- Why There are No Epistemic Duties.Chase B. Wrenn - 2007 - Dialogue: The Canadian Philosophical Review 46 (1):115-136.details
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Why There Are No Epistemic Duties.Chase B. Wrenn - 2007 - Dialogue 46 (1):115-136.details
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The realm of rights.Judith Jarvis Thomson - 1990 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.details
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Resistance to evidence and the duty to believe.Mona Simion - 2023 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 108 (1):203-216.details
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When Beliefs Wrong.Mark Schroeder - 2018 - Philosophical Topics 46 (1):115-127.details
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Reasons First.Mark Schroeder - 2021 - Oxford University Press.details
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Evidentialism and Moral Encroachment.Georgi Gardiner - 2018 - In McCain Kevin (ed.), Believing in Accordance with the Evidence: New Essays on Evidentialism. Cham: Springer Verlag.details
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The Epistemic Value of Moral Considerations: Justification, Moral Encroachment, and James' 'Will To Believe'.Michael Pace - 2010 - Noûs 45 (2):239-268.details
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We Have No Positive Epistemic Duties.Mark T. Nelson - 2010 - Mind 119 (473):83-102.details
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Beyond accuracy: Epistemic flaws with statistical generalizations.Jessie Munton - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):228-240.details
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Moral Encroachment.Sarah Moss - 2018 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 118 (2):177-205.details
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Defeating pragmatic encroachment?Matthew McGrath - 2018 - Synthese 195 (7).details
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Belief, Credence, and Moral Encroachment.Elizabeth Jackson & James Fritz - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):1387–1408.details
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You ought to have known: positive epistemic norms in a knowledge-first framework.Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa - 2022 - Synthese 200 (5):1-23.details
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Dilemmic Epistemology.Nick Hughes - 2019 - Synthese 196 (10):4059-4090.details
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What is a speaker owed?Sanford C. Goldberg - 2022 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 50 (3):375-407.details
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On the epistemic costs of implicit bias.Tamar Szabó Gendler - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (1):33-63.details
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Pragmatic Encroachment and Moral Encroachment.James Fritz - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (S1):643-661.details
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Knowledge in an uncertain world.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2009 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Matthew McGrath.details
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Evidence, pragmatics, and justification.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (1):67-94.details
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Morality justifies motivated reasoning in the folk ethics of belief.Corey Cusimano & Tania Lombrozo - 2021 - Cognition 209 (C):104513.details
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Wrongs, Rights, and Third Parties.Nicolas Cornell - 2015 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 43 (2):109-143.details
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Belief, credence, and norms.Lara Buchak - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (2):1-27.details
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Knowledge in an uncertain world * by Jeremy Fantl and Matthew McGrath. [REVIEW]Kenneth Boyd - 2011 - Analysis 71 (1):189-191.details
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Varieties of Moral Encroachment.Renée Jorgensen Bolinger - 2020 - Philosophical Perspectives 34 (1):5-26.details
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The rational impermissibility of accepting (some) racial generalizations.Renée Jorgensen Bolinger - 2020 - Synthese 197 (6):2415-2431.details
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What We Epistemically Owe To Each Other.Rima Basu - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (4):915–931.details
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The wrongs of racist beliefs.Rima Basu - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2497-2515.details
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Radical moral encroachment: The moral stakes of racist beliefs.Rima Basu - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):9-23.details
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Intricate ethics: rights, responsibilities, and permissible harm.Frances Kamm - 2007 - New York ;: Oxford University Press.details
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The Realm of Rights.J. J. Thomson - 1990 - Philosophy 66 (258):538-540.details
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Who's Afraid Of Epistemic Dilemmas?Nick Hughes - forthcoming - In Scott Stapleford, Mathias Steup & Kevin McCain (eds.), Epistemic Duties: New Arguments, New Angles.details
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What is it to wrong someone? A puzzle about justice.Michael Thompson - 2004 - In R. Jay Wallace (ed.), Reason and value: themes from the moral philosophy of Joseph Raz. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 333-384.details
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Probabilistic Knowledge.Sarah Moss - 2018 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
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The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law: Volume 2: Offense to Others.Joel Feinberg - 1988 - New York, US: Oxford University Press USA.details
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The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law Volume 1: Harm to Others.Joel Feinberg - 1984 - New York, US: Oxford University Press USA.details
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The Trolley Problem Mysteries.Frances Myrna Kamm (ed.) - 2015 - New York: Oup Usa.details
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Intricate Ethics: Rights, Responsibilities, and Permissible Harm.F. M. Kamm - 2006 - New York, US: Oxford University Press USA.details
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Doxastic Wronging.Rima Basu & Mark Schroeder - 2019 - In Brian Kim & Matthew McGrath (eds.), Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology. Routledge. pp. 181-205.details
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Shaping the Normative Landscape.David Owens - 2012 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Justification and the Truth-Connection.Clayton Littlejohn - 2012 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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Rape Culture and Epistemology.Bianca Crewe & Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa - 2021 - In Jennifer Lackey (ed.), Applied Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 253–282.details
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The Realm of Rights.Judith Jarvis Thomson, Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld & Walter Wheeler Cook - 1993 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (1):181-185.details
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