- On the Connection between Lying, Asserting, and Intending to Cause Beliefs.Vladimir Krstic - 2022 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
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Lying, hedging, and the norms of assertion.Noah Betz-Richman - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2).details
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Lying: Knowledge or belief?Neri Marsili - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (5):1445-1460.details
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True lies and Moorean redundancy.Alex Wiegmann & Emanuel Viebahn - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):13053-13066.details
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The Epistemology of Groups.Jennifer Lackey - 2020 - New York, NY: Oxford University Press.details
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Lying, speech acts, and commitment.Neri Marsili - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):3245-3269.details
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Objective falsity is essential to lying: an argument from convergent evidence.John Turri - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (6):2101-2109.details
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(1 other version)On Bullshit.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1986 - Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.details
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Lying and knowing.Ben Holguín - 2019 - Synthese 198 (6):5351-5371.details
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Immoral lies and partial beliefs.Neri Marsili - 2022 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 65 (1):117-127.details
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The folk concept of lying.Alex Wiegmann & Jörg Meibauer - 2019 - Philosophy Compass 14 (8).details
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Lying with Presuppositions.Emanuel Viebahn - 2020 - Noûs 54 (3):731-751.details
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Lying, fast and slow.Angelo Turri & John Turri - 2019 - Synthese 198 (1):757-775.details
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What is Disinformation?Don Fallis - 2015 - Library Trends 63 (3):401-426.details
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(1 other version)Lying and Insincerity.Andreas Stokke - 2018 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.details
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Facts, Factives, and Contrafactives.Richard Holton - 2017 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 91 (1):245-266.details
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(3 other versions)Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.details
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(3 other versions)Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.details
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(1 other version)On Bullshit.Harry Frankfurt - 1986 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (223):300-301.details
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No need for an intention to deceive? Challenging the traditional definition of lying.Ronja Rutschmann & Alex Wiegmann - 2017 - Philosophical Psychology 30 (4):438-457.details
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Intending.Donald Davidson - 1978 - Philosophy of History and Action 11:41-60.details
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Lying and Certainty.Neri Marsili - 2018 - In Jörg Meibauer (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Lying. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford Handbooks. pp. 170-182.details
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Malfunction Defended.Ema Sullivan-Bissett - 2017 - Synthese 194 (7):2501-2522.details
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(1 other version)Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy.Bernard Williams - 2002 - Princeton University Press.details
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(1 other version)Speech Matters: On Lying, Morality, and the Law.Seana Valentine Shiffrin - 2014 - Princeton: Princeton University Press.details
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The Definition of Lying and Deception.James Edwin Mahon - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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The truth about lying.Angelo Turri & John Turri - 2015 - Cognition 138 (C):161-168.details
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Lies and deception: an unhappy divorce.Jennifer Lackey - 2013 - Analysis 73 (2):236-248.details
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Epistemic Intuitions in Fake-Barn Thought Experiments.David Colaço, Wesley Buckwalter, Stephen Stich & Edouard Machery - 2014 - Episteme 11 (2):199-212.details
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Lying.Frederick A. Siegler - 1966 - American Philosophical Quarterly 3 (2):128 - 136.details
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What Is Wrong with Lying?Paul Faulkner - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (3):535-557.details
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Knowledge-lies.Roy Sorensen - 2010 - Analysis 70 (4):608-615.details
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Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Bald-faced lies! Lying without the intent to deceive.Roy Sorensen - 2007 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (2):251-264.details
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Malfunctions.Paul Sheldon Davies - 2000 - Biology and Philosophy 15 (1):19-38.details
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The definition of lying.Thomas L. Carson - 2006 - Noûs 40 (2):284–306.details
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(1 other version)Lying, liars and language.David Simpson - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (3):623-639.details
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Knowledge and certainty.Jason Stanley - 2008 - Philosophical Issues 18 (1):35-57.details
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Norms of assertion.Jennifer Lackey - 2007 - Noûs 41 (4):594–626.details
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(1 other version)The right to lie: Kant on dealing with evil.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1986 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 15 (4):325-349.details
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Applying pragmatics to epistemology.Kent Bach - 2008 - Philosophical Issues 18 (1):68-88.details
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What Is Lying.Don Fallis - 2009 - Journal of Philosophy 106 (1):29-56.details
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(1 other version)Assertion, Knowledge, and Rational Credibility.Igor Douven - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (4):449-485.details
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Lying despite telling the truth.Alex Wiegmann, Jana Samland & Michael R. Waldmann - 2016 - Cognition 150 (C):37-42.details
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Lying, Belief, and Knowledge.Matthew A. Benton - 2018 - In Jörg Meibauer (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Lying. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford Handbooks. pp. 120-133.details
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Davidson was Almost Right about Lying.Don Fallis - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (2):337-353.details
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Two Definitions of Lying.James Edwin Mahon - 2008 - International Journal of Applied Philosophy 22 (2):211-230.details
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On truth, lies, and bullshit.Harry Frankfurt - 2009 - In Clancy W. Martin (ed.), The philosophy of deception. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 37.details
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(1 other version)Assertion, knowledge, and rational credibility.Igor Douven - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (4):449-485.details
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Intending.Robert Audi - 1973 - Journal of Philosophy 70 (13):387-403.details
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