In this paper, I attempt to clarify the heart of Dewey’s philosophy: his method (denotative method (DM) / pattern of inquiry (PI)). Despite the traditional understanding of Dewey as anti-foundationalist, I want to show that Dewey did have metaphysical foundations for his method: the principle of continuity or theory of emergentism. I also argue that Dewey’s metaphysical position is better named as ‘cultural emergentism’, rather than his own term ‘cultural naturalism’. What Dewey called ‘common sense’ in his Logic, Husserl termed (...) as the ‘life-world’ in his Crisis. I compare two perspectives of dealing with the phenomenon and conclude that for Dewey, the difference between natural sciences and the common sense inquiry is that of subject-matter but not of method. Thus, the goal is to find the unified method to be applied in both domains. Whereas Husserl was more pessimistic: for him, the difference was not only in subject-matter, but in the very methods. Following that discussion, I also attempt to reformulate the hard problem of consciousness in Deweyan terms. In the end, I compare Dewey’s DM / PI with Popper’s understandings of scientific method and conclude that there is no significant difference between the two and that Dewey’s method could also be looked at as hypothetic-deductive method, with the only difference in emphases. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that Dewey’s ultimate solution to the mind-body problem is grounded not in his emergentist metaphysics per se but rather in his metametaphysical qualitative naturalism. The latter precedes Dewey’s emergent theory of mind, as postulated in his Experience and Nature. Thus, Dewey’s emergentism is rather a consequence of his qualitative naturalism. As such, Dewey’s ultimate metametaphysical solution to the mind-body problem precedes his emergentist metaphysics, and not vice versa. The essence of Dewey’s qualitative naturalism can be (...) captured in a maxim “Quality first, quantity second!” which is an alternative to Galileo’s quantitative naturalism with the maxim “Quantity first, quality second!”. (shrink)

At first, I shortly analyze the origins of Kirk's zombie argument (I'm talking about Descartes and epiphenomenalism). Then, I analyze his 1974 papers "Sentience and Behaviour" and "Zombies v. Materialists". And, in the end, I conclude that nevertheless Robert Kirk is the founder of a zombie argument and defended the view according to which zombies are logically possible, aftewards he became an "anti-zombist".

Статтю присвячено аналізу матеріальної культури давньоруського населення Канівського Подніпров’я з погляду її інформаційних та атрактивних властивостей як предмета музейної експозиції. Проаналізовано як предмети матеріальної культури, так і нерухомі археологічні об’єкти та комплекси. Інформаційні властивості давніх артефактів як потенційних музейних експонатів запропоновано визначати за історичною інтерпретацією та статистичним принципом. Рівень атрактивності традиційно визначається зовнішнім виглядом артефакту і має відносний характер. До історичної інтерпретації входить низка характеристик: техніко-типологічні особливості артефактів, їхнє функціональне значення, походження, соціальна страта та етнічна належність власника або значення об’єкта (...) для давнього суспільства в період його функціонування за прямим призначенням. У музейній експозиції також повинні висвітлюватися регіональні особливості історико-культурного розвитку Канівського Подніпров’я у Х–ХІІІ ст. Статистичний принцип враховує чотири аспекти. У першому випадку статистично опрацьовуються для потреб музейної експозиції масові або рідкісні типи артефактів, притаманні «надетнічній» загальнодержавній культурі Давньої Русі. До другого належать матеріальні залишки, притаманні традиційній культурі східних слов’ян. До третього – об’єкти матеріальної спадщини, характерні для традиційної культури іноетнічних груп, які проживали на теренах Канівського Подніпров’я в давньоруський час. Четвертий аспект стосується імпортних речей. Отже, за інформаційними властивостями експонати розподілено на три групи: допоміжні, основні та унікальні. Перші відносно інших мають найменшу атрактивність, другі – середню, треті – високу. Експонати групи «допоміжні» доповнюють музейну експозицію, розширюючи її «інформаційний діапазон». Артефакти групи «основні» є рештками предметів матеріальної культури, здебільшого статистично найпоширеніших у культурних нашаруваннях пам’яток і пов’язаних із широкими масами давньоруського населення Канівського Подніпров’я. Знахідки групи «унікальні» спрямовані на підвищення загального рівня атрактивності експозиції. Переважно це речі, пов’язані з представниками соціальної верхівки давньоруського суспільства; або знахідки, які є носіями статистично рідкісної історичної інформації. Автор доходить висновку, що задля відображення якомога ширшої інформації про матеріальну культуру давньоруського населення в музейній експозиції мають бути представлені експонати всіх трьох груп. Однак центральне місце має належати експонатам групи «основні», оскільки саме вони відображають характер матеріальної культури найширших мас населення. -/- . (shrink)

In this paper, I critically approach the essence of Dewey’s philosophy: his method. In particular, it is what Dewey termed as denotative method is at the center of my attention. I approach Dewey’s denotative method via what I call the “genealogical deconstruction” that is followed by the “pragmatic reconstruction.” This meta-approach is not alien to Dewey’s philosophy, and in fact was employed by Dewey himself in Experience and Nature. The paper consists of two parts. In Part 1, I genealogically deconstruct (...) the philosophical foundation of the denotative method: the doctrine of immediate empiricism. The latter was originally stated in Dewey’s 1905 seminal “The Postulate of Immediate Empiricism” article, and fully developed twenty years later in his Experience and Nature. I claim that Dewey’s immediate empiricism is essentially incompatible with his pragmatism (instrumentalism) and with pragmatism overall. In Part 2, I pragmatically reconstruct Dewey’s denotative method from the perspective of what I term as the “hermeneutic empiricism” which is grounded in Dewey’s 1896 “The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology” article. As opposed to the immediate empiricism’s main thesis “things are what they are experienced as,” the motto of the hermeneutic empiricism would be “things are what they are interpreted as”/“things are experienced what they are interpreted as.” The above-mentioned pragmatic reconstruction also leads to the transformation of the notion of “common sense” which is vital to Dewey’s method, into the notion of sound reason. (shrink)

It is a detailed philosophical and translational analysis of the main notions of David Chalmers’ philosophy of mind as represented in his 1995 and 1996 program works.

The main focus of this paper is the mind-body problem in its relation to the doctrine of ‘neutral monism’ and the question who can be considered its proponents. According to Bertrand Russell, these are Ernst Mach, William James, and John Dewey (to name a few). This paper aims to clarify whether Russell himself was right in his conclusions or not. At first, I start with the clarification of the relation between ‘neutral monism’ and ‘dual-aspect theory’. Secondly, I analyze the ‘big (...) three’ of the neutral monism: Mach, James and Russell. My starting-point here is Russell’s very understanding of Mach and James positions. In the end, it appears that neither Mach, nor James as well as Dewey can be considered as neutral monists. It was rather Russell’s misunderstanding of the both James’ radical empiricism and Mach’s analysis of sensations, which led him to the creation of his own original version of ‘neutral monism’ (or ‘Russelian monism’). (shrink)

According to Tim Crane, “the ’hard problem’ of consciousness is supposed to be the real heart of the mind-body problem in today’s philosophy”. The idea of the problem can be expressed in the following way: Why are the physical processes in our brain accompanied by the qualitative (or phenomenal) feel? The mere qualitative feel or qualia are those to be explained. The originator of the problem’s name is the Australian philosopher David Chalmers who divided the problems of consciousness into the (...) ‘easy’ problems and the ‘hard’ problem. The former are ‘easy’ because they can be functionally explained. The ‘hard’ problem, in its turn, cannot. From this, it follows that the explanation of the hard problem of consciousness must be found elsewhere. Chalmers’ nonreductive theory of consciousness (or naturalistic dualism) is a serious candidate for a such-like explanation. In general, it suggests conscious experience as one of the fundamental features of our world, together with such fundamental world features as mass, charge etc. It is a general overview of David Chalmers’ philosophy of mind that is carrying out in the proposed paper. Key words: the ‘easy’ problems and the ‘hard’ problem of consciousness, the phenomenal and psychological concepts of mind, awareness, experience, something it is like, qualia, supervenience, zombie, naturalistic dualism, the principle of structural coherence, the principle of organizational invariance, the double-aspect theory of information. (shrink)

The paper deals with the main argument against the doctrine of Materialism and the heart of the mind-body problem — the Zombie argument. The main proponent of the idea of philosophical zombies is the Australian philosopher David Chalmers, whose main opus 'The Conscious Mind' is wholly based on the idea of conceivability and logical possibility of zombies. The author aims to show that for the adequate analysis of Chalmers' zombie argument, the frame of the Analytic philosophy alone is not sufficient, (...) and due to that, one needs to involve Rene Descartes' philosophy as well as Husserlian phenomenology. It is because the author considers Chalmers' zombie argument as an inverted Cartesian argument from mind-body distinction and which has two levels of argumentation: intuitive obviousness and logical (conceivability-possibility frame). Chalmers' appeal to phenomenal consciousness, experience and intuition gives a solid basis to call his Philosophy of Mind project and himself as analytic phenomenology, and analytic phenomenologist respectively. Key words: the zombie argument, epiphenomenalism, the knowledge argument, intuitive obviousness, analytic phenomenology, continental phenomenology, Chalmers, Descartes, Husserl. (shrink)

This paper attempts to do the following things. First, it reinterprets the notion of «mind engineering» from a more neutral standpoint and offers a totally new approach to the phenomenon. Thus, instead of looking at the phenomenon from a wholly negative perspective (such as identification of mind engineering with «brainwashing», «mind control» and other coercive and manipulatory techniques), it defines mind engineering as the process of «design/redesign, implementation/reimplementation, evaluation/reevaluation of minds». In itself, this process can be deliberate or forceful. Here, (...) the author looks at deliberate mind engineering primarily. Secondly, the «mind» is defined as a set of beliefs, and the latter, following Charles Peirce, is interpreted as the set of habits. The phenomenon of habit is interpreted pragmatically-hermeneutically and is defined as a «‘fixed’ functional interpretation of the world and one’s place in it that either works or does not work». If a specific interpretation constantly works, it constitutes a «good» habit. If it does not work, it means a «bad» habit. Unlike the current social-psychological approaches to habit as goal-independent and automatic, and therefore «mindless»/non-cognitive, the author claims that habits are essentially goal-dependent, and cognitive. The habit’s main goal is to resolve the problematic situation that the organism is in. Habit’s cognitive element is grounded in the organism’s interpretive effort that allows it to specify a problematic situation as problematic. Therefore, the connection between the organism and a situation is not direct/immediate but rather is mediated via functional interpretive meaning. In the end, mind engineering must be taken as «habit engineering», and, thus understood, the phenomenon in question can be seen as one of the key phenomena to clarify human nature. (shrink)

In this paper, I am dealing with the phenomena of “life” and “death.” The questions that I attempt to answer are “What is life, and what is death?” “Is it bad to die?” and “Is there life after death?” The method that I am using in this paper is that of phenomenology. The latter I understand as an inquiry into meaning, that is, what makes this or that phenomenon as such. Thus, I am approaching the phenomena in question from the (...) point of view of their meaning in the first place. I claim that ordinarily we constitute phenomena of “life” and “death” in a twofold way. When it comes to “life,” one can specify “life-as-biological,” and “life-as-a-possibility” senses. The former I understand as a cluster of biological processes that unfold in physical time. By “life-as-a-possibility,” I understand a cluster of projects, potentials that depend on our subjectivity. I claim that we essentially perceive life-as-biological through life-as-possibility. When it comes to “death,” I argue that we essentially constitute this phenomenon in a similar manner. On the one hand, we perceive “death” in the “death-as-biological/physical” sense which signifies the end of the organism’s biological processes. On the other hand, we constitute “death” as the “existential/practical death”/“death-of-possibility.” By that I mean an annihilation of all possibilities, and projects. In short, it is a situation when one’s life suddenly loses all its meaning and value: death of meaning. I argue that what constitutes the significance of “death-as-biological” for us is what I call the “existential/practical death” or “death-of-possibility.” I use the phenomena of mourning and suicide to illustrate my point better. -/- Reflecting on whether it is bad to die, I claim that if we accept the hypotheses I am defending in the paper, it appears that death is bad because it entails the loss of all possibilities. I also want to show that people’s desire for immortality is in fact reasonable, because the more one lives, the more possibilities one is able to realize. In other words, people’s desire for immortality is grounded in the essential understanding of the phenomenon of “life” as a possibility. -/- Reflecting on whether there is life after death, my answer is twofold. Since there is no scientific evidence of life after physical/biological death, I think there is no reason to believe in such as well. But when it comes to the question whether there is life after the existential/practical death, my answer is positive: “Yes, there is!” I try to show that it is always possible to find the meaning of life even in the light of the most terrible events. In this sense, there is always a light in the end of the tunnel. (shrink)

The main topic of this paper is the mind-body problem. The author analyzes it in the context of Hus- serlian phenomenology. The key texts for the analysis and interpretation are Descartes’ magnum opus “Meditations on the First Philosophy” and Husserl’ last work “The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology”. The author claims that already in Descartes’ text instead of one mind-body problem, one can find two: the ontological mind-body problem (mind-brain relation) and conceptual one (“mind” and “body” as concepts). (...) In Descartes’ “Meditations”, the ontological level is explicit, while the conceptual level is implicit. In Husserl’s “Crisis”, on the other hand, the situation is different: the conceptual level of the problem (as the opposition between transcendental phenomenology and natural sciences) is explicit, while the ontological level is implicit. Nevertheless, it seems that Husserl has answers to both the “traditional” as well as the “conceptual” mind-body problems. (shrink)

The main topic of this paper is the mind-body problem. The author analyzes it in the context of Hus- serlian phenomenology. The key texts for the analysis and interpretation are Descartes’ magnum opus “Meditations on the First Philosophy” and Husserl’ last work “The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology”. The author claims that already in Descartes’ text instead of one mind-body problem, one can find two: the ontological mind-body problem (mind-brain relation) and conceptual one (“mind” and “body” as concepts). (...) In Descartes’ “Meditations”, the ontological level is explicit, while the conceptual level is implicit. In Husserl’s “Crisis”, on the other hand, the situation is different: the conceptual level of the problem (as the opposition between transcendental phenom- enology and natural sciences) is explicit, while the ontological level is implicit. Nevertheless, it seems that Husserl has answers to both the “traditional” as well as the “conceptual” mind-body problems. (shrink)

The authors of the book have come to the conclusion that toensuring the country’s security in the conditions of military aggression, it is necessary to use the mechanisms of protection of territories and population, support of economic entities, international legal levers of influence on the aggressor country. Basic research focuses on assessment the resource potential of enterprises during martial law, the analysis of migration flows in the middle of the country and abroad, the volume of food exports, marketing and logistics (...) system. The research results have been implemented in the different decision-making models during martial law, information and economic security management, formation of personnel potential and assets of enterprises, food, energy and environmental security management, use of budgetary levers and financial instruments. The results of the study can be used in the developing of directions, programs and strategies for the post-war recovery of Ukraine’s economy and the attraction of foreign investments in the regions, decision-making at the level of ministries and agencies that regulate security management processes. The results can also be used by students and young scientists in the educational process and conducting scientific research on the problems of ensuring the country’s security. (shrink)

The paper presents the content, as well as approaches to the use in the educational process of the author’s Electronic educational methodical complex (EEMC) “Construction of car”. The course is created for students of the speciality 015 Professional education (Transport, the operation and repairing of automobiles). Its content covers general topics including the study of a car engine, electrical equipment and automotive driveline. The created electronic course embraces, in addition to textual material, illustrations, dynamic models, instructions, manuals, textbooks, reference books (...) and glossaries, test material for each topic. Its possibilities of application during lectures, in the course of performing 15 laboratory works, organizing test control of knowledge, as well as for managing students’ independent study activities have been shown. Approaches to expert evaluation of the developed electronic study course by 11 criteria have been disclosed. The directions for further improvement of the content and methods of organizing the study and cognitive activity of students when using the course have been highlighted. These include the organization of level assimilation of the material, the creation of an individual educational trajectory of students. A rather high assessment of the developed author’s course received from experts allows it to be used in the system of vocational preparation specialists in the transport area of expertise. (shrink)

A review of Douglas Husak, Philosophy of Criminal Law: Selected Essays (Oxford University Press, 2010).

El filósofo checo Karel Kosík (1926-2003) desempeñó un rol prominente en el seno del movimiento de oposición a los regímenes de Novotný y Husák, contribuyendo tanto a la gestación como a la pervivencia de los anhelos expresados por la población checoslovaca durante la Primavera de Praga. Junto a la contextualización histórica de su obra, se pone también de manifiesto cómo Marx y Heidegger incidieron con igual relevancia en la conformación de su pensamiento. La filosofía de Kosík reviste por ello una (...) singularidad propia que la aleja de las versiones tradicionales del humanismo marxista predominantes a mediados del siglo pasado en el bloque oriental y occidental. (shrink)