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Lying and Certainty.Neri Marsili - 2018 - In Jörg Meibauer (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Lying. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford Handbooks. pp. 170-182.details
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Common ground.Robert Stalnaker - 2002 - Linguistics and Philosophy 25 (5-6):701-721.details
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How to do things with words.John Langshaw Austin - 1962 - Oxford [Eng.]: Clarendon Press. Edited by Marina Sbisá & J. O. Urmson.details
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The Assessment Sensitivity of Knowledge Attributions.John MacFarlane - 2005 - In Tamar Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 197--234.details
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Lying and Deceit.Paul Faulkner - 2013 - In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Hoboken, NJ: Blackwell.details
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Silencing and assertion.Alessandra Tanesini - 2018 - In Sanford C. Goldberg (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Assertion. Oxford University Press. pp. 749-769.details
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The Assessment Sensitivity of Knowledge Attributions.John MacFarlane - 2005 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 1. Oxford University Press UK.details
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Lying, Liars and Language.David Simpson - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (3):623-639.details
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Illocutionary Acts and Sentence Meaning.William P. Alston - 2000 - Cornell University Press.details
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How to Be Trustworthy.Katherine Hawley - 2019 - New York, NY: Oxford University Press.details
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Lying and Insincerity.Andreas Stokke - 2018 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.details
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Can You Lie Without Intending to Deceive?Vladimir Krstić - 2019 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (2):642–660.details
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Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy.Bernard Williams - 2002 - Princeton: Princeton University Press.details
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Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy.Bernard Williams - 2002 - Princeton University Press.details
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Knowing and asserting.Timothy Williamson - 1996 - Philosophical Review 105 (4):489-523.details
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Lying despite telling the truth.Alex Wiegmann, Jana Samland & Michael R. Waldmann - 2016 - Cognition 150 (C):37-42.details
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Stick to the Facts: On the Norms of Assertion.Daniel Whiting - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (4):847-867.details
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Must we know what we say?Matthew Weiner - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (2):227-251.details
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Systematic Epistemic Rights Violations in the Media: A Brexit Case Study.Lani Watson - 2018 - Social Epistemology 32 (2):88-102.details
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Asserting and promising.Gary Watson - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 117 (1-2):57-77.details
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Non-literal Lies.Emanuel Viebahn - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (6):1367-1380.details
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Lying with Presuppositions.Emanuel Viebahn - 2020 - Noûs 54 (3):731-751.details
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"Calm down, dear": intellectual arrogance, silencing and ignorance.Alessandra Tanesini - 2016 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 90 (1):71-92.details
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Lying, Deceiving, and Misleading.Andreas Stokke - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (4):348-359.details
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Lying and Asserting.Andreas Stokke - 2013 - Journal of Philosophy 110 (1):33-60.details
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Bald-faced lies! Lying without the intent to deceive.Roy Sorensen - 2007 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (2):251-264.details
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Knowledge-lies.Roy Sorensen - 2010 - Analysis 70 (4):608-615.details
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Lying, liars and language.David Simpson - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (3):623-639.details
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How performatives work.John R. Searle - 1989 - Linguistics and Philosophy 12 (5):535 - 558.details
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What is Said?Andreas Stokke & Anders J. Schoubye - 2015 - Noûs 50 (4):759-793.details
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Assertion, justificatory commitment, and trust.Fernando Rudy Hiller - 2016 - Análisis Filosófico 36 (1):29-53.details
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Shifting the burden of proof?Michael Rescorla - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (234):86-109.details
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Dialectics: a controversy-oriented approach to the theory of knowledge.Nicholas Rescher - 1977 - Albany: State University of New York Press.details
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Assertion and its constitutive norms.Michael Rescorla - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (1):98-130.details
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Performative utterances: A reply to Bach and Harnish. [REVIEW]Marga Reimer - 1995 - Linguistics and Philosophy 18 (6):655 - 675.details
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Content, Mood, and Force.Francois Recanati - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (7):622-632.details
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Lying and the “Methods of Ethics”.Igor Primoratz - 1984 - International Studies in Philosophy 16 (3):35-57.details
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Truth and assertion: rules vs aims.Neri Marsili - 2018 - Analysis 78 (4):638–648.details
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Normative accounts of assertion: from Peirce to Williamson and back again.Neri Marsili - 2015 - Rivista Italiana di Filosofia del Linguaggio 2014:112-130.details
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Lies, Common Ground and Performative Utterances.Neri Marsili - 2021 - Erkenntnis 88 (2):567-578.details
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Lying by Promising. A study on insincere illocutionary acts.Neri Marsili - 2016 - International Review of Pragmatics 8 (2):271-313.details
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Immoral lies and partial beliefs.Neri Marsili - 2022 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 65 (1):117-127.details
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Disagreement with a bald‐faced liar.Teresa Marques - 2020 - Ratio 33 (4):255-268.details
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Lying and lies.D. S. Mannison - 1969 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 47 (2):132 – 144.details
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Two Definitions of Lying.James Edwin Mahon - 2008 - International Journal of Applied Philosophy 22 (2):211-230.details
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Xiv *-making sense of relative truth.John MacFarlane - 2005 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (1):305-323.details
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Making sense of relative truth.John MacFarlane - 2005 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (3):321–339.details
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Scorekeeping in a language game.David Lewis - 1979 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 8 (1):339--359.details
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General semantics.David K. Lewis - 1970 - Synthese 22 (1-2):18--67.details
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