According to the epistemic account of request normativity, a request gives us reasons by revealing normatively relevant information. The information is normative, not the request itself. I raise a new objection to the epistemic account based on situations where we might try to avoid someone requesting something of us. The best explanation of these situations seems to be that we do not want to acquire a new reason to do something. For example, if you know I am going to ask (...) you to read a draft of my paper, you might avoid running into me so as to avoid acquiring a reason to read a draft of my paper. I then argue that the epistemic account can successfully reply to this objection and that in fact the epistemic account does a better job of accounting for cases like this than competing views of the normativity of requests. (shrink)

Non-naturalist realists are committed to the belief, famously voiced by Parfit, that if there are no non-natural facts then nothing matters. But it is morally objectionable to conditionalise all our moral commitments on the question of whether there are non-natural facts. Non-natural facts are causally inefficacious, and so make no difference to the world of our experience. And to be a realist about such facts is to hold that they are mind-independent. It is compatible with our experiences that there are (...) no non-natural facts, or that they are very different from what we think. As Nagel says, realism makes scepticism intelligible. So the non-naturalist must hold that you might be wrong that your partner matters, even if you are correct about every natural, causal fact about your history and relationship. But to hold that conditional attitude to your partner would be a moral betrayal. So believing non-naturalist realism involves doing something immoral. (shrink)

There are many phenomena where politicians try to perpetuate their power through political dynasties, especially in local government. This is worrying, considering that the abuse of power will be easier with the political elite consisting of their own families. This research will then look at how political dynasties can occur in the Indonesian government system. This research will be carried out using a descriptive qualitative approach. The data used in this research was obtained through the literature study method. The results (...) of this research then found that several factors cause political dynasties to occur in Indonesia. The first factor is Indonesian society which is plural, so individual political behavior is strongly influenced by social, economic, psychological, historical, political, and cultural factors. Another factor is that candidates who have charisma and popularity will provide great opportunities and make it easier for other family members to run for office in society. (shrink)

This essay develops the epistemic challenge to non-naturalist moral realism. While evolutionary considerations do not support the strongest claims made by ‘debunkers’, they do provide the basis for an inductive argument that our moral dispositions and starting beliefs are at best partially reliable. So, we need some method for separating truth from falsity. Many non-naturalists think that rational reflection can play this role. But rational reflection cannot be expected to bring us to truth even from reasonably accurate starting points. Reflection (...) selects views that are coherent and conflict-free, yet there is no reason to think that the non-natural moral truth must be like this. Inasmuch as we seek coherent, conflict-free, ethical viewpoints, that suggests that our goal is not non-natural truth at all. (shrink)

We approach the notion of general (global) human intelligence as a prominently multifaceted concept which can be tested in at least seventy specific scenarios. We say that an agent has Artificial Global Intelligence (AGLI), if it is able to perform in an intelligent manner for at least the collection of tasks defining the former scenarios. In particular, based on Gartner's multiple intelligences theory, we describe the design of a concrete test for AGLI made in such a way that an ‘average’ (...) young human being should, per diffinitionem, pass it. We compare our holistic test with several highly representative human and artificial intelligence tests for deducing that our AGLI test is the one with the broader scope of the whole range of intelligence. However, we claim as a plausible hypothesis and based on the wide thematic spectrum of the test that the most outstanding inventions of AI currently available are far from getting a high score on it. Finally, we open a discussion about the fact that, although there are artificial agents being able to simulate intelligent behaviour at a perfect level for several local tasks, this seems not to be the case for AGLI. This would imply, in particular, a kind of practical implausibility of the notion of intelligence explosion coming from philosophy of AI. (shrink)

Experiences like pains, pleasures, and emotions have affective phenomenal character: they feel pleasant or unpleasant. Imperativism proposes to explain affective phenomenal character by appeal to imperative content, a kind of intentional content that directs rather than describes. We argue that imperativism is on the right track, but has been developed in the wrong way. There are two varieties of imperativism on the market: first-order and higher-order. We show that neither is successful, and offer in their place a new theory: reflexive (...) imperativism. Our proposal is that an experience P feels pleasant in virtue of being constituted by a Command with reflexive imperative content, while an experience U feels unpleasant in virtue of being constituted by a Command with reflexive imperative content : More of P!Less of U! If you need a slogan: experiences have affective phenomenal character in virtue of commanding us Get more of me! Get less of me! (shrink)

We argue for the possibility of validating the presence of consciousness in another person from a perspective that blends both, a third-person approach of coming close to, observing, and understanding the other; and a first-person assessment of how the experience of the other feels like. For this, we will need to explain how the line between the third-person and first-person approaches is blurred in some methodological approaches. We rest our position largely on the back of some seminal conclusions of the (...) meditations of Ren\'e Descartes and other theories concerning consciousness like Chalmers' naturalistic dualism and, to some secondary extent on Integrated Information Theory (IIT). Additionally, we describe fundamental contextual principles already developed in the literature and the arts (like Stanivlaski's Acting System), and then we use them for setting a suitable methodology that we feel can be used to validate the presence of others' conscious experiences in one's consciousness (at suitable periods of spacetime). Finally, we give general methodological guidelines for the construction of the concrete experiment and we explore very briefly the potential implications of this kind of research in other academic and non-academic settings. (shrink)

We present a multidisciplinary, universal a pragmatic theory of causation based explicitly on five methodological causal seminal dimensions. The first one is called formal-mathematical-idealist theory and emerges as a meta-conceptual fusion of several existing causal theories. The second one is essentially based on a global, scientific and technical perspective. In fact, this can be considered as a meta-dimension encompassing a huge number of academic disciplines. The third dimension arises once more as combination of former approaches having the mind and its (...) laws as the central paradigm. The fourth one is structurally related with our subjective phenomenological world and its objective impact on the external universe. And, finally, the fifth dimension is closely related with the first one, but more oriented toward the global implicit purpose of the universe and what this implies causally on the events in nature. We give several concrete examples elucidating the explanatory range of our theory. (shrink)

We describe (essential features and an axiomatization of) a new metamathematical (cognitive) ability, i.e., functional conceptual substratum, used implicitly in the generation of several mathematical proofs and definitions, and playing a fundamental role in Artificial Mathematical Intelligence (or Cognitive-computational metamathematics). Furthermore, we present an initial (first-order) formalization of this mechanism together with its characterizing relation with classic notions like primitive positive definability and Diophantiveness. Additionally, we analyze the semantic variability of functional conceptual substratum when small syntactic modifications are done. Finally, (...) we describe cognitively natural inference rules for (mathematical) definitions inspired by functional conceptual substratum and we show that they are sound and complete w.r.t.\ standard calculi. (shrink)

The boundless nature of the natural numbers imposes paradoxically a high formal bound to the use of standard artificial computer programs for solving conceptually challenged problems in number theory. In the context of the new cognitive foundations for mathematics' and physics' program immersed in the setting of artificial mathematical intelligence, we proposed a refined numerical system, called the physical numbers, preserving most of the essential intuitions of the natural numbers. Even more, this new numerical structure additionally possesses the property of (...) being a bounded object allowing us to work with quite similar axioms like the classic Peano axioms, but in a finite environment and with an enriched physical dimension. Finally, we present several enlightening examples and we conclude that the physical numbers provide a natural formal setting for approaching classic problems in number theory from a more hybrid perspective, i.e. with a potential participation in the generation of solutions, not only of working mathematicians but also of more sophisticated artificial interactive (mathematical) intelligent agents (within the context of cognitive-computational metamathematics or artificial mathematical intelligence) and more controlled by physically-inspired principles. Finally, this paper addresses a highly new, bottom-up and paradigm-shifting approach to the foundations of physics: One should refine and improve the conceptual formal setting of the language that we use for understanding physical phenomena (e.g. the mathematical grounding concepts and theories) for being able to understand better more subtle and complex physical phenomena. (shrink)

Die analytische Philosophie ist nicht dafür bekannt, dass ihre Vertreter*innen sich in ihrer Rolle als Philosoph*innen an radikaler Politik beteiligen . Progressive Politik links des Liberalismus bezieht ihr philosophisches Verständnis hauptsächlich aus der marxistischen und post-strukturalistischen Tradition. Nach einem kurzen Überblick über die Geschichte der analytischen Philosophie, zeige ich, warum sie bisher keine Grundlage für radikale Politik liefern konnte. Alternativ schlage ich eine Form des liberalen Naturalismus als Basis für einen kritischen, interdisziplinären Materialismus vor. Analytic philosophers are not known for (...) taking part in radical politics. Radical left-wing politics takes its philosophical inspiration mainly from Marxist and post-structuralist traditions. After giving a short overview of Analytic philosophy’s history, I will show why this approach could not deliver a foundation for radical politics. Alternatively, I outline a form of liberal naturalism, which could serve as a basis for a critical, interdisciplinary materialism. (shrink)

Affective experiences such as pains, pleasures, and emotions have affective phenomenology: they feel pleasant. This type of phenomenology has a loopy regulatory profile: it often motivates us to act a certain way, and these actions typically end up regulating our affective experiences back. For example, the pleasure you get by tasting your morning coffee motivates you to drink more of it, and this in turn results in you obtaining another pleasant gustatory experience. In this article, we argue that reflexive imperativism (...) is the only intentionalist account of affective phenomenology—probably, the only account at all—that is able to make sense of its loopy regulatory profile. (shrink)

In Escape from Leviathan, Jan Lester sets out a conception of liberty as absence of imposed cost which, he says, advances no moral claim and does not premise an assignm..

A physical model was utilized to show that the neural system can memorize a target position and is able to cause motor and sensory events that move the arm to a target with more accuracy. However, this cannot indicate in which coordinates the necessary computations are carried out. Turning off the lights causes the error to increase which is accomplished by cutting off one feedback path. The geometrical properties of arm kinematics and the properties of the kinesthetic and visual sensorial (...) systems should be better known before inferences about higher levels of processing can be drawn. (shrink)

In Chapter 2 of Escape from Leviathan, Jan Lester defends two hypotheses: that instrumental rationality requires agents to maximise the satisfaction of their wants and that all agents actually meet this requirement. In addition, he argues that all agents are self-interested (though not necessarily egoistic) and he offers an account of categorical moral desires which entails that no agent ever does what he genuinely feels to be morally wrong. I show that Lester’s two hypotheses are false because they cannot accommodate (...) weakness of will, because they are inconsistent with agency, which requires free will, because ends, obligations and values cannot be reduced to desires, and because maximisation is often not possible. Further, Lester’s claim that agents are self-interested is vacuous, his attempted reduction of moral behaviour to want-satisfaction fails, and his contention, that agents always do what they genuinely think to be morally required, seems untenable. A defence of freedom that depends on homo economicus is far from promising. (shrink)

As the world grapples with the urgent need for sustainable development, the transition towards green energy stands as a critical imperative. Financing this transition poses significant challenges, requiring innovative approaches that align financial objectives with environmental sustainability goals. This review presents a conceptual framework for leveraging data-driven techniques in sustainable finance to facilitate the transition towards green energy. The proposed framework integrates principles of sustainable finance with advanced data analytics to enhance decision-making processes across the financial ecosystem. At its core, (...) the framework emphasizes the importance of harnessing vast datasets related to energy production, consumption, environmental impact, and financial performance. By leveraging machine learning algorithms and predictive modeling techniques, financial stakeholders can gain deeper insights into the risks and opportunities associated with green energy investments. Key components of the framework include data collection and aggregation, risk assessment, impact measurement, and investment optimization. Data sources range from traditional financial indicators to environmental metrics, social impact assessments, and geopolitical factors. Through comprehensive data analysis, financial institutions can assess the long-term viability and sustainability of green energy projects, while also evaluating potential social and environmental impacts. Risk assessment methodologies within the framework consider both financial risks, such as market volatility and regulatory uncertainty, and non-financial risks, such as climate change impacts and community resilience. By integrating these factors into risk models, investors can make more informed decisions that mitigate potential losses and maximize returns. Furthermore, impact measurement tools enable stakeholders to quantify the environmental and social benefits of green energy investments. By tracking metrics such as carbon emissions reduction, energy efficiency improvements, and job creation, investors can assess the contribution of their portfolios towards broader sustainability objectives. Finally, the framework incorporates investment optimization strategies that align financial goals with environmental objectives. Through portfolio diversification, asset allocation, and innovative financial instruments such as green bonds and impact investing funds, financial institutions can allocate capital more efficiently towards green energy projects. The conceptual framework presented herein offers a systematic approach to integrating data-driven methodologies into sustainable finance practices. By leveraging advanced analytics and comprehensive datasets, financial stakeholders can drive the transition towards green energy while simultaneously achieving financial returns and positive environmental outcomes. (shrink)

In “The Applied Epistemology of Official Stories” (2023), Tim Hayward offers a thorough and convincing rejection of Neil Levy’s claim that we ought to defer to official stories from relevant epistemic authorities. In this response, I take no issue with Hayward’s criticism of Levy. Rather, I suggest that Hayward’s position could go further, and he already implies a deeper problem with the concept of an ‘official story’. In fact, I’m so swayed by several of his claims against (...) things called ‘official stories’, that, in this essay, I investigate the feasibility of a generalist position towards ‘official stories’. (shrink)

In his article “Utility Cascades”, Max Khan Hayward argues that act-utilitarians should sometimes either ignore evidence about the effectiveness of their actions or fail to apportion their support to an action's effectiveness. His conclusions are said to have particular significance for the effective altruism movement, which centers seeking and being guided by evidence. Hayward's argument is that act-utilitarians are vulnerable to succumbing to “utility cascades”, that these cascades function to frustrate the ultimate goals of act-utilitarians, and that one (...) apposite way to avoid them is by “ostriching”: ignoring relevant evidence. If true, this conclusion would have remarkable consequences for act-utilitarianism and the effective altruism movement. However, Hayward is mistaken – albeit in an interesting way and with broader significance for moral philosophy. His argument trades on a subtle mischaracterization of act-utilitarianism. Act-utilitarians are not especially vulnerable to utility cascades, and they shouldn't ostrich. (shrink)

Brought to you by: Crop X editors: Jonathan Alexander Perez, Harmony Smith, Corinne Tendorf, David Turturo, and Derek Rahn Williams. Faculty Advisor: David Turturo; Crop X team included: Chaimae Alehyane, Zachary S. Casey, Suzanna Brinez, Jacob Brown, Elizabeth George, Francisco Javier Muniz Ituarte, Brodey Myers. -/- Credits: Huckabee College of Architecture; Graphic Designers: Studio BLDG (Blossom Liu + Danny Gray); English Editor: Luke Studebaker; Spanish Translator: Jessie Forbes; Printer: Die Keure. Cover Photo: Derek Williams. -/- Generously supported by the (...) Graham Foundation for Advanced Studies in the Fine Arts and the Huckabee College of Architecture, Texas Tech University. (shrink)

Early discussions of ?climate justice? have been dominated by economists rather than political philosophers. More recently, analytical liberal political philosophers have joined the debate. However, the philosophical discussion of climate justice remains in its early stages. This paper considers one promising approach based on human rights, which has been advocated recently by several theorists, including Simon Caney, Henry Shue and Tim Hayward. A basic argument supporting the claim that anthropogenic climate change violates human rights is presented. Four objections to (...) this argument are examined: the ?future persons? objection; the ?risk? objection; the ?collective causation? objection; and the ?demandingness? objection. This critical examination leads to a more detailed specification and defence of the claim that anthropogenic climate change violates human rights. (shrink)

I respond to an objection recently formulated by Barlassina and Hayward against first-order imperativism about pain, according to which it cannot account for the self-directed motivational force of pain. I am going to agree with them: it cannot. This is because pain does not have self-directed motivational force. I will argue that the alternative view—that pain is about dealing with extramental, bodily threats, not about dealing with itself—makes better sense of introspection, and of empirical research on pain avoidance. Also, (...) a naturalistic theory of body-involving commands falls straightforwardly out of our most prominent naturalistic metasemantic accounts, while the token-reflexive contents that would underlie self-directed motivation are more problematic. (shrink)

This article gives a short presentation of reflexive imperativism, the intentionalist theory of valence I developed with Max Khan Hayward. The theory says that mental states have valence in virtue of having reflexive imperative content. More precisely, mental states have positive valence (i.e., feel good) in virtue of issuing the command "More of me!", and they have negative valence (i.e., feel bad) in virtue of issuing the command "Less of me!" The article summarises the main arguments in favour of (...) reflexive imperativism and against other intentionalist treatments of valence. (shrink)

Evaluativism (Carruthers 2018) and reflexive imperativism (Barlassina and Hayward 2019) agree that valence—the (un)pleasantness of experiences—is a natural kind shared across all affective states. But they disagree about what valence is. For evaluativism, an experience is pleasant/unpleasant in virtue of representing its worldly object as good/bad; for reflexive imperativism, an experience is pleasant/unpleasant in virtue of commanding its subject to get more/less of itself. I argue that reflexive imperativism is superior to evaluativism according to Carruthers’s own standards. He maintains (...) that a theory of valence should account for its phenomenology and role in imagination-based decision-making. I show that it is reflexive imperativism, rather than evaluativism, that fits this explanatory bill. (shrink)

Comincio con alcuni commenti famosi del filosofo (psicologo) Ludwig Wittgenstein perché Pinker condivide con la maggior parte delle persone (a causa delle impostazioni predefinite della nostra psicologia innata evoluta) certi pregiudizi sul funzionamento della mente, e perché Wittgenstein offre approfondimenti unici e profondi sul funzionamento del linguaggio, del pensiero e della realtà (che ha visto come più o meno coetantana) non trovati altrove. Ilre è solo riferimento a Wittgenstein in questo volume, che è più sfortunato considerando che era il più (...) brillante e originale analista del linguaggio. Nell'ultimo capitolo, utilizzando la famosa metafora della grotta di Platone, riassume splendidamente il libro con una panoramica di come la mente (linguaggio, pensiero, psicologia intenzionale) – un prodotto di egoismo cieco, moderato solo leggermente da altruismo automatizzato per parenti stretti che trasportano copie dei nostri geni (Inclusive Fitness)- funziona automaticamente, ma cerca di finire in una nota ottimista dandoci la speranza che possiamo comunque impiegare le sue vaste capacità di cooperare e rendere il mondo un posto dignitoso. Pinker è certamente a conoscenza, ma dice poco sul fatto che molto di più sulla nostra psicologia è lasciato fuori di quanto incluso. Tra le finestre della natura umana che vengono lasciate fuori o che richiedono un'attenzione minima ci sono la matematica e la geometria, la musica e i suoni, le immagini, gli eventi e la causalità, l'ontologia (classi di cose o ciò che sappiamo), la maggior parte dell'epistemologia (come lo conosciamo), disposizioni (credenti, pensare, giudicare, intendere ecc.) e il resto della psicologia intenzionale dell'azione, neurotrasmettitori ed espiogeni, stati spirituali (ad esempio, satori e illuminazione, stimolazione e registrazione cerebrale, danni cerebrali e disturbi comportamentali, giochi e sport, teoria delle decisioni (inclusi la teoria dei giochi e l'economia comportamentale), il comportamento animale (molto poco linguaggio ma un miliardo di anni di errori genetici condivisi). Molti libri sono stati scritti su ognuna di queste aree della psicologia intenzionale. I dati di questo libro sono descrizioni, non spiegazioni che mostrano perché i nostri cervelli lo fanno in questo modo o come viene fatto. Come facciamo a sapere di usare le frasi nel loro modo diverso (cioè, conoscere tutti i loro significati)? Questa è la psicologia evolutiva che opera a un livello più elementare – il livello in cui Wittgenstein è più attivo. E c'è una particolare attenzione al contesto in cui vengono usate le parole, un'arena che Wittgenstein ha aperto la strada. Tuttavia, questo è un lavoro classico e con queste precauzioni è ancora ben vale la pena leggere. Coloro che desiderano un quadro aggiornato completo per il comportamento umano dalla moderna vista a due systems possono consultare il mio libro 'La struttura logica dellafilosofia, psicologia, Mind e il linguaggio in Ludwig Wittgenstein e John Searle' 2nd ed (2019). Coloro che sono interessati a più dei miei scritti possono vedere 'TalkingMonkeys--Filosofia, Psicologia, Scienza, Religione e Politica su un Pianeta Condannato--Articoli e Recensioni 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) e Suicidal Utopian Delusions nel 21st Century 4th ed (2019) . (shrink)

Deep decarbonization – slashing global greenhouse gas emissions to net-zero – now dominates global climate policy. Two recent books assess feasible routes to achieve deep decarbonization. Bill Gates’ How to Avoid a Climate Disaster explains in depth why deep decarbonization requires significant innovations in tech, and Danny Cullenward and David Victor’s Making Climate Policy Work emphasizes the importance of policy innovation (beyond carbon pricing) for driving clean tech breakthroughs. In this critical review essay, I summarize and assess both books. (...) In the final section, I raise several normative questions, which the pair of books might lead us to. (shrink)

Frederick 2013 (the critique) offers criticisms of the Escape from Leviathan (EfL) theory of libertarian liberty and also of its compatibility with preference-utilitarian welfare and private-property anarchy. This reply to the critique first explains the underlying philosophical problem with libertarian liberty and EfL’s proposed solution. It then goes through the critique in detail showing that it does not grasp the problem or the solution and offers only misrepresentations and unsound criticisms.