- Intuitions as Evidence, Philosophical Expertise and the Developmental Challenge.Steve Clarke - 2013 - Philosophical Papers 42 (2):175-207.details
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Evaluative Effects on Knowledge Attributions.James R. Beebe - 2016 - In Justin Sytsma & Wesley Buckwalter (eds.), A Companion to Experimental Philosophy. Malden, MA: Wiley. pp. 359-367.details
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Knowledge, Practical Interests, and Rising Tides.Stephen R. Grimm - 2015 - In John Greco & David Henderson (eds.), Epistemic Evaluation: Point and Purpose in Epistemology. Oxford University Press.details
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Knowledge-first believing the unknowable.Simon Wimmer - 2021 - Synthese 198 (4):3855-3871.details
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False memories and quasi-memories are memories.Vilius Dranseika - 2020 - In Tania Lombrozo, Shaun Nichols & Joshua Knobe (eds.), Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy Volume 3. Oxford University Press.details
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In Our Shoes or the Protagonist’s? Knowledge, Justification, and Projection.Chad Gonnerman, Lee Poag, Logan Redden, Jacob Robbins & Stephen Crowley - 2020 - In Tania Lombrozo, Shaun Nichols & Joshua Knobe (eds.), Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy Volume 3. Oxford University Press. pp. 189-212.details
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Introduction to Philosophy: Epistemology.Brian C. Barnett (ed.) - 2021 - Rebus Community.details
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No State A Priori Known to Be Factive is Mental.Elia Zardini - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):462-492.details
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Naturalistic quietism or scientific realism?Johanna Wolff - 2019 - Synthese 196 (2):485-498.details
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The test of truth: An experimental investigation of the norm of assertion.John Turri - 2013 - Cognition 129 (2):279-291.details
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Knowledge and suberogatory assertion.John Turri - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (3):557-567.details
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Knowledge and suberogatory assertion.John Turri - 2013 - Philosophical Studies (3):1-11.details
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Epistemic invariantism and speech act contextualism.John Turri - 2010 - Philosophical Review 119 (1):77-95.details
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How to Forget that 'Know' is Factive.Savas L. Tsohatzidis - 2012 - Acta Analytica 27 (4):449-459.details
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Strengthened, and weakened, by belief.Tue Trinh - 2023 - Linguistics and Philosophy 47 (1):37-76.details
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Why We Need Corpus Linguistics in Intuition-Based Semantics.Leonid Tarasov - 2018 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 95 (4):421-435.details
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Interest as a Starting Place for Philosophy.Brian Talbot - 2012 - Essays in Philosophy 13 (1):119-144.details
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Protagonist Projection.Andreas Stokke - 2013 - Mind and Language 28 (2):204-232.details
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Expert or Esoteric? Philosophers Attribute Knowledge Differently Than All Other Academics.Christina Starmans & Ori Friedman - 2020 - Cognitive Science 44 (7):e12850.details
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The Role of Memory in Agential Self-Knowledge.Ben Sorgiovanni - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (3):413-425.details
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Understanding as Usability and Context-Sensitivity to Interests.Andreas Søndergaard - 2023 - Philosophia 51 (5):2603-2623.details
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Introspection and inference.Nicholas Silins - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (2):291-315.details
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Further Reflections on Quasi-factivism: A Reply to Baumann.Michael J. Shaffer - 2022 - Logos and Episteme 13 (2):207-215.details
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Can Knowledge Really be Non-factive?Michael J. Shaffer - 2021 - Logos and Episteme: An International Journal of Epistemology 12 (2):215-226.details
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Attitudes and the (dis)continuity between memory and imagination.André Sant'Anna - 2021 - Estudios de Filosofía (Universidad de Antioquia) 64:73-93.details
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¿Puede el conocimiento ser un estado mental?Florencia Rimoldi - 2014 - Análisis Filosófico 34 (2):171-201.details
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A Quantitative History of Ordinary Language Philosophy.J. D. Porter & Nat Hansen - 2023 - Synthese 201 (6):1–36.details
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The Tesseract, the Cube and Truthless Knowledge.Nenad Popovic - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (4):1569-1573.details
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Attributing error without taking a stand.Caleb Perl & Mark Schroeder - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (6):1453-1471.details
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Updating as Communication.Sarah Moss - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):225-248.details
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Subjunctive Credences and Semantic Humility.Sarah Moss - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (2):251-278.details
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Epistemology Formalized.Sarah Moss - 2013 - Philosophical Review 122 (1):1-43.details
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Defending The Coherence Of Contextualism.Martin Montminy & Wes Skolits - 2014 - Episteme 11 (3):319-333.details
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The Disappearance of Ignorance. [REVIEW]Robin McKenna - 2020 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 10 (1):4-20.details
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Data and phenomena in conceptual modelling.Benedikt Löwe & Thomas Müller - 2011 - Synthese 182 (1):131-148.details
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Unifying the Intellectual Virtues.Christopher Lepock - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (1):106-128.details
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Propositional learning: From ignorance to knowledge.Pierre Le Morvan - 2020 - Episteme 17 (2):162-177.details
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Memory belief is weak.Changsheng Lai - 2023 - Ratio 36 (3):204-214.details
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Epistemic Gradualism Versus Epistemic Absolutism.Changsheng Lai - 2021 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 103 (1):186-207.details
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Against epistemic absolutism.Changsheng Lai - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):3945-3967.details
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Los vínculos de la cooperación epistémica.Rodrigo Laera - 2018 - Revista de Filosofía 43 (1):139-153.details
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Semantic Awareness for Skeptical Pragmatic Invariantism.Christos Kyriacou - 2021 - Episteme 18 (2):123-141.details
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Moral Fixed Points, Rationality and the ‘Why Be Moral?’ Question.Christos Kyriacou - 2019 - Erkenntnis 86 (3):647-664.details
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Knowledge as a thick concept: explaining why the Gettier problem arises.Brent G. Kyle - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (1):1-27.details
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Truth and ignorance.Brent G. Kyle - 2020 - Synthese (8):1-24.details
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The genealogical method in epistemology.Martin Kusch & Robin McKenna - 2020 - Synthese 197 (3):1057-1076.details
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Knowledge and Certainties in the Epistemic State of Nature.Martin Kusch - 2011 - Episteme 8 (1):6-23.details
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Attentional progress by conceptual engineering.Eve Kitsik - 2021 - Metaphilosophy 53 (2-3):254-266.details
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In defense of subject-sensitive invariantism.Brian Kim - 2016 - Episteme 13 (2):233-251.details
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Commodious knowledge.Christoph Kelp & Mona Simion - 2017 - Synthese 194 (5):1487-1502.details
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