Switch to: Citations

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. Probability and Evidence.A. J. Ayer & Graham MacDonald - 1972 - [London]: Cambridge University Press.
    A. J. Ayer was one of the foremost analytical philosophers of the twentieth century, and was known as a brilliant and engaging speaker. In essays based on his influential Dewey Lectures, Ayer addresses some of the most critical and controversial questions in epistemology and the philosophy of science, examining the nature of inductive reasoning and grappling with the issues that most concerned him as a philosopher. This edition contains revised and expanded versions of the lectures and two additional essays. Ayer (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Bayes or Bust?: A Critical Examination of Bayesian Confirmation Theory.John Earman - 1992 - MIT Press.
    There is currently no viable alternative to the Bayesian analysis of scientific inference, yet the available versions of Bayesianism fail to do justice to several aspects of the testing and confirmation of scientific hypotheses. Bayes or Bust? provides the first balanced treatment of the complex set of issues involved in this nagging conundrum in the philosophy of science. Both Bayesians and anti-Bayesians will find a wealth of new insights on topics ranging from Bayes’s original paper to contemporary formal learning theory.In (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   282 citations  
  • The paradoxes of confirmation - a survey.R. Swinburne - 1971 - American Philosophical Quarterly 8 (4):318 - 330.
    THE PARADOXES OF CONFIRMATION ARE CONSTITUTED BY THE CONTRADICTIONS ARISING FROM THE CONJUNCTION OF THREE PRINCIPLES OF CONFIRMATION - NICOD’S CRITERION, THE EQUIVALENCE CONDITION, AND WHAT THE PAPER CALLS THE SCIENTIFIC LAWS CONDITION. THE PAPER DISCUSSES IN DETAIL THE VARIOUS SOLUTIONS PROVIDED BY ABANDONING ONE OF THE PRINCIPLES. IN THE END IT FINDS NICOD’S CRITERION FALSE, BUT FINDS THE EXPLANATIONS GIVEN BY H.G. ALEXANDER AND OTHERS OF WHY NICOD’S CRITERION IS FALSE THEMSELVES UNSATISFACTORY. IT THEN PROVIDES A MORE ADEQUATE ACCOUNT (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   28 citations  
  • Scientific reasoning: the Bayesian approach.Peter Urbach & Colin Howson - 1993 - Chicago: Open Court. Edited by Peter Urbach.
    Scientific reasoning is—and ought to be—conducted in accordance with the axioms of probability. This Bayesian view—so called because of the central role it accords to a theorem first proved by Thomas Bayes in the late eighteenth ...
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   569 citations  
  • (2 other versions)Fact, Fiction, and Forecast.Nelson Goodman - 1983 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
    In his new foreword to this edition, Hilary Putnam forcefully rejects these nativist claims.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1128 citations  
  • Studies in the logic of confirmation (I.).Carl Gustav Hempel - 1945 - Mind 54 (213):1-26.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   300 citations  
  • Studies in the logic of confirmation (II.).Carl Gustav Hempel - 1945 - Mind 54 (214):97-121.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   207 citations  
  • (1 other version)Bayes or Bust?: A Critical Examination of Bayesian Confirmation Theory. [REVIEW]Alan Hajek & Brian Skyrms - 2000 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 60 (3):707-711.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   29 citations  
  • Rationality and objectivity in science or Tom Kuhn meets Tom Bayes.Wesley Salmon - 1956 - In C. Wade Savage (ed.), Scientific Theories. University of Minnesota Press. pp. 14--175.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   76 citations  
  • (1 other version)Hypotheticals.David Pears - 1949 - Analysis 10 (3):49 - 63.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • (1 other version)The paradox of confirmation.J. L. Mackie - 1962 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 13 (52):265-277.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   37 citations  
  • The white shoe is a red Herring.I. J. Good - 1966 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 17 (4):322.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   63 citations  
  • (1 other version)The paradox of confirmation.J. L. Mackie - 1963 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 13 (52):265-276.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   32 citations  
  • [Handout 12].J. L. Mackie - unknown
    1. Causal knowledge is an indispensable element in science. Causal assertions are embedded in both the results and the procedures of scientific investigation. 2. It is therefore worthwhile to investigate the meaning of causal statements and the ways in which we can arrive at causal knowledge.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   316 citations  
  • (1 other version)The anatomy of inquiry.Israel Scheffler - 1963 - Indianapolis,: Bobbs-Merrill.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   52 citations  
  • The Anatomy of Inquiry.Israel Scheffler - 1966 - Philosophy of Science 33 (1):82-84.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   45 citations  
  • Studies in Bayesian Confirmation Theory.Branden Fitelson - 2001 - Dissertation, University of Wisconsin, Madison
    According to Bayesian confirmation theory, evidence E (incrementally) confirms (or supports) a hypothesis H (roughly) just in case E and H are positively probabilistically correlated (under an appropriate probability function Pr). There are many logically equivalent ways of saying that E and H are correlated under Pr. Surprisingly, this leads to a plethora of non-equivalent quantitative measures of the degree to which E confirms H (under Pr). In fact, many non-equivalent Bayesian measures of the degree to which E confirms (or (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   85 citations  
  • The plurality of bayesian measures of confirmation and the problem of measure sensitivity.Branden Fitelson - 1999 - Philosophy of Science 66 (3):378.
    Contemporary Bayesian confirmation theorists measure degree of (incremental) confirmation using a variety of non-equivalent relevance measures. As a result, a great many of the arguments surrounding quantitative Bayesian confirmation theory are implicitly sensitive to choice of measure of confirmation. Such arguments are enthymematic, since they tacitly presuppose that certain relevance measures should be used (for various purposes) rather than other relevance measures that have been proposed and defended in the philosophical literature. I present a survey of this pervasive class of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   218 citations  
  • The paradoxes of confirmation.H. G. Alexander - 1958 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 9 (35):227-233.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  • Inference, Method and Decision.David Miller - 1980 - Philosophical Quarterly 30 (120):264.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   35 citations  
  • (1 other version)On confirmation.Janina Hosiasson-Lindenbaum - 1940 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 5 (4):133-148.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   41 citations  
  • (1 other version)Hypotheticals.David Pears - 1950 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 15 (3):215-216.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • (4 other versions)Probability and Evidence.Paul Horwich - 1973 - Philosophical Review 82 (4):547.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   71 citations  
  • Hempel's Paradox.D. Stove - 1966 - Dialogue 4 (4):444-455.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Confirmation and Relevance: Bayesian Approaches.W. C. Salmon - 1998 - In Martin Curd & Jan A. Cover (eds.), Philosophy of Science: The Central Issues. Norton.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • (1 other version)Symmetries and asymmetries in evidential support.Ellery Eells & Branden Fitelson - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 107 (2):129 - 142.
    Several forms of symmetry in degrees of evidential support areconsidered. Some of these symmetries are shown not to hold in general. This has implications for the adequacy of many measures of degree ofevidential support that have been proposed and defended in the philosophical literature.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   86 citations  
  • Inference, Method and Decision.R. D. Rosenkrantz - 1978 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 29 (3):301-304.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   39 citations  
  • Inference, Method and Decision: Towards a Bayesian Philosophy of Science by Roger D. Rosenkrantz. [REVIEW]Stephen Spielman - 1981 - Journal of Philosophy 78 (6):356-367.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   27 citations  
  • (1 other version)On Confirmation.Janina Hosiasson-Lindenbaum - 1940 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 6 (2):63-63.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   27 citations  
  • (1 other version)Probability and Evidence.[author unknown] - 1972 - Philosophy and Rhetoric 7 (2):129-132.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations