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(6 other versions)Consciousness and its place in nature.David Chalmers - 2003 - In Ted Warfield (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell. pp. 102--142.details
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The Foundations of Two-Dimensional Semantics.David J. Chalmers - 2006 - In Manuel Garcia-Carpintero & Josep Macià (eds.), Two-Dimensional Semantics. New York: Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 55-140.details
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Epistemic Two-Dimensional Semantics.David J. Chalmers - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 118 (1-2):153-226.details
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(1 other version)The components of content.David J. Chalmers - 2002 - In David John Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. New York: Oxford University Press USA.details
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Lockeans Maximize Expected Accuracy.Kevin Dorst - 2019 - Mind 128 (509):175-211.details
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(1 other version)On sense and intension.David J. Chalmers - 2002 - Philosophical Perspectives 16:135-82.details
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(1 other version)Two-dimensional semantics.David J. Chalmers - 2006 - In Ernest LePore & Barry C. Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook to the Philosophy of Language. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings.David John Chalmers (ed.) - 2002 - New York: Oxford University Press USA.details
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Contrastive causation.Jonathan Schaffer - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (3):327-358.details
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Restrictions on Quantifier Domains.Kai von Fintel - 1994 - Dissertation, University of Massachusetts at Amherstdetails
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Context dependence, disagreement, and predicates of personal taste.Peter Lasersohn - 2005 - Linguistics and Philosophy 28 (6):643--686.details
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(1 other version)Epistemic Modals in Context.Andy Egan, John Hawthorne & Brian Weatherson - 2005 - In Gerhard Preyer & Georg Peter (eds.), Contextualism in philosophy: knowledge, meaning, and truth. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 131-168.details
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Which Concepts Should We Use?: Metalinguistic Negotiations and The Methodology of Philosophy.David Plunkett - 2015 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 58 (7-8):828-874.details
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Disagreement.Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield (eds.) - 2010 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Will done Better: Selection Semantics, Future Credence, and Indeterminacy.Fabrizio Cariani & Paolo Santorio - 2018 - Mind 127 (505):129-165.details
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Knowing the Answer.Jonathan Schaffer - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2):383-403.details
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Toward a mechanistic psychology of dialogue.Martin J. Pickering & Simon Garrod - 2004 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (2):169-190.details
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Disagreements about taste.Timothy Sundell - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 155 (2):267-288.details
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Good Guesses.Kevin Dorst & Matthew Mandelkern - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 105 (3):581-618.details
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Epistemic modals, relativism and assertion.Andy Egan - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 133 (1):1--22.details
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How I learned to stop worrying and love probability 1.Daniel Greco - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):179-201.details
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Dynamics of Epistemic Modality.Malte Willer - 2013 - Philosophical Review 122 (1):45-92.details
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Judge dependence, epistemic modals, and predicates of personal taste.Tamina Stephenson - 2007 - Linguistics and Philosophy 30 (4):487--525.details
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A Preference Semantics for Imperatives.William B. Starr - 2020 - Semantics and Pragmatics 20.details
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The problem with the Frege–Geach problem.Nate Charlow - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (3):635-665.details
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Hyperintensionality.Francesco Berto & Daniel Nolan - 2021 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Definite Knowledge and Mutual Knowledge.Herbert H. Clark & Catherine R. Marshall - 1981 - In Aravind K. Joshi, Bonnie L. Webber & Ivan A. Sag (eds.), Elements of Discourse Understanding. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. pp. 10–63.details
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Evidentialist Reliabilism.Juan Comesaña - 2010 - Noûs 44 (4):571-600.details
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(2 other versions)Contrastive knowledge.Jonathan Schaffer - 2005 - In Tamar Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 235.details
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Lying, speech acts, and commitment.Neri Marsili - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):3245-3269.details
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A Uniform Theory of Conditionals.William B. Starr - 2014 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (6):1019-1064.details
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Moral Contextualism and Moral Relativism.Berit Brogaard - 2008 - Philosophical Quarterly 58 (232):385 - 409.details
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Semantics without semantic content.Daniel W. Harris - 2020 - Mind and Language 37 (3):304-328.details
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Counterpossibles in Science: The Case of Relative Computability.Matthias Jenny - 2018 - Noûs 52 (3):530-560.details
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(2 other versions)The Assessment Sensitivity of Knowledge Attributions.John MacFarlane - 2005 - In Tamar Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 197--234.details
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Against the identification of assertoric content with compositional value.Brian Rabern - 2012 - Synthese 189 (1):75-96.details
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Lying and Asserting.Andreas Stokke - 2013 - Journal of Philosophy 110 (1):33-60.details
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Logic and Semantics for Imperatives.Nate Charlow - 2014 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (4):617-664.details
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A plea for monsters.Philippe Schlenker - 2002 - Linguistics and Philosophy 26 (1):29-120.details
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The nature of narrow content.David J. Chalmers - 2003 - Philosophical Issues 13 (1):46-66.details
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Dog whistles, covertly coded speech, and the practices that enable them.Anne Quaranto - 2022 - Synthese 200 (4):1-34.details
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Prospects for an Expressivist Theory of Meaning.Nate Charlow - 2015 - Philosophers' Imprint 15:1-43.details
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De se attitudes: Ascription and communication.Dilip Ninan - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (7):551-567.details
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Coulda, woulda, shoulda.Stephen Yablo - 2002 - In Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 441-492.details
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Semantics and the objects of assertion.Dilip Ninan - 2010 - Linguistics and Philosophy 33 (5):355-380.details
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Modal Disagreements.Justin Khoo - 2015 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 58 (5):511-534.details
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Semantic expressivism for epistemic modals.Peter Hawke & Shane Steinert-Threlkeld - 2020 - Linguistics and Philosophy 44 (2):475-511.details
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Indexicals as token-reflexives.Manuel Garc'ıa-Carpintero - 1998 - Mind 107 (427):529-564.details
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Indeterminism and the Thin Red Line.Nuel Belnap & Mitchell Green - 1994 - Philosophical Perspectives 8:365 - 388.details
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