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  1. Vision.David Marr - 1982 - W. H. Freeman.
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  • (1 other version)Logical foundations of probability.Rudolf Carnap - 1950 - Chicago]: Chicago University of Chicago Press.
    APA PsycNET abstract: This is the first volume of a two-volume work on Probability and Induction. Because the writer holds that probability logic is identical with inductive logic, this work is devoted to philosophical problems concerning the nature of probability and inductive reasoning. The author rejects a statistical frequency basis for probability in favor of a logical relation between two statements or propositions. Probability "is the degree of confirmation of a hypothesis (or conclusion) on the basis of some given evidence (...)
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  • Bayesian Epistemology.Luc Bovens & Stephan Hartmann - 2003 - Oxford: Oxford University Press. Edited by Stephan Hartmann.
    Probabilistic models have much to offer to philosophy. We continually receive information from a variety of sources: from our senses, from witnesses, from scientific instruments. When considering whether we should believe this information, we assess whether the sources are independent, how reliable they are, and how plausible and coherent the information is. Bovens and Hartmann provide a systematic Bayesian account of these features of reasoning. Simple Bayesian Networks allow us to model alternative assumptions about the nature of the information sources. (...)
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  • Scientific reasoning: the Bayesian approach.Peter Urbach & Colin Howson - 1993 - Chicago: Open Court. Edited by Peter Urbach.
    Scientific reasoning is—and ought to be—conducted in accordance with the axioms of probability. This Bayesian view—so called because of the central role it accords to a theorem first proved by Thomas Bayes in the late eighteenth ...
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  • Probabilistic Reasoning in Intelligent Systems: Networks of Plausible Inference.Judea Pearl - 1988 - Morgan Kaufmann.
    The book can also be used as an excellent text for graduate-level courses in AI, operations research, or applied probability.
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  • Bayes or Bust?: A Critical Examination of Bayesian Confirmation Theory.John Earman - 1992 - MIT Press.
    There is currently no viable alternative to the Bayesian analysis of scientific inference, yet the available versions of Bayesianism fail to do justice to several aspects of the testing and confirmation of scientific hypotheses. Bayes or Bust? provides the first balanced treatment of the complex set of issues involved in this nagging conundrum in the philosophy of science. Both Bayesians and anti-Bayesians will find a wealth of new insights on topics ranging from Bayes’s original paper to contemporary formal learning theory.In (...)
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  • A subjectivist’s guide to objective chance.David K. Lewis - 2010 - In Antony Eagle (ed.), Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings. New York: Routledge. pp. 263-293.
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  • Bayesian Rationality: The Probabilistic Approach to Human Reasoning.Mike Oaksford & Nick Chater - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
    Are people rational? This question was central to Greek thought and has been at the heart of psychology and philosophy for millennia. This book provides a radical and controversial reappraisal of conventional wisdom in the psychology of reasoning, proposing that the Western conception of the mind as a logical system is flawed at the very outset. It argues that cognition should be understood in terms of probability theory, the calculus of uncertain reasoning, rather than in terms of logic, the calculus (...)
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  • The logic of conditionals: an application of probability to deductive logic.Ernest Wilcox Adams - 1996 - Boston: D. Reidel Pub. Co..
    THE INDICATIVE CONDITIONAL. A PROBABILISTIC CRITERION OF SOUNDNESS FOR DEDUCTIVE INFERENCES Our objective in this section is to establish a prima facie case ...
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  • (1 other version)Logical Foundations of Probability.Rudolf Carnap - 1950 - Mind 62 (245):86-99.
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  • Philosophical Guide to Conditionals.Jonathan Bennett - 2003 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
    Conditional sentences are among the most intriguing and puzzling features of language, and analysis of their meaning and function has important implications for, and uses in, many areas of philosophy. Jonathan Bennett, one of the world's leading experts, distils many years' work and teaching into this book, making it the fullest and most authoritative treatment of the subject.
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  • In Defence of Objective Bayesianism.Jon Williamson - 2010 - Oxford University Press.
    Objective Bayesianism is a methodological theory that is currently applied in statistics, philosophy, artificial intelligence, physics and other sciences. This book develops the formal and philosophical foundations of the theory, at a level accessible to a graduate student with some familiarity with mathematical notation.
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  • The theory of probability.Hans Reichenbach - 1949 - Berkeley,: University of California Press.
    We must restrict to mere probability not only statements of comparatively great uncertainty, like predictions about the weather, where we would cautiously ...
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  • (1 other version)A nonpragmatic vindication of probabilism.James M. Joyce - 1998 - Philosophy of Science 65 (4):575-603.
    The pragmatic character of the Dutch book argument makes it unsuitable as an "epistemic" justification for the fundamental probabilist dogma that rational partial beliefs must conform to the axioms of probability. To secure an appropriately epistemic justification for this conclusion, one must explain what it means for a system of partial beliefs to accurately represent the state of the world, and then show that partial beliefs that violate the laws of probability are invariably less accurate than they could be otherwise. (...)
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  • (2 other versions)Vision: Variations on Some Berkeleian Themes.Robert Schwartz & David Marr - 1985 - Philosophical Review 94 (3):411.
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  • The Psychology of Deductive Reasoning (Psychology Revivals).Jonathan Evans - 2015 - Psychology Press.
    Originally published in 1982, this was an extensive and up-to-date review of research into the psychology of deductive reasoning, Jonathan Evans presents an alternative theoretical framework to the rationalist approach which had dominated much of the published work in this field at the time. The review falls into three sections. The first is concerned with elementary reasoning tasks, in which response latency is the prime measure of interest. The second and third sections are concerned with syllogistic and propositional reasoning respectively, (...)
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  • Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: The conjunction fallacy in probability judgment.Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman - 1983 - Psychological Review 90 (4):293-315.
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  • A logic for default reasoning.Ray Reiter - 1980 - Artificial Intelligence 13 (1-2):81-137.
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  • Philosophical Theories of Probability.Donald Gillies - 2000 - New York: Routledge.
    The Twentieth Century has seen a dramatic rise in the use of probability and statistics in almost all fields of research. This has stimulated many new philosophical ideas on probability. _Philosophical Theories of Probability_ is the first book to present a clear, comprehensive and systematic account of these various theories and to explain how they relate to one another. Gillies also offers a distinctive version of the propensity theory of probability, and the intersubjective interpretation, which develops the subjective theory.
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  • Probabilities of conditionals and conditional probabilities.David Lewis - 1976 - Philosophical Review 85 (3):297-315.
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  • (1 other version)The logic of conditionals.Ernest Adams - 1965 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 8 (1-4):166 – 197.
    The standard use of the propositional calculus ('P.C.?) in analyzing the validity of inferences involving conditionals leads to fallacies, and the problem is to determine where P.C. may be ?safely? used. An alternative analysis of criteria of reasonableness of inferences in terms of conditions of justification rather than truth of statements is proposed. It is argued, under certain restrictions, that P. C. may be safely used, except in inferences whose conclusions are conditionals whose antecedents are incompatible with the premises in (...)
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  • (2 other versions)Generics: Cognition and acquisition.Sarah-Jane Leslie - 2008 - Philosophical Review 117 (1):1-47.
    Ducks lay eggs' is a true sentence, and `ducks are female' is a false one. Similarly, `mosquitoes carry the West Nile virus' is obviously true, whereas `mosquitoes don't carry the West Nile virus' is patently false. This is so despite the egg-laying ducks' being a subset of the female ones and despite the number of mosquitoes that don't carry the virus being ninety-nine times the number that do. Puzzling facts such as these have made generic sentences defy adequate semantic treatment. (...)
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  • Erratum: Probabilities of Conditionals and Conditional Probabilities.David Lewis - 1976 - Philosophical Review 85 (4):561.
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  • (1 other version)The Logic of Conditionals.Ernest Adams, Ernest W. Adams, Jaakko Hintikka & Patrick Suppes - 1965 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 39 (3):609-611.
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  • How to improve Bayesian reasoning without instruction: Frequency formats.Gerd Gigerenzer & Ulrich Hoffrage - 1995 - Psychological Review 102 (4):684-704.
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  • (2 other versions)A Philosophical Guide to Conditionals.Jonathan Bennett - 2003 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 66 (2):379-380.
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  • (2 other versions)A Philosophical Guide to Conditionals.Jonathan Bennett - 2003 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 10 (4):565-570.
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  • (1 other version)Interpretations of probability.Alan Hájek - 2007 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  • (2 other versions)A Philosophical Guide to Conditionals.Jonathan Bennett - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (220):524-526.
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  • (1 other version)Logical Foundations of Probability (2nd edition).Rudolf Carnap - 1962 - Chicago: Chicago University Press.
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  • Précis of bayesian rationality: The probabilistic approach to human reasoning.Mike Oaksford & Nick Chater - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (1):69-84.
    According to Aristotle, humans are the rational animal. The borderline between rationality and irrationality is fundamental to many aspects of human life including the law, mental health, and language interpretation. But what is it to be rational? One answer, deeply embedded in the Western intellectual tradition since ancient Greece, is that rationality concerns reasoning according to the rules of logic – the formal theory that specifies the inferential connections that hold with certainty between propositions. Piaget viewed logical reasoning as defining (...)
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  • Word learning as Bayesian inference.Fei Xu & Joshua B. Tenenbaum - 2007 - Psychological Review 114 (2):245-272.
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  • Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability.Richard C. Jeffrey (ed.) - 1971 - Berkeley: University of California Press.
    Then, in 1960, Carnap drew up a plan of articles for Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability — a surrogate for Volume II of the ...
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  • Theory-based Bayesian models of inductive learning and reasoning.Joshua B. Tenenbaum, Thomas L. Griffiths & Charles Kemp - 2006 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 10 (7):309-318.
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  • The Probabilistic Mind: Prospects for Bayesian Cognitive Science.Nick Chater & Mike Oaksford (eds.) - 2008 - Oxford University Press.
    'The Probabilistic Mind' is a follow-up to the influential and highly cited 'Rational Models of Cognition'. It brings together developments in understanding how, and how far, high-level cognitive processes can be understood in rational terms, and particularly using probabilistic Bayesian methods.
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  • Generics and the structure of the mind.Sarah-Jane Leslie - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):375–403.
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  • Conditional probabilities and compounds of conditionals.Vann McGee - 1989 - Philosophical Review 98 (4):485-541.
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  • Topics in semantic representation.Thomas L. Griffiths, Mark Steyvers & Joshua B. Tenenbaum - 2007 - Psychological Review 114 (2):211-244.
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  • Vision as Bayesian inference: analysis by synthesis?Alan Yuille & Daniel Kersten - 2006 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 10 (7):301-308.
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  • Letting Structure Emerge: Connectionist and Dynamical Systems Approaches to Cognition.Linda B. Smith James L. McClelland, Matthew M. Botvinick, David C. Noelle, David C. Plaut, Timothy T. Rogers, Mark S. Seidenberg - 2010 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 14 (8):348.
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  • Generics and the ways of normality.Bernhard Nickel - 2008 - Linguistics and Philosophy 31 (6):629-648.
    I contrast two approaches to the interpretation of generics such as ‘ravens are black:’ majority-based views, on which they are about what is the case most of the time, and inquiry-based views, on which they are about a feature we focus on in inquiry. I argue that majority-based views face far more systematic counterexamples than has previously been supposed. They cannot account for generics about kinds with multiple characteristic properties, such as ‘elephants live in Africa and Asia.’ I then go (...)
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  • Probabilistic models of cognition: Conceptual foundations.Nick Chater & Alan Yuille - 2006 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 10 (7):287-291.
    Remarkable progress in the mathematics and computer science of probability has led to a revolution in the scope of probabilistic models. In particular, ‘sophisticated’ probabilistic methods apply to structured relational systems such as graphs and grammars, of immediate relevance to the cognitive sciences. This Special Issue outlines progress in this rapidly developing field, which provides a potentially unifying perspective across a wide range of domains and levels of explanation. Here, we introduce the historical and conceptual foundations of the approach, explore (...)
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  • (1 other version)Arguments For—Or Against—Probabilism?Alan Hájek - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of belief. London: Springer. pp. 229--251.
    Four important arguments for probabilism—the Dutch Book, representation theorem, calibration, and gradational accuracy arguments—have a strikingly similar structure. Each begins with a mathematical theorem, a conditional with an existentially quantified consequent, of the general form: if your credences are not probabilities, then there is a way in which your rationality is impugned. Each argument concludes that rationality requires your credences to be probabilities. I contend that each argument is invalid as formulated. In each case there is a mirror-image theorem and (...)
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  • (1 other version)Arguments for–or against–Probabilism?Alan Hájek - 2008 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (4):793-819.
    Four important arguments for probabilism—the Dutch Book, representation theorem, calibration, and gradational accuracy arguments—have a strikingly similar structure. Each begins with a mathematical theorem, a conditional with an existentially quantified consequent, of the general form: if your credences are not probabilities, then there is a way in which your rationality is impugned.Each argument concludes that rationality requires your credences to be probabilities.I contend that each argument is invalid as formulated. In each case there is a mirror-image theorem and a corresponding (...)
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  • Bayesian Epistemology.William Talbott - 2006 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    ‘Bayesian epistemology’ became an epistemological movement in the 20th century, though its two main features can be traced back to the eponymous Reverend Thomas Bayes (c. 1701-61). Those two features are: (1) the introduction of a formal apparatus for inductive logic; (2) the introduction of a pragmatic self-defeat test (as illustrated by Dutch Book Arguments) for epistemic rationality as a way of extending the justification of the laws of deductive logic to include a justification for the laws of inductive logic. (...)
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  • A Philosophical Guide to Conditionals.W. G. Lycan - 2005 - Mind 114 (453):116-119.
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  • What is 'normal'? An evolution-theoretic foundation for normic laws and their relation to statistical normality.Gerhard Schurz - 2001 - Philosophy of Science 68 (4):476-497.
    Normic laws have the form "if A, then normally B." They are omnipresent in everyday life and non-physical 'life' sciences such as biology, psychology, social sciences, and humanities. They differ significantly from ceteris-paribus laws in physics. While several authors have doubted that normic laws are genuine laws at all, others have argued that normic laws express a certain kind of prototypical normality which is independent of statistical majority. This paper presents a foundation for normic laws which is based on generalized (...)
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  • Verisimilitude and Belief Change for Conjunctive Theories.Gustavo Cevolani, Vincenzo Crupi & Roberto Festa - 2011 - Erkenntnis 75 (2):183-202.
    Theory change is a central concern in contemporary epistemology and philosophy of science. In this paper, we investigate the relationships between two ongoing research programs providing formal treatments of theory change: the (post-Popperian) approach to verisimilitude and the AGM theory of belief change. We show that appropriately construed accounts emerging from those two lines of epistemological research do yield convergences relative to a specified kind of theories, here labeled “conjunctive”. In this domain, a set of plausible conditions are identified which (...)
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  • Structured statistical models of inductive reasoning.Charles Kemp & Joshua B. Tenenbaum - 2009 - Psychological Review 116 (1):20-58.
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  • Probability, confirmation, and the conjunction fallacy.Vincenzo Crupi, Branden Fitelson & Katya Tentori - 2007 - Thinking and Reasoning 14 (2):182 – 199.
    The conjunction fallacy has been a key topic in debates on the rationality of human reasoning and its limitations. Despite extensive inquiry, however, the attempt to provide a satisfactory account of the phenomenon has proved challenging. Here we elaborate the suggestion (first discussed by Sides, Osherson, Bonini, & Viale, 2002) that in standard conjunction problems the fallacious probability judgements observed experimentally are typically guided by sound assessments of _confirmation_ relations, meant in terms of contemporary Bayesian confirmation theory. Our main formal (...)
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