- The (Many) Foundations of Knowledge.Walter Hopp - 2012 - In Dan Zahavi (ed.), The Oxford handbook of contemporary phenomenology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
The Problem of Perception.Tim Crane - 2005 - The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
|
|
The normativity of rationality.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2013 - Dissertation, Humboldt University of Berlindetails
|
|
Epistemic Reasons, Evidence, and Defeaters.Errol Lord - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Weighing Reasons.Errol Lord & Barry Maguire (eds.) - 2016 - New York, NY: Oxford University Press USA.details
|
|
Contemporary Theories of Knowledge, 2nd Edition.John Pollock & Joe Cruz - 1999 - Rowman & Littlefield.details
|
|
The Normativity of Rationality.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2017 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
What Intuitions Are Like.Elijah Chudnoff - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (3):625-654.details
|
|
Seemings and Justification: An Introduction.Chris Tucker - 2013 - In Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism. New York: Oxford University Press USA. pp. 1-29.details
|
|
Phenomenal Conservatism and Cognitive Penetration: The Bad Basis Counterexamples.Matthew McGrath - 2013 - In Chris Tucker (ed.), Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism. New York: Oxford University Press USA. pp. 225–247.details
|
|
Searching for True Dogmatism.Peter J. Markie - 2013 - In Chris Tucker (ed.), Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism. New York: Oxford University Press USA. pp. 248.details
|
|
Phenomenal Conservatism and the Principle of Credulity.William G. Lycan - 2013 - In Chris Tucker (ed.), Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism. New York: Oxford University Press USA. pp. 293-305.details
|
|
Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism.Chris Tucker (ed.) - 2013 - New York: Oxford University Press USA.details
|
|
Mind and World.John McDowell - 1994 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.details
|
|
The Basing Relation.Ram Neta - 2019 - Philosophical Review 128 (2):179-217.details
|
|
Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?Edmund L. Gettier - 1963 - Analysis 23 (6):121-123.details
|
|
Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.details
|
|
Knowledge needs no justification.Hilary Kornblith - 2008 - In Quentin Smith (ed.), Epistemology: new essays. New York : Oxford University Press,: Oxford University Press. pp. 5--23.details
|
|
Theory of knowledge.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1966 - Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,: Prentice-Hall.details
|
|
A Theory of the a Priori.George Bealer - 1999 - Philosophical Perspectives 13:29-55.details
|
|
Contemporary theories of knowledge.John L. Pollock - 1986 - London: Hutchinson.details
|
|
Epistemic justification.Richard Swinburne - 2001 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
The Contents of Visual Experience.Susanna Siegel - 2010 - , US: Oxford University Press USA.details
|
|
Internalism, Externalism, and the Architecture of Justification.Alvin I. Goldman - 2009 - Journal of Philosophy 106 (6):309-338.details
|
|
Perception and Basic Beliefs: Zombies, Modules and the Problem of the External World.Jack Lyons - 2009 - New York, US: Oxford University Press. Edited by Jack Lyons.details
|
|
Why open-minded people should endorse dogmatism.Chris Tucker - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):529-545.details
|
|
On the relationship between propositional and doxastic justification.John Turri - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (2):312-326.details
|
|
The Intellectual Given.John Bengson - 2015 - Mind 124 (495):707-760.details
|
|
The Theory of Epistemic Rationality.Richard Foley - 1987 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.details
|
|
An Opinionated Guide to the Weight of Reasons.Barry Maguire & Errol Lord - 2016 - In Errol Lord & Barry Maguire (eds.), Weighing Reasons. Oup Usa.details
|
|
A coherence theory of truth and knowledge.Donald Davidson - 1986 - In Ernest LePore (ed.), Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson. Cambridge: Blackwell. pp. 307–319.details
|
|
A coherence theory of truth and knowledge.Donald Davidson - 1986 - In Ernest LePore (ed.), Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson. Cambridge: Blackwell. pp. 307-319.details
|
|
Empiricism and the philosophy of mind.Wilfrid Sellars - 1997 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Edited by Richard Rorty & Robert Brandom.details
|
|
The Problem of Knowledge.Alfred Jules Ayer - 1956 - New York,: Harmondsworth.details
|
|
Perceiving: A Philosophical Study.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1957 - Ithaca,: Cornell University Press.details
|
|
The Rationality of Perception.Susanna Siegel - 2017 - Oxford University Press.details
|
|
The Importance of Being Rational.Errol Lord - 2018 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
The Rationality of Perception.Susanna Siegel - 2017 - Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Introduction: Perception Without Representation.Keith A. Wilson & Roberta Locatelli - 2017 - Topoi 36 (2):197-212.details
|
|
Keep Things in Perspective: Reasons, Rationality, and the A Priori.Daniel Whiting - 2014 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 8 (1):1-22.details
|
|
Evidence and Inquiry: Towards Reconstruction in Epistemology.Jonathan Vogel & Susan Haack - 1995 - Philosophical Review 104 (4):621.details
|
|
Peer Disagreement, Evidence, and Well-Groundedness.Han van Wietmarschen - 2013 - Philosophical Review 122 (3):395-425.details
|
|
What apparent reasons appear to be.Kurt Sylvan - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (3):587-606.details
|
|
Knowledge as a Non‐Normative Relation.Kurt Sylvan - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (1):190-222.details
|
|
Epistemic Reasons I: Normativity.Kurt Sylvan - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (7):364-376.details
|
|
Unrestricted Foundationalism and the Sellarsian Dilemma.Matthias Steup - 2000 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 60 (1):75-98.details
|
|
How to defeat opposition to Moore.Ernest Sosa - 1999 - Philosophical Perspectives 13:137-49.details
|
|
A virtue epistemology: Apt belief and reflective knowledge, volume I * by Ernest Sosa. [REVIEW]Ernest Sosa - 2007 - Analysis 69 (2):382-385.details
|
|
Possessing reasons: why the awareness-first approach is better than the knowledge-first approach.Paul Silva - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):2925-2947.details
|
|