the extent that they cannot accommodate the insights which attention to needs yield, (3) to offer some sketches that should be helpful to future cartographers charting the domain of morally significant (...)
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  • Needs, moral demands and moral theory.Soran Reader & Gillian Brock - 2004 - Utilitas 16 (3):251-266.
    In this article we argue that the concept of need is as vital for moral theory as it is for moral life. In II we analyse need and its normativity in public and private moral practice. In III we describe simple cases which exemplify the moral demandingness of needs, and argue that the significance of simple cases for moral theory is obscured by the emphasis in moral philosophy on unusual cases. In IV we argue that moral theories are inadequate if (...)
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  • Value pluralism.Elinor Mason - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Overview of the main issues about value pluralism.
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  • Headaches, Lives and Value.Dale Dorsey - 2009 - Utilitas 21 (1):36.
    University of Alberta Forthcoming in Utilias Consider Lives for Headaches: there is some number of headaches such that the relief of those headaches is sufficient to outweigh the good life of an innocent person. Lives for Headaches is unintuitive, but difficult to deny. The argument leading to Lives for Headaches is valid, and appears to be constructed out of firmly entrenched premises. In this paper, I advocate one way to reject Lives for Headaches; I defend a form of lexical superiority (...)
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  • The importance of what we care about.Harry Frankfurt - 1982 - Synthese 53 (2):257-272.
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  • Internalism and the good for a person.Connie S. Rosati - 1996 - Ethics 106 (2):297-326.
    Proponents of numerous recent theories of a person's good hold that a plausible account of the good for a person must satisfy existence internalism. Yet little direct defense has been given for this position. I argue that the principal intuition behind internalism supports a stronger version of the thesis than it might appear--one that effects a "double link" to motivation. I then identify and develop the main arguments that have been or might be given in support of internalism about a (...)
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  • (1 other version)Justice as fairness: Political not metaphysical.John Rawls - 1985 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 14 (3):223-251.
    The JSTOR Archive is a trusted digital repository providing for long-term preservation and access to leading academic journals and scholarly literature from around the world. The Archive is supported by libraries, scholarly societies, publishers, and foundations. It is an initiative of JSTOR, a not-for-profit organization with a mission to help the scholarly community take advantage of advances in technology. For more information regarding JSTOR, please contact support@ jstor.org.
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  • Moral realism.Peter Railton - 1986 - Philosophical Review 95 (2):163-207.
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  • (2 other versions)Two distinctions in goodness.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1983 - Philosophical Review 92 (2):169-195.
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  • Necessity and desire.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1984 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 45 (1):1-13.
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  • Measurement.Nancy Cartwright & Rosa Runhardt - 2014 - In Nancy Cartwright & Eleonora Montuschi (eds.), Philosophy of Social Science: A New Introduction. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
    Designing proper measures and carrying them out is one of the key jobs we expect science to accomplish. Properly defined and properly executed scientific measurements provide us with a precise picture of the things we study and give us the kind of information from which we can build scientific laws, models and principles that can help us predict and change the world around us. This chapter is about how this is done in the social sciences.
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  • (2 other versions)Modern Moral Philosophy.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1997 - In Roger Crisp & Michael Slote (eds.), Virtue Ethics. Oxford University Press.
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  • (2 other versions)Two Distinctions in Goodness.Christine Korsgaard - 1997 - In Thomas L. Carson & Paul K. Moser (eds.), Morality and the good life. New York: Oxford University Press.
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  • (4 other versions)Measurement.Nancy Cartwright - 2005 - In Martin Curd & Stathis Psillos (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Science. New York: Routledge.
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  • Aggregation, Risk, and Reductio.Joe Horton - 2020 - Ethics 130 (4):514-529.
    Is there any number of people you should save from paralysis rather than saving one person from death? Is there any number of people you should save from a migraine rather than saving one person from death? Many people answer “yes” and “no,” respectively. The aim of partially aggregative moral views is to capture and justify combinations of intuitions like these. In this article, I develop a risk-based reductio argument that shows that there can be no adequate partially aggregative view. (...)
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  • (2 other versions)Modern Moral Philosophy.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1997 - In Thomas L. Carson & Paul K. Moser (eds.), Morality and the good life. New York: Oxford University Press.
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  • (4 other versions)Measurement.Nancy Cartwright - 2005 - In Martin Curd & Stathis Psillos (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Science. New York: Routledge.
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  • Still Lives for Headaches: A reply to Dorsey and Voorhoeve.Julius Schönherr - 2018 - Utilitas 30 (2):209-218.
    There is no large number of very small bads that is worse than a small number of very large bads – or so, some maintain, it seems plausible to say. In this article, I criticize and reject two recently proposed vindications of the above intuition put forth by Dale Dorsey and Alex Voorhoeve. Dorsey advocates for a threshold marked by the interference with a person's global life projects: any bad that interferes with the satisfaction of a life project is worse (...)
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  • Needing and Necessity.Guy Fletcher - 2011 - In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 170-192.
    Claims about needs are a ubiquitous feature of everyday practical discourse. It is therefore unsurprising that needs have long been a topic of interest in moral philosophy, applied ethics, and political philosophy. Philosophers have devoted much time and energy to developing theories of the nature of human needs and the like. -/- Philosophers working on needs are typically committed to the idea that there are different kinds of needs and that within the different kinds of needs is a privileged class (...)
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  • Is it Rational to Maximize?James Wood Bailey - 1998 - Utilitas 10 (2):195-221.
    Most versions of utilitarianism depend on the plausibility and coherence of some conceptionof maximizing well-being, but these conceptions have been attacked on various grounds. This paper considers two such contentions. First, it addresses the argument that because goods are plural and incommensurable, maximization is incoherent. It is shown that any conception of incommensurability strong enough to show the incoherence of maximization leads to an intolerable paradox. Several misunderstandings of what maximization requires are also addressed. Second, this paper responds to the (...)
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  • Human Flourishing Versus Desire Satisfaction.Richard J. Arneson - 1999 - Social Philosophy and Policy 16 (1):113-142.
    What is the good for human persons? If I am trying to lead the best possible life I could lead, not the morally best life, but the life that is best for me, what exactly am I seeking?This phrasing of the question I will be pursuing may sound tendentious, so some explanation is needed. What is good for one person, we ordinarily suppose, can conflict with what is good for other persons and with what is required by morality. A prudent (...)
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  • Comparing Harms: Headaches and Human Lives.Alastair Norcross - 1997 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 26 (2):135-167.
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  • Fairness, needs, and desert.Brad Hooker - 2008 - In Matthew H. Kramer (ed.), The legacy of H.L.A. Hart: legal, political, and moral philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press.
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  • Exposition of the theory of choice under uncertainty.Kenneth J. Arrow - 1966 - Synthese 16 (3-4):253 - 269.
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  • Preference and urgency.T. M. Scanlon - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):655-669.
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  • Specifying norms as a way to resolve concrete ethical problems.Henry S. Richardson - 1990 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 19 (4):279-310.
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  • The priority of needs.Robert E. Goodin - 1985 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 45 (4):615-625.
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  • Morally important needs.Gillian Brock - 1998 - Philosophia 26 (1-2):165-178.
    Frankfurt argues that there are two categories of needs that are at least prima facie morally important (relative to other claims). In this paper I examine Frankfurt's suggestion that two categories of needs, namely, nonvolitional and constrained volitional needs, are eligible for (at least prima facie) moral importance. I show both these categories to be defective because they do not necessarily meet Frankfurt's own criteria for what makes a need morally important. I suggest a further category of needs as being (...)
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  • An Idea we Cannot do Without: What difference will it make (eg. to moral, political and environmental philosophy) to recognize and put to use a substantial conception of need?David Wiggins - 2005 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 57:25-50.
    1. Conferences on the subject of need are lamentably rare. All the more honour then for this one to the Royal Institute of Philosophy (an organisation long dedicated to saving philosophy’s better self from its worse), to the Philosophy Department at Durham, and to Soran Reader, the organizer and editor.1. Conferences on the subject of need are lamentably rare. All the more honour then for this one to the Royal Institute of Philosophy (an organisation long dedicated to saving philosophy’s better (...)
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  • Superiority in Value.Gustaf Arrhenius - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 123 (1):97-114.
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  • Two Visions of Welfare.Fred Feldman - 2019 - The Journal of Ethics 23 (2):99-118.
    In earlier work I defended Intrinsic Attitudinal Hedonism—a view about what makes for individual personal welfare. On this view, a person’s level of welfare is entirely determined by the amounts of intrinsic attitudinal pleasure and pain he or she takes in things. The view seems to run into trouble in cases involving individuals who take their pleasure in disgusting, immoral things; and in cases involving individuals who take their pleasure in things that really don’t actually happen; and in cases involving (...)
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