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Belief's Own Ethics.[author unknown] - 2004 - Behavior and Philosophy 32 (2):269-272.details
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Offences and defences: selected essays in the philosophy of criminal law.John Gardner - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Review of Donald Davidson: Essays on Actions and Events. [REVIEW]Tyler Burge - 1983 - Ethics 93 (3):608-611.details
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Is Perception a Propositional Attitude?Tim Crane - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):452-469.details
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Justification and truth.Stewart Cohen - 1984 - Philosophical Studies 46 (3):279--95.details
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Subject‐Sensitive Invariantism and the Knowledge Norm for Practical Reasoning.Jessica Brown - 2008 - Noûs 42 (2):167-189.details
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Reasons and motivation: John Broome.John Broome - 1997 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 71 (1):131–146.details
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Does Rationality Consist in Responding Correctly to Reasons?John Broome - 2007 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 4 (3):349-374.details
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Perception and Reason.Bill Brewer - 1999 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Is evidence non-inferential?Alexander Bird - 2004 - Philosophical Quarterly 54 (215):252–265.details
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An Internalist Theory of Normative Grounds.Robert Audi - 2001 - Philosophical Topics 29 (1-2):19-46.details
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On Acting Rationally Against One's Best Judgment.Nomy Arpaly - 2000 - Ethics 110 (3):488-513.details
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On Sensations of Position.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1962 - Analysis 22 (3):55-58.details
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Belief's Own Ethics.Jonathan Eric Adler - 2002 - MIT Press.details
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The rules of thought.Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa & Benjamin W. Jarvis - 2013 - Oxford: Oxford University Press. Edited by Benjamin W. Jarvis.details
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Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Unreasonable Knowledge.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):1-21.details
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A puzzle about epistemic akrasia.Daniel Greco - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (2):201-219.details
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Perception and conceptual content.Alex Byrne - 2013 - In Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Blackwell. pp. 231--250.details
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The Contents of Visual Experience.Susanna Siegel - 2010 - , US: Oxford University Press USA.details
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Essays on Actions and Events: Philosophical Essays Volume 1.Donald Davidson - 1970 - Oxford, GB: Clarendon Press.details
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Reasons: Explanations or Evidence.Stephen Kearns & Daniel Star - 2008 - Ethics 119 (1):31-56.details
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Internalism Explained.Ralph Wedgwood - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2):349-369.details
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Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):452-458.details
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An analysis of factual knowledge.Peter Unger - 1968 - Journal of Philosophy 65 (6):157-170.details
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The ontology of epistemic reasons.John Turri - 2009 - Noûs 43 (3):490-512.details
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Rationality’s Fixed Point.Michael G. Titelbaum - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 5.details
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How to derive a narrow-scope requirement from wide-scope requirements.Michael G. Titelbaum - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (2):535-542.details
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Blindspots.Michael Levin - 1991 - Noûs 25 (3):389-392.details
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Moore's Paradox and the Accessibility of Justification.Declan Smithies - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):273-300.details
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Deception and evidence.Nicholas Silins - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):375–404.details
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A new argument for evidentialism.Nishi Shah - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (225):481–498.details
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Having reasons.Mark Schroeder - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (1):57 - 71.details
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Knowledge and Evidence.Gideon Rosen - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (3):681.details
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Practical Reason and Norms.C. H. Whiteley - 1976 - Philosophical Quarterly 26 (104):287-288.details
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Practical reason and norms.Joseph Raz - 1975 - London: Hutchinson.details
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Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2004 - Journal of Philosophical Research 29:191-220.details
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Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2004 - Journal of Philosophical Research 29:191-220.details
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Knowledge and Justification.John L. Pollock - 1974 - Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. Edited by John Pollock.details
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Knowledge and Justification.Robert L. Martin - 1976 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 36 (3):435-436.details
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Reasons and Motivation.Derek Parfit - 1997 - Supplement to the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 71 (1):99-130.details
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Reasons and motivation.Derek Parfit - 1997 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 71 (1):99–130.details
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What evidence do you have?Ram Neta - 2008 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (1):89-119.details
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The lottery paradox, knowledge, and rationality.Dana K. Nelkin - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (3):373-409.details
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Knowledge and evidence.Paul K. Moser - 1989 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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Justification as 'Would-Be' Knowledge.Aidan McGlynn - 2012 - Episteme 9 (4):361-376.details
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I—Non‐Inferential Knowledge.Marie McGinn - 2012 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112 (1pt1):1-28.details
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Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?John McDowell & I. G. McFetridge - 1978 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 52 (1):13-42.details
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Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?John McDowell & I. G. McFetridge - 1978 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 52 (1):13-42.details
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