- When Things Fail to Fit Together.Daniel Fogal - forthcoming - Analysis.details
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Kierkegaard on the Relationship between Practical and Epistemic Reasons for Belief.Z. Quanbeck - forthcoming - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.details
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Epistemic Courage.Jonathan Ichikawa - 2024 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Epistemic Normativity Without Epistemic Teleology.Benjamin Kiesewetter - manuscriptdetails
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Against normative defeat.Nikolaj Nottelmann - 2021 - Mind 130.details
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Epistemic Normativity is Independent of our Goals.Alex Worsnip - forthcoming - In Ernest Sosa, Matthias Steup, John Turri & Blake Roeber (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, 3rd edition. Wiley-Blackwell.details
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The Specter of Normative Conflict: Does Fairness Require Inaccuracy?Rima Basu - 2020 - In Erin Beeghly & Alex Madva (eds.), An Introduction to Implicit Bias: Knowledge, Justice, and the Social Mind. New York, NY, USA: Routledge. pp. 191-210.details
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Can the lottery paradox be solved by identifying epistemic justification with epistemic permissibility?Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2019 - Episteme 16 (3):241-261.details
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The Normativity of Rationality.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2017 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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The Epistemic and the Zetetic.Jane Friedman - 2020 - Philosophical Review 129 (4):501-536.details
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In Defense of Clutter.Brendan Balcerak Jackson, DiDomenico David & Kenji Lota - 2022 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 9.details
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Epistemic Dilemmas: A Guide.Nick Hughes - forthcoming - In Essays on Epistemic Dilemmas. Oxford University Press.details
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Against Evidential Minimalism.Daniel Buckley - forthcoming - Episteme:1-20.details
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On the Practical Significance of Irrelevant Factors.Seyed Mohammad Yarandi - 2023 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 53 (2):156-171.details
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A Defense of Impurist Permissivism.Jenny Yi-Chen Wu - 2023 - Episteme:1-21.details
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Do great minds really think alike?Christopher Willard-Kyle - 2017 - Synthese 194 (3).details
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The Good and the True (or the Bad and the False).Daniel Whiting - 2013 - Philosophy 88 (2):219-242.details
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Higher-Order Evidence.Daniel Whiting - 2021 - Analysis 80 (4):789-807.details
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Does belief (only) aim at the truth?Daniel Whiting - 2012 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (2):279-300.details
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Aesthetic Reasons and the Demands They (Do Not) Make.Daniel Whiting - 2021 - Philosophical Quarterly 71 (2):407-427.details
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If you justifiably believe that you ought to Φ, you ought to Φ.Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1873-1895.details
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Moral Encroachment, Symmetry, and Believing Against the Evidence.Caroline von Klemperer - 2023 - Philosophical Studies (7).details
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Is higher-order evidence evidence?Eyal Tal - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (10):3157-3175.details
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Epistemic repugnance four ways.Brian Talbot - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):3001-3022.details
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The illusion of discretion.Kurt Sylvan - 2016 - Synthese 193 (6):1635-1665.details
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Why There May Be Epistemic Duties.Scott Stapleford - 2015 - Dialogue 54 (1):63-89.details
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Imperfect epistemic duties and the justificational fecundity of evidence.Scott Stapleford - 2013 - Synthese 190 (18):4065-4075.details
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Epistemic versus all things considered requirements.Scott Stapleford - 2015 - Synthese 192 (6):1861-1881.details
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Epistemic duties and failure to understand one’s evidence.Scott Stapleford - 2012 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 16 (1):147-177.details
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Knowledge and inquiry—the missing key for a knowledge-based decision theory.Moritz Schulz - 2023 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 2 (2):1-13.details
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Testimony and Non-Evidential Reasons for Belief (A Non-Purist Place for Interpersonalism).Florencia Rimoldi & Federico Penelas - forthcoming - Episteme:1-21.details
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Suspending is Believing.Thomas Raleigh - 2019 - Synthese (3):1-26.details
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Belief, blame, and inquiry: a defense of doxastic wronging.Z. Quanbeck - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (10-11):2955-2975.details
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Dynamic permissivism.Abelard Podgorski - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1923-1939.details
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Strong internalism, doxastic involuntarism, and the costs of compatibilism.Timothy Perrine - 2020 - Synthese 197 (7):3171-3191.details
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A Meno Problem for Evidentialism.Daniel M. Mittag - 2014 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 52 (2):250-266.details
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Evidentialism and Epistemic Duties to Inquire.Emily C. McWilliams - 2023 - Philosophical Quarterly 73 (4):965-982.details
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The Illusion of Exclusivity.Conor McHugh - 2013 - European Journal of Philosophy 23 (4):1117-1136.details
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Objectivism and Perspectivism about the Epistemic Ought.McHugh Conor - 2017 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 4.details
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Do epistemic reasons bear on the ought simpliciter?Susanne Mantel - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):214-227.details
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Bounded emotionality and our doxastic norms.Winnie Ma - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
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Two Faces of Responsibility for Beliefs.Giulia Luvisotto - 2022 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 52 (7):761-776.details
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Resolutions Against Uniqueness.Kenji Lota & Ulf Hlobil - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (3):1013–1033.details
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The Paradox of Graded Justification.Artūrs Logins - forthcoming - Episteme:1-29.details
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A note concerning justification and access.Clayton Littlejohn - 2013 - Episteme 10 (4):369-386.details
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Epistemic reasons for action: a puzzle for pragmatists.Stephanie Leary - 2022 - Synthese 200 (3):1-22.details
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Les raisons épistémiques sont-elles instrumentales?Daniel Laurier - 2013 - Dialogue 52 (2):211-231.details
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The Duty to Object.Jennifer Lackey - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (1):35-60.details
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The lottery paradox, epistemic justification and permissibility.Thomas Kroedel - 2012 - Analysis 72 (1):57-60.details
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Just Say ‘No’: Obligations to Voice Disagreement.Casey Rebecca Johnson - 2018 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 84:117-138.details
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