Results for 'Alon Friedman'

112 found
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  1. Nodes and Arcs: Concept Map, Semiotics, and Knowledge Organization.Alon Friedman & R. P. Smiraglia - 2013 - Journal of Documentation 1 (69):27-48.
    Purpose – The purpose of the research reported here is to improve comprehension of the socially-negotiated identity of concepts in the domain of knowledge organization. Because knowledge organization as a domain has as its focus the order of concepts, both from a theoretical perspective and from an applied perspective, it is important to understand how the domain itself understands the meaning of a concept. Design/methodology/approach – The paper provides an empirical demonstration of how the domain itself understands the meaning of (...)
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  2. Peirce's Sign Theory as an Open-Source R Package.Alon Friedman & Erin Feichtinger - 2017 - Signs 8 (1-24).
    Throughout Peirce’s writing, we witness his developing vision of a machine that scientists will eventually be able to create. Nadin (2010) raised the question:Why do computer scientists continue to ignore Peirce’s sign theory? A review of the literature on Peirce’s theory and the semiotics machine reveals that many authors discussed the machine;however, they donot differentiate between a physical computer machine and its software. This paper discusses the problematic issues involved in converting Peirce’s theory into a programming language, machine and software (...)
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  3.  18
    Belief-Like Imagining and Correctness.Alon Chasid - 2021 - American Philosophical Quarterly 58 (2):147-160.
    This paper explores the sense in which correctness applies to belief-like imaginings. It begins by establishing that when we imagine, we ‘direct’ our imaginings at a certain imaginary world, taking the propositions we imagine to be assessed for truth in that world. It then examines the relation between belief-like imagining and positing truths in an imaginary world. Rejecting the claim that correctness, in the literal sense, is applicable to imaginings, it shows that the imaginer takes on, vis-à-vis the imaginary world, (...)
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  4. Imagining in Response to Fiction: Unpacking the Infrastructure.Alon Chasid - 2019 - Philosophical Explorations 23 (1):31-48.
    Works of fiction are alleged to differ from works of nonfiction in instructing their audience to imagine their content. Indeed, works of fiction have been defined in terms of this feature: they are works that mandate us to imagine their content. This paper examines this definition of works of fiction, focusing on the nature of the activity that ensues in response to reading or watching fiction. Investigating how imaginings function in other contexts, I show, first, that they presuppose a cognitive (...)
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  5. Friedman on Suspended Judgment.Michal Masny - 2020 - Synthese 197 (11):5009-5026.
    In a recent series of papers, Jane Friedman argues that suspended judgment is a sui generis first-order attitude, with a question as its content. In this paper, I offer a critique of Friedman’s project. I begin by responding to her arguments against reductive higher-order propositional accounts of suspended judgment, and thus undercut the negative case for her own view. Further, I raise worries about the details of her positive account, and in particular about her claim that one suspends (...)
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  6. The Folk Conception of Knowledge.Christina Starmans & Ori Friedman - 2012 - Cognition 124 (3):272-283.
    How do people decide which claims should be considered mere beliefs and which count as knowledge? Although little is known about how people attribute knowledge to others, philosophical debate about the nature of knowledge may provide a starting point. Traditionally, a belief that is both true and justified was thought to constitute knowledge. However, philosophers now agree that this account is inadequate, due largely to a class of counterexamples (termed ‘‘Gettier cases’’) in which a person’s justified belief is true, but (...)
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  7. Is Probabilistic Evidence a Source of Knowledge?Ori Friedman & John Turri - 2015 - Cognitive Science 39 (5):1062-1080.
    We report a series of experiments examining whether people ascribe knowledge for true beliefs based on probabilistic evidence. Participants were less likely to ascribe knowledge for beliefs based on probabilistic evidence than for beliefs based on perceptual evidence or testimony providing causal information. Denial of knowledge for beliefs based on probabilistic evidence did not arise because participants viewed such beliefs as unjustified, nor because such beliefs leave open the possibility of error. These findings rule out traditional philosophical accounts for why (...)
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  8. Does Milton Friedman Support a Vigorous Business Ethics?Christopher Cosans - 2009 - Journal of Business Ethics 87 (3):391-399.
    This paper explores the level of obligation called for by Milton Friedman’s classic essay “The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase Profits.” Several scholars have argued that Friedman asserts that businesses have no or minimal social duties beyond compliance with the law. This paper argues that this reading of Friedman does not give adequate weight to some claims that he makes and to their logical extensions. Throughout his article, Friedman emphasizes the values of freedom, respect (...)
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  9.  48
    A Puzzle About Imagining Believing.Alon Chasid - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-19.
    Suppose you’re imagining that it’s raining hard. You then proceed to imagine, as part of the same imaginative project, that you believe that it isn’t raining. Such an imaginative project is possible if the two imaginings arise in succession. But what about simultaneously imagining that it’s raining and that you believe that it isn’t raining? I will argue that, under certain conditions, such an imagining is impossible. After discussing these conditions, I will suggest an explanation of this impossibility. Elaborating on (...)
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  10.  96
    Imaginative Immersion, Regulation, and Doxastic Mediation.Alon Chasid - forthcoming - Synthese: 1-43.
    This paper puts forward an account of imaginative immersion. Elaborating on Kendall Walton’s thesis that imagining aims at the fictional truth, it first argues that imaginings are inherently rule- or norm-governed: they are ‘regulated’ by that which is presented as fictionally true. It then shows that an imaginer can follow the rule or norm mandating her to imagine the propositions presented as fictional truths either by acquiring explicit beliefs about how the rule (norm) is to be followed, or directly, without (...)
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  11. The Perception of Relations.Alon Hafri & Chaz Firestone - 2021 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 25 (6).
    The world contains not only objects and features (red apples, glass bowls, wooden tables), but also relations holding between them (apples contained in bowls, bowls supported by tables). Representations of these relations are often developmentally precocious and linguistically privileged; but how does the mind extract them in the first place? Although relations themselves cast no light onto our eyes, a growing body of work suggests that even very sophisticated relations display key signatures of automatic visual processing. Across physical, eventive, and (...)
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  12.  9
    How Judgments of Visual Resemblance Are Induced by Visual Experience.Alon Chasid & Alik Pelman - forthcoming - Journal of Consciousness Studies.
    Judgments of visual resemblance (‘A looks like B’), unlike other judgments of resemblance, are often induced directly by visual experience. What is the nature of this experience? We argue that the visual experience that prompts a subject looking at A to judge that A looks like B is a visual experience of B. After elucidating this thesis, we defend it, using the ‘phenomenal contrast’ method. Comparing our account to competing accounts, we show that the phenomenal contrast between a visual experience (...)
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  13.  58
    Maximality and Ontology: How Axiom Content Varies Across Philosophical Frameworks.Sy-David Friedman & Neil Barton - 2017 - Synthese 197 (2):623-649.
    Discussion of new axioms for set theory has often focused on conceptions of maximality, and how these might relate to the iterative conception of set. This paper provides critical appraisal of how certain maximality axioms behave on different conceptions of ontology concerning the iterative conception. In particular, we argue that forms of multiversism and actualism face complementary problems. The latter view is unable to use maximality axioms that make use of extensions, where the former has to contend with the existence (...)
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  14. Knowledge Central: A Central Role for Knowledge Attributions in Social Evaluations.John Turri, Ori Friedman & Ashley Keefner - 2017 - Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 70 (3):504-515.
    Five experiments demonstrate the central role of knowledge attributions in social evaluations. In Experiments 1–3, we manipulated whether an agent believes, is certain of, or knows a true proposition and asked people to rate whether the agent should perform a variety of actions. We found that knowledge, more so than belief or certainty, leads people to judge that the agent should act. In Experiments 4–5, we investigated whether attributions of knowledge or certainty can explain an important finding on how people (...)
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  15.  46
    A Case Against Representationalism.Alon Chasid - 2013 - Iyyun 62 (1):29-42.
    The case of blurry vision has been cited by many as a counterexample to representationalism in the theory of perception. Specifically, it is claimed that the phenomenon of blurry vision is incompatible with the supervenience thesis which is at the root of representationalism. Michael Tye, a leading representationalist, has responded to such objections by giving an account of blurry vision in a way that, allegedly, renders it compatible with representationalism. In this paper I argue that Tye’s account of blurry vision, (...)
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  16. Belief-Like Imaginings and Perceptual (Non-)Assertoricity.Alon Chasid & Assaf Weksler - 2020 - Philosophical Psychology 33 (5):731-751.
    A commonly-discussed feature of perceptual experience is that it has ‘assertoric’ or ‘phenomenal’ force. We will start by discussing various descriptions of the assertoricity of perceptual experience. We will then adopt a minimal characterization of assertoricity: a perceptual experience has assertoric force just in case it inclines the perceiver to believe its content. Adducing cases that show that visual experience is not always assertoric, we will argue that what renders these visual experiences non-assertoric is that they are penetrated by belief-like (...)
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  17.  94
    Not by Imaginings Alone: On How Imaginary Worlds Are Established.Alon Chasid - forthcoming - Journal of the American Philosophical Association.
    This article explores the relation between belief-like imaginings and the establishment of imaginary worlds (often called fictional worlds). After outlining the various assumptions my argument is premised on, I argue that belief-like imaginings, in themselves, do not render their content true in the imaginary world to which they pertain. I show that this claim applies not only to imaginative projects in which we are instructed or intend to imagine certain propositions, but also to spontaneous imaginative projects. After arguing that, like (...)
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  18. Winners and Losers in the Folk Epistemology of Lotteries.John Turri & Ori Friedman - forthcoming - In James Beebe (ed.), Advances in Experimental Epistemology. London, United Kingdom: pp. 45-69.
    We conducted five experiments that reveal some main contours of the folk epistemology of lotteries. The folk tend to think that you don't know that your lottery ticket lost, based on the long odds ("statistical cases"); by contrast, the folk tend to think that you do know that your lottery ticket lost, based on a news report ("testimonial cases"). We evaluate three previous explanations for why people deny knowledge in statistical cases: the justification account, the chance account, and the statistical (...)
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  19. The Search for New Axioms in the Hyperuniverse Programme.Claudio Ternullo & Sy-David Friedman - 2016 - In Andrea Sereni & Francesca Boccuni (eds.), Objectivity, Realism, and Proof. FilMat Studies in the Philosophy of Mathematics. Berlin: Springer. pp. 165-188.
    The Hyperuniverse Programme, introduced in Arrigoni and Friedman (2013), fosters the search for new set-theoretic axioms. In this paper, we present the procedure envisaged by the programme to find new axioms and the conceptual framework behind it. The procedure comes in several steps. Intrinsically motivated axioms are those statements which are suggested by the standard concept of set, i.e. the `maximal iterative concept', and the programme identi fies higher-order statements motivated by the maximal iterative concept. The satisfaction of these (...)
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  20. Ending the so-Called 'Friedman-Freeman'debate.R. Edward Freeman - 2008 - Business Ethics Quarterly 18 (2):153-190.
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  21. Universism and Extensions of V.Carolin Antos, Neil Barton & Sy-David Friedman - forthcoming - Review of Symbolic Logic:1-50.
    A central area of current philosophical debate in the foundations of mathematics concerns whether or not there is a single, maximal, universe of set theory. Universists maintain that there is such a universe, while Multiversists argue that there are many universes, no one of which is ontologically privileged. Often model-theoretic constructions that add sets to models are cited as evidence in favour of the latter. This paper informs this debate by developing a way for a Universist to interpret talk that (...)
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  22.  50
    Logical Form and the Order of Nature: Comments on Beátrice Longuenesse's Kant and the Capacity to Judge.Michael Friedman - 2000 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 82 (2):202-215.
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  23. Dewey's Naturalistic Metaphysics: Expostulations and Replies.Randy L. Friedman - 2011 - Education and Culture 27 (2):48-73.
    Critics of Dewey’s metaphysics point to his dismissal of any philosophy which locates ideals in a realm beyond experience. However, Dewey’s sustained critique of dualistic philosophies is but a first step in his reconstruction and recovery of the function of the metaphysical. Detaching the discussion of values from inquiry, whether scientific, philosophical or educational, produces the same end as relegating values to a transcendent realm that is beyond ordinary human discourse. Dewey’s naturalistic metaphysics supports his progressive educational philosophy. The duty (...)
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  24. Michael Friedman on Kant and Newton.William Harper - 2000 - Dialogue 39 (2):279-.
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  25. How Do Children Represent Pretend Play?Ori Friedman - 2013 - In M. Taylor (ed.), Oxford handbook of the development of imagination. Oxford University Press. pp. 186-195.
    How do young children represent pretend play? One possibility is that recognizing and representing pretend play depends on children’s ability to infer the mental states of the person engaged in pretend play (mentalist account). The two dominant alternative possibilities are that children view as a distinctive form of non-representational behavior (behavioral account), and that children represent pretense by temporarily treating objects as though they have fictional or make-believe properties (flagging account). This chapter provides an overview of the debate between these (...)
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  26. The Development of Territory-Based Inferences of Ownership.Brandon W. Goulding & Ori Friedman - 2018 - Cognition 177:142-149.
    Legal systems often rule that people own objects in their territory. We propose that an early-developing ability to make territory-based inferences of ownership helps children address informational demands presented by ownership. Across 6 experiments (N = 504), we show that these inferences develop between ages 3 and 5 and stem from two aspects of the psychology of ownership. First, we find that a basic ability to infer that people own objects in their territory is already present at age 3 (Experiment (...)
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  27. Authentic Gettier Cases: A Reply to Starmans and Friedman.Jennifer Nagel, Valerie San Juan & Raymond Mar - 2013 - Cognition 129 (3):666-669.
    Do laypeople and philosophers differ in their attributions of knowledge? Starmans and Friedman maintain that laypeople differ from philosophers in taking ‘authentic evidence’ Gettier cases to be cases of knowledge. Their reply helpfully clarifies the distinction between ‘authentic evidence’ and ‘apparent evidence’. Using their sharpened presentation of this distinction, we contend that the argument of our original paper still stands.
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  28.  95
    Milton Friedman: Economics in Theory and Practice, by Abraham Hirsch and Neil de Marchi, University of Michigan Press, 1990, VIII+325 Pages. [REVIEW]Philippe Mongin - 1992 - Economics and Philosophy 8 (1):183-191.
    A review of A. Hisch and N. de Marchi's thorough historical study on Milton Friedman's life-long work as an economist (and more specifically as a monetary economist) and as an economic methodologist (in his famous essay "The Methodology of Positive Economics".
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  29. Revisiting Friedman’s F53: Popper, Knight, and Weber.Hoyningen-Huene Paul - 2017
    Neither Karl Popper, nor Frank Knight, nor Max Weber are cited or mentioned in Friedman’s famous 1953 essay “On the methodology of positive economics” (F53). However, they play a crucial role in F53. Making their con-tribution explicit suggests that F53 has been seriously misread in the past. I will first show that there are several irritating statements in F53 that are, taken together, not compatible with any of the usual readings of F53. Sec-ond, I show that an alternative reading (...)
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  30. Knowledge Before Belief.Jonathan Phillips, Wesley Buckwalter, Fiery Cushman, Ori Friedman, Alia Martin, John Turri, Laurie Santos & Joshua Knobe - forthcoming - Behavioral and Brain Sciences:1-37.
    Research on the capacity to understand others’ minds has tended to focus on representations of beliefs, which are widely taken to be among the most central and basic theory of mind representations. Representations of knowledge, by contrast, have received comparatively little attention and have often been understood as depending on prior representations of belief. After all, how could one represent someone as knowing something if one doesn't even represent them as believing it? Drawing on a wide range of methods across (...)
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  31. Children with Reading Disability Show Brain Differences in Effective Connectivity for Visual, but Not Auditory Word Comprehension.Li Liu, Vira Amit, Emma Friedman & James Booth - 2010 - PLoS ONE 10.
    Background -/- Previous literature suggests that those with reading disability (RD) have more pronounced deficits during semantic processing in reading as compared to listening comprehension. This discrepancy has been supported by recent neuroimaging studies showing abnormal activity in RD during semantic processing in the visual but not in the auditory modality. Whether effective connectivity between brain regions in RD could also show this pattern of discrepancy has not been investigated. Methodology/Principal Findings -/- Children (8- to 14-year-olds) were given a semantic (...)
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  32. A Failed Encounter in Mathematics and Chemistry: The Folded Models of van ‘T Hoff and Sachse.Michael Friedman - 2016 - Teorie Vědy / Theory of Science 38 (3):359-386.
    Three-dimensional material models of molecules were used throughout the 19th century, either functioning as a mere representation or opening new epistemic horizons. In this paper, two case studies are examined: the 1875 models of van ‘t Hoff and the 1890 models of Sachse. What is unique in these two case studies is that both models were not only folded, but were also conceptualized mathematically. When viewed in light of the chemical research of that period not only were both of these (...)
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  33. Epistemically Transformative Experience.Jane Friedman - manuscript
    A discussion of L.A. Paul's 'Transformative Experience' from an Author Meets Critics session at the 2015 Pacific APA.
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  34. Levinas's Empiricism and James's Phenomenology.Randy L. Friedman - 2012 - Journal of Scriptural Reasoning 11 (2).
    Genealogies in philosophy can be tricky and even a little dangerous. Lines of influence and inheritance run much more linearly on paper than in reality. I am often reminded of Robert Frost's "Mending Walls" and the attention that must be paid to what is being walled in and what is being walled out. In other words, William James and Emmanuel Levinas are not natural conversation partners. I have always read James as a fellow traveler of Edmund Husserl, and placed both (...)
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  35. Multicultural Education and Feminist Ethics.Marilyn Friedman - 1995 - Hypatia 10 (2):56 - 68.
    Feminist ethics supports the contemporary educational trend toward increased multiculturalism and a diminished emphasis on the Western canon. First, I outline a feminist ethical justification for this development. Second, I argue that Western canon studies should not be altogether abandoned in a multicultural curriculum. Third, I suggest that multicultural education should help combat oppression in addition to simply promoting awareness of diversity. Fourth, I caution against an arrogant moralism in the teaching of multiculturalism.
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  36. The Ant Colony as a Test for Scientific Theories of Consciousness.Daniel A. Friedman & Eirik Søvik - 2019 - Synthese (2):1-24.
    The appearance of consciousness in the universe remains one of the major mysteries unsolved by science or philosophy. Absent an agreed-upon definition of consciousness or even a convenient system to test theories of consciousness, a confusing heterogeneity of theories proliferate. In pursuit of clarifying this complicated discourse, we here interpret various frameworks for the scientific and philosophical study of consciousness through the lens of social insect evolutionary biology. To do so, we first discuss the notion of a forward test versus (...)
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  37. The Future of Value Sensitive Design.Batya Friedman, David Hendry, Steven Umbrello, Jeroen Van Den Hoven & Daisy Yoo - 2020 - Paradigm Shifts in ICT Ethics: Proceedings of the 18th International Conference ETHICOMP 2020.
    In this panel, we explore the future of value sensitive design (VSD). The stakes are high. Many in public and private sectors and in civil society are gradually realizing that taking our values seriously implies that we have to ensure that values effectively inform the design of technology which, in turn, shapes people’s lives. Value sensitive design offers a highly developed set of theory, tools, and methods to systematically do so.
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  38. Burying Mont Pèlerin: Milton Friedman and Neoliberal Vanguardism.Victor L. Shammas - 2018 - Constellations 25 (1):117-132.
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  39. Children Hold Owners Responsible When Property Causes Harm.Celina K. Bowman-Smith, Brandon W. Goulding & Ori Friedman - 2018 - Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 147 (8):1191-1199.
    Since ancient times, legal systems have held owners responsible for harm caused by their property. Across 4 experiments, we show that children aged 3–7 also hold owners responsible for such harm. Older children judge that owners should repair harm caused by property, and younger children may do this as well. Younger and older children judge that owners should apologize for harm, even when children do not believe the owners allowed the harm to occur. Children are also as likely to hold (...)
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  40. Explanation = Unification? A New Criticism of Friedman’s Theory and a Reply to an Old One.Roche William & Sober Elliott - 2017 - Philosophy of Science 84 (3):391-413.
    According to Michael Friedman’s theory of explanation, a law X explains laws Y1, Y2, …, Yn precisely when X unifies the Y’s, where unification is understood in terms of reducing the number of independently acceptable laws. Philip Kitcher criticized Friedman’s theory but did not analyze the concept of independent acceptability. Here we show that Kitcher’s objection can be met by modifying an element in Friedman’s account. In addition, we argue that there are serious objections to the use (...)
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  41. Kant’s Response to Hume in the Second Analogy: A Critique of Gerd Buchdahl’s and Michael Friedman’s Accounts.Saniye Vatansever - 2018 - Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 8 (2):310–346.
    This article presents a critical analysis of two influential readings of Kant’s Second Analogy, namely, Gerd Buchdahl’s “modest reading” and Michael Friedman’s “strong reading.” After pointing out the textual and philosophical problems with each, I advance an alternative reading of the Second Analogy argument. On my reading, the Second Analogy argument proves the existence of necessary and strictly universal causal laws. This, however, does not guarantee that Kant has a solution for the problem of induction. After I explain why (...)
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  42.  53
    Introduction to Special Issue on the Foundations of Mathematics.Carolin Antos, Neil Barton, Sy-David Friedman, Claudio Ternullo & John Wigglesworth - 2020 - Synthese 197.
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  43.  30
    Set Theory and Structures.Neil Barton & Sy-David Friedman - 2019 - In Deniz Sarikaya, Deborah Kant & Stefania Centrone (eds.), Reflections on the Foundations of Mathematics. Springer Verlag.
    Set-theoretic and category-theoretic foundations represent different perspectives on mathematical subject matter. In particular, category-theoretic language focusses on properties that can be determined up to isomorphism within a category, whereas set theory admits of properties determined by the internal structure of the membership relation. Various objections have been raised against this aspect of set theory in the category-theoretic literature. In this article, we advocate a methodological pluralism concerning the two foundational languages, and provide a theory that fruitfully interrelates a `structural' perspective (...)
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  44. Review of Michael Friedman, Kant’s Construction of Nature. [REVIEW]David Hyder - 2014 - Isis 105 (2):433-435.
    Isis, Vol. 105, No. 2 (June 2014) , pp. 432-434.
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  45. A Critical Commentary on Block 2011: "David Friedman and Libertarianism: A Critique" and a Comparison with Lester [2000] 2012's Responses to Friedman.J. C. Lester - 2014 - In Explaining Libertarianism: Some Philosophical Arguments. Buckingham, England: The University of Buckingham Press. pp. 106-143.
    David Friedman posed a number of libertarian philosophical problems (Friedman 1989). This essay criticizes Walter Block’s Rothbardian responses (Block 2011) and compares them with J C Lester’s critical-rationalist, libertarian-theory responses (Lester [2000] 2012). The main issues are as follows. 1. Critical rationalism and how it applies to libertarianism. 2.1. How libertarianism is not inherently about law and is inherently about morals. 2.2. How liberty relates to property and can be maximized: carbon dioxide and radio waves. 2.3. Applying the (...)
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  46. What's Wrong with "What's Wrong with Libertarianism": A Reply to Jeffrey Friedman.J. C. Lester - 2016 - In Arguments for Liberty: A Libertarian Miscellany. pp. 95-101.
    This essay explains Jeffrey Friedman's two fundamental and persistent philosophical errors concerning the libertarian conception of liberty and the lack of a "justification‟ of libertarianism. It is ironic that Friedman himself is thereby revealed to be guilty of both an “a priori” anti-libertarianism and an anti-libertarian “straddle.” Critical-rationalist, proactive-imposition-minimising libertarianism remains completely unchallenged by him.
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  47.  19
    The Problem of Meaning Change in Friedman's Notion of Constitutive a Priori Principle.Roberto Angeloni - 2012 - Kairos (misc) 5 (1):57-76.
    What I want to point out is the “meaning change” that Friedman ascribes to terms and principles, which he calls a priori, in the transition from the old framework to the new: -/- 'This captures the sense, in particular, in which there has indeed been a ”meaning change” in the transition from the old framework to the new: even if the same terms and principles reappear in the new framework they do not have the same meaning they had in (...)
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  48.  77
    Review of Kant’s Construction of NatureMichael Friedman, Kant’s Construction of Nature: A Reading of the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press , 646 Pp., $37.99. [REVIEW]Chris Smeenk - 2015 - Philosophy of Science 82 (4):718-726.
    Review of Michael Friedman, Kant’s Construction of Nature: A Reading of the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2015), 646 pp., $37.99 (paper).
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  49. Once More Unto the Breach: Kant and Newton: Michael Friedman: Kant’s Construction of Nature. A Reading of the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, Xix+624pp, £70 HB.Marius Stan - 2014 - Metascience 23 (2):233-242.
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  50. Inquiry and Belief: Comments on Jane Friedman.Adam Pautz - manuscript
    Jane Friedman proposes DBI: One ought not to believe an (complete) answer to a question & at the same time inquire into that question – that’d be irrational. I raise some counterexamples. Then I propose an alternative principle which has the further of following from more general platitudes about knowledge.
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