- The Aim of Belief.Timothy Chan (ed.) - 2013 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Fittingness: The sole normative primitive.Richard Yetter Chappell - 2012 - Philosophical Quarterly 62 (249):684 - 704.details
|
|
Value, reality, and desire.Graham Oddie - 2005 - New York: Clarendon Press.details
|
|
Is there reason to be theoretically rational?Andrew Reisner - 2011 - In Andrew Reisner & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Reasons for Belief. New York: Cambridge University Press.details
|
|
Intention, practical rationality, and self‐governance.Michael E. Bratman - 2009 - Ethics 119 (3):411-443.details
|
|
Slaves of the passions.Mark Andrew Schroeder - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Natural goodness.Philippa Foot - 2001 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Intention, plans, and practical reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Cambridge: Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.details
|
|
What we owe to each other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.details
|
|
The moral problem.Michael Smith - 1994 - Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell.details
|
|
Against Content Normativity.Kathrin Glüer & Åsa Wikforss - 2009 - Mind 118 (469):31-70.details
|
|
The normativity of meaning and content.Kathrin Glüer, Asa Wikforss & Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini - 2022 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
|
|
Direction of Fit and Motivational Cognitivism.Sergio Tenenbaum - 2010 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 235-64.details
|
|
Why Be Disposed to Be Coherent?Niko Kolodny - 2008 - Ethics 118 (3):437-463.details
|
|
In defence of closure.Richard Feldman - 1995 - Philosophical Quarterly 45 (181):487-494.details
|
|
Does thought imply ought?Krister Bykvist & Anandi Hattiangadi - 2007 - Analysis 67 (4):277–285.details
|
|
Moral conflict and its structure.David O. Brink - 1994 - Philosophical Review 103 (2):215-247.details
|
|
Attitudes and contents.Simon Blackburn - 1988 - Ethics 98 (3):501-517.details
|
|
A puzzle about belief.Saul A. Kripke - 1979 - In A. Margalit (ed.), Meaning and Use. Reidel. pp. 239--83.details
|
|
The Possibility of Practical Reason.David Velleman - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by J. David Velleman.details
|
|
Self-deception, interpretation and consciousness.Paul Noordhof - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (1):75-100.details
|
|
Self-knowledge and resentment.Akeel Bilgrami - 2000 - Knowing Our Own Minds (October):207-243.details
|
|
Problems of the Self.Bernard Williams - 1973 - Cambridge [Eng.]: Cambridge University Press.details
|
|
The Waterfall Illusion.Tim Crane - 1988 - Analysis 48 (June):142-47.details
|
|
A Study of Concepts.Christopher Peacocke - 1992 - MIT Press.details
|
|
The normativity of the mental.Nick Zangwill - 2005 - Philosophical Explorations 8 (1):1-19.details
|
|
The normativity of content.Paul A. Boghossian - 2003 - Philosophical Issues 13 (1):31-45.details
|
|
Direction of fit and normative functionalism.Nick Zangwill - 1998 - Philosophical Studies 91 (2):173-203.details
|
|
Controlling attitudes.Pamela Hieronymi - 2006 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (1):45-74.details
|
|
The aim of belief.Ralph Wedgwood - 2002 - Philosophical Perspectives 16:267-97.details
|
|
Norms for pure desire.Víctor M. Verdejo - 2020 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 35 (1):95-112.details
|
|
Rules of Belief and the Normativity of Intentional Content.Derek Green - 2021 - Acta Analytica 36 (2):159-69.details
|
|
The Fundamentality of Fit.Christopher Howard - 2019 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 14.details
|
|
The Game of Belief.Barry Maguire & Jack Woods - 2020 - Philosophical Review 129 (2):211-249.details
|
|
Problems of the Self.Bernard Williams - 1973 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 37 (3):551-551.details
|
|
Normativity.J. J. Thomson - 2008 - Analysis 70 (4):713-715.details
|
|
Blind reasoning.Paul A. Boghossian - 2003 - Supplement to the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 77 (1):225-248.details
|
|
What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 2002 - Mind 111 (442):323-354.details
|
|
Primitive Normativity and Skepticism about Rules.Hannah Ginsborg - 2011 - Journal of Philosophy 108 (5):227-254.details
|
|
Rationality Through Reasoning.John Broome (ed.) - 2013 - Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.details
|
|
Is Knowledge Normative?Mark Schroeder - 2015 - Philosophical Issues 25 (1):379-395.details
|
|
Fittingness First.Conor McHugh & Jonathan Way - 2016 - Ethics 126 (3):575-606.details
|
|
Against Belief Normativity.Kathrin Glüer & Åsa Wikforss - 2013 - In Timothy Chan (ed.), The Aim of Belief. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Oughts and thoughts: rule-following and the normativity of content.Anandi Hattiangadi - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
The autonomy of ethics.A. N. Prior - 1960 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 38 (3):199 – 206.details
|
|
Truth and correct belief.Allan Gibbard - 2005 - Philosophical Issues 15 (1):338–350.details
|
|
The Value-Based Theory of Reasons.Barry Maguire - 2016 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 3.details
|
|
The Normativity of Belief.Conor McHugh & Daniel Whiting - 2014 - Analysis 74 (4):698-713.details
|
|
Reasons.John Broome - 2004 - In R. Jay Wallace (ed.), Reason and value: themes from the moral philosophy of Joseph Raz. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 2004--28.details
|
|
There Are No Norms of Belief.David Papineau - 2013 - In Timothy Chan (ed.), The Aim of Belief. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
|
|