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Reference and Reflexivity.John Perry - 2001 - Stanford, Calif.: Center for the Study of Language and Inf.details
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Self-Knowing Agents.Lucy O'Brien - 2007 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness.Joseph Levine - 2001 - New York, US: Oxford University Press USA.details
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Cognitive Phenomenology.Tim Bayne & Michelle Montague (eds.) - 2011 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.details
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The Varieties of Consciousness.Uriah Kriegel - 2015 - New York, NY: Oxford University Press.details
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Cognitive Phenomenology.Elijah Chudnoff - 2015 - New York: Routledge.details
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The Mirror of the World: Subjects, Consciousness, and Self-Consciousness.Christopher Peacocke - 2014 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Renewed Acquaintance.Brie Gertler - 2012 - In Declan Smithies & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Introspection and Consciousness. , US: Oxford University Press. pp. 89-123.details
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The Phenomenology of Cognition, Or, What Is It Like to Think That P?David Pitt - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (1):1-36.details
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What Intuitions Are Like.Elijah Chudnoff - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (3):625-654.details
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Demonstratives: An Essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics and Epistemology of Demonstratives and other Indexicals.David Kaplan - 1989 - In Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 481-563.details
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(1 other version)Elements of symbolic logic.Hans Reichenbach - 1980 - London: Dover Publications.details
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Philosophical explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.details
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The phenomenal self.Barry Dainton - 2008 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Thought and reference.Kent Bach - 1987 - New York: Clarendon Press.details
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De re senses.John Mcdowell - 1984 - Philosophical Quarterly 34 (136):283-294.details
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The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford: Oxford University Press. Edited by John Henry McDowell.details
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Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge.Richard Moran - 2001 - Princeton University Press.details
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Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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A Study of Concepts.Christopher Peacocke - 1992 - MIT Press.details
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(1 other version)The problem of the essential indexical.John Perry - 1979 - Noûs 13 (1):3-21.details
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(2 other versions)On a confusion about a function of consciousness.Ned Block - 1995 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.details
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Introspecting phenomenal states.Brie Gertler - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2):305-28.details
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Self-reference and self-awareness.Sydney S. Shoemaker - 1968 - Journal of Philosophy 65 (October):555-67.details
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The first person.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1975 - In Samuel D. Guttenplan (ed.), Mind and language. Oxford [Eng.]: Clarendon Press. pp. 45â65.details
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(2 other versions)A theory of phenomenal concepts.Michael Tye - 2003 - In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Minds and Persons. Cambridge University Press. pp. 91-105.details
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(1 other version)The content and epistemology of phenomenal belief.David Chalmers - 2002 - In Aleksandar Jokic & Quentin Smith (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 220--72.details
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(2 other versions)Phenomenal states.Brian Loar - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:81-108.details
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(2 other versions)On a confusion about a function of consciousness.Ned Block - 2014 - In Josh Weisberg (ed.), Consciousness (Key Concepts in Philosophy). Cambridge, UK: Polity.details
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(1 other version)A Study of Concepts.David Papineau - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (2):425-432.details
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A Study of Concepts.Christopher Peacocke - 1992 - Studia Logica 54 (1):132-133.details
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A Study of Concepts.Robert Hanna - 1994 - Philosophical Review 103 (3):541.details
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Knowing what it's like.Joseph Levine - 2003 - In Brie Gertler (ed.), Privileged Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge. Ashgate.details
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Reasons and Persons.Joseph Margolis - 1986 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):311-327.details
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(1 other version)Reference and Reflexivity.Eros Corazza - 2003 - Mind 112 (445):171-175.details
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Introspection, Phenomenality, and the Availability of Intentional Content.David Pitt - 2011 - In Tim Bayne & Michelle Montague (eds.), Cognitive Phenomenology. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 141-173.details
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Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness.Alex Byrne - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (4):594-597.details
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Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness.Joseph Levine - 2001 - Philosophy 77 (299):130-135.details
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(2 other versions)A Theory of Phenomenal Concepts.Michael Tye - 2003 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 53:91-105.details
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(1 other version)The Demonstrative Model of first-person thought.Daniel Morgan - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1795-1811.details
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Phenomenal epistemology: What is consciousness that we may know it so well?Terry Horgan & Uriah Kriegel - 2007 - Philosophical Issues 17 (1):123-144.details
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Self-knowledge and self-reference.Robert J. Howell - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (1):44-70.details
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