- Why Suspend Judging?Jane Friedman - 2017 - Noûs 51 (2):302-326.details
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(1 other version)The Wrong Kind of Reason.Pamela Hieronymi - 2005 - Journal of Philosophy 102 (9):437 - 457.details
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Suspended judgment.Jane Friedman - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):165-181.details
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Moral encroachment and reasons of the wrong kind.James Fritz - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (10):3051-3070.details
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Inquiry and Belief.Jane Friedman - 2017 - Noûs 53 (2):296-315.details
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Encroachment on Emotion.James Fritz - 2022 - Episteme 19 (4):515-533.details
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Doxastic deliberation.Nishi Shah & J. David Velleman - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (4):497-534.details
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(1 other version)How truth governs belief.Nishi Shah - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (4):447-482.details
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Attitudinal strength as distance to withholding.Andrew T. Forcehimes - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (3):963-981.details
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(1 other version)Why be rational.Niko Kolodny - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):509-563.details
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(1 other version)Contextualism and knowledge attributions.Keith DeRose - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (4):913-929.details
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A solution for Russellians to a puzzle about belief.Sean Crawford - 2004 - Analysis 64 (3):223-29.details
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The Varieties of Agnosticism.Filippo Ferrari & Luca Incurvati - 2021 - Philosophical Quarterly 72 (2):365-380.details
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Higher-Order Defeat is Object-Independent.Joshua DiPaolo - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (2):248-269.details
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Ethics without principles.Jonathan Dancy - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Suspending Judgment is Something You Do.Lindsay Crawford - 2022 - Episteme 19 (4):561-577.details
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Reasons to believe and reasons to act.Stewart Cohen - 2016 - Episteme 13 (4):427-438.details
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Higher Order Evidence.David Christensen - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):185-215.details
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Belief, credence, and norms.Lara Buchak - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (2):1-27.details
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Practical reasons, theoretical reasons, and permissive and prohibitive balancing.John Brunero - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-23.details
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Two Reasons Why Epistemic Reasons Are Not Object‐Given Reasons.Anthony Robert Booth - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (1):1-14.details
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Varieties of Moral Encroachment.Renée Jorgensen Bolinger - 2020 - Philosophical Perspectives 34 (1):5-26.details
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A Combinatorial Argument against Practical Reasons for Belief.Selim Berker - 2018 - Analytic Philosophy 59 (4):427-470.details
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The questioning-attitude account of agnosticism.Avery Archer - 2022 - Synthese 200 (6):1-15.details
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(1 other version)Evidence and Self-Fulfilling Belief.Gregory Antill - 2019 - American Philosophical Quarterly 56 (4):319-331.details
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(1 other version)Evidence and Self-Fulfilling Belief.Gregory Antill - 2019 - American Philosophical Quarterly 56 (4):319-330.details
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Rational Suspension.Alexandra Zinke - 2021 - Theoria 87 (5):1050-1066.details
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Agnosticism as settled indecision.Verena Wagner - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (2):671-697.details
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Suspension of Judgement: Fittingness, Reasons, and Permissivism.Michael Vollmer - 2023 - Episteme:1-16.details
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Against zetetic encroachment.Michael Vollmer - 2024 - Synthese 203 (6):1-23.details
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A Puzzle about withholding.John Turri - 2012 - Philosophical Quarterly 62 (247):355-364.details
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Transitional attitudes and the unmooring view of higher‐order evidence.Julia Staffel - 2021 - Noûs 57 (1):238-260.details
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Knowledge and practical interests.Jason Stanley - 2005 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Merely statistical evidence: when and why it justifies belief.Paul Silva - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (9):2639-2664.details
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(1 other version)How Doxastic Justification Helps Us Solve the Puzzle of Misleading Higher-Order Evidence.Paul Silva - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (S1):308-328.details
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Reasons Wrong and Right.Nathaniel Sharadin - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (3):371-399.details
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Reasoning in Stages.Nishi Shah & Matthew Silverstein - 2013 - Ethics 124 (1):101-113.details
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(1 other version)Nothing but the Evidential Considerations?Nathaniel P. Sharadin - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (2):1-19.details
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(1 other version)Nothing but the Evidential Considerations?Nathaniel P. Sharadin - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (2):343-361.details
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Withhold by Default: A Difference Between Epistemic and Practical Rationality.Chris Tucker - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies.details
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What is Structural Rationality?Wooram Lee - 2024 - Philosophical Quarterly 74 (2):614-636.details
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The Ubiquity of State-Given Reasons.Mark Schroeder - 2012 - Ethics 122 (3):457-488.details
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Stakes, withholding, and pragmatic encroachment on knowledge.Mark Schroeder - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 160 (2):265 - 285.details
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Reasons First.Mark Schroeder - 2021 - Oxford University Press.details
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Holism, Weight, and Undercutting.Mark Schroeder - 2010 - Noûs 45 (2):328 - 344.details
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Facts about incoherence as non-evidential epistemic reasons.Eva Schmidt - 2023 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):1-22.details
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Fittingness first?: Reasons to withhold belief.Wooram Lee - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (12):3565-3581.details
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Reasons to Not Believe (and Reasons to Act).Blake Roeber - 2016 - Episteme 13 (4):439-48.details
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(1 other version)Getting Things Right: Fittingness, Value, and Reasons.Conor McHugh & Jonathan Way - 2022 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Epistemic Norms for Waiting.Matthew McGrath - 2021 - Philosophical Topics 49 (2):173-201.details
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