The Value-free ideal of science (VFI) is a view that claims that scientists should not use non-epistemic values when they are justifying their hypotheses, and is widely considered to be obsolete in the philosophy of science. I will defend the ideal by demonstrating that acceptance of non-epistemic values, prohibited by VFI, necessitates legitimizing certain problematic scientific practices. Such practices, including biased methodological decisions or Questionable Research Practices (QRP), significantly contribute to the Replication Crisis. I will argue that the realizability of (...) VFI is not a necessary condition for its validity. Then, I will show how some of the prominent proposals of value-laden science legitimize problematic scientific practices, provide real-world examples, and generalize the argument. Finally, I will show how value-laden methodological decisions contribute to the Replicability Crisis and discuss two strategies for realizing VFI. (shrink)

This paper critically assesses the possibility of moral enhancement with ambient intelligence technologies and artificial intelligence presented in Savulescu and Maslen (2015). The main problem with their proposal is that it is not robust enough to play a normative role in users’ behavior. A more promising approach, and the one presented in the paper, relies on an artifi-cial moral reasoning engine, which is designed to present its users with moral arguments grounded in first-order normative theories, such as Kantianism or utilitarianism, (...) that reason-responsive people can be persuaded by. This proposal can play a normative role and it is also a more promising avenue towards moral enhancement. It is more promising because such a system can be designed to take advantage of the sometimes undue trust that people put in automated technologies. We could therefore expect a well-designed moral reasoner system to be able to persuade people that may not be persuaded by similar arguments from other people. So, all things considered, there is hope in artificial intelli-gence for moral enhancement, but not in artificial intelligence that relies solely on ambient intelligence technologies. (shrink)

Brandom (Citation1994) made inferentialism an intensely debated idea in the philosophy of language in the last three decades. Inferentialism is a view that associates the meaning of linguistic expression with the role said expression plays in inferences. It seems rather uncontroversial that the correct theory of meaning should distinguish between linguistic correctness and factual correctness. For instance, speaker S can be wrong in saying ‘I have arthritis’ in two distinct ways: (i) S fails to apply a word correctly to make (...) a true statement due to having made a factual error, and (ii) S uses an expression incorrectly because they are wrong about its meaning. In this paper, I show that properly understood normative inferentialism can make room for such a distinction. I propose that linguistic correctness is a structural issue: linguistic mistakes stem from the improper or insufficient acquisition of an inferential role. Factual correctness, on the other hand, is a one-off issue of the correct application of inferential rules to a particular situation. I argue that, by tying the issue of correctness to the game of giving and asking for reasons, inferentialism can establish a reliable method for distinguishing between two types of correctness (and mistakes). (shrink)

"Realitas formalis/realitas obiectiva. The Paradox of Descartes’ Representationism" The paper discusses some aspects of the highly original theory of representation, developed by Descartes in his ‘Meditations’, and based on the ontological isomorphism of ideas and their material correlates. In the course of the analysis it is shown that the Cartesian theory involves unavoidable problems with discrimination or correlation of the objects in question, which is connected with the problem of constitutiveness of their modes of existence. Consequently, the conclusion of the (...) paper is that representationism based on the isomorphistic theory of representation turns out to be self-contradictory. (shrink)

"A Special Case of Logical Contradiction – Content Implication Approach" The difference between so-called performative/pragmatic and logical contradiction seems to be one of the most firmly established philosophical distinctions. There are, however, some utterances, which fall outside this classification in its current form. Moreover, they reveal that the expressive power of the language of classical logic is too weak to express some form of the logical contradiction. The main aim of this paper is to characterize this special case of the (...) contradiction. By extending classical logic with a new connective, i.e. content implication, it also provides tools needed for adequate formal representation of this phenomenon. (shrink)

In a recent series of papers, Jane Friedman argues that suspended judgment is a sui generis first-order attitude, with a question as its content. In this paper, I offer a critique of Friedman’s project. I begin by responding to her arguments against reductive higher-order propositional accounts of suspended judgment, and thus undercut the negative case for her own view. Further, I raise worries about the details of her positive account, and in particular about her claim that one suspends judgment about (...) some matter if and only if one inquires into this matter. Subsequently, I use conclusions drawn from the preceding discussion to offer a tentative account: S suspends judgment about p iff S believes that she neither believes nor disbelieves that p, S neither believes nor disbelieves that p, and S intends to judge that p or not-p. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to suggest how the internal logic and dynamics of the development of Cartesian philosophy can be reconstructed by means of the historical-theoretical analysis of one of the most forgotten lines of reception of Cartesianism, leading through the philosophy of British thinkers minorum gentium: Arthur Collier, John Norris, Richard Burthogge etc. Such analysis of the particular stages of the evolution of post-Cartesian thought – within one intellectual-cultural context, makes it possible to situate Berkeley’s system (considered (...) as a culminating point of the development of post-Cartesian British idealism) in the stream of the widely understood Cartesian thought. At the same time the analysis provides sufficient data to draw some general conclusions regarding the logic of the development of Cartesian-inspired philosophical systems. (shrink)

This article presents an argument for the view that we can perceive temporal features without awareness. Evidence for this claim comes from recent empirical work on selective visual attention. An interpretation of selective attention as a mechanism that processes high-level perceptual features is offered and defended against one particular objection. In conclusion, time perception likely has an unconscious dimension and temporal mental qualities can be instantiated without ever being conscious.

It is not clear to what the projects of creating an artificial intelligence (AI) that does ethics, is moral, or makes moral judgments amounts. In this paper we discuss some of the extant metaethical theories and debates in moral philosophy by which such projects should be informed, specifically focusing on the project of creating an AI that makes moral judgments. We argue that the scope and aims of that project depend a great deal on antecedent metaethical commitments. Metaethics, therefore, plays (...) the role of an Archimedean fulcrum in this context, very much like the Archimedean role that it is often taken to take in context of normative ethics (Dworkin 1996; Dreier 2002; Fantl 2006; Ehrenberg 2008). (shrink)

According to the orthodox view, the goodness of a life depends exclusively on the things that actually happened within it, such as its pleasures and pains, the satisfaction of its subject’s preferences, or the presence of various objective goods and bads. In this paper, I argue that the goodness of a life also depends on what could have happened, but didn’t. I then propose that this view helps us resolve ethical puzzles concerning the standards for a life worth living for (...) animals and the significance of a life’s shape. (shrink)

"Galileo on the Distinction between Primary and Secondary Qualities (I). A Superessentialist Argument" Galileo’s distinction between primary and secondary qualities has hitherto been examined almost exclusively from a contextual, historical perspective. This paper, the first of two planned, aims to fill this gap by providing a systematic, theoretical analysis of his principal argument for the distinction, as advanced in "The Assayer". I begin with a reconstruction of the key steps in the argument, and then proceed to identify and discuss the (...) epistemological and ontological presuppositions underpinning it. I argue that the most crucial and original assumption behind Galileo’s reasoning is the superessentialist principle, implying the mutual conditionality of the essentiality and reality of a material body’s properties. An in-depth analysis of the assumptions underlying Galileo’s reasoning paves the way for further examination of the most controversial aspect of his theory, that is, the ontological status of the secondary qualities. This issue will be addressed in the second forthcoming paper. (shrink)

This essay presents the Aestheticism of the 19th century as the foundational movement of modernist-formalist aesthetics of the 20th century. The main principle of this movement is what I denominate “productive opacity”. Aestheticism has not been recognized as a philosophical aesthetic theory. However, its definition of artwork as an exclusive kind of form—a deep, opaque form—is among the most precise ever given in the discipline. This essay offers an interpretation of aestheticism as a formalist theory, referred to here as “deep (...) formalism”, focusing on the thinking of leading aestheticists, Walter Pater, Oscar Wilde, and James Whistler. These three thinkers defined artwork as a form saturated with an inextricable content, viz. opaque form. (shrink)

Bakery products are very important in human nutrition and are the basis of any daily diet. Their social significance is determined by the traditions and habits of the population of the countries, accessibility for all groups of the population, diverse assortment, including bakery products for functional and specialized purposes. The up-to-date trend is to expand the assortment of functional bakery products, the use of which will provide the body’s need for the necessary macro- and micronutrients for an active and healthy (...) lifestyle. In the bread and bakery products market, consumer preferences are constantly changing. Consumers prefer products that contain less fat and sugar. The market is in demand for bakery products that are healthy, while taste remains an important success factor. Manufacturers include popular healthy additives (grains, seeds and legumes) in their products. Particularly popular at present are ingredients from Eastern Europe and Asia: yuzu, sesame, matcha, shiso. Tropical fruits (passion fruit, mango, bergamot) and fragrances (dried hibiscus, lavender and rose) are predicted to become popular. This causes the complexity of demand segmentation, features of merchandising and pricing policy, features of consumer behavior and consumption psychology, etc. An assessment is given of the dynamics of production and consumption of bread and exports of products, and a forecast is made for the development of the world market for bread and bakery products. The results of the analysis are necessary to assess the level of food safety and to develop a strategy that takes into account the current trends in the global bread and bakery products market. Prospective trends for sustainable production of frozen bakery products have been developed. (shrink)

This book offers a new definition of metaphor-as an ontological and visual construction, whose roots are external visual forms, and its motivation is our attachment to forms. This definition, which Michalle Gal names “visualist,” challenges the ruling conceptualist theory of metaphors and places a new emphasis on how we experience rather than understand metaphors. In doing so, she responds to the visual turn that is taking place in literature and the media, demanding that the visual become a site of philosophical (...) analysis. This focus on the external visual world allows Gal to employ visual theories to capture the essence of metaphor. She looks beyond conceptual or semantic mechanism, and returns to theories of Arnheim and Gombrich and the current evolution of ideas about the visual or material and embodied cognition. Proposing to see visual metaphors in their basic form, she uses a new externalist terminology of ontology, visuality, composition, affordance, construction, and emergence. Setting out a new theory that takes into account that humans are visual no less than cognitive creatures, Visual Metaphors and Aesthetics lays the foundation for a new vocabulary to talk about metaphors. (shrink)

"Richard Burthogge's Conceptualism and Its Origins in the Medieval Perspectivist Optics" The paper aims to analyse the historical determinants of the conceptualist argument for epistemological idealism made by the seventeenth-century English philosopher Richard Burthogge. The crux of this argument, unprecedented in earlier philosophy, is an attempt to prove the inherent inadequacy of human cognition from the divergence between the general concepts and the extra-mental singulars. At the same time, Burthogge considers the relationship between the universal and the particular to be (...) analogous to the relation between the visual image and the thing. I argue that, as suggested by certain significant aspects of Burthogge’s theory, it was medieval perspectivist optics that had decisively influenced the conception of visual cognition, which provided the basis for this analogy and, consequently, for the conceptualist argument itself. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Schopenhauer's argument against suicide has served as a punching bag for many modern-day commentators. Dale Jacquette, Sandra Shapshay, and David Hamlyn all argue that the premises of this argument or its conclusion are inconsistent with Schopenhauer's wider metaphysical and ethical project. This paper defends Schopenhauer from these charges. Along the way, it examines the relations between suicide, death by voluntary starvation, negation of the will, compassion, and Schopenhauer's critiques of cynicism and stoicism. The paper concludes that there may be (...) gaps in Schopenhauer's system, but not where the aforementioned commentators tried to locate them. (shrink)

The overreliance on verbal models and theories in psychology has been criticized for hindering the development of reliable research programs (Harris, 1976; Yarkoni, 2020). We demonstrate how the conceptual space framework can be used to formalize verbal theories and improve their precision and testability. In the framework, scientific concepts are represented by means of geometric objects. As a case study, we present a formalization of an existing three-dimensional theory of emotion which was developed with a spatial metaphor in mind. Wundt (...) posits that the range of human emotion can be represented along three axes of basic emotions (pleasure/displeasure, excitement/inhibition, tension/relaxation), just as color vision can be represented using three basic colors. We use dimensions to represent basic emotions, points to represent emotional states, and regions to represent broader emotional concepts. We then compare our formalization to an existing structuralist formalization of Wundt’s theory. Further, we discuss the empirical predictions that our formalization generates, such as comparisons of similarity and intensity. We conclude by demonstrating how the tools developed in the conceptual space framework can be used to formulate a theory of emotion based on empirical observation. (shrink)

Tato studie je v první řadě studií z dějin filosofie. Jejím hlavním úkolem je popsat život a dílo autora, který byl v česko-slovenském intelektuálním prostředí dlouhou dobu opomíjen: anglo-amerického matematika, fyzika a filosofa Alfreda Northa Whiteheada. Jeho životní příběh bývá někdy popisován jako „příběh tří měst“: Cambridge v Anglii, Londýna a nakonec Cambridge v Massachusetts, kde sídlí Harvardova univerzita. Studie se soustředí na některé významné momenty ve filosofově životě a pokouší se je zdůraznit jako klíč k porozumění Whiteheadovu celoživotnímu projektu. (...) Na samotném závěru je dodáno několik poznámek o recepci Whiteheadových myšlenek v česko-slovenském myšlenkovém milieu. (shrink)

This paper offers a theoretical framework that can be used to derive viable engineering strategies for the design and development of robots that can nudge people towards moral improvement. The framework relies on research in developmental psychology and insights from Stoic ethics. Stoicism recommends contemplative practices that over time help one develop dispositions to behave in ways that improve the functioning of mechanisms that are constitutive of moral cognition. Robots can nudge individuals towards these practices and can therefore help develop (...) the dispositions to, for example, extend concern to others, avoid parochialism, etc. (shrink)

The book "Unnoticed Revolution. Richard Burthogge's Constructivist Idealism" focuses on the theory of cognition developed by Richard Burthogge, the seventeenth-century English philosopher and author, among other works, of the "Organum Vetus & Novum" (1678) and "An Essay upon Reason and the Nature of Spirits" (1694). Burthogge’s ideas had a minimal impact on the philosophy of his time and have hitherto not been the subject of a detailed study. Nevertheless, his writings contain a highly original concept of constructivist idealism, which, when (...) seen from a historical perspective, turns out to have anticipated the crucial points of that proposed a century later by Kant. It is because at the core of Burthogge’s epistemological position lies the claim that the external object of cognition is never presented to the mind directly, but always under the 'modus concipiendi', a particular form of conceptualisation of the external reality, performed in the manner and with the means determined by the structural and functional properties of the human cognitive powers. As a result, Burthogge clearly anticipates Kant in claiming that the external world is unknowable in itself, being accessible to the human mind only through the ‘phenomena’ that the mind itself co-produces. The need for deeper analysis of the works by the ‘forgotten’ philosophers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries has been recognised for at least ninety years. The discussed book tries to meet these expectations. Its direct aim is to increase our knowledge of early modern British philosophy. At the same time, the restoration of the memory of the idealist doctrine, anticipating by almost a century that of Kant, should enable us to draw some new conclusions about the internal logic and immanent dynamic of the development of the whole post-Cartesian thought. (shrink)

Indicative conditionals and tendency causal claims are closely related (e.g., Frosch and Byrne, 2012), but despite these connections, they are usually studied separately. A unifying framework could consist in their dependence on probabilistic factors such as high conditional probability and statistical relevance (e.g., Adams, 1975; Eells, 1991; Douven, 2008, 2015). This paper presents a comparative empirical study on differences between judgments on tendency causal claims and indicative conditionals, how these judgments are driven by probabilistic factors, and how these factors differ (...) in their predictive power for both causal and conditional claims. (shrink)

The Minimal Theory of Causation, presented in Graßhoff and May, 2001, aspires to be a version of a regularity analysis of causation able to correctly predict our causal intuitions. In my article, I will argue that it is unsuccessful in this respect. The second aim of the paper will be to defend Hitchcock’s proposal concerning divisions of causal relations against criticism made, in Jakob, 2006 on the basis of the Minimal Theory of Causation.

The chapter is devoted to the probability and acceptability of indicative conditionals. Focusing on three influential theses, the Equation, Adams’ thesis, and the qualitative version of Adams’ thesis, Sikorski argues that none of them is well supported by the available empirical evidence. In the most controversial case of the Equation, the results of many studies which support it are, at least to some degree, undermined by some recent experimental findings. Sikorski discusses the Ramsey Test, and Lewis’s triviality proof, with special (...) attention dedicated to the popular ways of blocking it. Sikorski concludes that the role of the three theses in future studies of conditionals should be re-thought, and he presents alternative proposals. (shrink)

Epistemic consequentialism has been challenged on the grounds that it is overly demanding. According to the Epistemic Junk Problem, this view implies that we are often required to believe junk propositions such as ‘the Great Bear Lake is the largest lake entirely in Canada’ and long disjunctions of things we already believe. According to the Numerosity Problem, this view implies that we are frequently required to have an enormous number of beliefs. This paper puts forward a novel version of epistemic (...) consequentialism which avoids these twin demandingness problems. The key is to recognise, first, that the final epistemic value of a true belief depends at least in part on the duration for which it is retained by the agent and, second, that our cognitive makeup places important constraints on which beliefs are retained and for how long. (shrink)

The paper deals with Martin Buber’s claim that responsibility “is the basic theme of my work in general.” As I show in the opening section of the article, his statement applies to the dialogical period of his work, but not the pre-dialogical. In the mystical phase of Buber’s thought there is no place for responsibility because the very nature of mysticism excludes that possibility. The incompatibility of mysticism and interpersonal responsibility is confirmed in the autobiographical fragment “conversion,” one of the (...) two biographical moments I discuss in relation to the shift in his thinking on responsibility. The second is his relationship with his wife Paula Winkler, which profoundly influenced his thinking about the importance of love and marriage for an understanding of responsibility. I then explore his view of responsibility as a doctrine, which developed along with his dialogical philosophy. Finally, I examine his critical views on four basic ways of avoiding responsibility, which highlight the close connection between freedom and responsibility: belief in fate, individualism, collectivism, and religious acosmism. (shrink)

Recent progress in geroscience holds the promise of significantly slowing down or even reversing ageing and age-related diseases, and thus increasing our healthspans. In this paper, I offer a novel argument in favour of developing such technology and making it unconditionally available to everyone. In particular, I argue that justice requires that each person be provided with sufficient opportunities to have a ‘complete life’, that many people currently lack such opportunities, and that we would substantially improve the status quo by (...) giving them access to anti-ageing technology. (shrink)

"Semantic Aspects of Instrumentalism in the Philosophy of Science".

How do we ensure agents formulating legal statements are not systematically in error? In this paper I assume that the success of legal statements follows from the fact that propositions expressed by legal statements adequately represent legal reality. I argue that the content of legal statements hinges implicetly on the sources of law and methods in which we attribute meaning to these sources. In this regard, I identify the primary obstacle to the success of actions that consist of asserting legal (...) statements as a systematic failure to refer to the proper method of interpretation by the agents formulating these statements. The paper explores several solutions to this challenge, focusing on the solution explaining the success in referring to the proper method of interpretation in virtue of meta-interpretive considerations. Subsequently, the paper discusses a challenge to this solution following from the claim that there are many different theories of meta-interpretation, and there is no fact (neither natural, nor conventional or intentional, anchored in the collective consciousness of society), determining that one of them is more accurate than the other ones. Given all the intricacies, this study focuses on exploring a coherent framework for understanding how different interpretive methods and meta-interpretative theories can be evaluated and applied in legal practice. It seeks to articulate a model that accommodates the diversity of interpretations while striving for a reasoned consensus on how legal texts should be understood and applied. (shrink)

"Principles of So-Called 'Material' and 'Formal' Truth. A Logical, Philosophical and Juridical Analysis" Concepts of material and formal truth have a long and well-grounded tradition in the doctrine of law. It seems, however, that they need some clarification and conceptualisation in purely philosophical and logical terms. In this paper, we propose such a theoretical analysis. These considerations are followed by a review of the key aspects of the current Polish legislation, which is written from the point of view of the (...) conclusions reached through the first level of analysis. (shrink)

The paper focuses on the epistemology developed by Richard Burthogge, the lesser-known seventeenth-century English philosopher, and author, among other works, of Organum Vetus & Novum (1678) and An Essay upon Reason and the Nature of Spirits (1694). Although his ideas had a minimal impact on the philosophy of his time, and have hitherto not been the subject of a detailed study, Burthogge’s writings contain a highly original concept of idealistic constructivism, anticipating (relatively speaking) Kant’s idealism. At the same time, some (...) interesting implications for the issue of self-interpretation and self-identity can be derived from his account of the mind. At the core of Burthogge’s epistemological position is a remarkable idea of structural and functional similarity between the three human cognitive faculties, that is between reasoning, sensation and imagination. Accordingly, every cognition, intellectual as well as sensuous, contains in its structure an object-directed operation of apprehending and thus can be viewed as an intentional act in a broad sense of the term. An immediate consequence of this claim for both mind and object is that they cannot be reduced to a pure stream of sense data, but on the contrary are to be considered ontologically independent from the content of a cognitive act. Furthermore, an object of cognition is never presented to the mind directly, as it is in itself, but always under the modus concipiendi, a particular form or manner of conceiving, specific to human cognitive powers due to their internal structure. As a result, Burthogge clearly anticipates Kant in claiming that it is impossible to know reality in itself, and in situating human consciousness as if in between two unknowable spheres: the external and internal one. Since these restrictions are imposed not only on external, but also on internal cognition, that is on self-knowledge, they lead to considerable difficulties regarding the mind’s identity. Basically, two principal strategies to address this issue are available in the post-Cartesian framework of seeing the mind as an ontologically independent entity, and both of them appear to be ineffective when employed in Burthogge’s epistemology. First, the mind identity can be grounded in some extra-mental factors, preferably in matter. However, with no access to the external world in itself, and with the scope of knowledge restricted to mental phenomena, the mind’s identity cannot be defined in terms of relationship with the reality of which it knows nothing except that it exits. The second option is to explain personal identity by referring it to the intrinsic properties of the mind. Nevertheless, this strategy also faces insuperable obstacles, and for the same reasons as the former does. Since self-knowledge is no exception to the structural-functional principles imposed on cognition, the mind can also be known only under the subjective conditions of conceiving. It is, therefore, just as unknowable in itself as the external things are. The main purpose of the paper is to explore this aspect of Burthogge’s philosophy. (shrink)

"Subjectivisation of Sense Perception and Two Models of Early Modern Idealism" The distinction between primary and secondary qualities, most famously outlined by Galileo, and subsequently supported, inter alia, by Descartes and by Locke has widely been considered one of the crucial factors in the development of modern idealism. In its contemporary form, the distinction identifies some of the perceived properties as mental phenomena due to their content and structural dependence on the mind. However, this account of the primary/secondary distinction is (...) largely different from its original version developed by the above-mentioned philosophers, within whose work the mental being of the perceived qualities was demonstrated objectively, from the conceptually-derived nature of matter, and not subjectively, by referring to the mind’s participation in the cognitive process. It was only at the next stage of the early modern subjectivisation of sense perception, best exemplified by such philosophers as Arnold Geulincx and Richard Burthogge, that the creative role played by the mind in sensation and, consequently, the mind-dependency of the sensible qualities was recognised – a turn influenced by the reinterpretation of Aristotelian philosophy offered by Jacopo Zabarella and Paduan school as well as by Anti-Aristotelianism of the kind developed in Netherlands. Furthermore, the two different approaches to the primary/secondary distinction can be linked with two main types of post-Cartesian idealism, i.e. Berkeleian and Kantian – a claim for which illustrative evidence from British philosophy, namely from Berkeley’s and Burthogge’s respective theories, can be drawn. (shrink)

This essay characterizes the perception of the visual hybrid as nonconceptual, introducing the terminology of nonconceptual content theory to aesthetics. The visual hybrid possesses a radical but nonetheless exemplary aesthetic composition and is well established in culture, art, and even design. The essay supplies a philosophical analysis of the results of cross-cultural experiments, showing that while categorization or conceptual hierarchization kicks in when the visual hybrids are juxtaposed with linguistic descriptions, no conceptual scheme takes effect when participants are presented with (...) mere visual hybrids. In isolation, the hybrids do not lend themselves to classification. I draw four conclusions from these experimental outcomes: 1. The perception of visual hybrids follows the structure of a nonconceptual mental content, because the original categories or concepts of the hybrids’ components are not combined into one, and their properties are not applied to one another, therefore none of the components reconstructs the other such that it is introduced to a new category. 2. Language freezes the hybridity of the visual hybrid into conceptuality. 3. Given that language has a freezing effect in the case of an extreme visual phenomenon such as the hybrid, it is all the more restraining in moderate artistic compositions, such as visual metaphors, in which properties of one component (the source) are applied to the other (the target). In those, nonconceptuality emerges from relatively organized compositions, forms, and relations, and from the dependence of objects and their properties on perceptual context. 4. Thus, the nonconceptualist terminology is suitable for the analysis of aesthetic perception in general and aesthetic perception’s relation to language. Keywords aesthetics, perception, nonconceptual content, hybrids, visual metaphors. (shrink)

The paper focuses on the theory of cognition developed by Richard Burthogge, the lesser known seventeenth-century English philosopher, and author, among other works, of Organum Vetus & Novum (1678) and An Essay upon Reason and the Nature of Spirits (1694). Although his ideas had a minimal impact on the philosophy of his time, and have hitherto not been the subject of a detailed study, Burthogge’s writings contain a highly original concept of idealistic constructivism, anticipating Kant’s idealism. Therefore, a closer examination (...) of his philosophy can not only deepen our understanding of early modern British thought, but may also shed new light on the internal dynamics of the development of the whole post-Cartesian epistemology. (shrink)

"Metaphysical Conditions of the Berkeleian Immaterialism" This paper discusses metaphysical conditions of the Berkeleian immaterialism. First, the abstract concept of existence is demonstrated to be inadequate for Berkeley’s metaphysics. The core of the argumentation involves showing that any attempt to establish immaterialism on the basis of the theory of existence cannot succeed without accepting the constitutiveness of idea’s mode of existence and rejecting the autonomy of an object in relation to its mode of existence. Second, it is shown that Berkeley’s (...) metaphysics demands a mono-existential theory of an object. Consequently, this paper shows that since Berkeley’s idea cannot have more than one mode of existence (i.e. in the human mind perceiving it), metaphysical analysis of Berkeleian philosophy allows one to refute all its multi-existential interpretations. (shrink)

“Il n’y a pas de hors-texte”. Intralinguistic Semantics and Its Philosophical and Cognitive Consequences The aim of this paper is to present and metatheoretically analyse the model of intralinguistic semantics as set forth by Umberto Eco in his Theory of Semiotics. The distinctive feature of this system is the rejection of the realistic category of reference, understood as a correspondence of meaningful units with the extralinguistic domain of interpretation, i.e., with a class of extralinguistic semantic correlates. As a result, the (...) main idea of Eco’s theory is to replace the traditional extralinguistic semantics with the new one, in which the meaning of each unit is determined solely by its relations with the other elements of the system. Language formed in this way is semantically autonomous, intralinguistically closed and self-explaining. Analysis of Eco’s theory by means of the appropriate conceptual apparatus reveals the far-reaching philosophical and cognitive implications of his approach in studies on language, meaning and truth. (shrink)

It is easier to talk frankly to a person whom one trusts. It is also easier to agree with a scientist whom one trusts. Even though in both cases the psychological state that underlies the behavior is called ‘trust’, it is controversial whether it is a token of the same psychological type. Trust can serve an affective, epistemic, or other social function, and comes to interact with other psychological states in a variety of ways. The way that the functional role (...) of trust changes across contexts and objects is further complicated when communities and individuals mediate it through technologies, and even more so when that mediation involves artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML). In this chapter I look at the ways in which trust in institutions, and specifically the medical profession, is affected by the use of AI and ML. There are two key elements of this analysis. The first is a disanalogy between institutional trust in medicine and institutional trust in science (Irzik and Kurtulmus 2021, 2019; Kitcher 2001). I note that as AI and ML become a more prominent part of medicine, trust in a medical institution becomes more like trust in a scientific institution. This is problematic for institutional trust in medicine and the practice of medicine, since institutional trust in science has been undermined by, among other things, the spread of misinformation online and the replication crisis (Romero 2019). There is also a strong analogy between the psychological state of the person who trusts a scientific report or testimony and the psychological state of a patient who trusts individual recommendations made by a medical professional in a clinical setting. In both cases, institutional trust makes it less likely that a mistake or malfeasance will result in reactive attitudes, such as blame or anger, directed at other individual members of that institution. However, it also renders people vulnerable enough to blame the institution itself. This, with time, can erode trust in the institution and naturally leads to policy recommendations that aim to preserve institutional trust. I survey two ways in which that can be done with institutional trust in medicine in the age of AI and ML. (shrink)

"Theory of modus concipiendi in Richard Burthogge’s Epistemology" The paper focuses on the epistemology of Richard Burthogge, the lesser known seventeenth-century English philosopher and author, among other works, of the Organum Vetus & Novum (1678) and An Essay upon Reason and the Nature of Spirits (1694). Although his ideas had a minimal impact on the philosophy of his time, and have hitherto not been the subject of a detailed study, Burthogge’s writings contain a highly original concept of idealistic constructivism. The (...) most important claim of this approach is that the external objects are never presented to the mind directly, as they are in themselves, but always under the modus concipiendi, a particular form of conceiving or conceptualising, performed by the human cognitive powers (both intellectual and sensuous) in the manner and with the means determined by their structural and functional properties. Thus, Burthogge clearly anticipates Kant in claiming that the external world is unknowable in itself, being accessible to the human mind only through the phenomena that the mind itself co-produces. The paper provides an outline of the theory of modus concipiendi, including its historical context and idealistic consequences, preceded by the brief presentation of Burthogge’s epistemology. (shrink)

"The Essence of Tradition. A Structural-Logical Approach" The concept of tradition is not unambiguous – the same word can be defined differently within different theoretical contexts. Fortunately there is a formal theory, i.e. speech act theory, that allows us to conduct a systematic structural linguistic analysis of the category in question. At the same time, speech-theoretical approach to the concept of “tradition” provides an universal method for expressing the results obtained in different conceptual systems. The subject of this paper is (...) a preliminary analysis of various benefits of applying the speech-theoretical framework to the research on tradition. (shrink)

"The Problem of Intersubjectivity in Berkeley’s Immaterialism" The paper discusses the issue of intersubjectivity in Berkeley’s early philosophy. In the course of metaphysical analysis I argue that it is not possible to save within Berkeleian metaphysics intersubjectivity of the object of cognition and the unity of the world of experience, either in version of its strict identity or by taking perfect likeness as a criterion of its identity.

"Nietzsche - Extreme Philosophy of Language?" The coherence of the Nietzschean conception of language is discussed in the article. First, Nietzsche's critique of the referential semantics and the correspondence theory of truth implied by the so-called "tropological" linguistic theory as well as the doctrine of perspectivism is questioned. Consequently, the core of the argumentation is to reveal the naturalistic and metaphysical assumptions of Nietzsche's strict relativistic philosophy of language and interpretation. The conclusiveness of the Nietzschean deconstruction of metaphysics as a (...) pure language creation seems to be doubtful with regard to his construction of the 'will-to-power metaphysics'. Moreover, the reception of the Nietzsche’s philosophy as deconstructivistic after the II World War has to be revised while confronted with his hermeneutical philology. Finally, the status of the Nietzschean affirmation of reality as a play of interpretations in accordance with Paul de Man can be recognized as purely rhetorical. (shrink)

'Culture’. The Work for Choir and Orchestra. Music as an Organon for the Structural Analysis of Myth.

"Between Essence and Existence. Metatheoretical Analysis of the History of Metaphysics" Der Text ist eine synthetische Darstellung der Geschichte der Metaphysik des Westens, von den klassischen Gedanken der Antike und Scholastik, über die Kartesianische subjektivistische Reform, die Transzendentalkonzeption, Hegels Philosophie des Geistes, bis hin zur Phänomenologie und der analytischen Metaphysik. Der Fokus des Artikels liegt in der Darstellung der Entwicklung des westlichen metaphysischen Gedankens und in der Rekonstruktion der immanenten Logik dieses Prozesses.

This is the editorial of the monothematic issue of the journal Filozofia dedicated to Martin Buber (1878 – 1965) on the occasion of the centenary of the first publication of his most famous and popular book, I and Thou, on his philosophy of dialogue.

Neuroscience is a fascinating discipline – its dynamic progress has led to the emergence of new interdisciplinary research programmes with great potential. One of these research areas is neuroeconomics. As will be shown in this article, this discipline, which is difficult to clearly characterize and define, is faced with many problems. This paper argues that social scientists should be interested in the problems and tendencies in social neuroscience for several reasons. Neuroeconomics, and other disciplines inspired by neuroscience, will compete with (...) their parent disciplines in many fields of interest. On one hand it will be necessary for scientists to define and defend the irreplaceable roles of their disciplines, but also critically evaluate the potential of new approaches on the other. In the context of this discussion, which reopens questions about the scientific status of economics and its roles, this paper introduces the main problems related to neuroeconomics. This paper concludes that these problems represent a wide domain for social scientists and methodologists of science. (shrink)

"Galileo on the Distinction between Primary and Secondary Qualities (II). The Problem of the Ontological Status of Sensations" The article is a continuation of the paper in which a theoretical analysis of Galileo’s principal argument for the distinction between primary and secondary qualities was provided. It focuses on the problem of the ontological status of secondary qualities/sensations. I discuss three main interpretative approaches to the issue, considered in light of the findings obtained in the first paper. In the first part (...) of the article, I address the mentalist interpretation of Galileo’s secondary qualities. Additionally, I explore the mechanistic rationale behind his account, in virtue of which it may be called ‘the dustbin theory of the sensorium’. In the second part, I examine the arguments for the materialist reading of the secondary qualities and, by contrasting it with the results obtained in the first article, the theoretical problems inherent in it. In the third part of the paper, I discuss the hermeneutical advantages and theoretical disadvantages of interpreting Galileo’s secondary qualities in Aristotelian terms. I conclude the study by indicating the textual basis and historical significance of the interpretative difficulties discussed. (shrink)

Unlike human soldiers, autonomous weapons systems are unaffected by psychological factors that would cause them to act outside the chain of command. This is a compelling moral justification for their development and eventual deployment in war. To achieve this level of sophistication, the software that runs AWS will have to first solve two problems: the frame problem and the representation problem. Solutions to these problems will inevitably involve complex software. Complex software will create security risks and will make AWS critically (...) vulnerable to hacking. I claim that the political and tactical consequences of hacked AWS far outweigh the purported advantages of AWS not being affected by psychological factors and always following orders. Therefore, one of the moral justifications for the deployment of AWS is undermined. (shrink)

Philosophers and scientists refer to the special character of phenomenal consciousness, something supposedly obvious to all conscious persons. However, we had no empirical evidence about the folk view of consciousness until the first studies were carried out in the experimental philosophy of consciousness. According to the leading interpretation of these results, laypersons—people without academic knowledge about consciousness—do not notice the phenomenal aspect of consciousness. The aim of the article is to answer the question of whether we can trust these results. (...) I show that there are serious doubts about the validity of the experimental philosophy of consciousness research. As a result, the leading interpretation should be rejected, and the question about the folk nature of the concept of consciousness must be regarded as open. (shrink)