Uma pesquisa revisando o pensamento gestáltico se justifica pelo intenso debate em torno da tese emergentista da mente. Sem a pretensão de uma exposição extensiva dos usos de noções emergentistas na análise do conceito de mente, realiza-se uma exposição do conceito com foco nas perspectivas de John R. Searle e de Evan Thompson. Ambos realizam uma defesa da emergência como conceito central na compreensão e explicação da relação mente corpo, mas o primeiro centrado no conceito de propriedades emergentes e o (...) segundo centrado no conceito de processos emergentes. Neste debate entendemos que contribuições da teoria da Gestalt podem se fazer interessantes. Apresenta-se neste contexto o pensamento gestáltico enfatizando o texto “Über ‘Gestaltqualitäten’ ” de 1932, ditado à sua esposa por Chistian von Ehrenfels (1859-1932) no ano de sua morte como um comentário a partir da repercussão de seu artigo “Über ‘Gestaltqualitäten’ ”, publicado em 1890 e comentado pelos três autores de maior repercussão da psicologia da Gestalt; Max Wertheimer (1880-1943), Kurt Koffka (1886-1941) e Wolfgang Köhler (1887-1967). (shrink)

A presente dissertação almeja analisar, a partir de Husserl, a forma com que o idealismo transcendental contribui na construção de uma fenomenologia enquanto fundamento de toda a filosofia. Para tal, o primeiro capítulo tem como foco determinar quais são os elementos que conduzem Husserl à virada transcendental. O segundo capítulo concentra-se na tarefa de apresentar a especificidade que Husserl confere ao seu idealismo, principalmente em relação a Kant. O terceiro e último capítulo, tem o objetivo de apontar o papel atribuído (...) ao idealismo fenomenológico-transcendental na fundamentação da filosofia. Em linhas gerais, pode se observar que Husserl enfatiza que somente a fenomenologia, ao retornar às coisas-mesmas, e com a consciência transcendentalmente purificada, promove as condições legítimas para o alcance do conhecimento. Esta organização da fenomenologia transcendental descobre a possibilidade de desenvolver uma doutrina que forneça as condições de consolidação de uma ciência rigorosa. Pois o idealismo fenomenológico, segundo o autor, possui uma abrangência universal, sendo que ao efetivar a redução fenomenológica, afasta-se de qualquer fundamentação que possa ser proveniente algo subjetivo, e, portanto, relativo. O fundamento da fenomenologia, revelado sob a forma do cogito, isto é, do Eu puro, detém uma veracidade apodítica, a partir da qual toda a reflexão se faz possível. Por isso, é que o fundamento da filosofia repousa sobre o idealismo fenomenológico-transcendental. (shrink)

Durante vários anos, Jean Héring (1890-1966) foi professor de teologia na Université de Strasbourg. Um fato pessoal que o marcou definitivamente, foi o privilégio de ter sido discípulo de Husserl, em Göttingen. Nesta oportunidade, também teve contato com outros representantes da fenomenologia, como Edith Stein, Adolf Reinach e Alexandre Koyré. No breve texto a seguir, datado de 1939, um ano antes da morte de Husserl, Héring relembra a sua chegada em Göttingen, no ano de 1909 e o modo como Husserl (...) impressionava os seus discípulos, pelo seu brilhantismo. Fato este que acompanhou Héring durante todo o restante de sua vida, impactando decisivamente em sua obra. (shrink)

The argument from illusion/hallucination have been proposed many times as supporting the strong conclusion that we are always perceiving directly sense-data. In Sense & Sensibilia, Austin argues that this argument is based on a “mass of seductive (mainly verbal) fallacies”. In this paper, I argue that Austin's argumentative moves to deconstruct the argument from illusion is better understood if they are seen as due to his implicit commitment to some disjunctivist conception of perception. His considerations should be taken as a (...) depth discussion about how to conceive perception. If we conceive the perceptual capacity disjunctively, even the weaker conclusion that we sometimes perceive sense-data does not hold. In response to Austin, Ayer claimed that the strong conclusion of the argument from illusion could be sustained by the method of the possibility of error. I argue that this method alone does not sustain that conclusion and the controversy turns back to the conflict between different conceptions of perception. The argument from illusion is philosophically interesting by putting in evidence the problem of how the perceptual capacity should be articulated and conceived. Although matters of fact are relevant to this question, they alone do not decide it. (shrink)

In this paper, I defend an account of how perceptual experience can bear rational relation to our empirical thought. In the first part, I elaborate two claims that are central for the justificational role of perceptual experience, namely, the claim that perception and belief share the same kind of content, and the claim that perception is independent from belief. At first sight, these claims seem not to be compatible, since the first one seems to require the truth of content conceptualism, (...) while the second one seems to require its falsity. In the second part, based on Alva Noë's actionist theory of perception, I argue in favor of a less intellectualist interpretation of the first claim, uncommitted to content conceptualism, and then I show how it can be reconciled with the second claim. Finally, I explain how perception holds rational relationships with our empirical thought through the exercise of observational concepts. These concepts link what I propose to call 'space of actions' to the logical space of reasons. (shrink)

Is ruling out the possibility that one is dreaming a requirement for a knowledge claim? In “Philosophical Scepticism and Everyday Life” (1984), Barry Stroud defends that it is. In “Others Minds” (1970), John Austin says it is not. In his defense, Stroud appeals to a conception of objectivity deeply rooted in us and with which our concept of knowledge is intertwined. Austin appeals to a detailed account of our scientific and everyday practices of knowledge attribution. Stroud responds that what Austin (...) says about those practices is correct in relation to the appropriateness of making knowledge claims, but that the skeptic is interested in the truth of those claims. In this paper, we argue that Stroud’s defense of the alleged requirement smuggles in a commitment to a kind of internalism, which asserts that the perceptual justification available to us can be characterized independently of the circumstances in which we find ourselves. In our reading of Austin, especially of Sense & Sensibilia, he rejects that kind of internalism by an implicit commitment to what is called today a “disjunctive” view of perception. Austin says that objectivity is an aspect of knowledge, and his disjunctivism is part of an explanation of why the alleged requirement is not necessary for a knowledge claim. Since both Stroud and Austin are committed to the objectivity of knowledge, Stroud may ask which view of perceptual knowledge is correct, whether the internalist or the disjunctive. We argue that by paying closer attention to what Austin says about our practices of knowledge attribution, one can see more clearly that it is grounded not only on a conception of objectivity, but also on a conception of ourselves as information agents, a conception that is as deeply rooted as that of the objectivity of knowledge. This gives us moral and practical reasons to favor the disjunctive view of perception. (shrink)

In this paper, I try to articulate and clarify the role of the epistemic authority of experts in Kuhn’s explanation for the transition process between rival paradigms in the scientific revolutionary period. If science progresses, that process should contribute to the attainment of the cognitive aim of science, namely, the articulation of paradigms increasingly successful at the resolution of problems. It is hard to see that process as rational and as attaining the cognitive aim of science without the consideration of (...) epistemic authority.The mistake of Kuhn was to emphasize and clarify insufficiently the role of the epistemic authority of experts; his critics failed for ignoring it altogether. (shrink)

The initial problem which motivated the writing of this thesis arose from reading of Emile by Rousseau. In this work, it was possible to detect the influence of different theoretical approaches, such as rationalism and empiricism, inspiring the development of the educational plan designed by Rousseau for his imaginary student (Emile). The very core question of the present thesis regards to whether there was a theory of knowledge pertaining to Rousseau’s philosophical thinking and, if so, how it was related to (...) his theories of education. In the set of his oeuvre, Rousseau’s affiliation to authors like Descartes, Leibniz, Locke and Malebranche, as well as Condillac, Diderot, D’Holbach and Helvétius was discovered. As the reading of the great philosophical work of Rousseau progressed, an original knowledge theory was discovered, of the kind which accepts the coexistence of opposite thoughts. Pedagogy, in the context of (the work) Emile, arose out of the miscellany of such theories and also for the intense philosophical maturing process on the core of Rousseau’s thinking. This study intended, therefore, to understand the origin and development of Rousseau’s theory of knowledge, and also to figure out how the philosopher formulated his theories on Education, especially in Emile. The object of this research, materialized through the extensive bibliography of the Swiss philosopher, was intensively read and analyzed. The methodology used was that of comparative, descriptive and critical documentary research of the mentioned authors. This research is divided into three sections: the first one intends to investigate the philosophical influence from different authors on the foundations of Rousseau’s epistemology; the second section addresses Rousseau’s theories of Education; the third and final part investigates the link between theory of knowledge and Education within Rousseau’s philosophical thought. -/- . (shrink)

In the world of Philosophy for Children (P4C), the word “method” is found frequently in its literature and in its practitioner’s handbooks. This paper focuses on the idea of community of philosophical inquiry (CPI) as P4C’s methodological framework for educational purposes, and evaluates that framework and those purposes in light of the question, what does it mean to bring children and philosophy together, and what methodological framework, if any, is appropriate to that project? Our broader aim is to highlight a (...) problem with regards to the concept of method in P4C, and to question the consequences of that concept in the practice of philosophical dialogue with children. To better situate the concept of method within P4C (which, we think, will help to clarify some of the dialogues and debates within P4C as a philosophical field), we will identify two different historical understandings—represented by Rene Descartes and Hans Georg Gadamer—of the concept, and suggest new possibilities for understanding philosophical practice with children in light of their difference. (shrink)

The philosophy of perception has been mostly focused on vision, to the detriment of other modalities like audition or olfaction. In this paper I focus on olfaction and olfactory experience, and raise the following questions: is olfaction a perceptual-representational modality? If so, what does it represent? My goal in the paper is, firstly, to provide an affirmative answer to the first question, and secondly, to argue that olfaction represents odors in the form of olfactory objects, to which olfactory qualities are (...) attributed. In order to do this I develop an empirically adequate notion of olfactory object that is sensitive to the peculiarities of olfaction, and defend it against various objections. (shrink)

Niche construction theory highlights the active role of organisms in modifying their environment. A subset of these modifications is the developmental niche, which concerns ecological, epistemic, social and symbolic legacies inherited by organisms as resources that scaffold their developmental processes. Since in this theory development is a situated process that takes place in a culturally structured environment, we may reasonably ask if implicit cultural biases may, in some cases, be responsible for maladaptive developmental niches. In this paper we wish to (...) argue for an affirmative answer. In order to do so, we first propose to conceptualize implicit bias as embodied perceptual habits, and then proceed to show that these habits are at least partially responsible for maladaptive developmental niches of children with Down syndrome and autism. With this framework we thus hope to bring together two fields of research that haven’t been explicitly connected: implicit bias and niche construction theory. Linking these two theories may bring benefits both to implicit bias researchers, who can extend this concept to characterize other sets of processes as biased, as well as to niche construction theorists, who will have a useful theoretical tool to diagnose maladaptive features of niches brought about by sociocultural biases. (shrink)

The extended mind thesis claims that at least some cognitive processes extend beyond the organism’s brain in that they are constituted by the organism’s actions on its surrounding environment. A more radical move would be to claim that social actions performed by the organism could at least constitute some of its mental processes. This can be called the socially extended mind thesis. Based on the notion of affordance as developed in the ecological psychology tradition, I defend the position that perception (...) extends to the environment. Then I will expand the notion of affordance to encompass social affordances. Thus, perception can in some situations also be socially extended. (shrink)

In this paper we put forward the thesis that qualia are tropes (or qualitons), and not (universal) properties. Further, we maintain that Wittgenstein hints in this direction. We also find in Wittgenstein elements of an account of language acquisition that takes the presence of qualia as an enabling condition. We conclude by pointing out some difficulties of this view.

This research aims to contribute to the discussion on the subject of Abortion by analyzing the concepts of formed and unformed in the Septuagint in Exodus 21:22-23, and the opinions of St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas on the social status of the fetus. The Greek version of the Hebrew Bible, which was translated in stages into Greek between the 3rd century BC and the 1st century BC, presents a different point of view than that found in the Hebrew text (...) of Exodus 21:22-23. It introduces the notions of formed and unformed fetus. In other words, he understood the fetus (embryo) in a perspective of developing reality. Augustine and Aquinas, two important names in Christian theology, seem to have reflected a tradition that granted protection to the unborn child according to the stages of its development. The discussion around the topic of abortion is complex, very sensitive, but it should not be avoided. Bibliographical research was used as methodology. As a result, it will be pointed out that the biblical presentation of human beings does not begin with an explanation of conception or the fetal period. It does not discuss the point at which the embryo attains the full moral status of a human person. Thus, for this research, the discussion about abortion must necessarily take into account issues such as risk to the pregnant woman's life; fetal malformation etc. But, above all, it must be centered on the personality of the pregnant woman. (shrink)

In The Deep History of Ourselves, Joseph LeDoux distinguishes between behavioral and physiological responses caused by the activation of defense circuits, and the emotion of fear. Although the former is found in nearly all bilateral animals, the latter is supposedly a unique human adaptation that requires language, reflective self-awareness, among other cognitive capacities. In this picture, fear is an autonoetic conscious experience that happens when defense circuit activation is integrated into self-awareness and the experience labeled with the “fear” concept. In (...) this commentary I will propose a different view, in which fear is a skillful activity that we coordinate with others as our social interactions unfold in time. If this is true, two important conclusions will follow. Firstly, the relevant brain circuits we should be looking for in our theory of emotions are those involved in affective social learning, social cognition, embodied intersubjectivity, and so on. Secondly, emotions may not be uniquely human, and may be present in any creature with the right kinds of social skills required for affective enactments. Therefore, although LeDoux is right to hold that emotions are not as deep as defense circuits, they are not as shallow as other cognitively sophisticated human capacities. (shrink)

In his book, "Perception as a Capacity for Knowledge" (2011), John McDowell advocates that the warrant provided by perception is infallible. For such, it is necessary to understand the role reason plays in the constitution of genuine perceptual states. Based on reason, we situate these states in the logical space of reasoning. So, we not only make the perceptual state into an episode of knowledge, but we also acquire knowledge of how we arrived to that knowledge. McDowell argues that this (...) condition for knowledge - the possession of the capacity to situate a perceptual state in the logical space of reasoning - does not commit him to intellectualism. In this paper, I defend that McDowell's internalism is not entirely exempt from intellectualism, and that internalism is more reasonable not only without intellectualism, but also without reflexivity. (shrink)

O objetivo do presente volume é apresentar à comunidade filosófica parte do trabalho realizado nos GTs de Filosofia da Libertação, Latino-americana e Africana e Filosofia e Raça durante o XIX Encontro Nacional da ANPOF (Goiânia, 2022), através de textos apresentados no XIX Encontro Nacional da ANPOF (Goiânia, 2022), ou frutos de discussões e debates realizados nos GTs supracitados. Agradecemos a todos, todas e todes que apresentaram seus trabalhos e/ou participaram ativamente das discussões que deram origem aos textos deste volume, enriquecendo (...) o debate filosófico e conferindo maior visibilidade e destaque a esses tópicos de pesquisa em nossa comunidade. -/- Os temas abordados e as bases epistemológicas do GT Filosofia da Libertação, Latino-americana e Africana e do GT Filosofia e Raça apresentam vários pontos de contato. Isso justifica esta publicação conjunta, que certamente incentivará a continuidade do diálogo entre os GTs e possibilitará a formação futura de novas agendas de pesquisa. As leitoras e os leitores deste livro têm a oportunidade de conhecer alguns dos trabalhos realizados pelos dois grupos e estão convidadas e convidados a participar das atividades realizadas pelos GTs. (shrink)

The problem of rational prediction, launched by Wesley Salmon, is without doubt the Achilles heel of the critical method defended by Popper. In this paper, I assess the response given both by Popper and by the popperian Alan Musgrave to this problem. Both responses are inadequate and thus the conclusion of Salmon is reinforced: without appeal to induction, there is no way to make of the practical prediction a rational action. Furthermore, the critical method needs to be vindicated if one (...) pretends that its application is suitable for the preference of a hypothesis. I argue that the nature of this vindication is such that it may be applied also to induction. Thus, to be a popperian is a good reason also to be an inductivist. (shrink)

In this paper, I articulate and discuss Clifford's two main arguments in favor of the norm that it is illegitimate to believe based on insufficient evidence. The first argument appeals to the instrumental value of belief, and the second one appeals to our intrinsic interest in the truth. Both arguments bring to the fore the relevance of moral and social factors to determine norms for belief. I sustain that the first argument is insufficient to establish Clifford's norm in general. Beliefs (...) that are not a mean to an action fall outside the scope of the first argument. The second argument has a wider scope. However, it can be undermined if the agent follows an intellectualized norm that aims to protect the rest of her cognitive and active life from her unjustified beliefs. It’s an empirical matter whether a human agent is able to follow this norm. I defend that Clifford’s norm should be reformulated, including some parameters that have influence on the sufficiency of evidence. Finally, prudential and moral factors can affect the legitimacy of belief. It’s legitimate to believe without sufficient evidence only in special cases, when the agent insulates the unjustified belief, or when the good that results from believing surpasses the harms yielded by credulity. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that hinge propositions are ways of acting that constitute abilities or skills. My starting point is Moyal-Sharrock's account of hinge propositions. However, Moyal-Sharrock's account leaves gaps to be filled, as it does not offer a unified explanation of the origin of our ungrounded grounds. Her account also lacks resources to respond to the issue of demarcation, since it does not provide a criterion for distinguishing ways of acting that can legitimately fulfill the role of ungrounded (...) grounds from those that cannot. Without an answer to this issue, the relativistic threat is serious. I then propose that by narrowing the ways of acting to those that are constitutive of abilities, we can deal with the relativistic threat. I provide an ecological approach to abilities through which I explain why abilities are reality-soaked and therefore why the ways of acting that constitute them are legitimate ungrounded grounds. Based on that approach, I provide an answer to the issue of demarcation that defuses the relativistic threat. (shrink)

Neste artigo, mapeio o terreno da discussão em torno das teorias da conspiração, destacando o problema de como defini-las, os fatores que levam à crença nas teorias da conspiração, os seus potenciais prejuízos e como devemos reagir a elas. Defendo que devemos avaliar as consequências da crença em uma teoria da conspiração para determinar se ela deve ser levada a serio ou não. Em bloco, as teorias da conspiração ameaçam a capacidade coletiva de produção de conhecimento e devemos nos preocupar (...) com a sua difusão. (shrink)

Information is a central notion for cognitive sciences and neurosciences, but there is no agreement on what it means for a cognitive system to acquire information about its surroundings. In this paper, we approximate three influential views on information: the one at play in ecological psychology, which is sometimes called information for action; the notion of information as covariance as developed by some enactivists, and the idea of information as minimization of uncertainty as presented by Shannon. Our main thesis is (...) that information for action can be construed as covariant information, and that learning to perceive covariant information is a matter of minimizing uncertainty through skilled performance. We argue that the agent’s cognitive system conveys information for acting in an environment by minimizing uncertainty about how to achieve her intended goals in that environment. We conclude by reviewing empirical findings that support our view and by showing how direct learning, seen as instance of ecological rationality at work, is how mere possibilities for action are turned into embodied know-how. Finally, we indicate the affinity between direct learning and sense-making activity. (shrink)

In this paper I claim that perceptual discriminatory skills rely on a suitable type of environment as an enabling condition for their exercise. This is because of the constitutive connection between environment and perceptual discriminatory skills, inasmuch as such connection is construed from an ecological approach. The exercise of a discriminatory skill yields knowledge of affordances of objects, properties, or events in the surrounding environment. This is practical knowledge in the first-person perspective. An organism learns to perceive an object by (...) becoming sensitized to its affordances. I call this position ecological disjunctivism. A corollary of this position is that a case of perception and its corresponding case of hallucination—which is similar to the former only in some respects—are different in nature. I show then how the distinguishability problem is addressed by ecological disjunctivism. (shrink)

Demandas por Redistribuição associam-se às ideias de justiça social, emancipação política e econômica. Devedoras da filosofia marxiana desde a década de 1990, dividem o cenário político com reivindicações por Reconhecimento da Identidade, que por sua vez associam-se à ideia de florescimento humano e inspirando-se na filosofia de Hegel. Será possível falarmos de injustiça tanto na dimensão econômica quanto na cultural? Sobre que fundamento filosófico poderíamos compor tais reivindicações em uma única agenda de reivindicação política? Esse trabalho pretende mapear o surgimento (...) do suposto antagonismo aqui mencionado, bem como apresentar a proposta de conciliação das mesmas, defendida pela filósofa Nancy Fraser. Demands for redistribution are related to ideas of social justice, as well as economical and political emancipation. Inheritance of the Marxist philosophy since the 90’s, these claims share political scenario with those for recognition of identity, which are related to the idea of human flowering, inspired in the philosophy of Hegel. Would it be possible to talk about injustice in both, economical and cultural dimensions? Under which philosophical fundamentals would such claims be addressed in the same political agenda? This paper tries to follow the birth and causes of the antagonism of both of the positions mentioned above, as well as to present the proposal of philosopher Nancy Fraser to help understand them. (shrink)

The COVID-19 pandemic prompted immense work on the investigation of the SARS-CoV-2 virus. Rapid, accurate, and consistent interpretation of generated data is thereby of fundamental concern. Ontologies––structured, controlled, vocabularies––are designed to support consistency of interpretation, and thereby to prevent the development of data silos. This paper describes how ontologies are serving this purpose in the COVID-19 research domain, by following principles of the Open Biological and Biomedical Ontology (OBO) Foundry and by reusing existing ontologies such as the Infectious Disease Ontology (...) (IDO) Core, which provides terminological content common to investigations of all infectious diseases. We report here on the development of an IDO extension, the Virus Infectious Disease Ontology (VIDO), a reference ontology covering viral infectious diseases. We motivate term and definition choices, showcase reuse of terms from existing OBO ontologies, illustrate how ontological decisions were motivated by relevant life science research, and connect VIDO to the Coronavirus Infectious Disease Ontology (CIDO). We next use terms from these ontologies to annotate selections from life science research on SARS-CoV-2, highlighting how ontologies employing a common upper-level vocabulary may be seamlessly interwoven. Finally, we outline future work, including bacteria and fungus infectious disease reference ontologies currently under development, then cite uses of VIDO and CIDO in host-pathogen data analytics, electronic health record annotation, and ontology conflict-resolution projects. (shrink)

A short entry on social affordance. Social affordances are possibilities for social interaction or possibilities for action that are shaped by social practices and norms.

Tomamos como certo que os nossos sentidos nos colocam em contato com o ambiente ao nosso redor. Enquanto caminhamos em uma rua, vemos obstáculos que temos de contornar ou remover. Mesmo de costas, podemos ouvir a bicicleta que se aproxima e dar passagem. Em suma, por meio de experiências perceptivas (visuais, auditivas, olfativas etc.), ficamos conscientes de objetos ou eventos que estejam ocorrendo ao nosso redor. Além disso, com base no que percebemos, podemos formar e manter crenças acerca do ambiente (...) e, assim, adquirir conhecimento perceptivo acerca do mundo. A importância desse conhecimento acerca do que está ao nosso alcance perceptivo é inestimável para a nossa sobrevivência e a condução de nossos projetos cotidianos. Contudo, podemos querer saber (1) se de fato temos acesso ao mundo físico circundante por meio das nossas experiências perceptivas, e (2) se e como essas experiências justificam as nossas crenças acerca do que percebemos. Esses problemas são centrais para a epistemologia da percepção, embora não sejam os únicos. Nessa entrada, abordaremos esses dois problemas. (shrink)

In this paper, I present the discussion between Ayer and Austin about whether sentences or utterances can be incorrigible and I argue in favor of Austin position. I defend Austin against objections from Ayer presented after the publication of Sense & Sensibilia. Unlike what was sustained by Ayer, experiential sentences and material object sentences are not epistemically asymmetrical. A material object sentence can be incorrigible if uttered in appropriated circumstances, and an experiential sentence can be corrigible if uttered in unappropriated (...) circumstances. Relying on Austin position, I argue that self-knowledge does not have any epistemic privilege in relation to knowledge of the external world. These kinds of knowledge equally depend on objective circumstances of the utterance situation. (shrink)

How to be being to be being/ next to the united and firm/ and trembling/ mouth of the poem?”, “How to say what is clearer than clarity [...]?” or “How to unite a light design and an obscure gesture?” These questions, as well as many others that emerge from the poetic and essay writing of António Ramos Rosa (1924-2013), represent different modulations of the same angular question: that of the relation between poem and reality, or, more radically, between poem and (...) being. And if such a question spreads into so many formulations it is because, in António Ramos Rosa, its scope is total, simultaneously aesthetic and ontological, metaphysical and spiritual. It is, therefore, this question that we will try to answer by looking into one of its possible faces: how can poetic creation be at the same time the most intimate gesture and the one that touches most deeply the undomesticated matter of the real, that absolute and unapprehensible Other? (shrink)

In this paper I defend a unified approach to knowledge and understanding. Both are achievements due to cognitive abilities or skills. The difference between them is a difference of aspects. Knowledge emphasizes the successful aspect of an achievement and the exclusion of epistemic luck, whereas understanding emphasizes the agent's contribution in bringing about an achievement through the exercise of one's cognitive skills. Knowledge and understanding cannot be separated. I argue against the claim that understanding is distinct from knowledge because the (...) former is compatible with environmental luck. Achievements rule out environmental luck because abilities can be exercised only in their proper environment. I also reject the intellectualist claim that understanding requires the ability to explain what one intends to understand. The understanding of an item is reflected in our ability to solve cognitive tasks using that item. The more tasks one can deal with by using an item, the deeper is one’s understanding of that item. Being able to explain why a claim holds is not necessary for possessing understanding, even though it may be necessary for accomplishing some very specific tasks. Neither understanding nor knowledge require any kind of second-order cognition by default. (shrink)

A partir de la tesis del filósofo español Miguel de Unamuno (1864-1936), según la cual el extremo occidental — Portugal — y el extremo oriental — India — se dieron las manos espirituales por vía de la comprensión de la vanidad del mundo (vanitas), presentada en su obra Por tierras de Portugal y España (1911), nos proponemos poner en diálogo las visiones del mundo barroco occidental y del mundo budista oriental sobre la vanidad y la muerte. En este sentido, nuestra (...) reflexión se centrará en el pensamiento del P. António Vieira, como ejemplo capital del pensamiento barroco portugués, y en el Sermón de Benares, como texto fundador del budismo. (shrink)

Neste texto, apresento e examino as principais ideias que animam a abordagem ecológica da percepção. Primeiro, na Seção 2, apresento a visão instantânea da percepção, contra a qual Gibson articula e propõe a abordagem ecológica. Em seguida, na Seção 3, apresento e discuto a noção de informação ecológica. Nas seções 4 e 5 articulo a teoria das affordances e discuto a aprendizagem perceptiva. Por fim, na Seção 6, exponho e discuto a possibilidade de estender a teoria das affordances para explicar (...) a cognição social. (shrink)

I try to read Aristotle's Poetics and Rhetoric as if they were an integral part of the Organon instead of separate works as they were sorted by Andronicus of Rhodes. The results are quite surprising. First, poetics and rhetoric, considered as sciences of speech, were much more intimately related to Aristotle's analytical logic than it is generally acknowledged by prominent interpreters. I maintain that Dialectics (the Topics) operated as a bridge leading from these two sciences to analytical logic; that the (...) types of speech encompassed by the four respective sciences did not only form a ladder, ascending from the more loose forms of persuasion to the more rigorous ones, but that there was between them a whole net of cross-currents and implications that were too much obvious for Aristotle to remain unaware of them, notwithstanding the fact that he doesn’t describe them anywhere. I maintain, in short, there was an unified science of persuasive speech, whose principles were implicitly intertwined in the fabric of Aristotle's Organon. By means of a comparative study of the works consecrated by Aristotle to poetics, rhetoric, dialectics and analytics, these principles could be unearthed and accurately expressed. I called them the theory of the four discourses. (shrink)

In this chapter, I put forward and sustain an articulation of the notion of bodily skill based on ecological psychology, and I show how it is relevant for the debate between Dreyfus and McDowell about skillful coping and also for the debate about whether know-how is reducible or not to propositional knowledge. The right metaphor to understand bodily skills is not the computer metaphor but the radio metaphor. These skills result from a process of organism attunement to its environment.

This paper aims to examine the nature of the situationist concept of spectacle, especially by separating it into its philosophical elements, in order to check the effectiveness, from a systematic point of view, of situationism’s radical critique. In doing so, the main focus of our attention will be Debord’s major theoretical work: Society of the Spectacle. In fact, the concept of spectacle, repeatedly evoked in other writings, has its most far-reaching version in that small but great book, whose first edition (...) was published in 1967. (shrink)

In this paper we advocate the thesis that qualia are tropes (or qualitons), and not (universal) properties. The main advantage of the thesis is that we can accept both the Wittgensteinian and Sellarsian assault on the given and the claim that only subjective and private states can do justice to the qualitative character of experience. We hint that if we take qualia to be tropes, we dissolve the problem of inverted qualia. We develop an account of sensory concept acquisition that (...) takes the presence of qualia as an enabling condition for learning. We argue that qualia taken to be qualitons are part of our mechanism of sensory concept acquisition. (shrink)

One of the most pressing questions concerning singular demonstrative mental contents is what makes their content singular: that is to say, what makes it the case that individual objects are the representata of these mental states. Many philosophers have required sophisticated intellectual capacities for singular content to be possible, such as the possession of an elaborate scheme of space and time. A more recent reaction to this strategy proposes to account for singular content solely on the basis of empirical models (...) of visual processing. We believe both sides make good points, and offer an intermediate way of looking into singular content. Our suggestion is that singular content may be traced to psychological capacities to form flexible, abstract representations in the prefrontal cortex. This allows them to be sustained for increasingly longer periods of time and extrapolated beyond the context of perception, thus going beyond lowlevel sensory representations while also falling short of more sophisticated intellectual abilities. (shrink)

A ideia de que a ciência — ou ao menos as atividades científicas que são consideradas as mais essenciais para a ciência — deve ser livre de valores é bastante difundida. Neste capítulo, vou discutir essa tese, normalmente entendida como um ideal de ciência. Na primeira seção, introduzo alguns conceitos e distinções que são importantes para entender essa tese, como a diferença entre valores cognitivos e não-cognitivos. Na segunda seção, discuto o papel dos valores na seleção de problemas e na (...) metodologia científica. Na terceira seção, apresento dois argumentos canônicos contra o ideal da ciência como livre de valores: o argumento da lacuna explicativa, de Helen Longino (1990), e o argumento do risco indutivo, de Heather Douglas (2009). Na quarta seção, discuto algumas respostas a esses argumentos. Por fim, na última seção, a partir da abordagem ecológica, exploro e sustendo a ideia de que a reconcepção da ciência como uma atividade social situada e adaptativa supera a dicotomia entre fato e valor que subjaz a discussão. Essa nova concepção de ciência nos permite acomodar melhor os resultados dos argumentos apresentados na terceira seção. (shrink)

Tradução de um artigo do discípulo de Husserl, Paul Landsberg, publicado em 1939, onde o autor tece algumas considerações sobre a ideia que Husserl tinha da filosofia.

Assessment of marine debris ingestion by sea turtles is important, especially to ensure their survival. From January to December 2011, 23 specimens of five species of sea turtleswere found dead or dying after being rehabilitated, along the coast of the municipality of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. To detect the presence of marine debris in the digestive tract of these turtles, we conducted a postmortemexamination from the esophagus until the distal portion of the large intestine for each specimen. Of the total (...) number of turtles, 39% had ingested marine debris such as soft plastic, hard plastic, metal, polyethylene terephthalate (PET) bottle caps, human hair, tampons, and latex condoms. Five of the seven sea turtles species are found along the Brazilian coast, where they feed and breed. A large number of animals are exposed to various kinds of threats, including debris ingestion. (shrink)

The authors of *Linguistic Bodies* appeal to shared know-how to explain the social and participatory interactions upon which linguistic skills and agency rest. However, some issues lurk around the notion of shared know-how and require attention and clarification. In particular, one issue concerns the agent behind the shared know-how, a second one concerns whether shared know-how can be reducible to individual know-how or not. In this paper, I sustain that there is no single answer to the first issue; depending on (...) the case, shared know-how can belong to the participants of a social activity or to the system the participants bring forth together. In relation to the second issue, I sustain, following the authors, a non-reductive account of shared know-how. I also suggest that responsiveness to others, which is a fundamental element of shared know-how, can be extended by perceptual learning. (shrink)

O presente artigo pretende explorar a máxima contida em Os irmãos Karamázov (se não há Deus, tudo é permitido?) à luz do pensamento de Immanuel Kant. Para tanto, se vale do pensamento de Dostoiévski apenas na medida em que ele serve como auxílio na apresentação da ideia de Deus e de sua relação com a posição do ateu. Tendo em vista a filosofia kantiana, buscamos não apenas a apresentação dessa ideia, mas também sua relação com o ato moral e com (...) a própria condição desse ato. Isso, portanto, resultará em Kant, uma resposta duplamente negativa à pergunta que reflete a posição ateísta de Ivan Karamazov. Pois Kant ao distinguir o ato moral por dever e conforme o dever, defende que recorrer a algo externo à razão (Deus) constituiria uma vontade meramente heterônoma. Portanto, o ato moral por excelência ocorre quando a ação é realizada de um modo unicamente guiado pela razão, com base num interesse puro, e isso conduz, por sua vez, à reprovação por parte de Kant da referida máxima presente na obra de Dostoiévski. (shrink)

O presente artigo almeja refletir sobre os pressupostos educacionais presentes na obra Sobre a Pedagogia, de Kant e A destinação do erudito, de Fichte. Quanto a Kant, buscar-se-á demonstrar a importância que o pensador confere a uma sólida formação na infância, que será refletida no adulto do futuro. No que se refere a Fichte, o pensador, partindo de pressupostos kantianos, reafirma a importância da construção de uma sociedade moral, na qual cada indivíduo tem uma vocação a ser exercida livremente e (...) que beneficiará a todos os demais. Em ambos os pensadores, pode-se perceber uma ênfase no estabelecimento da educação moral, com o objetivo de promover uma boa convivência em sociedade. A finalidade dessa educação é fazer com que os instintos se submetam à lei moral, que, em última instância, serve para permitir que o indivíduo conviva em harmonia com seus semelhantes. (shrink)

Kant clearly endorses some version of the ‘old formula of the schools’, according to which all volition is sub ratione boni. There has been a debate whether he holds this only for morally good actions. I argue that a closer look at the distinction between the good and the agreeable does not support this conclusion. Considering Kant’s account of the detrimental and the correct use of this thesis, I argue that rational beings always will sub ratione boni, even when they (...) act immorally, because they act on principles. I argue that Kant’s accounts of self-love and self-conceit support this view. (shrink)

This work tries to show that the metapoetic meditation developed by Ramos Rosa throughout his very extensive poetic work not only did not condemn his poetry to a cold cloister in the textual plane, but also contributed decisively to the opening to the real, to the effect of evidence and to the sense of communion that would become increasingly sensitive in his writing. To this end, we propose to clarify the thread that, under the aegis of the poetic lucidity consecrated (...) by the author, leads us from his metapoetic meditation to a poetic meditation of an ontophenomenological and sapiential nature, that is, from his metapoetry to a poetry whose wisdom provides a set of intuitions with a sapiential and philosophical accent. It is our intention to contribute, in this way, to the understanding of the (cognitive and ontological) demand and scope of Rosa’s poetic path, as well as, collaterally, to the debate around topics such as poetic (self-)reference, the ontological status of the poetic text or the philosophy-literature relationship. (shrink)

A tradução a seguir tem como pretensão demonstrar o modo como Gaston Berger (1896-1960) em seu texto Husserl et Hume, promove uma articulação entre a fenomenologia de Edmund Husserl e o empirismo de David Hume. No texto, o autor apresenta a maneira como a fenomenologia ao valorizar a experiência (tendo-a como imprescindível) se aproxima da filosofia de Hume, e ao tratá-la como insuficiente por si mesma, acaba por estabelecer uma estreita relação com o idealismo transcendental kantiano. O fato é que (...) por mais que Husserl acredite ter superado a imediaticidade dos fatos empíricos vindo a construir um novo sistema de idealismo transcendental, a sua fenomenologia jamais deixou de clara fazer referência a Hume. (shrink)

This volume publishes the Proceedings of the 1st International Meeting "Thinking Baroque in Portugal" (26-28 June 2017), which dealt with the metaphysical, ethical and political thought of Francisco Suárez. Counting on the collaboration of some of the greatest international specialists in the work and thought of this famous professor of the University of Coimbra in the 17th century, this volume celebrates the 400th anniversary of his death and marks the productivity of his philosophical-theological legacy.