- The Weirdness of the World.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2024 - Princeton University Press.details
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Better Foundations for Subjective Probability.Sven Neth - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.details
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Reply to Sprenger’s “A Novel Solution to the Problem of Old Evidence”.Fabian Pregel - 2024 - Philosophy of Science 91 (1):243-252.details
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Confirmation, Coherence and the Strength of Arguments.Stephan Hartmann & Borut Trpin - 2023 - Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society 45:1473-1479.details
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General Relativity, MOND, and the problem of unconceived alternatives.Abhishek Kashyap - 2023 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 13 (3):1-18.details
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Probability and Inductive Logic.Antony Eagle - manuscriptdetails
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Should credence be sensitive to practical factors? A cost–benefit analysis.Jie Gao - 2023 - Mind and Language 38 (5):1238-1257.details
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The Nature of Awareness Growth.Chloé de Canson - 2024 - Philosophical Review 133 (1):1-32.details
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Likelihoodism and Guidance for Belief.Tamaz Tokhadze - 2022 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 53 (4):501-517.details
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A Dilemma for Solomonoff Prediction.Sven Neth - 2023 - Philosophy of Science 90 (2):288-306.details
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Reasonable Doubt from Unconceived Alternatives.Hylke Jellema - 2024 - Erkenntnis 89 (3):971-996.details
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Peirce, Pedigree, Probability.Rush T. Stewart & Tom F. Sterkenburg - 2022 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 58 (2):138-166.details
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Conceptualizing uncertainty: the IPCC, model robustness and the weight of evidence.Margherita Harris - 2021 - Dissertation, London School of Economicsdetails
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Inference to the Best Explanation - An Overview.Frank Cabrera - 2023 - In Lorenzo Magnani (ed.), Handbook of Abductive Cognition. Springer. pp. 1-34.details
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Conceptual challenges for interpretable machine learning.David S. Watson - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-33.details
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Bayesian Epistemology.Jürgen Landes - 2022 - Kriterion – Journal of Philosophy 36 (1):1-7.details
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Don't trust Fodor's guide in Monte Carlo: Learning concepts by hypothesis testing without circularity.Michael Deigan - 2023 - Mind and Language 38 (2):355-373.details
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Integrated HPS? Formal versus historical approaches to philosophy of science.Bobby Vos - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):14509-14533.details
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Probability, Evidential Support, and the Logic of Conditionals.Vincenzo Crupi & Andrea Iacona - 2021 - Argumenta 6:211-222.details
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Real and ideal rationality.Robert Weston Siscoe - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (3):879-910.details
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Gravity and Grace.Gordon Belot - 2022 - Philosophers' Imprint 22 (1).details
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“Adding Up” Reasons: Lessons for Reductive and Nonreductive Approaches.Shyam Nair - 2021 - Ethics 132 (1):38-88.details
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Fragmentation and Old Evidence.Will Fleisher - 2023 - Episteme 20 (3):542-567.details
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Knowledge Closure and Knowledge Openness: A Study of Epistemic Closure Principles.Levi Spectre - 2009 - Stockholm: Stockholm University.details
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Reasoning with heuristics.Brett Karlan - 2021 - Ratio 34 (2):100-108.details
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Belief, Credence and Statistical Evidence.Davide Fassio & Jie Gao - 2020 - Theoria 86 (4):500-527.details
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Bayesian coherentism.Lisa Cassell - 2020 - Synthese 198 (10):9563-9590.details
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Assessing Scientific Theories: The Bayesian Approach.Stephan Hartmann & Radin Dardashti - 2019 - In Dawid Richard, Dardashti Radin & Thebault Karim (eds.), Epistemology of Fundamental Physics: Why Trust a Theory? Cambridge University Press. pp. 67–83.details
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What is epistemically wrong with research affected by sponsorship bias? The evidential account.Alexander Reutlinger - 2020 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 10 (2):1-26.details
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Evidentialism and belief polarization.Emily C. McWilliams - 2021 - Synthese 198 (8):7165-7196.details
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The structure of epistemic probabilities.Nevin Climenhaga - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (11):3213-3242.details
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The epistemic impact of theorizing: generation bias implies evaluation bias.Finnur Dellsén - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (12):3661-3678.details
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Logical ignorance and logical learning.Richard Pettigrew - 2020 - Synthese 198 (10):9991-10020.details
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Statistical Inference and the Plethora of Probability Paradigms: A Principled Pluralism.Mark L. Taper, Gordon Brittan Jr & Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay - manuscriptdetails
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Bayesianism for Non-ideal Agents.Mattias Skipper & Jens Christian Bjerring - 2020 - Erkenntnis 87 (1):93-115.details
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Linguistics and the explanatory economy.Gabe Dupre - 2019 - Synthese 199 (Suppl 1):177-219.details
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La capacidad unificadora de las teorías científicas. Una propuesta alternativa desde el estructuralismo metateórico al enfoque kitchereano de patrones explicativos.Daniel Blanco, Santiago Ginnobili & Pablo Lorenzano - 2019 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 34 (1):111-131.details
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On the Origins of Old Evidence.Benjamin Eva & Stephan Hartmann - 2020 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (3):481-494.details
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Bayesian Variations: Essays on the Structure, Object, and Dynamics of Credence.Aron Vallinder - 2018 - Dissertation, London School of Economicsdetails
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Persistent Disagreement and Polarization in a Bayesian Setting.Michael Nielsen & Rush T. Stewart - 2021 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 72 (1):51-78.details
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A Bayesian explanation of the irrationality of sexist and racist beliefs involving generic content.Paul Silva - 2020 - Synthese 197 (6):2465-2487.details
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Permissivism and the Value of Rationality: A Challenge to the Uniqueness Thesis.Miriam Schoenfield - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (2):286-297.details
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Ockham’s Razors: A User’s Manual, by Elliott Sober. [REVIEW]Joel Velasco - 2018 - Mind 127 (507):891-902.details
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The heuristic conception of inference to the best explanation.Finnur Dellsén - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 175 (7):1745-1766.details
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Semantic Information Measure with Two Types of Probability for Falsification and Confirmation.Lu Chenguang - manuscriptdetails
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Theory Assessment and Coherence.Peter Brössel - 2008 - Abstracta 4 (1):57-71.details
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When Rational Reasoners Reason Differently.Michael G. Titelbaum & Matthew Kopec - 2019details
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Bayesian representation of a prolonged archaeological debate.Efraim Wallach - 2018 - Synthese 195 (1):401-431.details
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How to improve Bayesian reasoning without instruction: Frequency formats.Gerd Gigerenzer & Ulrich Hoffrage - 1995 - Psychological Review 102 (4):684-704.details
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Bayesian Confirmation: A Means with No End.Peter Brössel & Franz Huber - 2015 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66 (4):737-749.details
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