- Moral realism: a defence.Russ Shafer-Landau - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Reasons Without Rationalism.Kieran Setiya - 2007 - Princeton University Press.details
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Reasons without rationalism * by Kieran Setiya * princeton university press, 2007. IX + 131 pp. 22.50: Summary.Kieran Setiya - 2009 - Analysis 69 (3):509-510.details
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Slaves of the passions.Mark Andrew Schroeder - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Slaves of the passions * by mark Schroeder.Mark Schroeder - 2009 - Analysis 69 (3):574-576.details
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(1 other version)What we owe to each other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.details
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Moral dimensions: permissibility, meaning, blame.Thomas Scanlon - 2008 - Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.details
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(1 other version)Thinking How to Live.Allan Gibbard - 2003 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.details
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(1 other version)Truth and Objectivity.Crispin Wright - 1992 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.details
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(3 other versions)Elusive Knowledge.David Lewis - 1999 - In Keith DeRose & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Skepticism: a contemporary reader. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)Humean Constructivism in Moral Theory.James Lenman - 2010 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 5.details
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(1 other version)Contractualism and Consequentialism.Philip Pettit - 2000 - Theoria 66 (3):228-236.details
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(1 other version)Contractualism and Consequentialism.Philip Pettit & T. M. Scanlon - 2000 - Theoria 66 (3):228-236.details
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Reasons and Persons.Joseph Margolis - 1986 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):311-327.details
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Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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The View From Nowhere.Thomas Nagel - 1986 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Ruling Passions.Simon Blackburn - 1998 - Philosophy 75 (293):454-458.details
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(1 other version)Truth as one and many.Michael P. Lynch - 2009 - New York : Clarendon Press,: Clarendon Press.details
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Truth as One and Many * By Michael Lynch. [REVIEW]Michael Lynch - 2010 - Analysis 70 (1):191-193.details
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General semantics.David K. Lewis - 1970 - Synthese 22 (1-2):18--67.details
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(3 other versions)Elusive knowledge.David Lewis - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):549 – 567.details
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Non-Realist Cognitivism, Truth and Objectivity.Jussi Suikkanen - 2017 - Acta Analytica 32 (2):193-212.details
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(2 other versions)Naturalism without tears.James Lenman - 2009 - Ratio 22 (1):1-18.details
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(2 other versions)Naturalism Without Tears.James Lenman - 2009 - Ratio (Misc.) 22 (1):1-18.details
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Compatibilism and contractualism: The possibility of moral responsibility.James Lenman - 2006 - Ethics 117 (1):7-31.details
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Objectivity and Truth: You’d Better Believe it.Ronald Dworkin - 1996 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 25 (2):87-139.details
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Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of Robust Realism.David Enoch - 2011 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.details
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Realism and Constructivism in Twentieth-Century Moral Philosophy.Christine M. Korsgaard - 2003 - Journal of Philosophical Research 28 (9999):99-122.details
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Is reflective equilibrium enough?Thomas Kelly & Sarah McGrath - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):325-359.details
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Armchair metaphysics.Frank Jackson - 1994 - In Murray Michael & John O'Leary-Hawthorne (eds.), Philosophy in Mind: The Place of Philosophy in the Study of Mind. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 23--42.details
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(1 other version)Humean Constructivism in Moral Theory.James Lenman - 2010 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume 5. Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)Constructivism about reasons.Sharon Street - 2008 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 3:207-45.details
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Being Realistic About Reasons.Thomas Scanlon - 2014 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)Thinking how to live.Allan Gibbard - 2003 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.details
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(2 other versions)Allan Gibbard, Thinking How to Live. [REVIEW]David O. Brink - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):267-272.details
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Comments on Gibbard’s Thinking How to Live.Allan Gibbard - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (3):699-706.details
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Coming to terms with contingency : Humean constructivism about practical reason.Sharon Street - 2012 - In James Lenman & Yonatan Shemmer (eds.), Constructivism in Practical Philosophy. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)Misunderstanding Metaethics: Korsgaard's Rejection of Realism.Nadeem Hussain & Nishi Shah - 2006 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume 1. Oxford University Press. pp. 265-94.details
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(1 other version)Constructivism in metaethics.Carla Bagnoli - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Toward Fin de siecle Ethics: Some Trends.Stephen Darwall, Allan Gibbard & Peter Railton - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (1):115-189.details
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Weighing lives.John Broome - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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The sources of normativity.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1996 - New York: Cambridge University Press. Edited by Onora O'Neill.details
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The moral problem.Michael Smith - 1994 - Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell.details
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(1 other version)Truth and objectivity.Crispin Wright - 1992 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.details
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The Nature of Normativity.Ralph Wedgwood - 2007 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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The limits of moral constructivism.Mark Timmons - 2003 - Ratio 16 (4):391–423.details
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(3 other versions)Internal reasons.Michael Smith - 1995 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (1):109-131.details
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(1 other version)Moral values, projection, and secondary qualities.Crispin Wright - 1988 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 62 (1):1-26.details
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Weighing Lives.Daniel M. Hausman - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):718-722.details
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(1 other version)The Last Word.Simon Blackburn & Thomas Nagel - 1998 - Philosophical Review 107 (4):653.details
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