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Being Somewhere. Egocentic spatial representation as self-representation.Ferdinand Pöhlmann - 2017 - Stuttgart: J.B. Metzler.details
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Practical Reason in Historical and Systematic Perspective.James Conant & Dawa Ometto (eds.) - 2023 - De Gruyter.details
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Free Will, Causality, and Neuroscience.Bernard Feltz, Marcus Missal & Andrew Sims (eds.) - 2019 - Leiden: Brill.details
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Practical Knowledge and Luminosity.Juan S. Piñeros Glasscock - 2019 - Mind 129 (516):1237-1267.details
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Kinds of Consciousness.Jacob Berger - 2021 - In Benjamin D. Young & Carolyn Dicey Jennings (eds.), Mind, Cognition, and Neuroscience: A Philosophical Introduction. Routledge.details
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First Person and Minimal Self-Consciousness.Thor Grünbaum - 2012 - In Sofia Miguens & Gerhard Preyer (eds.), Consciousness and Subjectivity. [Place of publication not identified]: Ontos Verlag. pp. 273-296.details
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What Do Animals See? Intentionality, Objects and Kantian Nonconceptualism.Sacha Golob - 2020 - In John J. Callanan & Lucy Allais (eds.), Kant and Animals. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.details
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Kierkegaard on Truth: One or Many?Daniel Watts - 2018 - Mind 127 (505):197-223.details
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Kierkegaard and the Search for Self‐Knowledge.Daniel Watts - 2011 - European Journal of Philosophy 21 (4):525-549.details
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Perspectives on de se immunity.Víctor M. Verdejo - 2021 - Synthese 198 (10):10089-10107.details
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What We Do When We Judge.Josefa Toribio - 2011 - Dialectica 65 (3):345-367.details
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From Volitionalism to the Dual Aspect Theory of Action.Joshua Stuchlik - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (3):867-886.details
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II—Waking, Knowing, and Being Conscious.James Stazicker - 2019 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 93 (1):137-160.details
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The First-Person Plural and Immunity to Error.Joel Smith - 2018 - Disputatio 10 (49):141-167.details
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Non‐Observational Knowledge of Action.John Schwenkler - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (10):731-740.details
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Introspection, Transparency, and Desire.Michael Roche - 2023 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 30 (3):132-154.details
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XIII—Self-Knowledge as a Personal Achievement.Ursula Renz - 2017 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 117 (3):253-272.details
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Metacognition.Joëlle Proust - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (11):989-998.details
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Mental action.Antonia Peacocke - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 16 (6):e12741.details
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Embedded mental action in self-attribution of belief.Antonia Peacocke - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (2):353-377.details
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Practical knowledge first.Carlotta Pavese - 2022 - Synthese 200 (5):1-18.details
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Immunity, thought insertion, and the first-person concept.Michele Palmira - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (12):3833-3860.details
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Modele jaźni w samowiedzy.Anita Pacholik-Żuromska - 2019 - Filozofia Nauki 27 (3):55-76.details
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Self-knowledge, agency and inner voices.L. O'Brien - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):93-108.details
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‘Obsessive Thoughts and Inner Voices’.Lucy O'Brien - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):93-108.details
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Modeling practical thinking.Matthew Mosdell - 2018 - Mind and Language 34 (4):445-464.details
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The Demonstrative Model of first-person thought.Daniel Morgan - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1795-1811.details
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Thinking about the body as subject.Daniel Morgan - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (4):435-457.details
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Intentionality: Some Lessons from the History of the Problem from Brentano to the Present.Dermot Moran - 2013 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 21 (3):317-358.details
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First-Person Thought.Daniel Morgan & Léa Salje - 2020 - Analysis 80 (1):148-163.details
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Judging as a non-voluntary action.Conor McHugh - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 152 (2):245 - 269.details
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Epistemic responsibility and doxastic agency.Conor McHugh - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):132-157.details
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Immunity to wh-misidentification.Aidan McGlynn - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):2293-2313.details
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In the eye of another: comments on Christopher Peacocke’s ‘Interpersonal self-consciousness’.M. G. F. Martin - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (1):25-38.details
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Some may beg to differ: individual beliefs and group political claims.Martin Lipscomb - 2013 - Nursing Philosophy 14 (4):254-270.details
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Disjunctivism about intending.Yair Levy - 2021 - American Philosophical Quarterly 58 (2):161-180.details
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Self-Knowledge, Elenchus and Authority in Early Plato.Fiona Leigh - 2020 - Phronesis 65 (3):247-280.details
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The transparency method and knowing our reasons.Sophie Keeling - 2019 - Analysis 79 (4):613-621.details
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Accounting for Doxastic Agency: Mental Action and Self-Awareness.Sophie Keeling - 2023 - Synthese 201 (6):1-24.details
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Guidance and Belief.David Hunter - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (S1):63-90.details
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Phenomenally Mine: In Search of the Subjective Character of Consciousness.Robert J. Howell & Brad Thompson - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (1):103-127.details
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Thinking of oneself as the thinker: the concept of self and the phenomenology of intellection.Marie Guillot - 2016 - Philosophical Explorations 19 (2):138-160.details
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Seeing what I am Doing.Thor Grünbaum - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (2):295-318.details
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Perception and non-inferential knowledge of action.Thor Grünbaum - 2011 - Philosophical Explorations 14 (2):153 - 167.details
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Is Remembering to do a Special Kind of Memory?Thor Grünbaum & Søren Kyllingsbæk - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11 (2):385-404.details
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XIII—Self‐Knowledge, Transparency, and Self‐Authorship.Sacha Golob - 2015 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 115 (3pt3):235-253.details
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Alienation or regress: on the non-inferential character of agential knowledge.Juan S. Piñeros Glasscock - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (6):1757-1768.details
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Authoritative Knowledge.Juan S. Piñeros Glasscock - 2020 - Erkenntnis 87 (5):2475-2502.details
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The philosophical significance of the De Se.Manuel García-Carpintero - 2017 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 60 (3):253-276.details
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