O presente artigo pretende mostrar como o filósofo e ensaísta de sobrenome árabe, origem judia e religião católica Fabrice Hadjadj se utiliza de dois autores italianos, a saber, Dante Alighieri e Lorenzo da Ponte, para aprofundar as suas reflexões sobre a noção de Paraíso. No primeiro caso, Hadjadj elabora um encontro entre Dante e Nietzsche, articulando uma compreensão de Paraíso que, na perspectiva hadjadjiana, ultrapassaria as críticas de Friedrich Nietzsche. No segundo, o autor explora o conceito de “redenção”, presente na (...) ópera “Don Giovanni”. Após a exposição da interpretação do filósofo em cada caso, constatamos que a leitura de Dante promove, para Hadjadj, um deslocamento do paraíso do exterior para o interior e que Don Giovanni explicita, segundo Hadjadj, a dinâmica redentora do Paraíso, à medida em que o convite à máxima felicidade não é fruto de uma conquista pessoal ou do cumprimento de um preceito moral, mas um dom que vem do Alto. Finalmente, constatamos o caráter transdisciplinar da leitura que Hadjadj faz de Da Ponte e Dante, considerando-os como autores cujas obras exprimem realidades profundas que precisam ser desveladas e que podem envolver e auxiliar àqueles que leem o texto contemporaneamente. (shrink)

The history of Christianity was a prevalent subject among 18th century philosophers. This article presents a historical perspective of the relationship between Christianity and power based on a comparative analysis of the ideas of Voltaire and Rousseau. Bibliographic research was undertaken using a philosophical approach to their works. This study examines Voltaire’s inquiry into Jesus Christ as a historical figure and a“genealogy” of Christianity in three of his works: Tumbeau du fanatisme(1736), Traité sur la tolérance(1763), and Catéchisme de l'honnête homme (...) (1763). Regarding Rousseau, this study interprets his historical approach to the connections between Christianity and politics based on the following works: Sur la Réponse qui a été faite à son Discours(1751), the chapter entitled “Civil Religion” in Du Contract social(1762), and Lettres écrites de la montagne(1764). Not only do the findings of this inquiry reveal the similarities and differences between the thoughts of Voltaire and Rousseau and the historical tensions between Christianity and power, the findings also point toward a fundamental defense of a secular state. (shrink)

CAVALCANTI NETO, Lamartine de Hollanda. Contributions of Thomistic Psychology to the study of the plasticity of the ethos. 2012. 571s. Thesis (Doctorate in Bioethics) – Centro Universitário São Camilo, São Paulo,2012. If Ethics is not a static science, it is because ethos — its basic object of study — is a mutable reality. For this reason, ethical themes, chiefly those of Bioethics, are directly related to the study of the plasticity of the ethos. Nevertheless, such investigation requires that the (...) researcher distance himself from concrete ethical questions, to apply himself to the theoretical examination of what enables the existence and development of such questions — that is, the aforementioned plasticity. However, bibliographical literature on this subject has revealed a scarcity of works focused specifically on the theme. This scarcity seems to indicate that the subject is still in a process of methodological definition. Therefore, we propose as a research question, to investigate at the theoretical level, if Thomistic Psychology can be considered a valid study tool for the plasticity of ethos. For this aim, we adopt a documental and bibliographical research methodology adapted to the aforesaid question, based on the presupposition that such validity can be gauged to the extent that Thomistic Psychology offers objective contributions to the study of the plasticity of the ethos. Backed by extensive literature, we present an overview of Thomistic Psychology, as well as of ethos and its plasticity. With the data obtained, we establish a discussion with a view to identifying these contributions. Based on the results, we close with a reply, while still open, to our research question, hoping to afford, in this way, a kind of platform on which new studies can be developed with greater facility. (shrink)

Our objective in this paper is twofold: first, we intend to address the tenability of the enactivist middle way between realism and idealism, as it is proposed in The Embodied Mind. We do so by taking the enactivist conception of bringing forth a world literally in three conceptual levels: enaction, niche construction and social construction. Based on this proposal, we claim that enactivism is compatible with the idea of an independent reality without committing to the claim that organisms have cognitive (...) access to a world composed of properties specified prior to any cognitive activity. Our second goal is to show that our literal interpretation of bringing forth a world not only sustains the legitimacy of the middle way, but it also allows us to revive the conception of evolution as natural drift—which is perhaps the least examined aspect of the original enactivist theory and is central to the understanding of cognition in an enactive way. Natural drift focuses on how structural couplings between organism and environment trigger viable pathways of maintenance and reproduction, instead of selecting the most adapted trait to a pregiven environment. Thus, although enactivists typically do not explore the consequences of their views regarding evolutionary dynamics, we show how natural drift provides a suitable starting point. (shrink)

Currently, anomalous lived temporality is not included in the main diagnostic criteria or standard symptom checklists. In this article, we present the Transdiagnostic Assessment of Temporal Experience, a structured interview that can be used by researchers and clinicians without a comprehensive phenomenological background to explore abnormal time experiences in persons with abnormal mental conditions regardless of their diagnosis. When extensive data gathered by this scale are available, it will be possible to delineate well-defined anomalous lived temporality profiles for each psychopathological (...) disorder. This instrument may also prove useful for clinicians by providing a more refined assessment of relevant psychopathological symptoms and an in-depth understanding of the patient’s abnormal behaviour as related to specific types of time experience. In the first part of the article, we provide a brief overview of the phenomenological concept of temporality, including pre-phenomenal and phenomenal time, synthesis, conation and synchronization, and of abnormal time experiences in persons affected by psychopathological conditions. In the following part, we describe the basic structure of the interview that comprises seven categories corresponding to the abnormal features of lived temporality: anomalies of synchrony, of time structure, of implicit time flow, of explicit time flow, and anomalous experiences of the past, the present and the future. The paper also includes a section on administration and scoring of the TATE scale, the complete interview and a Likert table for quantifying the frequency, intensity and interference with daily life of the phenomena explored. (shrink)

Many philosophers have been attracted to the idea of using the logical form of a true sentence as a guide to the metaphysical grounds of the fact stated by that sentence. This paper looks at a particular instance of that idea: the widely accepted principle that disjunctions are grounded in their true disjuncts. I will argue that an unrestricted version of this principle has several problematic consequences and that it’s not obvious how the principle might be restricted in order to (...) avoid them. My suggestion is that, instead of trying to restrict the principle, we should distinguish between metaphysical and conceptual grounds and take the principle to apply exclusively to the latter. This suggestion, if correct, carries over to other prominent attempts at using logical form as a guide to ground. (shrink)

Relativists make room for the possibility of “faultless disagreement” by positing the existence of subjective propositions, i.e. propositions true from some points of view and not others. We discuss whether the adoption of this position with respect to a certain domain of discourse is compatible with a realist attitude towards the matters arising in that domain. At first glance, the combination of relativism and realism leads to an unattractive metaphysical picture on which reality comprises incoherent facts. We will sketch the (...) contours of a realist-relativist position called “subjectivism”, which avoids this result by giving up the assumption that the points of view of different subjects are all metaphysically “on a par”. (shrink)

Ecological-enactive approaches to cognition aim to explain cognition in terms of the dynamic coupling between agent and environment. Accordingly, cognition of one’s immediate environment (which is sometimes labeled “basic” cognition) depends on enaction and the picking up of affordances. However, ecological-enactive views supposedly fail to account for what is sometimes called “higher” cognition, i.e., cognition about potentially absent targets, which therefore can only be explained by postulating representational content. This challenge levelled against ecological-enactive approaches highlights a putative explanatory gap between (...) basic and higher cognition. In this paper, we examine scientific cognition—a paradigmatic case of higher cognition—and argue that it shares fundamental features with basic cognition, for enaction and affordance selection are central to the scientific enterprise. Our argument focuses on modeling, and on how models promote scientific understanding. We base our argument on a non-representational account of scientific understanding and on the material engagement theory, for models are hereby conceived as material objects designed for scientific engagements. Having done so, we conclude that the explanatory gap is significantly less threatening to the ecological-enactive approach than it might appear. (shrink)

In order to meet the explanatory challenge levelled against non-representationalist views on cognition, radical enactivists claim that cognition about potentially absent targets involves the socioculturally scaffolded capacity to manipulate public symbols. At a developmental scale, this suggests that higher cognition gradually emerges as humans begin to master language use, which takes place around the third year of life. If, however, it is possible to show that pre-linguistic infants represent their surroundings, then the radical enactivists’ explanation for the emergence of higher (...) cognition is defeated. In this paper, I critically assess experiments designed to show that pre-linguistic infants inherit representational abilities. I begin by outlining these experiments in Sect. 2. In Sect. 3, I argue that these experiments only succeed in supporting widespread representationalism by committing a particular kind of circular reasoning, which I call conjunctivist reasoning due to its origins in the debates about the nature of perception. I conclude by developing two independent yet congruent enactivist lines of interpretation for the experiments discussed in 2. I explain the infants’ responses to atypical experimental conditions based on agent-environment codetermination and then I argue that surprise behavior can be explained in terms of embodied habits and unfulfilled anticipation. (shrink)

Introduction to The Oxford Handbook of Phenomenological Psychopathology.

This book is a collection of papers presented at conferences by the author on topics related to Thomistic Psychology. Although not being a systematic exposition of it, its reading provides a comprehensive view of the psychological approach derived from the Works of St. Thomas Aquinas, complemented by the specific developments of each subject treated. Topics such as the process of human knowledge, emotions, the formation of opinions, certainties and decisions, the constitution of ethos and its plasticity, its relations with the (...) instinct of sociability, the repercussions of this dynamism on personality and behavior, as well as the contributions that Thomistic Psychology offers to mental health diagnosis and therapy are addressed. The teachings of St. Thomas elucidate these and several other questions of daily life that are not always answered by contemporary psychological currents. To facilitate comprehension, the necessary assumptions are presented in accessible language, with examples and applications to daily life, correlating them, when appropriate, with contemporary themes such as computer science, neuroscience and Cognitive-Behavioral Psychology. The common reader thus acquires a better knowledge of his own mind, that of others and of the psychological interaction in life in society. And to the specialized reader, the invitation is opened for new and thought-provoking studies on questions of surprising actuality. -/- . (shrink)

The aims of my paper are to set out Aquinas’s arguments in favour of the thesis of God as Subsistent Being itself; set out the arguments against; and propose a fresh reading of that thesis that takes into account both Thomistic doctrine and the criticisms of it. In this way, I shall proceed as in a medieval quaestio, with arguments in favour, sed contra and respondeo.

Solving the meta-problem of consciousness requires, among other things, explaining why we are so reluctant to endorse various forms of illusionism about the phenomenal. I will try to tackle this task in two steps. The first consists in clarifying how the concept of consciousness precludes the possibility of any distinction between 'appearance' and 'reality'. The second consists in spelling out our reasons for recognizing the existence of something that satisfies that concept.

The recent social crisis in Brazil has given political players of a certain leaning the excuse they needed to make political maneuvers of a suspicious nature. Backed by corporations, the mainstream media and agribusiness, such measures, which have also been called “reforms,” have been hastened by members of the legislature in collusion with the highest-ranking government leaders. Their scheme was hatched at the height of the crisis of President Dilma’s government and culminated with her impeachment. Shortly after the usurpation of (...) the executive branch, much of the Brazilian public began to perceive it as a farce created by the privileged classes with the ideological support of the mass media. In light of this context, the goal of this paper is to reflect critically on the Brazilian scenario, endorsing alternative interpretations to those espoused by the mainstream media. The paper begins with the problematization of the concept of crisis in Bobbio (2004) and Santos (2007) in order to gain insight into the reasons behind of the offensive waged by the privileged classes in command of Brazil. Next the paper examines the concept of conscientization found in Gramsci (2011) and Freire (2006), which interprets knowledge as a means to resist oppression via political engagement. The paper concludes by recovering the concept of politics from the outworn view of it as an art to the understanding of politics, per Arendt (2002), as an instrument of humanization and social inclusion. (shrink)

There are two intuitions about time. The first is that there's something special about the present that objectively differentiates it from the past and the future. Call this intuition Specialness. The second is that the time at which we happen to live is just one among many other times, all of which are ‘on a par’ when it comes to their forming part of reality. Call this other intuition Egalitarianism. Tradition has it that the so-called ‘A-theories of time’ fare well (...) at addressing the first intuition, but rather badly when it comes to the second. The goal of this article is to offer advice to A-theorists about how to reconcile their view with Egalitarianism. (shrink)

This paper defends the view that one's own mental states are metaphysically privileged vis-à-vis the mental states of others, even if only subjectively so. This is an instance of a more general view called Subjectivism, according to which reality is only subjectively the way it is. After characterizing Subjectivism in analogy to two relatively familiar views in the metaphysics of modality and time, I compare the Subjectivist View of the Mental with Egocentric Presentism, a version of Subjectivism recently advocated by (...) Caspar Hare. I argue that the Subjectivist View of the Mental goes a considerable way towards solving certain long-standing philosophical puzzles having to do with the unity of consciousness, the contents of self-awareness and the intransmissibility of experiential knowledge through testimony. (shrink)

The problem of self-knowledge has been thoroughly discussed in the context of traditional epistemology. In parallel to the traditional approach to epistemology, Radically Embodied Cognitive Science (RECS) has emerged in the last 30 years as a genuine contender in its field. According to RECS, the unity of analysis of cognitive processes is the dynamics between brain, body and environment. In this paper, I advance a RECS approach to self-knowledge, which immediately suggests that knowing oneself is a matter of knowing what (...) one’s body can do. I then turn to resistance training, particularly weightlifting, and argue that it offers a paradigmatic case of self-knowledge in RECS’s terms. More precisely, resistance training allows the trainee to achieve knowledge of themselves in a fundamentally practical manner—and doing so is transformative of the kind of actions they are capable of. (shrink)

Cartesians and Lichtenbergians have diverging views of the deliverances of introspection. According to the Cartesians, a rational subject, competent with the relevant concepts, can come to know that he or she thinks – hence, that he or she exists – on the sole basis of his or her introspective awareness of his or her conscious thinking. According to the Lichtenbergians, this is not possible. This paper offers a defence of the Lichtenbergian position using Peacocke and Campbell's recent exchange on Descartes'scogitoas (...) a framework for discussion. A thought-experiment will be presented involving two communities with radically different conceptions of the metaphysics of the self. The purpose of the thought-experiment is to suggest that a substantive metaphysical thesis, whose truth cannot be a priori known, is presupposed by any justified transition from one's introspective awareness of a certain mental activity to the self-ascription of that activity. (shrink)

In the apostolic exhortation Evangelii gaudium, Pope Francis traces a relationship of clear interdependence between the evangelizing mission of the ecclesial community and the experience of joy that it lives in the faith in Jesus Christ. This work presents some contributions from the theology of Alexander Schmemann, in For the Life of the World, and from the philosophy of Fabrice Hadjadj, in Le paradis à la porte, which can enrich the reception of this programmatic document of the pontificate of Francis. (...) In this path, we identify four points of convergence between the two authors' vision: the rediscovery of the eucharistic dimension of joy, as an experience of a gift that extends itself as thanksgiving; of its paschal dimension, which goes through evil and pain, fertilizing them without denying them; of its epiphanic dimension, as a look that allows us to recognize the proximity of the mystery in everyday life; and of its transforming dimension, as a gratuity that spills over into an truly disinterested service. (shrink)

Through an analysis of Heloise’s third letter to Peter Abelard, and the insertion of this letter in the major context of correspondance and philosophical/theological discussion lead by Abelard, this article states that there is a triple reading approach to it: the first one is directed related with the letter’s theme and can be read as a criticism of monastic environment on 12th Century; the second one is inserted in the discussion of their correspondence, and states a continuity between the second (...) and the third letters, despite the difference on the themes; the last one is the view of how the female body, understood as a starting point to Heloise’s Christian personal experience, refutes Abelard’s inicial proposition, that is, that the body is abject. (shrink)

It has been observed that, unlike other kinds of singular judgments, mental self-ascriptions are immune to error through misidentification: they may go wrong, but not as a result of mistaking someone else’s mental states for one’s own. Although recent years have witnessed increasing interest in this phenomenon, three basic questions about it remain without a satisfactory answer: what is exactly an error through misidentification? What does immunity to such errors consist in? And what does it take to explain the fact (...) that mental self-ascriptions exhibit this sort of immunity? The aim of this paper is to bring these questions into focus, propose some tentative answers and use them to show that one prominent attempt to explain the immunity to error through misidentification of mental self-ascriptions is unsuccessful. (shrink)

The present article intends to discuss the basis of the teleological argument from the work of the Spanish physicist and philosopher Mariano Artigas. After observing the prolific production of many scientists on the subject, we notice that the concept of “finality” must be nuanced. This nuance of the concepct allows to investigate in what ways the empirical sciences and philosophical thought can sustain the “finality” be understood. Then, it demonstrates that the notions of “chance” and “finality” aren’t incompatible, because there (...) is an possible harmonization beetween then. Throughout the process, it is stressed the need to correctly evaluate the advances of the experimental sciences, so as not to extrapolate their own statutes. In the end, having observed how Artigas responds to the question, the author of the article comments on the ethical developments that resonate from the main concept discussed. (shrink)

The rationality of the human being applied in science-technique in the contemporary capitalist system is distorted; the purpose, which is the good life for human beings, has become the means to sustain and feedback the technicist system of technological capitalism. Thus, the modus operandi of science, aims only to legitimize technology, apart from the ethics applied in this relationship between technology and human beings, and cut off from critical philosophical thinking. With the result presented, the problem lies in the reason (...) of the contemporary human being, who seeks to satisfy his desires and envisions the good life (eudaimonía) in material goods, suppressing the contemplative leisure of life (ataraxia); becoming a slave to the system it fosters. The objective is to demonstrate the need to reformulate the modern system, in order to earn a good life for human beings as a purpose of technical science, which should be the means for this and as technological advances in favor of the quality of human beings. and, not for capitalist reproduction. The research methodology is an exploratory bibliography, exposing and dialoguing with authors on the subject in order to forge our conclusion, that pleads for science-technical that enjoys ethics and human reason in favor of eudaimonia. (shrink)

"The plasticity of ethos is an interdisciplinary topic that, due to the lack of studies related directly to the subject, still appears to be in its phase of methodological definition. This article attempts to summarize our research on the possibility of considering Thomistic Psychology as a valid study tool for the aforementioned theme, as well as some of the contributions it can offer to the study itself. It summarizes a broader work that we presented in the form of a doctoral (...) thesis in Bioethics at the Centro Universitário São Camilo, in São Paulo, Brazil, in August, 2012.". (shrink)

According to Leibniz’s infinite-analysis account of contingency, any derivative truth is contingent if and only if it does not admit of a finite proof. Following a tradition that goes back at least as far as Bertrand Russell, several interpreters have been tempted to explain this biconditional in terms of two other principles: first, that a derivative truth is contingent if and only if it contains infinitely complex concepts and, second, that a derivative truth contains infinitely complex concepts if and only (...) if it does not admit of a finite proof. A consequence of this interpretation is that Leibniz’s infinite-analysis account of contingency falls prey to Robert Adams’s Problem of Lucky Proof. I will argue that this interpretation is mistaken and that, once it is properly understood how the idea of an infinite proof fits into Leibniz’s circle of modal notions, the problem of lucky proof simply disappears. (shrink)

Primeiro apresento as linhas gerais do programa de pesquisa sobre cognição corporificada. Em uma posição central nesse programa, está a tese de que a cognição atravessa cérebro, corpo e mundo – e que, portanto, atividades cognitivas não são eventos exclusivamente intracraniais que ocorrem pela manipulação de representações. Eu apresento a gênese histórica desse programa, a saber, o projeto autopoiético dos chilenos Humberto Maturana e Francisco Varela. Desse projeto, é possível atestar um plano de fundo antirrealista e construtivista, segundo o qual (...) a cognição é uma construção do mundo pelo organismo. Depois, eu apresento o fundamento teórico que recentemente tomou os holofotes do programa, a saber, o enativismo sensório-motor. Esse enativismo manifesta o compromisso com um realismo comedido, segundo o qual há estruturas objetivas a serem exploradas de acordo com a morfologia corpórea do organismo. Assim, observa-se uma tensão epistemológica no cerne do programa. Eu apresento uma possibilidade de resolução dessa tensão pela rejeição de uma das teses centrais do projeto autopoiético – a continuidade forte entre vida e cognição – e por uma melhor interpretação do que significa dizer que a cognição requer que o oragnismo “construa” o seu ambiente. (shrink)

Not unlike many contemporary philosophers, Leibniz admitted the existence of temporary truths, true propositions that have not always been or will not always be true. In contrast with contemporary philosophers, though, Leibniz conceived of truth in terms of analytic containment: on his view, the truth of a predicative sentence consists in the analytic containment of the concept expressed by the predicate in the concept expressed by the subject. Given that analytic relations among concepts are eternal and unchanging, the problem arises (...) of explaining how Leibniz reconciled one commitment with the other: how can truth be temporary, if concept-containment is not? This paper presents a new approach to this problem, based on the idea that a concept can be consistent at one time and inconsistent at another. It is argued that, given a proper understanding of what it is for a concept to be consistent, this idea is not as problematic as it may seem at first, and is in fact implied by Leibniz’s general views about propositions, in conjunction with the thesis that some propositions are only temporarily true. (shrink)

In this paper, I will defend a communitarian perspective on the so-called “hinge propositions” (hinges, for short). Accordingly, I will argue that hinges play a normative role, in the sense that, among other things, they govern the mechanisms of social inclusion/exclusion. In particular, I will examine the so-called “religious hinges”; and I will argue that such hinges, being the product of mere indoctrination, are particularly effective in shaping boundaries among communities. Finally, with the help of Peter Munz's theory of altruism, (...) I will attempt to explain why religious hinges play the role they do. (shrink)

ABSTRACT I propose a middle-ground between a perceptual model of self-knowledge, according to which the objects of self-awareness are accessed through some kind of causal mechanism, and a rationalist model, according to which self-knowledge is constituted by one's rational agency. Through an analogy with the role of the exercises of sensorimotor abilities in rationally grounded perceptual knowledge, self-knowledge is construed as an exercise of action-oriented and action-orienting abilities. This view satisfies the privileged access condition usually associated with self-knowledge without entailing (...) an insurmountable gap between self- knowledge and knowledge of other minds. RESUMO Proponho um meio-termo entre um modelo perceptual de autoconhecimento, segundo o qual os objetos de autoconhecimento são acessadas mediante um tipo de mecanismo causal, e um modelo racionalista, segundo o qual o autoconhecimento é constituído pela agência racional. Por analogia ao papel que o exercício de habilidades sensório-motoras desempenham no conhecimento perceptual racionalmente fundado, autoconhecimento é entendido como um exercício de habilidades que são orientadas pela e orientam a ação. Essa imagem satisfaz a condição de acesso privilegiado que geralmente é associada ao autoconhecimento sem implicar uma lacuna intransponível entre autoconhecimento e conhecimento de outras mentes. (shrink)

We address some of the highlights of Augustine's thought, highlighting the author's philosophical themes. We will start with a presentation of Augustine`s biography and intellectual trajectory, and we will highlight some elements of its historical context, namely, the fragmentation of the Roman Empire and the nascent Christianity. We then address five philosophical problems that are part of the vast Augustinian discussion: 1) his critique of academic skepticism; 2) free will; 3) the problem of evil; 4) memory and time. As an (...) epilogue, 5) we approach the intertwined relationships between faith and reason in Augustinian thought. (shrink)

Questioning the reasons that led Augustine to reflect about time, a theme often associated with metaphysics and cosmology, in his work Confessions, which main character is autobiographical, we hypothesized that the theme belongs to the unitary project of the work, whose keys of reading would be 1) the purpose of human life and 2) the distinction between God and creatures. When analyzing the Augustinian argument, it is noticed that it is possible to insert the debate in question in the general (...) scope of the narrative of this specific work. It is also noticed that, from this perspective, the psychological approach is not necessarily linked to an understanding of time from a purely subjectivist aspect, since the central concern of the discussion is not with the metaphysical / cosmological aspect, but with the analysis interior. (shrink)

Williamson’s anti-luminosity argument has been thought to be in tension with the doctrine that we enjoy privileged epistemic access to our own mental states. In this paper, I will argue that the tension is only apparent. Friends of privileged access who accept the conclusion of the argument need not give up the claim that our beliefs about our own mental states are mostly or invariably right, nor the view that mental states are epistemically available to us in a way that (...) renders everything within our mind ‘open to view’ – arguably, two main pillars of their doctrine. What they need to reject is the idea that the mental is a realm whose ’determinacy’ or ’fineness of grain’ never escapes our appreciation. This idea – I will suggest – is not essential to privileged access and defenders of the doctrine should not be afraid to give it up. (shrink)

Kilimanjaro is an example of what some philosophers would call a ‘vague object’: it is only roughly 5895 m tall, its weight is not precise and its boundaries are fuzzy because some particles are neither determinately part of it nor determinately not part of it. It has been suggested that this vagueness arises as a result of semantic indecision: it is because we didn’t make up our mind what the expression “Kilimanjaro” applies to that we can truthfully say such things (...) as “It is indeterminate whether this particle is part of Kilimanjaro”. After reviewing some of the limitations of this approach, I will propose an alternative account, based on a new semantic relation—multiple reference—capable of holding in a one-many pattern between a term and several objects in the domain. I will explain how multiple reference works, what differentiates it from plural reference and how it might be used to accommodate at least some aspects of our ordinary discourse about vague objects. (shrink)

This article examines Jacobi's two novels, Allwill and Woldemar indirectly showing how much Allwill prefigures Kierkegaard's Seduce in Either/Or and the plot of Woldemar Hegel's final scene of Section VI of his Phenomenology of Spirit.

Philosophy of Mind is usualy seen as the theoretical field in which theories about the functioning of the mind are elaborated, to be afterwards empirically tested through Artificial Intelligence. But this empirical approach does not fit the human mind which is not simply a machine. It is therefore possible to see Philosophy of Mind as a necessary creation to empty AI of its philosophical charge.

Giovanni Mion defends the idea that knowledge is context relative, but, in contrast to current versions of epistemic contextualism, on his view, knowledge is relative to contexts that are objective. Following Christopher Gauker’s conception of what a context is, Mion argues that knowledge is relative to the speakers’ conversational goals; and since the best way to achieve the goals of a conversation depends upon the way the world really is, it follows that participants in a conversation might be unaware (...) of the content of the context that truly governs their conversation. Finally, Mion uses objective contexts to explain why practical interests have epistemic significance. According to him, if we assume that the primary function of language is not to share thoughts, but to achieve practical goals, and, accordingly, that knowledge attributions play primarily an action-guiding role (as opposed to a mind-revealing role), then we are in a better position to understand why knowledge is not just a matter of theoretical factors, but it is also a matter of how much is at stake. (shrink)

The discussion and debates around Ethical AI cannot simply ignore the fact that ethics is not a self-standing discipline by is part of Philosophy and can only be approached as such.

The paper argues that it is the rise of Artificial Intelligence as a concrete possibility (the idea of a thinking machine) that favoured the growth of interest in Cognitive Science within the academic community. This puts the history and the definition of AI in a different light, as it can be seen and understood as "a continuation of Philosophy by other means" (Landi, 2020) and not merely as a technology or a sum of technologies.

Some philosophical considerations over Yann LeCun’s position paper “A Path Towards Autonomous Machine Intelligence”.

What is the epistemological status of Big Data? Is there really place for them in a scientific search for new empirical laws?

We present an algebraic account of the Tongan kinship terminology (TKT) that provides an insightful journey into the fabric of Tongan culture. We begin with the ethnographic account of a social event. The account provides us with the activities of that day and the centrality of kin relations in the event, but it does not inform us of the conceptual system that the participants bring with them. Rather, it is a slice in time of an ongoing dynamic process that links (...) behavior with a conceptual system of kin relations and vice versa. To understand this interplay, we need an account of the underlying conceptual system that is being activated during the event. Thus, we introduce a formal, algebraically based account of TKT. This account brings to the fore the underlying logic of TKT and allows us to distinguish between features of the kinship system that arise from the logic of TKT as a generative structure and features that must have arisen through cultural intervention. (shrink)

O presente artigo pretende explorar a máxima contida em Os irmãos Karamázov (se não há Deus, tudo é permitido?) à luz do pensamento de Immanuel Kant. Para tanto, se vale do pensamento de Dostoiévski apenas na medida em que ele serve como auxílio na apresentação da ideia de Deus e de sua relação com a posição do ateu. Tendo em vista a filosofia kantiana, buscamos não apenas a apresentação dessa ideia, mas também sua relação com o ato moral e com (...) a própria condição desse ato. Isso, portanto, resultará em Kant, uma resposta duplamente negativa à pergunta que reflete a posição ateísta de Ivan Karamazov. Pois Kant ao distinguir o ato moral por dever e conforme o dever, defende que recorrer a algo externo à razão (Deus) constituiria uma vontade meramente heterônoma. Portanto, o ato moral por excelência ocorre quando a ação é realizada de um modo unicamente guiado pela razão, com base num interesse puro, e isso conduz, por sua vez, à reprovação por parte de Kant da referida máxima presente na obra de Dostoiévski. (shrink)

According to Russellian monism (RM), the quiddities which underlie the fundamental causal structure of the physical world are also responsible for the existence of phenomenal consciousness. This view has been argued to provide an attractive alternative to physicalism and dualism, but it is plagued by the so-called ‘combination problem’ – namely, the problem of explaining how the quiddities underlying the microphysical structure of a macroscopic conscious agent (e.g., a human being) combine together to constitute his or her phenomenal experiences. In (...) this paper, I will explore a type of monism that avoids the combination problem altogether. According to this view – which I shall call panquidditist monism – all causal roles, and not just the fundamental ones, stand in need of quiddities realizing them. Moreover, the quiddities that realize causal roles at one physical level should not in general be seen as grounded in, or otherwise derivative on, the quiddities that realize causal roles at lower levels. Crucial to the tenability of this view is a distinction between two varieties of grounding – one aiming to metaphysically explain the causal properties of various objects ‘from below’ (vertical grounding), the other aiming to metaphysically explaining them ‘from the inside’ (horizontal grounding). I will argue that, thanks to the distinction between vertical and horizontal grounds, panquidditist monism is well-placed to secure the advantages that RM promises – but, because of the combination problem, fails to deliver – vis-à-vis physicalism and dualism. (shrink)

Assuming a radical stance on embodied cognition, according to which the information ac- quired through basic cognitive processes is not contentful (Hutto and Myin, 2013), and as- suming that perception is a source of rationally grounded knowledge (Pritchard, 2012), a pluralistic account of perceptual knowledge is developed. The paper explains: (i) how the varieties of perceptual knowledge fall under the same broader category; (ii) how they are subject to the same kind of normative constraints; (iii) why there could not be (...) a conflict between the different varieties of perceptual knowledge; and (iv) why the traditional episte- mological inquiry is inclined to overestimate the role of propositional perceptual knowledge. (shrink)