- Incommensurability, incomparability, and practical reason.Ruth Chang (ed.) - 1997 - Cambridge, MA, USA: Harvard.details
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(1 other version)Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions.Keith DeRose - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (4):913-929.details
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(1 other version)The Importance of Being Rational.Errol Lord - 2018 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.details
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Rationality Through Reasoning.John Broome (ed.) - 2013 - Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.details
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Narrow-Scoping for Wide-Scopers.Alex Worsnip - 2015 - Synthese 192 (8):2617-2646.details
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What apparent reasons appear to be.Kurt Sylvan - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (3):587-606.details
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(1 other version)The Importance of Being Rational.Errol Lord - 2013 - Dissertation, Princeton Universitydetails
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Voluntary Belief on a Reasonable Basis.Philip J. Nickel - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (2):312-334.details
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(1 other version)Internal and External Reasons.Bernard Williams - 1979 - In Ross Harrison (ed.), Rational action: studies in philosophy and social science. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 101-113.details
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The Toxin Puzzle.Gregory S. Kavka - 1983 - Analysis 43 (1):33-36.details
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Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong.John Leslie Mackie - 1977 - New York: Penguin Books.details
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The moral problem.Michael Smith - 1994 - Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell.details
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Normative requirements.John Broome - 1999 - Ratio 12 (4):398–419.details
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(1 other version)Epistemic permissiveness.Roger White - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):445–459.details
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Normativity, commitment and instrumental reason.R. Jay Wallace - 2001 - Philosophers' Imprint 1:1-26.details
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(1 other version)How truth governs belief.Nishi Shah - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (4):447-482.details
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Means-end coherence, stringency, and subjective reasons.Mark Schroeder - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 143 (2):223 - 248.details
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(1 other version)Why be rational.Niko Kolodny - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):509-563.details
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Oughts, options, and actualism.Frank Jackson & Robert Pargetter - 1986 - Philosophical Review 95 (2):233-255.details
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(1 other version)Contextualism and knowledge attributions.Keith DeRose - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (4):913-929.details
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On Acting Rationally Against One's Best Judgment.Nomy Arpaly - 2000 - Ethics 110 (3):488-513.details
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Change in View: Principles of Reasoning.Gilbert Harman - 1986 - Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press.details
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The aim of belief.Ralph Wedgwood - 2002 - Philosophical Perspectives 16:267-97.details
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Imperatives and Logic.Afl Ross - 1941 - Theoria 7 (1):53.details
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The domain of reasons.John Skorupski - 2010 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Impartial reason.Stephen L. Darwall - 1983 - Ithaca N.Y.: Cornell University Press.details
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The scope of rational requirements.John Brunero - 2010 - Philosophical Quarterly 60 (238):28-49.details
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Against internalism.Kieran Setiya - 2004 - Noûs 38 (2):266–298.details
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The Myth of Practical Consistency.Niko Kolodny - 2008 - European Journal of Philosophy 16 (3):366-402.details
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Conditional oughts and hypothetical imperatives.Patricia Greenspan - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (10):259-276.details
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(1 other version)The Australasian Journal Of Philosophy.[author unknown] - 1968 - Review of Metaphysics 21 (4):770-771.details
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Vindicating the Normativity of Rationality.Nicholas Southwood - 2008 - Ethics 119 (1):9-30.details
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The Illusion of Exclusivity.Conor McHugh - 2013 - European Journal of Philosophy 23 (4):1117-1136.details
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(2 other versions)Imperatives and Logic.Alf Ross - 1944 - Philosophy of Science 11 (1):30-46.details
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(2 other versions)Against All Reason? Scepticism about the Instrumental Norm.Stephen Finlay - 2010 - In Charles Pigden (ed.), Hume on Is and Ought. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan.details
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(1 other version)Michael Smith: The Moral Problem. [REVIEW]James Lenman - 1994 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 1 (1):125-126.details
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Wide and narrow scope.Sam Shpall - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (3):717-736.details
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Should I Believe the Truth?Daniel Whiting - 2010 - Dialectica 64 (2):213-224.details
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The Coherent and the Rational.Errol Lord - 2014 - Analytic Philosophy 55 (2):151-175.details
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Two Accounts of the Normativity of Rationality.Jonathan Way - 2009 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 4 (1):1-9.details
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Unifying the requirements of rationality.Andrew Reisner - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (3):243-260.details
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The Hypothetical Imperative.Thomas E. Hill - 1973 - Philosophical Review 82 (4):429-450.details
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Review of Gilbert Harman: Change in View: Principles of Reasoning. [REVIEW]Howard Margolis - 1986 - Ethics 99 (4):966-966.details
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(2 other versions)Against all reason? : scepticism about the instrumental norm.Stephen Finlay - 2009 - In Charles Pigden (ed.), Hume on motivation and virtue. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan.details
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Impartial Reason.Stephen L. Darwall - 1983 - Ethics 96 (3):604-619.details
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(3 other versions)Change in View: Principles of Reasoning, Cambridge, Mass.Gilbert Harman - 1986 - Behaviorism 16 (1):93-96.details
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