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Finkish dispositions.David Kellogg Lewis - 1997 - Philosophical Quarterly 47 (187):143-158.details
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Bad Luck Once Again.Neil Levy - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (3):749-754.details
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Minkish dispositions.Alan Hájek - 2020 - Synthese 197 (11):4795-4811.details
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Masked Abilities and Compatibilism.M. Fara - 2008 - Mind 117 (468):843-865.details
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Modest libertarianism.Randolph Clarke - 2000 - Noûs 34 (s14):21-46.details
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Causes, Laws, and Free Will: Why Determinism Doesn't Matter.Kadri Vihvelin - 2013 - New York, NY, USA: Oup Usa.details
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Building better beings: a theory of moral responsibility.Manuel Vargas - 2013 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Making sense of freedom and responsibility.Dana Kay Nelkin - 2011 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Hard Luck: How Luck Undermines Free Will and Moral Responsibility.Neil Levy - 2011 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.details
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Dispositional Abilities.Ann Whittle - 2010 - Philosophers' Imprint 10.details
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