- The Second Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, and Accountability.Stephen L. Darwall - 1996 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.details
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Learning from words: testimony as a source of knowledge.Jennifer Lackey - 2008 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Lying, misleading, and what is said: an exploration in philosophy of language and in ethics.Jennifer Mather Saul - 2012 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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In Defense of Moral Luck: Why Luck Often Affects Praiseworthiness and Blameworthiness.Robert J. Hartman - 2017 - New York: Routledge.details
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Two faces of responsibility.Gary Watson - 1996 - Philosophical Topics 24 (2):227–48.details
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Norms of assertion.Jennifer Lackey - 2007 - Noûs 41 (4):594–626.details
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Deciding to trust, coming to believe.Richard Holton - 1994 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (1):63 – 76.details
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Trust, Distrust and Commitment.Katherine Hawley - 2012 - Noûs 48 (1):1-20.details
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Acting for the right reasons.Julia Markovits - 2010 - Philosophical Review 119 (2):201-242.details
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(1 other version)Getting told and being believed.Richard Moran - 2005 - Philosophers' Imprint 5:1-29.details
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The reasons of trust.Pamela Hieronymi - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2):213 – 236.details
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Moral Worth and Moral Knowledge.Paulina Sliwa - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (2):393-418.details
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What Is Lying.Don Fallis - 2009 - Journal of Philosophy 106 (1):29-56.details
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Testimonial knowledge and transmission.Jennifer Lackey - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (197):471-490.details
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Lying and Asserting.Andreas Stokke - 2013 - Journal of Philosophy 110 (1):33-60.details
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Moral Worth.Nomy Arpaly - 2002 - Journal of Philosophy 99 (5):223.details
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Telling as inviting to trust.Edward S. Hinchman - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (3):562–587.details
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Lies and deception: an unhappy divorce.Jennifer Lackey - 2013 - Analysis 73 (2):236-248.details
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Why Do We Believe What We Are Told?Angus Ross - 1986 - Ratio (1):69-88.details
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Bald-faced lies! Lying without the intent to deceive.Roy Sorensen - 2007 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (2):251-264.details
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The definition of lying.Thomas L. Carson - 2006 - Noûs 40 (2):284–306.details
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The truth about lying.Angelo Turri & John Turri - 2015 - Cognition 138 (C):161-168.details
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Lying and Misleading in Discourse.Andreas Stokke - 2016 - Philosophical Review 125 (1):83-134.details
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Is Memory Merely Testimony from One's Former Self?David James Barnett - 2015 - Philosophical Review 124 (3):353-392.details
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(1 other version)Getting told and being believed.Richard Moran - 2006 - In Jennifer Lackey & Ernest Sosa (eds.), The epistemology of testimony. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Lying, risk and accuracy.Sam Fox Krauss - 2017 - Analysis 77 (4):726-734.details
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Testimony and the epistemic uncertainty of interpretation.Andrew Peet - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (2):395-416.details
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Lying as a scalar phenomenon.Neri Marsili - 2014 - In Sibilla Cantarini, Werner Abraham & Elisabeth Leiss (eds.), Certainty-Uncertainty Âe and the Attitudinal Space in Between. John Benjamins Publishing.details
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Lying, Belief, and Knowledge.Matthew A. Benton - 2018 - In Jörg Meibauer (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Lying. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford Handbooks. pp. 120-133.details
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Testimony and Assertion.David Owens - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 130 (1):105-129.details
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Bald-faced lies: how to make a move in a language game without making a move in a conversation.Jessica Keiser - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (2):461-477.details
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Testimony: A Philosophical Introduction.Joseph Shieber - 2015 - New York: Routledge.details
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Creditworthiness and Matching Principles.Jonathan Way - 2017 - In Mark C. Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Vol 7. Oxford University Press.details
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Are Bald‐Faced Lies Deceptive after All?Don Fallis - 2014 - Ratio 28 (1):81-96.details
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Davidson was Almost Right about Lying.Don Fallis - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (2):337-353.details
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Lying despite telling the truth.Alex Wiegmann, Jana Samland & Michael R. Waldmann - 2016 - Cognition 150 (C):37-42.details
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Trust, Reliance and the Participant Stance.Berislav Marušić - 2017 - Philosophers' Imprint 17.details
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Assurance and warrant.Edward Hinchman - 2014 - Philosophers' Imprint 14:1-58.details
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A second paradox concerning responsibility and luck.John Greco - 1995 - Metaphilosophy 26 (1-2):81-96.details
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Truth Serum, Liar Serum, and Some Problems About Saying What You Think is False.Jessica Pepp - 2018 - In Eliot Michaelson & Andreas Stokke (eds.), Lying and Insincerity. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.details
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The epistemic significance of address.Benjamin McMyler - 2013 - Synthese 190 (6):1059-1078.details
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Virtue, Luck and the Pyrrhonian Problematic.John Greco - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 130 (1):9-34.details
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The Assurance View of Testimony.Frederick F. Schmitt - 2008 - In Duncan Pritchard, Alan Millar & Adrian Haddock (eds.), Social Epistemology. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 216--242.details
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Knowledge laundering: Testimony and sensitive invariantism.John MacFarlane - 2005 - Analysis 65 (2):132–138.details
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Testimony, evidence and interpersonal reasons.Nick Leonard - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (9):2333-2352.details
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Lost in transmission: Testimonial justification and practical reason.Andrew Peet & Eli Pitcovski - 2017 - Analysis 77 (2):336-344.details
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Metaphors and Martinis: a response to Jessica Keiser.Andreas Stokke - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (4):853-859.details
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Learning from Words: Testimony as a Source of Knowledge. [REVIEW]Jennifer Lackey - 2012 - Philosophy Now 88:44-45.details
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Risk, doubt, and transmission.Rachel Elizabeth Fraser - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (10):2803-2821.details
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Lying and lies.D. S. Mannison - 1969 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 47 (2):132 – 144.details
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