- Imperatives and Modals.Paul Portner - 2007 - Natural Language Semantics 15 (4):351-383.details
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An improved probabilistic account of counterfactual reasoning.Christopher G. Lucas & Charles Kemp - 2015 - Psychological Review 122 (4):700-734.details
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Vaghezza: confini, cumuli e paradossi.Sebastiano Moruzzi - 2012 - Roma: Laterza.details
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The Meaning of Cause and Prevent: The Role of Causal Mechanism.Clare R. Walsh & Steven A. Sloman - 2011 - Mind and Language 26 (1):21-52.details
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Causal Argument.Ulrike Hahn, Frank Zenker & Roland Bluhm - 2017 - In Michael Waldmann (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Causal Reasoning. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. pp. 475-494.details
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Intervention and the Probabilities of Indicative Conditionals.Michael Zhao - 2015 - Journal of Philosophy 112 (9):477-503.details
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Vagueness, conditionals and probability.Robert Williams - 2009 - Erkenntnis 70 (2):151 - 171.details
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Schaffer on laws of nature.Alastair Wilson - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (3):653-667.details
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New surprises for the Ramsey Test.Malte Willer - 2010 - Synthese 176 (2):291 - 309.details
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Defending Conditional Excluded Middle.J. Robert G. Williams - 2010 - Noûs 44 (4):650-668.details
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Conversation and conditionals.J. Robert G. Williams - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 138 (2):211 - 223.details
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The Probability of Iterated Conditionals.Janneke Wijnbergen‐Huitink, Shira Elqayam & David E. Over - 2015 - Cognitive Science 39 (4):788-803.details
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Possible World Semantics and True-True Counterfactuals.Lee Walters - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (3):322-346.details
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Against Hypothetical Syllogism.Lee Walters - 2014 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (5):979-997.details
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An Argument for Conjunction Conditionalization.Lee Walters & Robert Williams - 2013 - Review of Symbolic Logic 6 (4):573-588.details
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The new Tweety puzzle: arguments against monistic Bayesian approaches in epistemology and cognitive science.Matthias Unterhuber & Gerhard Schurz - 2013 - Synthese 190 (8):1407-1435.details
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A Ranking‐Theoretic Approach to Conditionals.Wolfgang Spohn - 2013 - Cognitive Science 37 (6):1074-1106.details
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A Causal Model Theory of the Meaning of Cause, Enable, and Prevent.Steven Sloman, Aron K. Barbey & Jared M. Hotaling - 2009 - Cognitive Science 33 (1):21-50.details
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Cognitive Success: A Consequentialist Account of Rationality in Cognition.Gerhard Schurz & Ralph Hertwig - 2019 - Topics in Cognitive Science 11 (1):7-36.details
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Counterfactuals and Arbitrariness.Moritz Schulz - 2014 - Mind 123 (492):1021-1055.details
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Capturing the relationship between conditionals and conditional probability with a trivalent semantics.Daniel Rothschild - 2014 - Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 24 (1-2):144-152.details
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Two causal theories of counterfactual conditionals.Lance J. Rips - 2010 - Cognitive Science 34 (2):175-221.details
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Popper's severity of test as an intuitive probabilistic model of hypothesis testing.Fenna H. Poletiek - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (1):99-100.details
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Indeterminism is a modal notion: branching spacetimes and Earman’s pruning. [REVIEW]T. Placek - 2012 - Synthese 187 (2):441-469.details
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Counterfactuals and Historical Possibility.Tomasz Placek & Thomas Müller - 2007 - Synthese 154 (2):173-197.details
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Mental probability logic.Niki Pfeifer & Gernot D. Kleiter - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (1):98-99.details
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The uncertain reasoner: Bayes, logic, and rationality.Mike Oaksford & Nick Chater - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (1):105-120.details
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Non-monotonicity and Informal Reasoning: Comment on Ferguson (2003).Mike Oaksford & Ulrike Hahn - 2006 - Argumentation 20 (2):245-251.details
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Subjunctive Credences and Semantic Humility.Sarah Moss - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (2):251-278.details
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On the Pragmatics of Counterfactuals.Sarah Moss - 2010 - Noûs 46 (3):561-586.details
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Epistemology Formalized.Sarah Moss - 2013 - Philosophical Review 122 (1):1-43.details
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Talking about worlds.Matthew Mandelkern - 2018 - Philosophical Perspectives 32 (1):298-325.details
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Against Preservation.Matthew Mandelkern & Justin Khoo - 2019 - Analysis 79 (3):424-436.details
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Counterfactuals and the fixity of the past.Penelope Mackie - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 168 (2):1-19.details
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How many kinds of reasoning? Inference, probability, and natural language semantics.Daniel Lassiter & Noah D. Goodman - 2015 - Cognition 136 (C):123-134.details
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Counterfactual Dependence and Arrow.Thomas Kroedel & Franz Huber - 2012 - Noûs 47 (3):453-466.details
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On the Substitution of Identicals in Counterfactual Reasoning.Alexander W. Kocurek - 2020 - Noûs 54 (3):600-631.details
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Counterfactuals and the analysis of necessity.Boris Kment - 2006 - Philosophical Perspectives 20 (1):237–302.details
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Causation: Determination and difference-making.Boris Kment - 2010 - Noûs 44 (1):80-111.details
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Triviality Results and the Relationship between Logical and Natural Languages.Justin Khoo & Matthew Mandelkern - 2019 - Mind 128 (510):485-526.details
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Causal Premise Semantics.Stefan Kaufmann - 2013 - Cognitive Science 37 (6):1136-1170.details
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A core ontology for requirements.Ivan J. Jureta, John Mylopoulos & Stéphane Faulkner - 2009 - Applied ontology 4 (3):169-244.details
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Indicative conditionals without iterative epistemology.Ben Holguín - 2019 - Noûs 55 (3):560-580.details
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Rational argument, rational inference.Ulrike Hahn, Adam J. L. Harris & Mike Oaksford - 2012 - Argument and Computation 4 (1):21 - 35.details
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The counterfactual direct argument.Simon Goldstein - 2020 - Linguistics and Philosophy 43 (2):193-232.details
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Denying antecedents and affirming consequents: The state of the art.David Godden & Frank Zenker - 2015 - Informal Logic 35 (1):88-134.details
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The universal density of measurement.Danny Fox & Martin Hackl - 2006 - Linguistics and Philosophy 29 (5):537 - 586.details
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Pollock on probability in epistemology. [REVIEW]Branden Fitelson - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 148 (3):455 - 465.details
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Conditional Intentions.Luca Ferrero - 2009 - Noûs 43 (4):700 - 741.details
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A Proposed Probabilistic Extension of the Halpern and Pearl Definition of ‘Actual Cause’.Luke Fenton-Glynn - 2017 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 68 (4):1061-1124.details
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