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The defeater version of Benacerraf’s problem for a priori knowledge.Joshua C. Thurow - 2013 - Synthese 190 (9):1587-1603.details
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Knowing Right From Wrong.Kieran Setiya - 2012 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Acting in ignorance.Jonathan Dancy - 2011 - Frontiers of Philosophy in China 6 (3):345-357.details
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Acting for reasons: Reply to Dancy. [REVIEW]John Hyman - 2011 - Frontiers of Philosophy in China 6 (3):358-368.details
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La Prévision: Ses Lois Logiques, Ses Sources Subjectives.Bruno de Finetti - 1937 - Annales de l'Institut Henri Poincaré 7 (1):1-68.details
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Ethics without principles.Jonathan Dancy - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism.Peter K. Unger - 1975 - Oxford [Eng.]: Oxford University Press.details
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The epistemological challenge to metanormative realism: how best to understand it, and how to cope with it.David Enoch - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 148 (3):413-438.details
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Intuitive non-naturalism meets cosmic coincidence.Matthew S. Bedke - 2009 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (2):188-209.details
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Against explanationist skepticism regarding philosophical intuitions.Joel Pust - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 106 (3):227 - 258.details
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Defeaters and higher-level requirements.Michael Bergmann - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (220):419–436.details
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What's wrong with Moore's argument?James Pryor - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):349–378.details
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How knowledge works.John Hyman - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (197):433-451.details
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(2 other versions)A causal theory of knowing.Alvin I. Goldman - 1967 - Journal of Philosophy 64 (12):357-372.details
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Thought.Gilbert Harman - 1973 - Princeton, NJ, USA: Princeton University Press.details
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The Reliability Challenge in Moral Epistemology.Matt Lutz - 2020 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 15:284-308.details
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An Occasionalist Response to Korman and Locke.David Killoren - 2021 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 19 (3).details
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Realism, reliability, and epistemic possibility: on modally interpreting the Benacerraf–Field challenge.Brett Topey - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):4415-4436.details
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Coincidence Avoidance and Formulating the Access Problem.Sharon Berry - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (6):687 - 701.details
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Knowledge is Believing Something Because It's True.Tomas Bogardus & Will Perrin - 2022 - Episteme 19 (2):178-196.details
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Debunking material induction.Jonathan Livengood & Daniel Z. Korman - 2020 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 84:20-27.details
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(1 other version)Justification and Explanation in Mathematics and Morality.Justin Clarke-Doane - 2006 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 10.details
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Debunking arguments.Daniel Z. Korman - 2019 - Philosophy Compass 14 (12):e12638.details
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Modal Security.Justin Clarke-Doane & Dan Baras - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (1):162-183.details
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(2 other versions)A Causal Theory of Knowing.Alvin I. Goldman - 2000 - In Sven Bernecker & Fred I. Dretske (eds.), Knowledge: readings in contemporary epistemology. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 18-30.details
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Groundwork for an Explanationist Account of Epistemic Coincidence.David Faraci - 2019 - Philosophers' Imprint 19.details
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Morality and Mathematics.Justin Clarke-Doane - 2020 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.details
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Against Minimalist Responses to Moral Debunking Arguments.Daniel Z. Korman & Dustin Locke - 2020 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 15:309-332.details
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Knowledge, belief and reasons for acting.Jennifer Hornsby - 2007 - In .details
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No Coincidence?Matthew S. Bedke - 2014 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 9:102-125.details
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What Makes Evolution a Defeater?Matt Lutz - 2018 - Erkenntnis 83 (6):1105-1126.details
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(1 other version)Ignorance : a case for scepticism.Peter Unger - 1975 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 166 (3):371-372.details
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(1 other version)Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism.Peter Unger - 1975 - Philosophy 50 (194):489-490.details
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(1 other version)Thought.Gilbert Harman - 1973 - Noûs 11 (4):421-430.details
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Debunking Arguments from Insensitivity.Matthew Braddock - 2017 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 7 (2):91-113.details
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Epistemology versus Non-Causal Realism.Jared Warren - 2017 - Synthese 194 (5).details
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Debunking and Dispensability.Justin Clarke-Doane - 2016 - In Uri D. Leibowitz & Neil Sinclair (eds.), Explanation in Ethics and Mathematics: Debunking and Dispensability. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press UK.details
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Knowledge, Explanation, and Motivating Reasons.Dustin Locke - 2015 - American Philosophical Quarterly 52:215-232.details
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Evolutionary Debunking of Moral Realism.Katia Vavova - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (2):104-116.details
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It takes two to tango: beyond reductionism and non-reductionism in the epistemology of testimony.Jennifer Lackey - 2006 - In Jennifer Lackey & Ernest Sosa (eds.), The epistemology of testimony. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 160--89.details
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Grasping the Third Realm.John Bengson - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 5:1-38.details
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(1 other version)Studies in subjective probability.Henry Ely Kyburg - 1980 - Huntington, N.Y.: Krieger. Edited by Howard Edward Smokler.details
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Practical Reality.Jonathan Dancy - 2000 - Philosophy 78 (305):414-425.details
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Platonism and the causal theory of knowledge.Mark Steiner - 1973 - Journal of Philosophy 70 (3):57-66.details
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