Switch to: Citations

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. The Anxious Mind: An Investigation Into the Varieties and Virtues of Anxiety.Charlie Kurth - 2018 - Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
    This book is about the various forms of anxiety—some familiar, some not—that color and shape our lives. The objective is two-fold. The first aim is to deepen our understanding of what anxiety is. The second aim is to re-orient thinking about the role of emotions in moral psychology and ethical theory. Here I argue that the current focus on backward looking moral emotions like guilt and shame leaves us with a picture that is badly incomplete. To get a better understanding (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  • Feelings of Being: Phenomenology, Psychiatry and the Sense of Reality.Matthew Ratcliffe (ed.) - 2008 - Oxford University Press.
    Emotions and bodily feelings -- Existential feelings -- The phenomenology of touch -- Body and world -- Feeling and belief in the Capgras delusion -- Feelings of deadness and depersonalization -- Existential feeling in schizophrenia -- What William James really said -- Stance, feeling, and belief -- Pathologies of existential feeling.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   179 citations  
  • Emotions and Formal Objects.Fabrice Teroni - 2007 - Dialectica 61 (3):395-415.
    It is often claimed that emotions are linked to formal objects. But what are formal objects? What roles do they play? According to some philosophers, formal objects are axiological properties which individuate emotions, make them intelligible and give their correctness conditions. In this paper, I evaluate these claims in order to answer the above questions. I first give reasons to doubt the thesis that formal objects individuate emotions. Second, I distinguish different ways in which emotions are intelligible and argue that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   118 citations  
  • The Passions: Emotions and the Meaning of Life.Robert C. Solomon - 1993 - Hackett Publishing Company.
    An abridged reprint of the Doubleday edition of 1976, with new preface and conclusion by the author.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   130 citations  
  • Towards a Computational Theory of Mood.Laura Sizer - 2000 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51 (4):743-770.
    Moods have global and profound effects on our thoughts, motivations and behavior. To understand human behavior and cognition fully, we must understand moods. In this paper I critically examine and reject the methodology of conventional ?cognitive theories? of affect. I lay the foundations of a new theory of moods that identifies them with processes of our cognitive functional architecture. Moods differ fundamentally from some of our other affective states and hence require distinct explanatory tools. The computational theory of mood I (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   31 citations  
  • The Rationality of Emotion.Ronald De Sousa - 1987 - MIT Press.
    In this urbane and witty book, Ronald de Sousa disputes the widespread notion that reason and emotion are natural antagonists.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   291 citations  
  • The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 141:125-126.
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1845 citations  
  • Emotional Insight: The Epistemic Role of Emotional Experience.Michael Brady - 2013 - Oxford University Press.
    Michael S. Brady offers a new account of the role of emotions in our lives. He argues that emotional experiences do not give us information in the same way that perceptual experiences do. Instead, they serve our epistemic needs by capturing our attention and facilitating a reappraisal of the evaluative information that emotions themselves provide.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   105 citations  
  • Not in the Mood for Intentionalism.Davide Bordini - 2017 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 41 (1):60-81.
    According to intentionalism, the phenomenal character of experience is one and the same as the intentional content of experience. This view has a problem with moods (anxiety, depression, elation, irritation, gloominess, grumpiness, etc.). Mood experiences certainly have phenomenal character, but do not exhibit directedness, i.e., do not appear intentional. Standardly, intentionalists have re-described moods’ undirectedness in terms of directedness towards everything or the whole world (e.g., Crane, 1998; Seager, 1999). This move offers the intentionalist a way out, but is quite (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Emotions, Value, and Agency.Christine Tappolet - 2016 - Oxford University Press UK.
    Emotions are crucial to human agency. But what are emotions? And how do they relate to agency? The aim of this book is to spell out an account of emotions, which is grounded on analogies between emotions and sensory experiences, and to explore the implications of this account for our understanding of human agency. The central claim is that emotions consist in perceptual experiences of values, such as the fearsome, the disgusting or the admirable. A virtue of this account is (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   110 citations  
  • Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.John R. Searle - 1983 - Oxford University Press.
    John Searle's Speech Acts and Expression and Meaning developed a highly original and influential approach to the study of language. But behind both works lay the assumption that the philosophy of language is in the end a branch of the philosophy of the mind: speech acts are forms of human action and represent just one example of the mind's capacity to relate the human organism to the world. The present book is concerned with these biologically fundamental capacities, and, though third (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   927 citations  
  • Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.John R. Searle - 1983 - Cambridge University Press.
    John Searle's Speech Acts and Expression and Meaning developed a highly original and influential approach to the study of language. But behind both works lay the assumption that the philosophy of language is in the end a branch of the philosophy of the mind: speech acts are forms of human action and represent just one example of the mind's capacity to relate the human organism to the world. The present book is concerned with these biologically fundamental capacities, and, though third (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   862 citations  
  • Gut Reactions: A Perceptual Theory of the Emotions.Jesse J. Prinz - 2004 - Oxford University Press.
    Gut Reactions is an interdisciplinary defense of the claim that emotions are perceptions of changes in the body.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   526 citations  
  • The Emotions: A Philosophical Exploration.Peter Goldie - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
    Peter Goldie opens the path to a deeper understanding of our emotional lives through a lucid philosophical exploration of this surprisingly neglected topic. Drawing on philosophy, literature and science, Goldie considers the roles of culture and evolution in the development of our emotional capabilities. He examines the links between emotion, mood, and character, and places the emotions in the context of consciousness, thought, feeling, and imagination. He explains how it is that we are able to make sense of our own (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   392 citations  
  • The Emotions.Nico H. Frijda - 1986 - Cambridge University Press.
    What are 'emotions'? This book offers a balanced survey of facts and theory.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   632 citations  
  • The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1950 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 1 (4):328-332.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1021 citations  
  • Content and Consciousness.D. C. Dennett - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 69 (18):604-604.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   243 citations  
  • Emotions as Attitudes.Julien A. Deonna & Fabrice Teroni - 2015 - Dialectica 69 (3):293-311.
    In this paper, we develop a fresh understanding of the sense in which emotions are evaluations. We argue that we should not follow mainstream accounts in locating the emotion–value connection at the level of content and that we should instead locate it at the level of attitudes or modes. We begin by explaining the contrast between content and attitude, a contrast in the light of which we review the leading contemporary accounts of the emotions. We next offer reasons to think (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   62 citations  
  • The Intentionality and Intelligibility of Moods.Jonathan Mitchell - 2019 - European Journal of Philosophy 27 (1):118-135.
    This article offers an account of moods as distinctive kinds of personal level affective-evaluative states, which are both intentional and rationally intelligible in specific ways. The account contrasts with those who claim moods are non-intentional, and so also arational. Section 1 provides a conception of intentionality and distinguishes moods, as occurrent experiential states, from other states in the affective domain. Section 2 argues moods target the subject’s total environment presented in a specific evaluative light through felt valenced attitudes (the Mood-Intentionality (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  • Towards a New Feeling Theory of Emotion.Uriah Kriegel - 2014 - European Journal of Philosophy 22 (3):420-442.
    According to the old feeling theory of emotion, an emotion is just a feeling: a conscious experience with a characteristic phenomenal character. This theory is widely dismissed in contemporary discussions of emotion as hopelessly naïve. In particular, it is thought to suffer from two fatal drawbacks: its inability to account for the cognitive dimension of emotion (which is thought to go beyond the phenomenal dimension), and its inability to accommodate unconscious emotions (which, of course, lack any phenomenal character). In this (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   25 citations  
  • What Feelings Can't Do.Laura Sizer - 2006 - Mind and Language 21 (1):108-135.
    Arguments over whether emotions and moods are feelings have demonstrated confusion over the concept of a feeling and, in particular, what it is that feelings can—and cannot—do. I argue that the causal and explanatory roles we assign emotions and moods in our theories are inconsistent with their being feelings. Sidestepping debates over the natures of emotions and moods I frame my arguments primarily in terms of what it is emotions, moods and feelings do. I provide an analysis that clarifies the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • A perceptual theory of moods.Mauro Rossi - 2021 - Synthese 198 (8):7119-7147.
    The goal of this paper is to offer a new theory of moods, according to which moods are perceptual experiences that represent undetermined objects as possessing specific evaluative properties. I start by listing a series of features that moods are typically taken to possess and claim that a satisfactory theory of moods must be able either to explain why moods genuinely possess these features or to explain these appearances away in a non-ad hoc way. I show that my account provides (...)
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • The Mood-Emotion Loop.Muk Wong - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (11):3061-3080.
    This paper aims to clarify and reformulate the conceptual relationship between emotions and moods in light of recent researches in philosophy and cognitive psychology. I argue that the mechanism of mood may produces cognitive biases that affect the appraisals involved in emotions, whereas the mechanism of emotion may produce physiological and behavioral responses that affect the energy level being monitored by mood. These two distinct mechanisms can affect each other repeatedly and continuously, which form the mood-emotion loop. I argue that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Emotion Experience, Rational Action, and Self-Knowledge.John A. Lambie - 2009 - Emotion Review 1 (3):272-280.
    This article examines the role of emotion experience in both rational action and self-knowledge. A key distinction is made between emotion experiences of which we are unaware, and those of which we are aware. The former motivate action and color our view of the world, but they do not do so in a rational way, and their nonreflective nature obscures self-understanding. The article provides arguments and evidence to support the view that emotion experiences contribute to rational action only if one (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  • Mood Experience: Implications of a Dispositional Theory of Moods.Matthias Siemer - 2009 - Emotion Review 1 (3):256-263.
    The core feature that distinguishes moods from emotions is that moods, in contrast to emotions, are diffuse and global. This article outlines a dispositional theory of moods (DTM) that accounts for this and other features of mood experience. DTM holds that moods are temporary dispositions to have or to generate particular kinds of emotion-relevant appraisals. Furthermore, DTM assumes that the cognitions and appraisals one is disposed to have in a given mood partly constitute the experience of mood. This article outlines (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  • Taking Affective Explanations to Heart.Julien Deonna & Fabrice Teroni - 2009 - Social Science Information 48 (3):359-377.
    In this article, the authors examine and debate the categories of emotions, moods, temperaments, character traits and sentiments. They define them and offer an account of the relations that exist among the phenomena they cover. They argue that, whereas ascribing character traits and sentiments (dispositions) is to ascribe a specific coherence and stability to the emotions (episodes) the subject is likely to feel, ascribing temperaments (dispositions) is to ascribe a certain stability to the subject's moods (episodes). The rationale for this (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  • Anxiety: A Case Study on the Value of Negative Emotions.Charlie Kurth - 2018 - In Christine Tappolet, Fabrice Teroni & Anita Konzelmann Ziv (eds.), Philosophical Perspectives on Negative Emotions: Shadows of the Soul. Routledge. pp. 95-104.
    Negative emotions are often thought to lack value—they’re pernicious, inherently unpleasant, and inconsistent with human virtue. Taking anxiety as a case study, I argue that this assessment is mistaken. I begin with an account of what anxiety is: a response to uncertainty about a possible threat or challenge that brings thoughts about one’s predicament (‘I’m worried,’ ‘What should I do?’), negatively valenced feelings of concern, and a motivational tendency toward caution regarding the potential threat one faces. Given this account of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Phenomenology and the Perceptual Model of Emotion.Poellner Peter - 2016 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 116 (3):261-288.
    In recent years there has been a revival of a theory of conscious emotions as analogous in important ways to perceptual experiences. In the standard versions of this view emotions are construed as, potentially, perceptual disclosures of values. The model has been widely debated and criticized. In this paper I reconstruct an early, qualified version of the perceptual model to be found in the classical phenomenological approaches of Scheler and Sartre. After outlining this version of the theory, I examine its (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  • From Appropriate Emotions to Values.Kevin Mulligan - 1998 - The Monist 81 (1):161-188.
    There are at least three well-known accounts of value and evaluations which assign a central role to emotions. There is first of all the emotivist view, according to which evaluations express or manifest emotional states or attitudes but have no truth values. Second is the dispositionalist view, according to which to possess a value or axiological property is to be capable of provoking or to be likely to provoke emotional responses in subjects characterised in certain ways. Third, there is an (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   76 citations  
  • Fear, Anxiety, and Boredom.Lauren Freeman & Andreas Elpidorou - 2020 - In Thomas Szanto & Hilge Landweer (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Phenomenology of Emotion. New York: Routledge. pp. 392-402.
    Phenomenology's central insight is that affectivity is not an inconsequential or contingent characteristic of human existence. Emotions, moods, sentiments, and feelings are not accidents of human existence. They do not happen to happen to us. Rather, we exist the way we do because of and through our affective experiences. Phenomenology thus acknowledges the centrality and ubiquity of affectivity by noting the multitude of ways in which our existence is permeated by our various affective experiences. Yet, it also insists that such (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Toward a Theory of Moods.Eric Lormand - 1985 - Philosophical Studies 47 (May):385-407.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   37 citations  
  • What is an Emotion?William James - 1884 - Mind 9:188.
    A perfectly matched layer (PML) absorbing material composed of a uniaxial anisotropic material is presented for the truncation of finite-difference time-domain (FDTD) lattices. It is shown that the uniaxial PML material formulation is mathematically equivalent to the perfectly matched layer method published by Berenger (see J. Computat. Phys., Oct. 1994). However, unlike Berenger's technique, the uniaxial PML absorbing medium presented in this paper is based on a Maxwellian formulation. Numerical examples demonstrate that the FDTD implementation of the uniaxial PML medium (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   666 citations  
  • Affect Without Object: Moods and Objectless Emotions.Carolyn Price - 2006 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 2 (1):49-68.
    Should moods be regarded as intentional states, and, if so, what kind of intentional content do they have? I focus on irritability and apprehension, which I examine from the perspective of a teleosemantic theory of content. Eric Lormand has argued that moods are non-intentional states, distinct from emotions; Robert Solomon and Peter Goldie argue that moods are generalised emotions and that they have intentional content of a correspondingly general kind. I present a third model, on which moods are regarded, not (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   24 citations  
  • Epistemic Anxiety, Adaptive Cognition, and Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder.Juliette Vazard - 2018 - Discipline Filosofiche 2 (Philosophical Perspectives on Af):137-158.
    Emotions might contribute to our being rational cognitive agents. Anxiety – and more specifically epistemic anxiety – provides an especially interesting case study into the role of emotion for adaptive cognition. In this paper, I aim at clarifying the epistemic contribution of anxiety, and the role that ill-calibrated anxiety might play in maladaptive epistemic activities which can be observed in psychopathology. In particular, I argue that this emotion contributes to our ability to adapt our cognitive efforts to how we represent (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Intentionality as the Mark of the Mental.Tim Crane - 1998 - In Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. Cambridge University Press. pp. 229-251.
    ‘It is of the very nature of consciousness to be intentional’ said Jean-Paul Sartre, ‘and a consciousness that ceases to be a consciousness of something would ipso facto cease to exist’.1 Sartre here endorses the central doctrine of Husserl’s phenomenology, itself inspired by a famous idea of Brentano’s: that intentionality, the mind’s ‘direction upon its objects’, is what is distinctive of mental phenomena. Brentano’s originality does not lie in pointing out the existence of intentionality, or in inventing the terminology, which (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   83 citations  
  • The Rationality of Emotion.Ronald DE SOUSA - 1987 - Philosophy and Rhetoric 22 (4):302-303.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   266 citations  
  • The Rationality of Emotion.Ronald de Sousa, Jing-Song Ma & Vincent Shen - 1987 - Philosophy and Culture 32 (10):35-66.
    How should we understand the emotional rationality? This first part will explore two models of cognition and analogy strategies, test their intuition about the emotional desire. I distinguish between subjective and objective desire, then presents with a feeling from the "paradigm of drama" export semantics, here our emotional repertoire is acquired all the learned, and our emotions in the form of an object is fixed. It is pretty well in line with the general principles of rationality, especially the lowest reasonable (...)
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   182 citations  
  • Content and Consciousness: An Analysis of Mental Phenomena.D. C. DENNETT - 1969
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   445 citations  
  • A Phenomenological Analysis of Anxiety as Experienced in Social Situations.Timothy J. Beck - 2013 - Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 44 (2):179-219.
    In this study, three individual descriptions of anxiety as experienced in social situations were analyzed so that a general structure representing social anxiety could potentially be obtained. The descriptions analyzed produced results that not only overlapped with already existing literature from various perspectives on the topic, but also highlighted certain key factors that have largely been unaccounted for by prior studies. By utilizing the Descriptive Phenomenological Method in Psychology , these factors were brought to light in more depth and clarity (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Consciousness and the Varieties of Emotion Experience: A Theoretical Framework.John A. Lambie & Anthony J. Marcel - 2002 - Psychological Review 109 (2):219-259.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   140 citations