- The Informativeness Norm of Assertion.Grzegorz Gaszczyk - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology.details
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No Hope for Conciliationism.Jonathan Dixon - 2024 - Synthese 203 (148):1-30.details
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The truth about assertion and retraction: A review of the empirical literature.Markus Kneer & Neri Marsili - forthcoming - In Alex Wiegmann (ed.), Lying, Fake News, and Bullshit. Bloomsbury.details
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My religion preaches ‘p’, but I don't believe that p: Moore's Paradox in religious assertions.Maciej Tarnowski - forthcoming - Religious Studies.details
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Unzipping the Zetetic Turn.David Domínguez - 2023 - Synthese 202 (6):1-29.details
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Counterevidentials.Laura Caponetto & Neri Marsili - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.details
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Norms of Speech Acts.Grzegorz Gaszczyk - 2022 - Studia Semiotyczne 36 (11):45-56.details
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Whose Responsibility is it Anyway?Accountability and Standpoints for Disaster Risk Reduction in Nepal.Sheena Ramkumar - 2022 - Dissertation, Durham Universitydetails
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The myth of true lies.Jesper Kallestrup - 2023 - Theoria 89 (4):451-466.details
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Hedging and the Norm of Belief.Peter van Elswyk & Christopher Willard-Kyle - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.details
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Accuracy Across Doxastic Attitudes: Recent Work on the Accuracy of Belief.Robert Weston Siscoe - 2022 - American Philosophical Quarterly 59 (2):201-217.details
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Science, assertion, and the common ground.Corey Dethier - 2022 - Synthese 200 (1):1-19.details
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(1 other version)Knowledge‐norms in a common‐law crucible.Cosim Sayid - 2021 - Ratio 34 (4):261-276.details
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(1 other version)Contextualism vs. Relativism: More empirical data.Markus Https://Orcidorg Kneer - 2022 - In Jeremy Wyatt, Julia Zakkou & Dan Zeman (eds.), Perspectives on Taste: Aesthetics, Language, Metaphysics, and Experimental Philosophy. Routledge.details
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Assertion is weak.Matthew Mandelkern & Kevin Dorst - 2022 - Philosophers' Imprint 22.details
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On the Independence of Belief and Credence.Elizabeth Jackson - 2022 - Philosophical Issues 32 (1):9-31.details
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Scientific Conclusions Need Not Be Accurate, Justified, or Believed by their Authors.Haixin Dang & Liam Kofi Bright - 2021 - Synthese 199:8187–8203.details
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Seeking confirmation: A puzzle for norms of inquiry.Jared Millson - 2020 - Analysis 80 (4):683-693.details
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Teaching & Learning Guide for: The Relationship Between Belief and Credence.Elizabeth Jackson - 2020 - Philosophy Compass 15 (6):e12670.details
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Should I say that? An experimental investigation of the norm of assertion.Neri Marsili & Alex Wiegmann - 2021 - Cognition 212 (C):104657.details
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The Relationship Between Belief and Credence.Elizabeth G. Jackson - 2020 - Philosophy Compass 15 (6):1–13.details
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Moorean Assertions and Their Normative Function.Voin Milevski - 2020 - Acta Analytica 35 (4):531-541.details
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Refined Invariantism.Jacques-Henri Vollet - 2020 - Theoria 86 (1):100-127.details
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Endorsement and assertion.Will Fleisher - 2019 - Noûs 55 (2):363-384.details
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Projective Adaptivism.Leonid Tarasov - 2019 - Philosophical Papers 48 (3):379-402.details
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What's the Point of Authors?Joshua Habgood-Coote - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.details
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On the Nature of Presupposition: A Normative Speech Act Account.Manuel García-Carpintero - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (2):269-293.details
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The norm of assertion: Empirical data.Markus Kneer - 2018 - Cognition 177 (C):165-171.details
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Recent Work on Assertion.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2015 - American Philosophical Quarterly 52 (4):365-380.details
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Credal pragmatism.Jie Gao - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (6):1595-1617.details
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You don't say! Lying, asserting and insincerity.Neri Marsili - 2017 - Dissertation, University of Sheffielddetails
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Culpability and Irresponsibility.Martin Montminy - 2018 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 12 (1):167-181.details
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(1 other version)Knowledge-how is the Norm of Intention.Joshua Habgood-Coote - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (7):1703-1727.details
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Assertion, Belief, and Context.Roger Clarke - 2018 - Synthese 195 (11):4951-4977.details
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Knowing-how, showing, and epistemic norms.Joshua Habgood-Coote - 2018 - Synthese 195 (8):3597-3620.details
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Moderate scientism in philosophy.Buckwalter Wesley & John Turri - 2018 - In Jeroen de Ridder, Rik Peels & Rene van Woudenberg (eds.), Scientism: Prospects and Problems. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Epistemic invariantism and contextualist intuitions.Alexander Dinges - 2016 - Episteme 13 (2):219-232.details
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No Need for Excuses: Against Knowledge-First Epistemology and the Knowledge Norm of Assertion.Joshua Schechter - 2017 - In J. Adam Carter, Emma C. Gordon & Benjamin W. Jarvis (eds.), Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 132-159.details
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Full Blooded Entitlement.Martin Smith - 2020 - In Peter Graham & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (eds.), Epistemic Entitlement. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.details
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Evidence of factive norms of belief and decision.John Turri - 2015 - Synthese 192 (12):4009-4030.details
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Unassertability and the Appearance of Ignorance.Geoff Pynn - 2014 - Episteme 11 (2):125-143.details
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Futher reflections on semantic minimalism: Reply to Wedgwood.Alessandro Capone - 2013 - In Alessandro Capone, Franco Lo Piparo & Marco Carapezza (eds.), Perspectives on Pragmatics and Philosophy. Cham: Springer. pp. 437-474..details
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Why assertion and practical reasoning are possibly not governed by the same epistemic norm.Robin McKenna - 2013 - Logos and Episteme 4 (4):457-464.details
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Telling, showing and knowing: A unified theory of pedagogical norms.Wesley Buckwalter & John Turri - 2014 - Analysis 74 (1):16-20.details
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Epistemic expressivism and the argument from motivation.Klemens Kappel & Emil F. L. Moeller - 2014 - Synthese 191 (7):1-19.details
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The Problem of ESEE Knowledge.John Turri - 2014 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 1:101-127.details
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Irksome assertions.Rachel McKinnon & John Turri - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (1):123-128.details
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Knowledge, Justification and Normative Coincidence1.Martin Smith - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (2):273-295.details
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Believing Things Unknown.Aidan McGlynn - 2011 - Noûs 47 (2):385-407.details
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(1 other version)Assertion and Practical Reasoning: Common or Divergent Epistemic Standards?Jessica Brown - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):123-157.details
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