Peter Achinstein has argued at length and on many occasions that the view according to which evidential support is defined in terms of probability-raising faces serious counterexamples and, hence, should be abandoned. Proponents of the positive probabilistic relevance view have remained unconvinced. The debate seems to be in a deadlock. This paper is an attempt to move the debate forward and revisit some of the central claims within this debate. My conclusion here will be that while Achinstein may be right (...) that his counterexamples undermine probabilistic relevance views of what it is for e to be evidence that h, there is still room for a defence of a related probabilistic view about an increase in being supported, according to which, if p > p, then h is more supported given e than it is without e. My argument relies crucially on an insight from recent work on the linguistics of gradable adjectives. (shrink)

This paper elaborates a new solution to the lottery paradox, according to which the paradox arises only when we lump together two distinct states of being confident that p under one general label of ‘belief that p’. The two-state conjecture is defended on the basis of some recent work on gradable adjectives. The conjecture is supported by independent considerations from the impossibility of constructing the lottery paradox both for risk-tolerating states such as being afraid, hoping or hypothesizing, and for risk-averse, (...) certainty-like states. The new proposal is compared to views within the increasingly popular debate opposing dualists to reductionists with respect to the relation between belief and degrees of belief. (shrink)

In a recent publication Travis Timmerman has claimed that sometimes it is morally permissible to not prevent something bad from happening, even if it is in one’s power to do so without sacrificing anything nearly as important.1 To defend his point, he has proposed a thought experiment and based his claims on putative common-sense morality intuitions. To aid in the subsequent discussion, Timmerman’s case is reproduced as follows.

According to the good reasoning view of normative reasons, p is a reason to F, just in case p is a premise of a good pattern of reasoning. This article presents two counterexamples to the most promising version of the good reasoning view.

In this article I focus on some unduly neglected common-sense considerations supporting the view that one's evidence is the propositions that one knows. I reply to two recent objections to these considerations.

In this paper, I argue against recent versions of justification norms of action and practical deliberation . I demonstrate that these norms yield unacceptable results in deception cases. However, a further modification of justification norms in the light of these results appears to be ad hoc. Hence, I claim, we should reject justification norms of action and practical deliberation.

According to recently popular pragmatist views it may be rational for one to believe p when one’s evidence doesn’t favour p over not-p. This may happen according to pragmatists in situations where one can gain something practically important out of believing p. In this paper I argue that given some independently plausible assumptions about the argumentative nature of philosophy and the irrelevance of bribes for good arguments, pragmatism leads to a contradiction.

The dominant theory of judgment in 1870 was one or other variety of combination theory: the act of judgment is an act of combining concepts or ideas in the mind of the judging subject. In the decades to follow a succession of alternative theories arose to address defects in the combination theory, starting with Bolzano’s theory of propositions in themselves, Brentano’s theory of judgment as affirmation or denial of existence, theories distinguishing judgment act from judgment content advanced by Brentano’s students (...) Twardowski, Husserl and Meinong, and finally, Adolf Reinach’s addition of a linguistic dimension to the Brentano-Husserlian theory of judgment – an account of judgments as ways of doing things with words in what Reinach called ‘social acts’. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to show that the account of objective truth taken for granted by logicians at least since the publication in 1933 of Tarski’s “The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages” arose out of a tradition of philosophical thinking initiated by Bolzano and Brentano. The paper shows more specifically that certain investigations of states of affairs and other objectual correlates of judging acts, investigations carried out by Austrian and Polish philosophers around the turn of the century, (...) formed part of the background of views that led to standard current accounts of the objectivity of truth. It thus lends support to speculations on the role of Brentano and his heirs in contemporary logical philosophy advanced by Jan Wolenski in his masterpiece of 1989 on the Logic and philosophy in the Lvov-Warsaw School. (shrink)

According to the knowledge view of evidence notoriously defended by Timothy Williamson (2000), for any subject, her evidence consists of all and only her propositional knowledge (E=K). Many have found (E=K) implausible. However, few have offered arguments against Williamson’s positive case for (E=K). In this paper, I propose an argument against Williamson’s positive case in favour of (E=K). Central to my argument is the possibility of the knowledge of necessary truths. I also draw some more general conclusions concerning theorizing about (...) evidence. (shrink)

MacKay and Robinson (2016) claim that some legal procedures that regulate organ donations (VAC, opt-in, opt-out) bypass people's rational capacities and thus are “potentially morally worse than MAC”, which only employs a very mild form of coercion. We provide a critique of their argumentation and defend the opposite thesis: MAC is potentially morally worse than the three other options.

The dominant theory of judgment in 1870 was one or other variety of combination theory: the act of judgment is an act of combining concepts or ideas in the mind of the judging subject. In the decades to follow a succession of alternative theories arose to address defects in the combination theory, starting with Bolzano’s theory of propositions in themselves, Brentano’s theory of judgment as affirmation or denial of existence, theories distinguishing judgment act from judgment content advanced by Brentano’s students (...) Twardowski, Husserl and Meinong, and finally, Adolf Reinach’s addition of a linguistic dimension to the Brentano-Husserlian theory of judgment – an account of judgments as ways of doing things with words in what Reinach called ‘social acts’. (shrink)

A common assumption in contemporary debates about normative reasons is that ‘subjective’ and ‘possessed’ are two names for the same sort of reason. This paper challenges that assumption. Given our cognitive limitations, it is unsurprising that normative reasons that derive from what we know and reasons that we are in a position to use in our deliberation are not always one and the same.

In this paper I examine Williamson’s (2000) claim that all evidence is propositional. I propose to reject this claim. I give two objections to two premises of Williamson’s argument. The first is a critique of Williamson’s claim that we choose between hypotheses on the basis of our evidence. The second objection is that Williamson’s claim that evidence is an explanandum of an hypothesis leads to counter-intuitive consequences and thus is not central to what evidence is, at least on an ordinary (...) understanding. (shrink)

In this paper I discuss the role that knowledge plays with regard to rational action. It has been recently argued that knowledge determines appropriate action. I examine this proposal, consider objections against it, and finally propose a defense of it.

I maintain that among the main views concerning the central questions of epistemology (in particular, the question of justified belief) are evidentialism, (Pyrrhonian) scepticism and fideism. In this paper, I first present the arguments in favour of a form of evidentialism, according to which no false belief can be epistemically justified on the basis of evidence. Second, I consider the historical emergence of evidentialism during the period of the early Enlightenment. In particular, I explore the disagreement between Pierre Bayle and (...) Jean-Pierre de Crousaz, which demonstrates the emergence of the modern opposition between evidentialism and fideism. (shrink)

Series of articles about Plato's dialogue "Theaetetus".

The aim of the article is to outline an interpretation of the philosophical understanding of the concept of the good in pre-Platonic thought. The interpretation is based on those fragments only in which the concept actually appears. As a result of the adopted assumption, the ideas of the first philosophers, i.e. Thales, Anaximander and Anaximenes, were outside the scope of the investigation, as well as those of Xenophanes, Eleatics, Empedocles, Anaxagoras and Leucippus. In the case of the first philosophical systems (...) of the pre-Platonic philosophy one notices a connection between the good and the One. It can also be found that understanding of the ‘the Best’ is depended on, and results from, ‘the good’. This is true also in Heraclitus, though, at the same time, he introduces an significant reversal in this respect, for he abolishes the absolute difference between the good and evil, and turns it to a subjective relation. The good has no ontological basis in the Democritus’ system as well, though the good’s connection with truth, accessible for every human being, allows to interpret him as arguing for an objectivistic conception of the good. The objectivity of good has subsequently been denied by the Sophists. (shrink)

According to one line of thought only propositions can be part of one’s evidence, since only propositions can serve the central functions of our ordinary concept of evidence. Ram Neta has challenged this argument. In this paper I respond to Neta’s challenge.

The aim of the present paper is to show how Plato suggested demarcating between knowledge and other kinds of human intellectual activities. The article proposes to distinguish between two ways of such a demarcation. The first, called `the external demarcation', takes place when one differentiates between knowledge and non-knowledge, the rational and non-rational or the reasonable and non-reasonable. The second, called `internal', marks the difference within knowledge itself and could be illustrated by the difference between the so called hard and (...) soft sciences. The analyses lead tothe following conclusions. Plato refers to the whole of human intellectual activity as doxa, which is divided into two spheres. The first of them is knowledge proper whose criterion is phronesis. Three other kinds of doxa are derived from knowledge proper: 1) the traditional peri phuseos investigation (called also sophia); 2) popular doxai concerning virtues; 3) wisdom of the antilogikoi. The difference represents the external demarcation. There may be, however, a difference in the scope of knowledge proper (the internal demarcation). If the peri phuseos investigators were able to explain the field of values, the result of their investigation could be acknowledged as knowledge, although it would still be characterized as inferior due to its being based on senses. What is interesting about knowledge proper is that it is not firm and reliable but only hypothetical. It does not determine the skeptical reading of the Phaedo but it indicates that Plato has just begun his own philosophical project (which is still in progress) and the knowledge presented in the dialogue is his first positive suggestion how to solve the problem of demarcation. (shrink)

The dominant theory of judgment in 1870 was one or other variety of combination theory: the act of judgment is an act of combining concepts or ideas in the mind of the judging subject. In the decades to follow a succession of alternative theories arose to address defects in the combination theory, starting with Bolzano’s theory of propositions in themselves, Brentano’s theory of judgment as affirmation or denial of existence, theories distinguishing judgment act from judgment content advanced by Brentano’s students (...) Twardowski, Husserl and Meinong, and finally, Adolf Reinach’s addition of a linguistic dimension to the Brentano-Husserlian theory of judgment – an account of judgments as ways of doing things with words in what Reinach called ‘social acts’. (shrink)

Series of articles about Plato's dialogue "Theaetetus".

According to a widely held view epistemic justification is a normative notion. According to another widely held assumption, epistemic justification comes in degrees. Given that gradability requires a context-sensitivity that normativity seems to lack, these two assumptions stand in tension. Giving up the assumption of gradability of justification represents a lesser theoretical cost.

The paper investigates the issue of historicity of existence and self-understanding within Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics. The purpose of the paper is to answer the question of how the author of Truth and method argues and interprets the unity of existence in the context of recognizing historicity as the fundamental characteristics of human being and the world. The paper shows that the historicity excludes the possibility of basing this unity on an absolute metaphysical foundation or on a reflective self-consciousness of transcendental (...) subjectivity. On the ground of philosophical hermeneutics, being-one of a human has the character of historical continuity, constituted in the process of incessant, interpretive transcending and uniting oneself. The paper shows what roles the inherited tradition and community in which one lives play in this process. Furthermore, the paper points out that for proper understanding of Gadamer’s interpretation of the unity of existence, it is necessary to take into account two issues: firstly, its departure from the concept of empty time, which is a stream of the past, present and future moments of the “Now”, in favour of ful-filled time and secondly, how general-individual relations are interpreted in philosophical hermeneutics. (shrink)

The article discusses the nature and significance of metaphilosophical knowledge on the ground of Heidegger’s fundamental ontology. The purpose of the article is to show metaphilosophical knowledge as an essential and immanent factor of philosophical reflection. The above mentioned goal is achieved by presenting connection, occurring within the fundamental ontology, between this knowledge and theoretical philosophical reflection, both in its descriptive (defining being of philosophy) and normative (indicating how philosophical reflection should be carried out) dimension. The descriptive dimension of the (...) connection indicates a circular nature of the interactions between metaphilosophical and theoretical aspects of philosophy. The theoretical reflection on specific phenomena is, at the same time, a determination of being of the philosophy; whereas the metaphilosophical knowledge, arising from the theoretical reflection, determines character and direction of further considerations. Furthermore, the normative dimension implies that philosophical considerations should take into account this connection and deliberately practice it through systematic metaphilosophical reflection. As the source of the connection between metaphilosophical knowledge and theoretical reflection, the article indicates Heidegger’s concept of philosophy, according to which philosophy is a way of being of Dasein, consisting of ontological, conceptual interpretation of being of beings and reflecting the structures of Dasein’s existence and its pre-ontological understanding of being. -/- Keywords: fundamental ontology, metaphilosophy, philosophical reflection, grounding of philosophy, Dasein, understanding of being. (shrink)

Tristan Augusta von Platena jako jedyny utwór biedermeierowskiego poety znalazł się w ścisłym kanonie liryki niemieckiej. Wiersz doczekał się jednak do tej pory niewielu wnikliwych analiz; nadto zarówno starsze, jak i najnowsze propozycje interpretacyjne koncentrowały się głównie na kontekście biograficznym. Artykuł jest próbą poszerzenia istniejącej literatury przedmiotowej o nowe aspekty. Stawia on przede wszystkim pytanie o obecność mitu w strukturze utworu. Szczegółowa analiza formalna oraz rozważania o warstwie filozoficzno-estetycznej wiersza konsekwentnie ukazują indywidualny gest, z jakim autor adaptuje mityczny topos o (...) transgresywnej miłości. W tym kontekście średniowieczny motyw Tristana jawi się w wierszu wzbogacony o antyczny motyw Orfeusza. Owa oryginalna kontaminacja świadczy o antycypacji przez PIatena niemieckiej poezji modernistycznej, szczególnie zaś wskazuje na powinowactwo jego Tristana z Sonetami do Orfeusza Rilkego. (shrink)

The goal of the study is to analyse the relation between students' digital learning and transversal skills, as well as between students' digital learning and virtues. In the correlative study, 73 teachers of Class 12 of general education institutions participated, filling out a questionnaire in the Google Docs environment. As a result of the theoretical analysis, the criteria for digital learning have been identified -access to digital technologies, cooperation, teachers’ digital competence and availability of activities in compliance with cognitive engagement (...) levels. The findings of the correlation analysis show that the availability of activities in compliance with cognitive engagement levels is the most important in the development of transversal skills,while in the inculcation of virtues -cooperation. The access to digital technologies has a statistically significant correlation with both transversal skills and virtues. The teachers’ digital competence promotes digital literacy and such virtues as responsibility and wisdom. The recommendations developed as part of the study include compilation and promotion of the positive experiences of digital learning at the state and local government level; continuous monitoring and feedback analysis of purposeful digital learning and educational quality at school and classroom level; the application of digital learning resources based on the offer of activities in compliance with the students' cognitive engagement levels at the personal level. Keywords:Digital technologies, cooperation, digital competence, cognitive engagement. (shrink)

According to strong pluralism, objects distinct by virtue of their modal properties can coincide. The most common objection towards such view invokes the so-called Grounding Problem according to which the strong pluralist needs to explain what the grounds are for supposed modal differences between the coincidents. As recognized in the literature, the failure to provide an answer to the Grounding Problem critically undermines the plausibility of strong pluralism. Moreover, there are strong reasons to believe that strong pluralists cannot provide an (...) explanation of the Grounding Problem. In this paper, we argue that strong pluralism can be motivated independently of the successful answer to the Grounding Problem. In order to achieve that aim, we provide a haecceitistic interpretation of strong pluralism according to which strong pluralism should be read as a position committed to the existence of primitive individuals, i.e., the individuals that have their criteria of individuation independently of their qualitative profiles. That said, we do not aim at defending haecceitism. Instead, our aim is rather modest: we want to provide a new way for the strong pluralist to supplement his view to make it more watertight. (shrink)

Death is a state of the total disappearance of life. Dying is a process of decay of the vital system, which ends with clinical death. In current perspectives there are several approaches to research on death and dying; these are the clinical, the humanistic, the philosophical, the psychological, the anthropological, and the sociological perspective.

Filozofia subiektywności dotarła w XX wieku do granic swoich możliwości. Jako odpowiedź na jej ograniczenia rozmaici filozofowie podjęli próby nowego rodzaju myślenia. Takie próby to m.in. myśl dialogiczna, która pierwszy wyraz znalazła w pismach takich filozofów, jak Franz Rosenzweig, Martin Buber czy Eberhard Grisebach. Innym przykładem jest postulat powrotu do pytania o bycie Martina Heideggera. W niniejszym artykule staram się pokazać, że obie próby mają ze sobą wiele wspólnego, choć ich przedstawiciele odnosili się do siebie nawzajem raczej krytycznie, o ile (...) w ogóle to czynili. Okazuje się jednak, że myśl Martina Bubera oraz Martina Heideggera ujmują człowieka jako byt dynamiczny, który staje w obliczu nachodzącego go wezwana. Dlatego też analizuję najpierw koncepcję Martina Heideggera z okresu Bycia i czasu, następnie przedstawiam myślenie Martina Bubera, głównie w oparciu o jego traktat Ja i Ty. Na koniec dokonuję zestawienia i porównania wątków wspólnych obu filozofom, jak również zaznaczam różnice, które dzielą obie próby przekroczenia filozofii podmiotowości. (shrink)

Sumário: 1. O conceito de revolução, Amélia de Jesus Oliveira; 2. Mudanças de concepção de mundo, Artur Bezzi Günther; 3. Habilidade e causalidade: uma proposta confiabilista para casos típicos de conhecimento, Breno Ricardo Guimarães Santos; 4. El realismo interno de Putnam y sus implicaciones en la filosofía de la ciencia y para el realismo científico, Marcos Antonio da Silva; 5.O papel da observação na atividade científica segundo Peirce, Max Rogério Vicentini; 6.Fact and Value entanglement: a collapse of objective reality?, (...) Oswaldo Melo Souza Filho; 7.Realismo interno e o paradoxo de Putnam, Renato Mendes Rocha; 8.Uma informação, dois formatos, dois destinos, Cícero Antônio Cavalcante Barroso; 9.O Mentiroso e as intuições acerca da noção de verdade na perspectiva de Saul Kripke, Ederson Safra Melo; 10.A conceptual difficulty with some definitions of behavior, Filipe Lazzeri; 11.A faceta epistêmica do problema da referência, Saulo Moraes de Assis; 12.Princípios metafísicos do método newtoniano, Bruno Camilo de Oliveira; 13.A resposta aristotélica para a aporia do regresso ao infinito nas demonstrações, Daniel Lourenço; 14.O uso da doutrina da ponderação aplicado ao principialismo, Cinthia Berwanger Pereira; 15.A fenomenologia da vida interior em Hannah Arendt, Elizabete Olinda Guerra; 16.Por que achar que o direito é formado por ordens é um fracasso?, ria Alice da Silva; 17 Por que ainda há poucas mulheres na filosofia? Uma versão modificada do modelo das “vozes diferentes”, Tânia A. Kuhnen; 18.Algumas considerações sobre Substância, Forma e Matéria na Metafísica de Aristóteles, Gabriel Geller Xavier. (shrink)

Apesar de ter florescido no século XII, a tradição do Graal, remonta ao século VI, com a história da “Destruição e Conquista da Bretanha”, escrita pelo clérigo Gildas, que não parece querer retratar mais do que fatos da época envolvendo líderes locais com status de Rei, lutas pelo poder, batalhas e assassinatos em família, todavia, se alguma tradição subterrânea (prática comum entre os judeus) havia, envolvendo esses personagens, sobre isso, Gildas, nada falou. -/- A memória desses homens guerreiros volta à (...) tona em meados do ano 828, em “A História dos Britânicos”, de Nennius, e mais tarde na “História dos Reis da Grã-Bretanha”, de Geoffrey of Monmouth, entre os anos de 1138 -1139. A tradição ressurge entre os anos de 1181 e 1190, com Chrétien de Troyes, que escreve “Perceval, a História do Graal”, que fica inacabada com sua morte. Poucos anos depois, entre 1191 e 1202, Robert de Boron escreve a “História do Graal ou José de Arimatéia”, onde introduz elementos cristãos, como o cálice da Última Ceia que recolheu o sangue do Cristo. No mito, José é preso, Cristo o visita e explica os mistérios do cálice. Após deixar a prisão, José viaja com seus sogros e outros seguidores para oeste, fundando uma dinastia de guardiões do Graal, de quem o rei Artur é descendente. Quase em seguida, surge “Parzival”, de Wolfram Schenbach, escrito entre os anos de 1195 – 1215, que, sem dúvida, é a obra mais robusta em simbolismos e que maior interesse desperta; o autor, por exemplo, não se refere ao Graal como “cálice sagrado”, mas o designa como “pedra”, expurgando, por assim dizer, o simbolismo cristão posto no romance por Robert de Boron e introduzindo o simbolismo judaico. -/- Agora, a questão da literatura arturiana parece estar ligada a algum tipo de tradição marginal que remonta aos primórdios do cristianismo, similarmente à queda da Judeia, já que absorve ambos os elementos. Chrétien de Troyes, que iniciou este novo ciclo da tradição, deixa a entender que escreveu sua história a pedido de Philip I, Conde de Flandres, da Casa de Alsace, isso por que o prólogo da obra (316) é dedicada a seu patrono com altos elogios, apresentando-o como o mais bravo dos homens do Império de Roma, dedicatória similar feita a uma obra anterior, encomendada por Maria de Champagne. Outro dado que chama a atenção, é a possibilidade de Chrétien ter sido um judeu convertido, hipótese fundamentada no fato de a cidade de Troyes ter sido um grande centro de comércio e ensino judaicos, mas também pela assinatura em um de seus poemas, “Philomena”, onde se refere como “Crestien li Gois” e o termo “Goy” implicaria um judeu convertido (317). -/- Logo a seguir à obra de Chrétien, Robert de Boron retoma a tradição acrescentando motivos cristãos e, tal como seu antecessor, a serviço de um nobre, Gautier de Montbéliard (318), da Casa de Montfaucon. Apesar de a obra de Robert ter se popularizado pelos elementos novos que introduziu, não é aquela que mais desperta interesse entre os estudiosos, no entanto, a adição de símbolos cristãos em uma tradição a princípio não cristã, pode referir-se a desvio de foco, mais que a qualquer outro objetivo, ideia que é reforçada quando entendemos que os autores escrevem a pedido de determinadas famílias nobres. Quase ao mesmo tempo, surge a obra capital do romance do Graal, escrita pelo alemão Wolfram Schenbach, que, não fugindo à regra, liga sua história à Casa de Anjou, na época, a família mais poderosa na Europa Ocidental e na Terra Santa, onde seus membros se revezavam como reis de Jerusalém. Um dado curioso é que Philip I, Conde de Flandres da Casa de Alsace, patrono da Chrétien de troyes era primo em primeiro grau do Rei Balduíno, de Jerusalém, da Casa de Anjou. -/- Wolfram Schenbach cita Kyot de Provence, identificado como Guiot de Provins, como sendo sua fonte (319). Historicamente, Guiot foi um autor renomado e popular em sua época, monge e porta voz dos Templários, que escreveu, desde canções de amor, a críticas à Igreja e também canções de adoração ao Templo, o que parece indicar uma origem judaica. Segundo Wolfram, kyot encontrou na cidade de Toledo (320) um antigo manuscrito escrito por Flegetanis, um judeu forçado ao batismo cristão, contendo a história “daquilo que era chamado Graal”, esse é um ponto importante quando entendemos que estamos lidando com uma tradição judaica e não cristã. Depois de ler o manuscrito, Kyot passa a investigar alguns dados nele contido, em vários centros da Europa, buscando principalmente as obras de escrita latina, encontrando finalmente, na França, nos anais da Casa de Anjou (321) ; a história de Mazadan e o registro de sua família (322). -/- O que essa informação quer nos dizer, nas entrelinhas, é que os registros familiares de Mazadan, foram reconhecidos como sendo os mesmos dos manuscritos de Flegetanis, no entanto, alguns estudiosos de “Parzival” dão como não confiável a referência ao personagem Kyot de Provence, não o identificando a Guiot de Provins (323), talvez porque Wolfram não faz qualquer referência ao poeta até o livro oito, para, abruptamente, citá-lo no livro nove, onde explica toda a história. Quero dizer que a referência feita no livro nove e não antes, como seria habitual, denota um antigo simbolismo judaico de utilizar o algarismo “nove” como expressão da verdade (324), veja, por exemplo, a fundação da Ordem do Templo por simbólicos “nove” cavaleiros, não mais, não menos. Das obras, portanto, sobre o romance do Graal, aquela que merece estudo e investigação é Parzival, se quisermos um motivo dentre tantos, a “coisa” que os outros autores chamam Graal, Wolfram não denomina “cálice”, mas “pedra”. -/- William: Lancio; pensei ter entendido quando você falou sobre o simbolismo do cálice associado ao romance do Graal. Mas agora estou confuso, quando diz que o cálice foi um motivo cristão adaptado a essa tradição e a que merece estudo e investigação é aquela em que o Graal não é simbolizado pelo cálice e sim por uma pedra. -/- Lancio: William, quando falamos ou escrevemos sobre simbolismo, o discurso ganha muitas e diferentes interpretações e todas estarão sempre em conformidade com a capacidade daqueles ou daquelas que nos ouvem ou nos leem, mas, todos aqueles que forem além da leitura ou do simples ouvir, questionarão e esses saberão mais. Quando me referi ao cálice como símbolo, associando-o à tradição do Graal, o fiz como ilustração simbólica a uma ritualística, nesse caso; o cálice é aquele que toma variadas formas, que é maleável a diversas leituras e interpretações, que é histórico e é judeu, não é fábula e por isso é também pedra. -/- William: desculpe, Lancio, eu continuo sem entender. A que cálice que também é pedra você se refere? -/- Lancio: o mesmo símbolo que sempre representou a tradição do Graal, não em Robert de Boron, mas em Wolfram Schenbach. Novamente, William, o cálice, antes de ser um símbolo cristão pela fábula de José de Arimatéia, é um símbolo judaico e quando discorri sobre esse simbolismo, era o cálice judaico ou o que se designou chamar de cálice, que Wolfram chamou de “pedra”, o símbolo em questão. -/- William: por maior esforço de memória, eu não consigo compreender a substituição de cálice por pedra dentro do mesmo simbolismo. Quando você deu o exemplo do coração como cálice, sim, é passível de entendimento, mas substituir o coração por pedra e manter o mesmo significado simbólico? -/- Lancio: a dúvida corajosa é a boa dúvida e isso em qualquer disciplina, por ser ela capaz de provocar perguntas capitais. Em poucas palavras, com o que já ouviu; você será capaz de entender o simbolismo do cálice. Primeiro devemos buscar, nas tradições judaicas, um ato ritualístico em que o cálice participe e não é difícil encontrá-lo, pois há no seio do judaísmo uma tradição em que o cálice ou vaso de ouro, como também é chamado, participa, refere-se ao sacrifício das frutas frescas, (omer), contudo, esse simbolismo em que está inscrito o cálice, nada diz à nossa investigação, é uma tradição judaica e nela se encerra, mas não podemos dizer o mesmo da sua representação nas moedas cunhadas pelos seguidores de Judas, o Galileu, quando estes tomaram Jerusalém e o Templo em 66 DC, dando início à primeira revolta contra Roma, proporcionando ao reino judeu, um breve período independência (326). Assim, torna-se ele, o cálice, símbolo daquela revolta e mais do que isso, torna-se o cálice um símbolo em si mesmo, capaz de servir à lembrança e à memória. Quando fiz referência ao simbolismo do cálice, era a esse simbolismo que me reportava e quanto à sua metamorfose em pedra, falarei agora. -/- Wolfram chama aquilo que representa o Graal, não de “cálice”, mas de “lapsit exiliis”, cuja tradução, apesar dos esforços de pesquisa e imaginação, definitivamente não está resolvida. -/- O nome “lapsit exillis” reúne assim como o nome “Lazalies”, “Mazadan” ou “Terdelaschoye”, um sentido propositadamente ambíguo, por isso há sempre dificuldade quanto a seu estudo (337), se é possível encontrar um tímido consenso sobre o significado da palavra lapsit, como sendo “pedra”, no que se refere à palavra composta, entretanto, não há consenso algum quanto ao significado, sendo muitas e corajosas, as interpretações que se tem buscado dar, inclusive com o sentido de “pedra do exílio” ou “pedra exilada”(338), que embora esteja no cesto das interpretações fantasiosas, devo dizer que não deveria, porque “pedra” é uma palavra largamente utilizada nos escritos judaicos com sentido além do literal, significando família, isso é possível devido a composição das palavras na língua hebraica, constituídas em sua maioria por duas ou mais palavras menores, assim pedra, “even”, soletrado, alef, beit, nun, é um acrônimo para av - ben, que significa “pai e filho”, representando a palavra pedra, esse conceito. -/- Esse simbolismo permeia toda a literatura judaica cristã (339). Quando, por exemplo, se diz em determinado versículo que Jacob pegou “pedras” e colocou sob sua cabeça como travesseiro e em outro versículo que Jacob ao acordar tirou a “pedra”, no singular, que tinha posto anteriormente sob sua cabeça; isso revela uma aparente discrepância, no entanto, isso significa, à luz dos intérpretes da Lei, que as “pedras”,no plural, significam os 12 filhos de Jacob, as 12 tribos de Israel que se fundiram em um só povo, uma só nação, uma só “pedra.”(340) Portanto, chamar o Graal por “lapsit exiliis” ou “pedra exilada” ou “pedra do exílio” ou ainda “pedra no exílio”, pelo simbolismo hebreu, significa o mesmo que dizer; família exilada, família do exílio ou família no exílio, termo aplicável ao povo judeu em geral e às famílias judias em particular, mas por ser o romance do Graal uma tradição relacionada a uma família específica, é a essa família que devemos buscar. (shrink)