- Veritism Unswamped.Kurt Sylvan - 2018 - Mind 127 (506):381-435.details
|
|
What's wrong with contextualism?John Greco - 2008 - Philosophical Quarterly 58 (232):416-436.details
|
|
(2 other versions)The Search for the Source of Epistemic Good.Linda Zagzebski - 2003 - Metaphilosophy 34 (1-2):12-28.details
|
|
‘Knowledge’ ascriptions, social roles and semantics.Robin McKenna - 2013 - Episteme 10 (4):335-350.details
|
|
Knowing How.Jason Stanley & Timothy Willlamson - 2001 - Journal of Philosophy 98 (8):411-444.details
|
|
(1 other version)A Sensible Subjectivism.David Wiggins - 1987 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
True to Life: Why Truth Matters.Michael P. Lynch - 2004 - Cambridge: MIT Press.details
|
|
(1 other version)Considered Judgment.Catherine Z. Elgin - 1996 - Princeton: New Jersey: Princeton University Press.details
|
|
(3 other versions)What is Justified Belief?Alvin I. Goldman - 1979 - In George Pappas (ed.), Justification and Knowledge: New Studies in Epistemology. Boston: D. Reidel. pp. 1-25.details
|
|
A virtue epistemology.Ernest Sosa - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Knowledge and practical interests.Jason Stanley - 2005 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
(1 other version)Agent reliabilism.John Greco - 1999 - Philosophical Perspectives 13:273-296.details
|
|
(6 other versions)A (Different) Virtue Epistemology.John Greco - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (1):1-26.details
|
|
(1 other version)A distinction in value: Intrinsic and for its own sake.Wlodek Rabinowicz & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2000 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100 (1):33–51.details
|
|
(2 other versions)A causal theory of knowing.Alvin I. Goldman - 1967 - Journal of Philosophy 64 (12):357-372.details
|
|
True enough.Catherine Z. Elgin - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):113–131.details
|
|
(2 other versions)Discrimination and perceptual knowledge.Alvin I. Goldman - 1976 - Journal of Philosophy 73 (November):771-791.details
|
|
Judgment and agency.Ernest Sosa - 2015 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
(1 other version)What We Owe to Each Other.T. M. Scanlon (ed.) - 1998 - Harvard University Press.details
|
|
Epistemic value in the subpersonal vale.J. Adam Carter & Robert D. Rupert - 2020 - Synthese 198 (10):9243-9272.details
|
|
Veritism, Epistemic Risk, and the Swamping Problem.Richard Pettigrew - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (4):761-774.details
|
|
(1 other version)Wise choices, apt feelings: a theory of normative judgment.Allan Gibbard - 1990 - Cambridge:details
|
|
(3 other versions)Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.details
|
|
(5 other versions)Philosophical Explanations. [REVIEW]Robert Nozick - 1981 - Philosophy 58 (223):118-121.details
|
|
(1 other version)The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1950 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 1 (4):328-332.details
|
|
(6 other versions)Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?Edmund L. Gettier - 1963 - Analysis 23 (6):121-123.details
|
|
(4 other versions)The Value of Knowledge.Duncan Pritchard - 2009 - The Harvard Review of Philosophy 16 (1):86-103.details
|
|
The Pursuit of Epistemic Good.Philip Percival - 2004 - Metaphilosophy 34 (1‐2):29-47.details
|
|
The values of truth and the truth of values.Michael P. Lynch - 2009 - In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford, GB: Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 225--42.details
|
|
The Value Problem of Knowledge: an Axiological Diagnosis of the Credit Solution.Anne Https://Orcidorg Meylan - 2013 - Res Philosophica 90 (2):261-275.details
|
|
What Are the “Chances” of Being Justified?Wayne D. Riggs - 1998 - The Monist 81 (3):452-472.details
|
|
For the Love of Truth?Ernest Sosa - 2001 - In Abrol Fairweather & Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (eds.), Virtue epistemology: essays on epistemic virtue and responsibility. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 49-62.details
|
|
(1 other version)Knowledge in Perspective: Selected Essays in Epistemology.Ernest Sosa - 1991 - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.details
|
|
(1 other version)The Value of Understanding.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 2009 - In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford, GB: Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 95-112.details
|
|
``Knowledge as Credit for True Belief".John Greco - 2003 - In Michael Raymond DePaul & Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (eds.), Intellectual virtue: perspectives from ethics and epistemology. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 111-134.details
|
|
(1 other version)Moral and Epistemic Virtues.Michael S. Brady & Duncan Pritchard - 2003 - Metaphilosophy 34 (1-2):1-11.details
|
|
(1 other version)Contextualism and knowledge attributions.Keith DeRose - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (4):913-929.details
|
|
(1 other version)Can virtue reliabilism explain the value of knowledge?Berit Brogaard - 2006 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (3):335-354.details
|
|
Depth, value, and context.Jumbly Grindrod - 2019 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 6 (24).details
|
|
Knowledge first, stability and value.Barnaby Walker - 2019 - Synthese 198 (4):3833-3854.details
|
|
Achievement and the Value of Knowledge.Brian Kim - 2019 - Episteme 18 (2):269-281.details
|
|
Review EssayHuman Knowledge and Human Nature: A New Introduction to an Ancient Debate.Knowledge and the State of Nature: An Essay in Conceptual Synthesis.Richard Feldman, Peter Carruthers & Edward Craig - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1):205.details
|
|
What’s the Point of “Knowledge” Anyway?Christoph9 Kelp - 2011 - Episteme 8 (1):53-66.details
|
|
(1 other version)I—why Knowledge Matters.Alan Millar - 2011 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85 (1):63-81.details
|
|
(1 other version)Reliability and the Value of Knowledge.Wayne D. Riggs - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (1):79-96.details
|
|
(1 other version)Why we don’t deserve credit for everything we know.Jennifer Lackey - 2007 - Synthese 158 (3):345-361.details
|
|
(1 other version)Responses to Critics.Jonathan Kvanvig - 2009 - In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford, GB: Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 339-353.details
|
|
(1 other version)How to defeat opposition to Moore.Ernest Sosa - 1999 - Philosophical Perspectives 13:137-49.details
|
|
The Myth of Factive Verbs.Allan Hazlett - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (3):497 - 522.details
|
|
Epistemic situationism, epistemic dependence, and the epistemology of education.J. Adam Carter & Duncan Pritchard - 2017 - In Mark Alfano & Abrol Fairweather (eds.), Epistemic Situationism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
|
|