- Self and Other: Exploring Subjectivity, Empathy, and Shame.Dan Zahavi - 2014 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Jaspers' Dilemma: The Psychopathological Challenge to Subjectivity Theories of Consciousness.Alexandre Billon & Uriah Kriegel - 2015 - In R. Gennaro (ed.), Disturbed Consciousness. MIT Press. pp. 29-54.details
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The Conscious Brain: How Attention Engenders Experience.Jesse Prinz - 2012 - , US: Oup Usa.details
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Witness-Consciousness: Its Definition, Appearance and Reality.Miri Albahari - 2009 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (1):62-84.details
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Self-Knowledge.Brie Gertler - 2010 - New York: Routledge.details
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Does consciousness entail subjectivity? The puzzle of thought insertion.Alexandre Billon - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (2):291 - 314.details
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Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs.Lisa Bortolotti - 2009 - Oxford University Press. Edited by K. W. M. Fulford, John Sadler, Stanghellini Z., Morris Giovanni, Bortolotti Katherine, Broome Lisa & Matthew.details
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Fractured phenomenologies: Thought insertion, inner speech, and the puzzle of extraneity.Peter Langland-Hassan - 2008 - Mind and Language 23 (4):369-401.details
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(1 other version)Self-Knowledge and the Transparency of Belief.Brie Gertler - 2011 - In Anthony Hatzimoysis (ed.), Self-Knowledge. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Agency, authorship, and illusion.Eddy Nahmias - 2005 - Consciousness and Cognition 14 (4):771-785.details
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Schizophrenia, consciousness, and the self.Louis A. Sass & Josef Parnas - 2003 - Schizophrenia Bulletin 29 (3):427-444.details
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When Self-Consciousness Breaks: Alien Voices and Inserted Thoughts.G. Lynn Stephens & George Graham - 2000 - MIT Press.details
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On the observability of the self.Roderick Chisholm - 1969 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 30 (September):7-21.details
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Self-Experience Despite Self-Elusiveness.Joseph Gottlieb - 2022 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 14 (4):1491-1504.details
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The Varieties of Selflessness.Raphael Milliere - 2020 - Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 1 (1):1-41.details
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The minimal self hypothesis.Timothy Lane - 2020 - Consciousness and Cognition 85:103029.details
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Me and I are not friends, just Acquaintances: On thought Insertion and Self-Awareness.Pablo López-Silva - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10 (2):319-335.details
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Thought insertion and disturbed for-me-ness (minimal selfhood) in schizophrenia.Mads Gram Henriksen, Josef Parnas & Dan Zahavi - 2019 - Consciousness and Cognition 74 (C):102770.details
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Ipseity at the Intersection of Phenomenology, Psychiatry and Philosophy of Mind: Are we Talking about the Same Thing?Kristina Musholt - 2018 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 9 (3):689-701.details
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Self-defense: Deflecting Deflationary and Eliminativist Critiques of the Sense of Ownership.Shaun Gallagher - 2017 - Frontiers in Psychology 8.details
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The Self Shows Up in Experience.Matt Duncan - 2019 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10 (2):299-318.details
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Editorial: Consciousness and Inner Awareness.Jonathan Farrell & Tom McClelland - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (1):1-22.details
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When Selfconsciousness Breaks: Alien Voices and Inserted Thoughts.G. Lynn Stephens & George Graham - 2002 - Philosophical Quarterly 52 (206):128-131.details
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Mysticism and schizophrenia: A phenomenological exploration of the structure of consciousness in the schizophrenia spectrum disorders.Josef Parnas & Mads Gram Henriksen - 2016 - Consciousness and Cognition 43:75-88.details
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Relations Between Agency and Ownership in the Case of Schizophrenic Thought Insertion and Delusions of Control.Shaun Gallagher - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):865-879.details
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I Me Mine: on a Confusion Concerning the Subjective Character of Experience.Marie Guillot - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology (1):1-31.details
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Phenomenally Mine: In Search of the Subjective Character of Consciousness.Robert J. Howell & Brad Thompson - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (1):103-127.details
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For-me-ness: What it is and what it is not.Dan Zahavi & Uriah Kriegel - 2016 - In Daniel O. Dahlstrom, Andreas Elpidorou & Walter Hopp (eds.), Philosophy of mind and phenomenology. New York: Routledge. pp. 36-53.details
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A model of the synchronic self.Glenn Carruthers - 2007 - Consciousness and Cognition 16 (2):533-550.details
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Experience and self-consciousness.Joseph Schear - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 144 (1):95 - 105.details
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A role for ownership and authorship in the analysis of thought insertion.Lisa Bortolotti & Matthew Broome - 2008 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (2):205-224.details
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Self-consciousness, mental agency, and the clinical psychopathology of thought insertion.G. Lynn Stephens & George Graham - 1994 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 1 (1):1-10.details
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Consciousness, Self-Consciousness, Selfhood: a Reply to some Critics.Dan Zahavi - 2018 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 9 (3):703-718.details
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Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First-Person Perspective.Dan Zahavi - 2005 - Human Studies 30 (3):269-273.details
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Self and World.Quassim Cassam - 1997 - In Self and World. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.details
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Self and World.Quassim Cassam - 1997 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.details
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Thought Insertion, Self-Awareness, and Rationality.Johannes Roessler - 2013 - In K. W. M. Fulford, Martin Davies, Richard Gipps, George Graham, John Sadler, Giovanni Stanghellini & Tim Thornton (eds.), The Oxford handbook of philosophy and psychiatry. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 658–672.details
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The First Person Perspective and Other Essays.Sydney Shoemaker - 1996 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 59 (2):378-378.details
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Non-Reflective Self-Awareness Towards a Situated Account.Somogy Varga - 2012 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 19 (3-4):3-4.details
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Thought Insertion Clarified.M. Ratcliffe & S. Wilkinson - 2015 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 22 (11-12):246-269.details
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Schizophrenia, self-experience, and the so-called "negative symptoms": Reflections on hyperreflexivity.Louis Sass - 2000 - In Dan Zahavi (ed.), Exploring the Self: Philosophical and Psychopathological Perspectives on Self-experience. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. pp. 149--82.details
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