At a House hearing on December 5, 2023, the presidents of three universities—Harvard, MIT, and the University of Pennsylvania—refused to state that certain kinds of hate speech, specifically calls for genocide of Jews, are prohibited on their campuses. The backlash against two of them, Harvard’s Claudine Gay and Penn’s Liz Magill, was swift and devastating; both of them were successfully pressured to resign. Still, while Professors Gay’s and Magill’s responses were widely criticized as tone-deaf, they were legally correct. At many (...) private, and all public, colleges and universities, even the worst hate speech is generally protected unless it is accompanied by aggressive, threatening, or violent conduct. -/- These “demotions” augur even worse consequences, including termination, for less powerful faculty who say the “wrong” thing, in particular statements in support of Trumpism, an increasingly mainstream ideology that stitches together white supremacy, misogyny, a preference for autocracy over democracy, and several phobias—homophobia, Islamophobia, transphobia, and xenophobia. The question I address in this paper is whether these consequences are constitutional at public schools. Whose right is stronger—a public-school teacher’s First Amendment right to express pro-Trumpist sentiments or a public school’s right to maintain a fair, inclusive, and welcoming learning environment? In this article, I argue that the public school has the upper hand here, that it is indeed constitutionally permitted to prohibit political hate speech that contributes to a hostile learning environment. Still, I narrowly limit this prohibition to dehumanizing speech—that is, speech explicitly suggesting that some human beings are “lesser”, intrinsically less valuable, than other human beings. -/- One objection to this position is that public schools may not prohibit any speech, no matter how dehumanizing, because such prohibition amounts to constitutionally impermissible viewpoint discrimination. I argue, however, that viewpoint discrimination is an integral part of education and therefore constitutionally permissible. Education necessarily involves promoting some values over others. These values fall into seven categories: constitutional principles, the humanist virtues, successful character traits and behaviors, knowledge and truth, art and beauty, health (both mental and physical), and social goods (such as justice, peace, and rule of law). (shrink)

Furthering Western style academic freedom has been challenging, as Arab countries, especially Libya, have known only autocratic regimes throughout their modern existence. Amidst its current political and social upheaval, Libyan society is drifting towards the unknown. The problem addressed in this study is the impact of political change on the state of academia but, more specifically, academic freedom. Since the intervention in Libya by NATO states, many academics have lost their jobs. Some have become refugees outside of Libya as a (...) direct result of the appropriation of most of the governmental posts in the country by religious and political radicals. The research questions reflect ways in which the new inserted de facto leaders of post-transitional Libya have impacted life on Libyan campuses and academic freedom. (shrink)

In this chapter, against the backdrop of campus responses to Israel and Gaza, I consider the mission of the university and whether that mission is served by institutional neutrality. On my view, it is not so easy (and may be impossible) to prise apart universities’ core functions and “public matters.” I argue that institutional neutrality is at best a useful fiction and at worst a way of concealing universities’ commitments and reinscribing the status quo. Along the way, I offer (...) a primer on academic and expressive freedoms in the context of universities, and on the importance of articulating and balancing core university values, including the duty of care. I conclude by offering advice on when universities should take a public stand on socio-political matters. -/- [This chapter is forthcoming in 2026 in an as-yet untitled edited collection edited by Marc Spooner and James McNinch and published by University of Regina Press.]. (shrink)

Political protests, debates on college campuses, and social media tirades make it seem like everyone is speaking their minds today. Surveys, however, reveal that many people increasingly feel like they're walking on eggshells when communicating in public. Speaking your mind can risk relationships and professional opportunities. It can alienate friends and anger colleagues. Isn't it smarter to just put your head down and keep quiet about controversial topics? In this book, Hrishikesh Joshi offers a novel defense of speaking your mind. (...) He explains that because we are social creatures, we never truly think alone. What we know depends on what our community knows. And by bringing our unique perspectives to bear upon public discourse, we enhance our collective ability to reach the truth on a variety of important matters. Speaking your mind is also important for your own sake. It is essential for developing your own thinking. And it's a core aspect of being intellectually courageous and independent. Joshi argues that such independence is a crucial part of a well-lived life. The book draws from Aristotle, John Stuart Mill, Friedrich Nietzsche, Bertrand Russell, and a range of contemporary thinkers to argue that it's OK to speak your mind. Key Features Shows that we have not just a right but a moral duty to publicly share what we know. Argues that discussing your unique ideas with others is essential for developing as a critical thinker. Explores the value of intellectual honesty and independence in the writings of John Stuart Mill and Friedrich Nietzsche and connects their thinking to contemporary problems. Argues that avoiding cultural blind spots today is important for the fate of future generations. (shrink)

notes on Jordan Peterson's 1999 magnum opus, with thoughts on his recent trajectory.

an inquiry into recent animal experimentation at Sick Kids Hospital, including detailed accounts of pain research and fear conditioning on neonatal rodents, induced lung trauma on piglets, and the infection of impregnated mice with malaria. -/- appended with three 2018 Press Releases that provoked Sick Kids to contact Toronto police and ban me from their premises and from contacting their researchers.

What is coercion and why do we care? Coercion is widespread and used especially when raising children, but on its darker side coercion can have devastating consequences. We are worried about coercion as it can invalidate consent. This is seen in the USA where campus rape cases have soared in recent years and brought consent and coercion back to the forefront of debate. Coercion is a hotly debated legal, political and ethical concept. However, in all this debate we have (...) seen little in the way of what coercion means exactly and how we determine it is taking place. Wertheimer and Garnett have interesting views about how coercion can be understood, from the morally wrong side of coercion to the situations where people are left much worse off because of its use. Only the morally wrong situations are subject to the law but there is a whole set of coercive situations that could take place which look bad to the outsider but are not necessarily morally wrong. This is the area of coercion I wish to discuss further. Wertheimer states that there are two types of coercion, moralised and non moralised. Moralised coercion concerns whether it was ‘wrongful’ to propose the offer and the non-moralised notion examines whether the coerced had any other reasonable choice. In a similar vein to Wertheimer, Garnett believes that coercion has two roles, Deontic (wrong) and Eudaimonic (bad). This would vaguely map to Deontic as Moralised and Eudaimonic as Non Moralised. Garnett discusses the eudaimonic version at length believing it is relatively unexplored in situations of coercion. This paper consists of 4 sections: • Section 1 discusses what Coercion is • Section 2 reviews Wertheimer’s view of Moralised and Non Moralised Consent • Section 3 discusses Garnett’s View • Section 4 considers a cost-benefit analysis of eudaimonically wrong situations. In conclusion it is apparent that, in order to have a full picture of what kind of situations coercion actually covers we must not simply rely on the deontic concept. The Deontic way of looking at situations will tell us what is morally wrongful and possibly redressable in court but many situations simply sit badly with us. It is here, in this arena, that the eudaimonic concept comes into its own. (shrink)

The Black Panther Party was founded to bridge the radical theorizing that swept college campuses in the mid-1960s and the lumpen proletariat abandoned by the so-called ‘Great Society’. However, shortly thereafter, Newton began to harshly criticize the academic Left in general for their drive to find ‘a set of actions and a set of principles that are easy to identify and are absolute.’ This article reconstructs Newton’s critique of progressive movements grounded primarily in academic debates, as well as his conception (...) of vanguard political theory. Newton’s grasp of revolution as a gradual, open, and above all dialectical process, not only provides a corrective to many dominant academic accounts of the nature of progressive change but, more importantly, it also grounds an emancipatory philosophy that can direct collective struggle, precisely because it remains grounded in the imperfect and internally conflicted lives of those whose freedom is to be won through it. (shrink)

The UK Government's Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Bill is currently progressing through Parliament. The bill is designed to strengthen free speech and academic freedom in higher education, in response to what former Education Secretary Gavin Williamson describes as ‘the rise of intolerance and cancel culture upon our campuses’. But is there really a crisis of academic freedom in British universities?To see that there is, say Judith Suissa and Alice Sullivan, we need only look at the contemporary reality of suppression (...) of debate on sex and gender. The evidence they catalogue of suppression of research, of blacklisting, harassment and smear campaigns, of no-platforming, disinvitations and shutting down of events, is incontrovertible. The recent experience of scholars and students wishing to discuss the material reality and political salience of sex makes complacency about academic freedom a luxury we cannot afford.Suissa and Sullivan set out a powerful argument for the role of academic freedom in pursuing truth within the academy and developing democracy beyond it. They effectively counter attempts to narrow the scope of academic freedom so as to render it compatible with no-platforming. And they lay out a series of practical steps administrators can take to ensure that universities are places where an expansive and pluralistic intellectual climate prevails.This is a timely and compelling intervention in a vexed but urgent public debate. For their clear-sighted diagnosis of where and how academic freedom has been eroded in our universities, and for their judicious account of what must be done to rebuild it, Suissa and Sullivan deserve a wide and attentive hearing. (shrink)

This paper explains how the practice of ‘no platforming’ can be reconciled with a liberal politics. While opponents say that no platforming flouts ideals of open public discourse, and defenders see it as a justifiable harm-prevention measure, both sides mistakenly treat the debate like a run-of-the-mill free speech conflict, rather than an issue of academic freedom specifically. Content-based restrictions on speech in universities are ubiquitous. And this is no affront to a liberal conception of academic freedom, whose purpose isn’t (...) just to protect the speech of academics, but also to give them the prerogative to determine which views and speakers have sufficient disciplinary credentials to receive a hearing in academic contexts. No platforming should therefore be acceptable to liberals, in principle, in cases where it is used to support a university culture that maintains rigorous disciplinary standards, by denying attention and credibility to speakers without appropriate disciplinary credentials. (shrink)

The currently used humanity model is chaotic, devoid of logic or coherence. In Part 1 of this two-part paper, we examined human traits of a scientific model in absence of ‘born sinner’ starting point. We demonstrated that the so-called ‘viceroy model’ that is characterized as scientifically sustainable can replace the existing models that are based on fear and scarcity. Part Two of the paper deals with adequate definition of moral campus that conforms to the viceroy model. In this paper, (...) it is shown that the talk of morality or a moral compass is aphenomenal in absence of strict necessary and sufficient conditions. It also follows that natural justice can only be followed after defining the term ‘natural’ with the same scientific rigor as that of the viceroy model. Once these terms are consistently defined, one is well poised to talk about inalienable rights, moral compass, environmental sustainability, and humanity. The immediate consequence of this model is the demonstration that currently used governance models, such as democracy, is inherently implosive and must be replaced with a new model that is in conformance with the scientific definition of ‘natural’. This emerging model is free from inconsistencies and will remain effective as a governance tool that optimizes individual rights and balances with the right of the state as well as a Creator. It is concluded that this model offers the only hope of maximizing individual liberty without compromising universal peace and natural justice. At this point, morality and legality become equivalent to each. The implications of this paper are overwhelming, making all current judicial actions immoral, in essence repudiating the entire Establishment as little more than a mafia entity, bringing back ‘might is right’ mantra, packaged as ‘social progress’. The paper finally shows how a standard that is necessarily and sufficiently universal can become impetus for a true knowledge. (shrink)

Ciência Política: Introdução à Sófocles*1 -/- Science Politics: Introduction to Sophocles -/- Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva*2 -/- Sófocles (496/4-406 a.C.) -/- 1 CONTEXTO HISTÓRICO: TEATRO E POLÍTICA -/- Na Grécia antiga, o teatro fazia parte das celebrações religiosas, especialmente nos rituais e representações dos festivais em homenagem ao deus Dionísio. A tragédia nasceu de tais circunstâncias, culminando seu apogeu no século V a.C., com as peças de Ésquilo*3 (525-456a.C.), SÓFOCLES*4 (496/4-406 a.C.) e Eurípedes*5 (480-406 a.C.). Pode-se dizer que, (...) contrário ao que ocorre normalmente, a arte não se deixou preceder pela filosofia, pois os poetas eram filósofos, pensando com sua própria mente e constituindo-se na vanguarda intelectual do seu tempo. -/- SÓFOCLES, em 468 a.C., ganhou do já consagrado Ésquilo, seu primeiro prêmio de tragédia, quando tinha vinte e sete anos. Ele nasceu em Colono, nas imediações de Atenas, filho de fabricante de espadas, que, com as guerras da Pérsia e do Peloponeso, aumentou seus serviços consideravelmente, enriquecendo a família. Não obstante, os demais atenienses empobreceram miseravelmente. SÓFOCLES era considerado bonito, inclusive sua estátua, que o representa na velhice, indica-lhe como um vigoroso homem. Era muito habilidoso em tudo o que fazia, tanto nas tragédias, como nas guerras e nos esportes. -/- Foi contemporâneo e amigo de Péricles*6 (495-429 a.C.), grande líder de Atenas, que lhe 6 ajudou a ocupar altos cargos, como o de tesoureiro e general, em 443 a.C. Em 440 a.C., encontrava-se entre os generais e comandantes das forças atenienses contra Pomos. Foi, ainda, membro do Comitê de Segurança Pública, votando a favor da Constituição oligárquica, em 411 a.C. Exerceu, também, funções de sacerdote. Era um homem alegre e amante dos prazeres, emanando encanto e simpatia, que lhes faziam perdoar os erros, envolvido com rapazes e cortesãs, inclusive teve um filho da célebre hetera Têoris.*7 Foi também contemporâneo de Eurípedes, ainda que nascido bem antes deste, mas ambos morreram no mesmo ano, em 406 a.C. -/- SÓFOCLES escreveu cento e treze peças, das quais só nos chegaram sete, nesta ordem de procedência, Ajax (c. 445 a.C.) As Traquínias (c. 445 a.C.), Antígona (c. 442), Édipo Rei (c. 425), Electra (c. 415), Filoteuto (409) e Édipo em Colono (401). Ganhou o primeiro prêmio de teatro, por dezenove vezes, tendo vinte e sete anos na primeira, e oitenta e cinco, na última. Governou o teatro ateniense por mais de trinta anos, da mesma maneira que seu amigo Péricles governava Atenas. -/- Escreveu uma trilogia não intencional, com as tragédias Édipo Rei (425 a.C.), Édipo em Colono (401 a.C.) e Antígona (442 a.C.). A primeira foi o mais famoso dos dramas gregos, tendo uma abertura impressionante, com a população diante do palácio real de Tebas. Havia uma peste que assolava a cidade, e isso os oráculos identificaram como decorrência de um grande crime. A clássica narrativa tratava de um filho, Édipo, que inadvertidamente matara o pai, Laio, e se casara com a mãe, Jocasta, com a qual teve quatro filhos: Antígona, Polinice, Etéocles e Ismênia. Quando tudo fora descoberto, Jocasta se enforcara e Édipo, enlouquecido, arrancara os próprios olhos e abandonara Tebas, partindo para o exílio em companhia apenas de Antígona. Já em Édipo em Colonos, este estava envelhecido a mendigar em Colono, perto de Atenas, apoiado apenas pela filha. -/- Antígona foi a última peça da trilogia, ainda que tenha sido a primeira a ser escrita. Ao tomar conhecimento de que seus irmãos Polinice e Etéocles estavam em guerra pelo trono de Tebas, regressou apressada para tentar apaziguá-los. Não obstante, eles lutaram até a morte. Creonte aliado de Etéocles, tomou o reino e puniu a rebeldia de Polinice, proibindo que fosse sepultado. Antígona, evocando a crença de que o espírito de um morto só se livrava das torturas da morte depois do corpo ser enterrado, violou o decreto de Creonte e sepultou seu irmão Polinice. Houve, então, o conflito entre as leis dos homens com as leis dos deuses, optando ela por esta, como esperavam as pessoas dignas de se comportarem. Antígona foi condenada pelo tio a ser enterrada viva, colocada em uma catacumba. Seu noivo, Hêmam, filho de Creonte, que desaparecera quando ela desobedecera o decreto real, voltou e encontrou sua prometida morta, suicidando-se em seguida.*8 O drama era denso em todos os seus elementos, mas se elevava quando discutia o comportamento que o cidadão devia ter frente às leis opressivas. -/- 2 DESOBEDIÊNCIA CIVIL: RECUSA DE ANTÍGONA -/- Antígona e sua irmã Ismênia representavam, respectivamente, os símbolos de resistência à tirania e de obediência à razão, colocando a lei de Creonte frente à lei da justiça. Diante do édito que impedia Antígona de sepultar Polinice, considerava a existência do direito natural de enterrá-lo, sendo este o seu drama político. Devia obedecer às leis da polis ou da consciência e dos princípios religiosos? Este drama é representado pelo magnífico texto de SÓFOCLES, quando Creonte perguntou se Antígona tripudiava sobre suas leis. Antígona lhe respondeu que: -/- “Essas leis não foram promulgadas por Zeus, nem mesmo a Justiça, que convive com os deuses do inferno, foi a que estabeleceu tais princípios para os homens. Ele ainda afirmou que os anúncios das leis de Creonte não tinham o poder que eles imaginavam que o tinha, e que um simples mortal pudesse suplantar os preceitos, não escritos e imutáveis dos deuses. Antígona ainda afirma que tais preceitos não foram de hora, como também não fora de ontem, mas que sempre vigoraram no mundo sensível, e que ninguém sabia ao certo de sua existência. Antígona afronta Creonte dizendo que por causa das leis do mesmo, não queria ser ela castigada perante os deuses por ter, de alguma forma, medo da ira e afronta de um reles mortal. Ainda diz que sua morte é algo inevitável, uma vez que é a única certeza dos homens, e que ela há de vir em um tempo, pois isso não se pode ignorar, todavia se sua morte não a tivesse sido anunciada antes, e que com isso morrera antes do tempo, o tomaria como vantagem, uma vez que, submetido as mais variadas intempéries da vida, como não iria considerar sua morte um benefício? E com isso, essa dor de nada vale no tocante de seu destino. Antígona continua dizendo que em nada o afeta ao ver o cadáver do filho morto de sua mãe na condição de insepulto, uma vez que isso não lhe causa dor . O mesmo conclui dizendo que se achara que ele cometera um ato de loucura após a proclamação de sua resposta, talvez o achasse louco aquele que viera a condená-lo.”*9 -/- O conflito entre a lei positiva, enunciava o drama grego, e a lei natural, significava que esta identificava-se com a Justiça dos deuses, que era superior à lei da terra.*10 Para Antígona, aquela deveria sempre prevalecer, mas a sua morte representou o triunfo, mesmo que trágico, da lei da polis.*11 SÓFOCLES foi quem primeiro falou do direito de resistência, inclusive com a possibilidade de se sofrer uma grave sanção, como ocorreu com Antígona, e ainda assim sabendo suportar a dor.*12 A teoria não logrou desenvolvimento na Grécia antiga, nem na teoria política antiga. Deixou, porém, uma indagação que só no século XVIII começou a ser respondida, pela forma clássica do direito de resistência. -/- NOTAS: *1: In. COSTA, N. N. Ciência Política. 3. ed. Rio de Janeiro: Forense, 2012. p. 61-67. *2: Tecnólogo em agropecuária pelo Instituto Federal de Pernambuco campus Belo Jardim. Normalista pela Escola Frei Cassiano Comacchio. Pesquisador assíduo de assuntos de cunho filosófico, com ênfase em política. *3: “Ésquilo, poeta grego (Elêusis, c. 525 – Gela, Sicília, 456 a.C.). Suas obras, As Suplicantes (c. 490), Os Persas (472), Os Sete contra Tebas (467), Prometeu Acorrentado (depois de 467) e a trilogia da Oréstia(Agamênom, Os Coéforos, As Eumênides) (458), fazem dele o verdadeiro criador da tragédia grega” (KOOGAN/HOUAISS. Enciclopédia e Dicionário Ilustrado, op. cit., p. 622). *4: “Sofócles, o poeta trágico grego (Colono, perto de Atenas, entre 496 e 494 a.C., Atenas 406 a.C.). Amigo de Péricles e Heródoto, cidadão completo, obteve, durante sua carreira excepcional, mais de 20 vitórias em concursos dramáticos. De sua obra, apenas sete tragédias, entre as mais de uma centena, e um drama satírico, do qual só restam longos fragmentos, Os Cães de Caça, chegaram até nós: Ajax (c. 445 a.C.), Trachiniani (c. 445?), Antígona(442), Édipo rei (c. 425), Electra (c. 415), Filotecto (409), Édipo em Colono (401). Deu à tragédia sua configuração definitiva: elevando de 12 para 15 o número de integrantes do coro,acrescentou um terceiro ator e substituiu atrilogia unida pela trilogia livre, onde cada drama forma um todo. Em Sófocles, a ação da tragédia é levada a termo pela vontade e pelas paixões do herói, indivíduo excepcional que, em luta contra um destino que o oprime, continua livre” (Grande Enciclopédia Larousse Cultural, op. cit., vol. 22, p. 5.441). *5: “Eurípedes, poeta trágico grego (Salamina, 480 – Macedônia, 406,a.C.), cujas obras mais célebres são: Alcestes (438), Medeia (431), Hipólito (428), Andrômaca (c. 426), Hécuba (c. 424), Íon (c. 418), Ifigênia em Áulida, As Bacantes. Eurípedes introduziu várias inovações na tragédia: ênfase na análise psicológica, preocupações científica e filosóficas, coros independentes da ação, introdução de personagens do povo” (KOOGAN/HOUAISS. Enciclopédia e Dicionário Ilustrado, op. cit., p. 642). *6: Vide nota 7 do capítulo II, Herôdotos. *7: “Más-línguas afirmam que Sófocles consumou sua velhice com a hetera Têoris, tendo um filho. Seu filho legítimo Iófas, talvez temendo que o poeta legasse ao filho de Têoris, levantou contra ele uma ação judicial,acusando-o de servil e incapaz da administração dos bens, Sófocles, para provar sua lucidez, fez perante os juízes a leitura de certos trechos da peça que na ocasião estava escrevendo, e que se julgou ser Édipo em Colono, ao término da leitura, os juízes não só o absolveram como o acompanharam até sua casa” (DURANT, Will. História da Civilização Mundial: nossa herança clássica, op. cit., vol. II, p. 314). *8: SÓFOCLES. Antígona. Brasília: Universidade de Brasília, 1997, p. 45. *9: Idem, op. cit., pp. 41-2. *10: “Aquela (Antígona), porém, prefere ficar com as ordens mais altas dos deuses, inacessíveis à maldade humana” (MACHADO PAUPÉRIO, A. O Direito Político de Resistência. 2ª ed. Rio de Janeiro: Forense, 1978, p. 38). *11: “Antígona, entretanto, rebelou-se contra o edital de Creonte, considerando o sepultamento um dever mais forte que as leis dos homens, principalmente em se tratando de parentes, e cumpriu, embora sumariamente, os ritos fúnebres de Polinice” (KURY, Mário da Gama. Dicionário de Mitologia Grega e Romana. Rio de Janeiro: Jorge Sales, 1990, p. 35). *12: “No século V a.C., os grandes trágicos gregos, Ésquilo, Sófocles e Eurípedes, empregavam os mitos antigos para explorar os mais profundos temas da condição humana” (TARNAS, Richard. A Epopeia do Pensamento Ocidental: para compreender as ideias que molduram nossa visão de mundo. 2ª ed. Rio de Janeiro: Bertrand Brasil, 2000, p. 33). -/- . (shrink)

The International Network of Critical Studies of Tourism, Territory and Self-Determination invites to the: -/- III International Meeting of REESCRITA Research Network Reflections for a Sustainable and Inclusive Tourism -/- to be held from January 29th to February 2nd, 2024 at the facilities of the Monterrey Institute of Technology and Higher Education, Campus Cuernavaca -/- Purposes To analyze the current situation of tourism and territoriality studies, in governmental, legislative, business and social sectors; To identify theoretical and methodological contributions and (...) empirical research results of specialists in various disciplines that converge around tourism studies, such as Anthropology, Organizational Sciences, Legal Sciences, Political Science, Communication, Demography, Economy, Geography, History, Social Psychology, International Relations and Sociology, as well as interdisciplinary areas that imply a vision of sustainability around territory and tourism, such as water, education, environment and sustainability, public health, social work, among others; To publicize research results FOR understanding tourism and its implications in community life, territoriality and environment. -/- Topics: Tourism from the community perspective Governance, territory and sustainability Tourism and health International perspectives for sustainable tourism -/- Participants Researchers Teachers Tourism professionals Public and private institutions related to tourism Academic institutions. (shrink)

Emily Chamlee-Wright is clearly right that self-censorship is an issue of concern within the academy. How much of a problem it is—how widespread and how bad it is when it occurs—is unclear and difficult to quantify. Administrators, faculty, and students all self-censor from time to time. Sometimes the self-censorship is just a matter of being polite or exercising pedagogical restraint, as Chamlee-Wright notes. The worry, of course, is that sometimes it prevents open and honest discussion about difficult topics and thus (...) stymies learning and truth-seeking. While I will keep these caveats in mind, I also want to help strengthen Chamlee-Wright’s case. I will also, though, point out a difficulty. (shrink)

Many philosophers of music, especially within the analytic tradition, are essentialists with respect to musical experience. That is, they view their goal as that of isolating the essential set of features constitutive of the experience of music, qua music. Toward this end, they eliminate every element that would appear to be unnecessary for one to experience music as such. In doing so, they limit their analysis to the experience of a silent, motionless individual who listens with rapt attention to the (...) sounds produced by either musicians a on stage, a stereo, or a portable device. This approach is illustrated in recent work by Nick Zangwill. Drawing on essentialist assumptions, Zangwill concludes that properly musical experience is effectively disembodied and radically private. While this seems plausible when we consider the essentialists’ paradigm case, Zangwill’s conclusion seems odd once we consider the wide variety of ways that people experience music. One’s body and social situation seem ineluctably enmeshed within the experience of, e.g., hot jazz played in a nightclub, where listeners bob their heads and dance to the music, cheer on the musicians, and socialize with their fellow concertgoers. The question this paper aims to answer is: should we consider this and similar experiences of music properly “musical”? I maintain that we should. Far from the world of pure music that Zangwill and others relegate properly musical experience, I conclude that our musical experiences are fully enmeshed within the somatic, affective, and interpersonal dimensions of human life. (shrink)

This paper argues that the current scholarship of radical politics primarily bannered by Christopher Ryan Maboloc is a misappropriation of the postMarxist political project of Mouffe and Laclau. Drawing primarily both on Mouffe’s and Laclau’s work Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics and an interview with Chantal Mouffe herself, the paper argues how the post-Marxist radical political project of Mouffe and Laclau fails to theoretically fit to the style of governance and regime of Duterte. Fundamental (...) to the idea of radical democratic politics is the task of radicalizing liberal democracy. However, as discussed in the paper, liberal democracy is a project whose very institutions and processes Duterte and his regime have undermined and attacked. Under Duterte’s regime, radical democracy lost the conditions for its flourishing, rendering its own impossibility. (shrink)

Bernard Williams articulated his later political philosophy notably in response to Ronald Dworkin, who, striving for coherence or integrity among our political concepts, sought to immunize the concepts of liberty and equality against conflict. Williams, doubtful that we either could or should eliminate the conflict, resisted the pursuit of conceptual integrity. Here, I reconstruct this Dworkin–Williams debate with an eye to drawing out ideas of ongoing philosophical and political importance. The debate not only exemplifies Williams's political realism and its connection (...) to his critique of the morality system. It also illustrates the virtues and hazards of contemporary efforts to ameliorate or engineer our concepts; it indicates what political philosophy might look to in appraising political concepts; it adverts to the different needs these concepts have to meet if they are to sustain a politics of pluralism, deal with polarization, and secure the consent of those who end up on the losing side of political decisions; and it presents us with two starkly contrasting conceptions of politics itself, of the place of political values within it, and of our prospects of reducing the uncomfortably conflictual character of those values through philosophy. (shrink)

Technology has the power to break the limitations of traditional passive learning and innovate almost all aspects of everyday life with the power of connecting things of the world to the Internet, “Internet of Things (IoT).” IoT is no longer a phenomenon, but it has become a prevalent system in which people, processes, data, and things connect to the Internet and each other. This paper ‘Enhanced Campus Automation System and the emerging need of IoT integration: an automation perspective’ [eCAS-IoT] (...) is an outcome of case study undertaken at St. Aloysius’ College, Jabalpur, India, wherein the automation challenges are taken into consideration that has been integrated in the existing ERP and related tools such as RFID based attendance and monitoring system in real-time, digital library, API integration and implementation of Optical Network. In this paper we have tried to bring out ideas to achieve the campus automation challenges and awareness of greater need of technical expertise, promotion and training on the effective use of ICT and related devices to make teaching, learning and administration more impacting. (shrink)

Obligations to reduce one’s green house gas emissions appear to be difficult to justify prior to large-scale collective action because an individual’s emissions have virtually no impact on the environmental problem. However, I show that individuals’ emissions choices raise the question of whether or not they can be justified as fair use of what remains of a safe global emissions budget. This is true both before and after major mitigation efforts are in place. Nevertheless, it remains difficult to establish an (...) obligation to reduce personal emissions because it appears unlikely that governments will in fact maintain safe emissions budgets. The result, I claim, is that under current conditions we lack outcome, fairness, promotional, virtue or duty based grounds for seeing personal emissions reductions as morally obligatory. (shrink)

There has been much interest in conspiracy theories (CTs) amongst philosophers in recent years. The aim of this paper will be to apply some of the philosophical research to issues in political theory. I will first provide an overview of some of the philosophical discussions about CTs. While acknowledging that particularism is currently the dominant position in the literature, I will contend that the ‘undue scepticism problem’, a modified version of an argument put forward by Brian Keeley, is an important (...) general objection to many CTs. This in turn leads to some substantial conclusions for liberal political philosophy, as the undue scepticism problem sets up a strong argument against non-liberal alternatives to liberal thought. I shall argue that we are justified in having far more doubt about the reliability of official sources in non-liberal societies, and it is legitimate to be more sceptical about claims designed to bolster non-liberal politics. Moreover, because scepticism is often more warranted in non-liberal societies, this may provide the possibility for the state to be stable, even if it is highly tyrannical or ineffective. These considerations are not intended to be decisive, but raise unresolved questions about the viability of non-liberal politics. (shrink)

Empirically-informed approaches to emotion often construe our emotions as modules: systems hardwired into our brains by evolution and purpose-built to generate certain coordinated patterns of expressive, physiological, behavioural and phenomenological responses. In ‘Against Modularity’ (2008), de Sousa argues that we shouldn’t think of our emotions in terms of a limited number of modules because this conflicts with our aspirations for a life of greater emotional richness. My aim in this paper is to defend de Sousa’s critique of modular emotion taxonomies (...) from some obvious rejoinders, and to develop his positive proposal as to how we might reconcile the evidence for emotional modularity with an attitude of disapproval towards rigid emotion taxonomies. (shrink)

This book offers a detailed study of the political philosophies of Thomas Hobbes and Benedict de Spinoza, focussing on their concept of power as potentia, concrete power, rather than power as potestas, authorised power. The focus on power as potentia generates a new conception of popular power. Radical democrats–whether drawing on Hobbes's 'sleeping sovereign' or on Spinoza's 'multitude'–understand popular power as something that transcends ordinary institutional politics, as for instance popular plebsites or mass movements. However, the book argues that (...) these understandings reflect a residual scholasticism which Hobbes and Spinoza ultimately repudiate. Instead, on the book's revisionist conception, a political phenomenon should be said to express popular power when it is both popular (it eliminates oligarchy and encompasses the whole polity), and also powerful (it robustly determines political and social outcomes). Two possible institutional forms that this popular power might take are distinguished: Hobbesian repressive egalitarianism, or Spinozist civic strengthening. But despite divergent institutional proposals, the book argues that both Hobbes and Spinoza share the conviction that there is nothing spontaneously egalitarian or good about human collective existence. From this point of view, the book accuses radical democrats of pernicious romanticism; the slow, meticulous work of organizational design and maintenance is the true centre of popular power. Three minute video summary available via HPBin3. Extended discussion on The Political Theory Review podcast. First chapter open access available via Oxford Scholarship Online. Videos of book talks at National University of Singapore (Centre for Legal Theory) and Universidad de Buenos Aires (Instituto de Investigaciones Gino Germani) available via YouTube. (See links below.). (shrink)

What does it mean to study places in ‘crisis’ and how does that affect the research done on the ‘rural’? To be considered to be in crisis is not really new as any literature review of rural studies indicates. And yet, we live now in a new context, with new challenges for ‘rural’ research, in particular that of sustainability. Sustainability is the new policy focus and is increasingly reflected in research on rural Europe. Although scholars are beginning to theorize on (...) what is sustainable in and for rural areas, our intention is to take this further. We theorize on what the focus on crisis and, increasingly on sustainability, means for the research we do and the knowledge we produce on rural Europe. Our aim is to bring attention to the politics of past and present knowledge production on the rural to be able to imagine just and sustainable futures. In an analysis of literature primarily from Sweden and the UK, we argue that two construals, that of a rural crisis and that of rural–urban polarization, have set the tone for rural studies and may have overshadowed a more plural approach. We outline what might be needed from rural research to meet future challenges and what the notion of sustainability, with its emphasis on the entanglements of the social, economic and environmental, might mean for the future of rural research. (shrink)

What are philosophers doing when they prescribe a particular epistemology for science? According to science and technology studies, the answer to this question implicates both knowledge and politics, even when the latter is hidden. Exploring this dynamic via a specific case, I argue that Longino’s “critical contextual empiricism” ultimately relies on a form of political liberalism. Her choice to nevertheless foreground epistemological concerns can be clarified by considering historical relationships between science and society, as well as the culture of (...) academic philosophy. This example, I conclude, challenges philosophers of science to consider the political ideals and accountability entailed by their prescribed knowledge practices. (shrink)

Scholarship on the politics of new media widely assumes that communication functions as a sufficient conceptual paradigm for critically assessing new media politics. This article argues that communication-centric analyses fail to engage the politics of information itself, limiting information only to its consequences for communication, and neglecting information as it reaches into our selves, lives, and actions beyond the confines of communication. Furthering recent new media historiography on the “information theory” of Shannon and Wiener, the article reveals (...) both the primacy of communication in midcentury information theory, and also a striking resonance between these postwar communication theories and Habermas’s more recent communicative theory of democracy. To achieve a critical perspective beyond communication, the article proposes a media genealogy of the politics of subjects as a methodology for developing an analysis of how information formats us as subjects of data. (shrink)

The case for an unprecedented penetration of life mechanisms into the politics of Western modernity has been a cornerstone of 20th-century social theory. Working with and beyond Foucault, this article challenges established views about the history of biopower by focusing on ancient medical writings and practices of corporeal permeability. Through an analysis of three Roman institutions: a) bathing; b) urban architecture; and c) the military, it shows that technologies aimed at fostering and regulating life did exist in classical antiquity (...) at the population scale. The article highlights zones of indistinction between natural and political processes, zoē and bíos, that are not captured by a view of destructive incorporation of or over life by sovereign power. In conclusion, the article discusses the theoretical potential of this historical evidence for contemporary debates on ‘affirmative biopolitics’ and ‘environmental biopower’. (shrink)

According to Aristotle, the medical art aims at health, which is a virtue of the body, and does so in an unlimited way. Consequently, medicine does not determine the extent to which health should be pursued, and “mental health” falls under medicine only via pros hen predication. Because medicine is inherently oriented to its end, it produces health in accordance with its nature and disease contrary to its nature—even when disease is good for the patient. Aristotle’s politician understands that this (...) inherent orientation can be systematically distorted, and so would see the need for something like the Hippocratic Oath. (shrink)

There appear to be few ways available to improve the prospects for international cooperation to address the threat of global warming within the very short timeframe for action. I argue that the most effective and plausible way to break the ongoing pattern of delay in the international climate regime is for economically powerful states to take the lead domestically and demonstrate that economic welfare is compatible with rapidly decreasing GHG emissions. However, the costs and risks of acting first can be (...) very large. This raises the question of whether it is fair to expect some states to go far ahead of others in an effort to improve the conditions for cooperation. I argue that a costly obligation to act unilaterally and to accept weak initial reciprocity can be justified and does not violate standards of fair burden sharing. Rather, the costs of creating the underlying conditions within which we can hope to achieve meaningful international cooperation are non-­‐ideal burdens for which we can appropriately assign fair shares. (shrink)

Taking his critique of totalitarianizing conceptions of community as a starting point, this text examines Jean-Luc Nancy's work of an ‘ontology of plural singular being’ for its political implications. It argues that while at first this ontology seems to advocate a negative or an anti-politics only, it can also be read as a ‘theory of communicative praxis’ that suggests a certain ethos – in the form of a certain use of symbols (which is expressed only inaptly by the word (...) ‘style’) that would render the ontological plurality of singulars perceptible and practically effective. Finally, some recent texts by Nancy even sidestep the ontology of being-with and face the question of what politics, faced with demands of justice, could be and what a democratic politics could provide. Both of these aspects in Nancy's work, however, still remain to be spelled out more politically. (shrink)

Appeals to nature are ubiquitous in Epicurean ethics and politics. The foundation of Epicurean ethics is its claim that pleasure is the sole intrinsic good and pain the sole intrinsic evil, and this is supposedly shown by the behavior of infants who have not yet been corrupted, "when nature's judgement is pure and whole." Central to their recommendations about how to attain pleasure is their division between types of desires: the natural and necessary ones, the natural but non-necessary ones, (...) and the vain and empty ones. Elsewhere, the Epicureans talk about the "natural goods" of political power and fame, and they contrast "natural wealth" with wealth as "defined by empty opinion." Finally, in their politics, Epicurus claims that the "the justice of nature is a pledge of reciprocal usefulness, [i.e.,] neither to harm one another nor to be harmed." This paper explores two questions regarding these various appeals to nature. The first is: what is it for these things to be natural, i.e., what notion of "natural" or "nature" is at play here? (Furthermore, is there a single notion being used across these appeals, and if not, how are they related?) The second is: what normative work does a thing's being natural do? That is, what reason, if any, does a desire's being natural give me for pursuing the object of that desire and trying to fulfill that desire, as opposed to not doing so and trying to eliminate it, and similarly for the other appeals to nature? (shrink)

Aristotle’s Politics is a study of the political institutions of the 4th C. Mediterranean world, including both Greek communities (like Athens and Sparta) and non-Greek communities (like Persia and Carthage). The work is foundational for a number of modern scholarly disciplines such as political science, political theory, ancient history, and ancient philosophy; thus, the work annually is the subject of a robust number of scholarly studies (on average, about four monographs and 25 journal articles and book chapters per year). (...) This chapter reviews scholarship on the Politics, focusing on work produced since 2010. The chapter first reviews general introductions, editions, and interpretative strategies for understanding the Politics. It then reviews major subsections or conceptual issues within the Politics. The chapter concludes with a review of major trends in scholarship and suggestions for future scholarly directions in understanding Aristotle’s Politics. (shrink)

Apocalypse, it seems, is everywhere. Preachers with vast followings proclaim the world's end and apocalyptic fears grip even the non-religious amid climate change, pandemics, and threats of nuclear war. But as these ideas pervade popular discourse, grasping their logic remains elusive. Ben Jones argues that we can gain insight into apocalyptic thought through secular thinkers. He starts with a puzzle: Why would secular thinkers draw on Christian apocalyptic beliefs--often dismissed as bizarre--to interpret politics? The apocalyptic tradition proves appealing in (...) part because it theorizes a special relation between crisis and utopia. Apocalyptic thought points to crisis as the vehicle to bring the previously impossible within reach, thus offering apparent resources for navigating challenges in ideal theory, which tries to imagine the best and most just society. By examining apocalyptic thought's appeal and risks, this study arrives at new insights on the limits of ideal theory and utopian hope. (shrink)

The higher education sector in Indonesia is currently confronting a concerning issue. Corruption and poor management plague various universities in this country, creating an unfavorable work environment for the academic community. The university management system, which should be an essential pillar in enlightening the nation, has instead become a source of problems troubling professors, staff, and students. This essay argues that urgent reform of the corrupt and ineffective university management system is necessary for the academic community's well-being.

The aim of this master’s thesis is to analyse and highlight the interaction between science, politics and law. More precisely, our research question concerns the use of scientific arguments in social spheres (notably in politics and law) instead of legal or political arguments. In fact, we want to raise the way in which certain actors invoke scientific arguments to impose "objective" elements of fact in debate and, in this way, refrain from politically and "subjectively" discussing these same elements (...) (or, at least, their social consequences). This Master’s thesis will adopt an interdisciplinary theoretical framework (chapter 1) mobilising philosophy of science, philosophy of law, sociology of law, legal technique and analytical theories. Then, we will apply it to a case study: the European regulation of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) after the European Court of Justice (CJEU) ruling of 25 July 2015 (chapter 2). The first chapter will provide theoretical elements to rethink the interaction between science, politics and law. The first section will propose a 'state of the art’ of the philosophical literature on the relationship between science (as a regime of truth) and politics. This master’s thesis will assess a truth under construction rather than a transcendental truth. Section 2 anticipates authoritarian claims based on science by considering the relationship science can have with power (Foucault). A solid review of philosophical, sociological and legal literature highlights the risks of giving decision-making power to an all-powerful science. Notably, the use of science to justify discriminatory policies is emphasised as these policies could not be challenged because, at the time, it was considered an objective scientific truth. Finally, section 3 offers a critique of the narratives of neutral and objective science, through the approach of science in action. This sociological approach presented all the doubts and subjectivity of science in action. The second chapter will propose a case study to illustrate the theoretical framework. We have chosen GMOs because they constitute a hybrid 'event', marked by scientific controversies, and with major socio-economic implications. The legal framework of GMOs in the European Union will be presented in the first section. In addition, the legal status of new breeding techniques (NBTs) will be examined. The second section will analyse the ruling of the European Court of Justice which made NBTs subject to GMO regulation. Finally, the third section will propose a reflection on the philosophy of law on the modes of existence of scientific, legal and political disciplines. (shrink)

Hate speech, understood broadly, is any form of expression intended to arouse hatred or contempt toward members of a particular social group. When university administrators have reason to believe that a planned speaking event on campus may feature hate speech (at least in the eyes of some), how should they respond? In this paper I address this question as it arises for Canadian universities. I argue that, where the regulation of campus speech is concerned, the right course of (...) action for university administrators is nearly always to do absolutely nothing. They will have reason to become actively involved only in order to ensure that a speaking event proceeds safely, or when it threatens to disrupt the functioning of the university, or when it is itself threatened with disruption by protesting groups. In those instances the justification for intervention will be to protect and facilitate speech, not to shut it down. (shrink)

Kant is often regarded as one of the founding fathers of modern liberal democracy. His political theory reaches its climax in the ground-breaking work, Perpetual Peace (1795), which sets out the basic framework for a world federation of states united by a system of international law. What is less well known is that two years earlier, in his Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason (1793/1794), Kant had postulated a very different, explicitly religious path to the politics of peace: (...) he presents the idea of an “ethical community” as a necessary requirement for humanity to become “satisfactory to God”. While many recent scholars have noted the importance of Kant’s concept of the ethical community, few recognize the force of his argument that such a community is possible only if it takes the form of a church; as a result, the precise status of his proposal remains unclear and under-appreciated. He argues in Division One, Section IV, of Religion’s Third Piece that the idea of this community can become a reality only through a “church” that is characterized by four rational requirements: unity, integrity, freedom, and the changeability of all church rules except these four unchangeable marks. Prior to Section IV, Division One portrays this ethical community as having a political form, yet an essentially nonpolitical matter. He compares it with Jewish theocracy, but observes that the latter failed to be an ethical commonwealth because it was explicitly political. Whereas traditional theocracy replaces the political state of nature (which conforms to the law, “might makes right”) with an ethical state of nature (which conforms to the law that I call, “should makes good”), or attempts to synthesize them, non-coercive theocracy transcends this distinction through a new perspective: it unites humanity in a common vision of a divine legislator whose only law is inward, binding church members together like families, through the law of love. Whereas the legal rights supported by democracy and a system of international law can go a long way to prepare for world peace, Kant’s conviction is that it will be ultimately impossible without support from healthy religion. (shrink)

Does the recent success of Podemos and Syriza herald a new era of inclusive, egalitarian left populism? Because leaders of both parties are former students of Ernesto Laclau and cite his account of populism as guiding their political practice, this essay considers whether his theory supports hope for a new kind of populism. For Laclau, the essence of populism is an “empty signifier” that provides a means by which anyone can identify with the people as a whole. However, the concept (...) of the empty signifier is not as neutral as he assumes. As I show by analyzing the role of race in his theory, some subjects are constituted in a way that prevents their unmediated identification with the people. Consequently, Laclau’s view should be read as symptomatic of the problems with populist logic if its adherents are to avoid reproducing its exclusions and practice a more inclusive politics. (shrink)

In The Women of Grub Street (1998), Paula McDowell highlighted the fact that the overwhelming majority of women’s texts in early modern England were polemical or religio-political in nature rather than literary in content. Since that time, the study of early modern women’s political ideas has dramatically increased, and there have been a number of recent anthologies, modern editions, and critical analyses of female political writings. As a result of Patricia Springborg’s research, Mary Astell (1668-1731) has risen to prominence as (...) one of the most astute female political commentators of her day. Springborg argues for Astell’s importance as one of the first systematic critics of the philosopher John Locke, and she interprets Astell’s political thought as a reaction to Lockean Whig politics in the early reign of Queen Anne. But some scholars claim that it is a mistake to think that Astell was chiefly preoccupied with Locke, and others suggest that reading Astell in relation to Locke alone can distort our understanding of her larger political theory. In this chapter, I argue that a more accurate picture of Astell’s political outlook emerges by examining a little studied essay, ‘A Prefatory Discourse to Dr D’Aveanant’ in her 1704 work Moderation Truly Stated. In this critique of Charles Davenant’s Essays upon Peace at Home, and War Abroad (1704), Astell provides a commentary on the political ruthlessness of Niccolo Machiavelli in his Discourses on Livy. Astell’s comments reveal that, in an age in which the political vocabulary was turning to the language of rights, property, and liberty, she still subscribed to the ancient world view, and the ethical-political language of virtue and the good. My intention is to show that these ethical dimensions of Astell’s political thought are consonant with her wider philosophy. (shrink)

Theorists analyzing the concepts of race and gender disagree over whether the terms refer to natural kinds, social kinds, or nothing at all. The question arises: what do we mean by the terms? It is usually assumed that ordinary intuitions of native speakers are definitive. However, I argue that contemporary semantic externalism can usefully combine with insights from Foucauldian genealogy to challenge mainstream methods of analysis and lend credibility to social constructionist projects.

Based on field research in Africa, this essay explores three claims: first, that sport hunting places economic value on wildlife and habitats; second, that this motivates conservation practices in the interest of sustaining revenue sources; and, third, that this benefits human populations. If true, then sport hunting may sometimes be justifiable on utilitarian grounds. While not dismissing objections from the likes of Singer and Regan, we suggest their views – if converted into policy in desperately impoverished places – would destroy (...) animals and the habitats on which they depend. There are empirical verifications of this, which we discuss. (shrink)

A review of Michael Ignatieff's book, 'Fire and Ashes: Success and Failure in Politics', published by Harvard University Press, 2013.

Eliminating sexual violence requires understanding where it comes from and why it happens. We must learn to detect when the grounds for violence are being built up so that we can promptly take them down. How can we improve our ability to notice the subtle practices of sexism and make them a matter of critical reflection? The aim of this paper is to show how film can enhance critical perception of the social conditions that give rise to sexual violence in (...) particular. We do this by way of a specific example, showing how Joyce Chopra’s 1985 film Smooth Talk serves to display the complex circumstances that make sexual violence possible – thereby illustrating Frye’s philosophical insight about the interconnected mechanisms of oppression.​ -/- . (shrink)

Il tema di questo saggio è la paideia greca vista attraverso il progetto del «terzo umanesimo», che Werner Jaeger propose nella Germania degli anni venti del Novecento per rispondere alla crisi del suo tempo e del suo paese. L’impegno educativo e intellettuale è considerato da Jaeger, al seguito di Platone, la condizione necessaria per riqualificare l’esperienza politica, nella convinzione che la crisi del tempo sia propria della Bildungstradition umanistica. Il fallimento del progetto jaegeriano non impedisce di tornare a interrogarsi sulla (...) possibilità di un rinnovato umanesimo alla luce della politica intesa come esperienza di vita e dei suoi conflitti.The topic of this essay is Greek paideia seen through the project of «third humanism», which Werner Jaeger put forward in 1920s Germany, in order to answer the crisis of his time and his country. Educational and intellectual commitment is considered by Jaeger, following Plato, the necessary condition to revalorise political experience, in the belief that the crisis of that time is characteristic of the humanistic Bildungstradition. The failure of the Jaegerian project does not prevent us from wondering again about the possibility of a renewed Humanism in the light of the conception of politics as experience of life and of its conflicts. (shrink)

This paper approaches the question of the relations between laypeople and experts by examining the relations between common sense and philosophy. The analysis of the philosophical discussions of the concept of common sense reveals how it provides democratic politics with an egalitarian foundation, but also indicates how problematic this foundation can be. The egalitarian foundation is revealed by analyzing arguments for the validity of common sense in the writings of Thomas Reid. However, a look at three modern philosophers committed (...) to the link between philosophy and common sense – Descartes, Berkeley and, again, Reid – shows that each assigns very different contents to the concept. This raises the suspicion that modern common sense is not only an egalitarian element, but also a rhetorical tool with which intellectuals attempt to shape the views of the lay masses. The last part suggests that the way out of the predicament is rejecting the supposition that common sense is a unified, homogeneous whole. An alternative is sketched through Antonio Gramsci’s concept of common sense. (shrink)

Reading the Phenomenology onto-grammatically means interpreting its constitutive forms of consciousness as grammatical iterations of the speculative proposition, where the subject-object relations can be read as dialogical encounters between subject and predicate, where the predicate “talks back”, creating a discursive space of hermeneutical ambiguity and openness, at play in the copula. The article begins with a brief presentation of Hegel’s general theory of language, as it pertains to the distinction between the linguistic sign (Zeichen) and the word (Wort), drawn from (...) his later writings, before applying these grammatical terms to the ontological reading of the speculative sentence, as presented in the Preface to the Phenomenology and discussed by Jere Surber. Then, the article puts its dialogical insights into practice, examining how the onto-grammatical reading of the speculative sentence plays out in the Phenomenology’s famous "lordship and bondage" (aka "master/slave") dialectic. (shrink)