Results for 'Given'

1000+ found
Order:
See also
Bibliography: The Given in Philosophy of Mind
Bibliography: Forgiveness in Normative Ethics
  1. Structure, Intentionality and the Given.M. Oreste Fiocco - 2019 - In Christoph Limbeck-Lilienau & Friedrich Stadler (eds.), The Philosophy of Perception. Berlin, Germany: De Gruyter. pp. 95-118.
    The given is the state of a mind in its primary engagement with the world. A satisfactory epistemology—one, it turns out, that is foundationalist and includes a naïve realist view of perception—requires a certain account of the given. Moreover, knowledge based on the given requires both a particular view of the world itself and a heterodox account of judgment. These admittedly controversial claims are supported by basic ontological considerations. I begin, then, with two contradictory views of the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. G. E. Moore and the Greifswald Objectivists on the Given and the Beginning of Analytic Philosophy.Nikolay Milkov - 2004 - Axiomathes 14 (4):361-379.
    Shortly before G. E. Moore wrote down the formative for the early analytic philosophy lectures on Some Main Problems of Philosophy (1910–1911), he had become acquainted with two books which influenced his thought: (1) a book by Husserl's pupil August Messer and (2) a book by the Greifswald objectivist Dimitri Michaltschew. Central to Michaltschew's book was the concept of the given. In Part I, I argue that Moore elaborated his concept of sense-data in the wake of the Greifswald concept. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  3. From the Myth of the Given to Radical Conceptual Diversity.Terence Rajivan Edward - 2015 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 22 (1):3-8.
    This paper evaluates the following argument, suggested in the writings of Donald Davidson: if there is such a thing as the given, then there can be alternative conceptual schemes; there cannot be alternative conceptual schemes; therefore there is no such thing as the given.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4.  17
    ‘Psychological Nominalism’ and the Given, From Abstract Entities to Animal Minds.James O'Shea - 2017 - In In: Patrick J. Reider, ed., Wilfrid Sellars, Idealism and Realism: Understanding Psychological Nominalism (London and New York: Bloomsbury), 2017: pp. 19–39. London: pp. 19-39.
    ABSTRACT: Sellars formulated his thesis of 'psychological nominalism' in two very different ways: (1) most famously as the thesis that 'all awareness of sorts…is a linguistic affair', but also (2) as a certain thesis about the 'psychology of the higher processes'. The latter thesis denies the standard view that relations to abstract entities are required in order to explain human thought and intentionality, and asserts to the contrary that all such mental phenomena can in principle ‘be accounted for causally' without (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5. BonJour’s ‘Basic Antifoundationalist Argument’ and the Doctrine of the Given.Daniel Howard-Snyder - 1998 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 36 (2):163-177.
    Laurence BonJour observes that critics of foundationalism tend to argue against it by objecting to "relatively idiosyncratic" versions of it, a strategy which has "proven in the main to be superficial and ultimately ineffective" since answers immune to the objections emerge quickly (1985: 17). He aims to rectify this deficiency. Specifically, he argues that the very soul of foundationalism, "the concept of a basic empirical belief," is incoherent (1985: 30). This is a bold strategy from which we can learn even (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  6. Appearance and Reality (An Inaugural Lecture as Director of the University of London’s Institute of Philosophy Given in the University of London on March 6, 2007).Tim Crane - manuscript
    I’d like to begin, if I may, by repeating myself. When I spoke at the Institute’s official launch last June, I quoted W.V. Quine’s remark that logic is an old subject, and since 1879 it has been a great one; and I commented that whatever the truth of this, it is undeniably true that philosophy is an old subject and has been a great one since the 5th century BC. The foundation of an institute of philosophy in the University of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7.  74
    The Fact of the Given From a Realist Idealist Perspective.Gregor Flock - 2017 - In Christoph Limbeck-Lilienau & Friedrich Stadler (eds.), The Philosophy of Perception and Observation. Contributions of the 40th International Wittgenstein Symposium August 6-12, 2017 Kirchberg am Wechsel. Kirchberg am Wechsel, Austria: Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. pp. 56-58.
    In his well-known Mind and World and in line with Wilfrid Sellars (1991) or “that great foe of ‘immediacy’” (ibid., 127) Hegel, McDowell claims that “when Evans argues that judgments of experience are based on non-conceptual content, he is falling into a version of the Myth of the Given” (1996, 114). In this talk and on the basis of a Berkeleyio-Kantian ‘realist idealist’ world view (sect. 1) and an explication of Kant’s concept of the “given manifold” (CPR, e.g. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8.  98
    Inferences, Experiences, and the Myth of the Given: A Reply to Champagne.Thomas Wilk - 2017 - Logos and Episteme 8 (1):155-162.
    In a recent article in this journal, Marc Champagne leveled an argument against what Wilfrid Sellars dubbed “the Myth of the Given.” Champagne contends that what is given in observation in the form of a sensation must be able to both cause and justify propositionally structured beliefs. He argues for this claim by attempting to show that one cannot decide which of two equally valid chains of inference is sound without appeal to what is given in experience. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9. The Given.Tim Crane - 2013 - In Joseph Schear (ed.), Mind, Reason and Being-in-the-World: the McDowell-Dreyfus Debate. London: Routledge. pp. 229-249.
    In The Mind and the World Order, C.I. Lewis made a famous distinction between the immediate data ‘which are presented or given to the mind’ and the ‘construction or interpretation’ which the mind brings to those data (1929: 52). What the mind receives is the datum – literally, the given – and the interpretation is what happens when we being it ‘under some category or other, select from it, emphasise aspects of it, and relate it in particular and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  10.  62
    On The Hypothetical Given.Adam Marushak - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    My aim in this paper is to assess the viability of a perceptual epistemology based on what Anil Gupta calls the “hypothetical given”. On this account, experience alone yields no unconditional entitlement to perceptual beliefs. Experience functions instead to establish relations of rational support between what Gupta calls “views” and perceptual beliefs. I argue that the hypothetical given is a genuine alternative to the prevailing theories of perceptual justification but that the account faces a dilemma: on a natural (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  11.  42
    Rethinking Sellars’ Myth of the Given: From the Epistemological to the Modal Relevance of Givenness in Kant and Hegel.Paul Redding - 2019 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 27 (3):379-398.
    ABSTRACTHere, I pursue consequences, for the interpretation of Sellars’ critique of the ‘Myth of the Given’, of separating the modal significance that Kant attributed to empirical intuition from th...
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  12.  92
    Tracking Inferences Is Not Enough: The Given as Tie-Breaker.Marc Champagne - 2016 - Logos and Episteme 7 (2):129-135.
    Most inferentialists hope to bypass givenness by tracking the conditionals claimants are implicitly committed to. I argue that this approach is underdetermined because one can always construct parallel trees of conditionals. I illustrate this using the Müller-Lyer illusion and touching a table. In the former case, the lines are either even or uneven; in the latter case, a moving hand will either sweep through or be halted. For each possibility, we can rationally foresee consequents. However, I argue that, until and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  13. The Paradox of Infinite Given Magnitude: Why Kantian Epistemology Needs Metaphysical Space.Lydia Patton - 2011 - Kant-Studien 102 (3):273-289.
    Kant's account of space as an infinite given magnitude in the Critique of Pure Reason is paradoxical, since infinite magnitudes go beyond the limits of possible experience. Michael Friedman's and Charles Parsons's accounts make sense of geometrical construction, but I argue that they do not resolve the paradox. I argue that metaphysical space is based on the ability of the subject to generate distinctly oriented spatial magnitudes of invariant scalar quantity through translation or rotation. The set of determinately oriented, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  14.  25
    Stillbirth Should Be Given Greater Priority on the Global Health Agenda.Zeshan U. Qureshi, Joseph Millum, Hannah Blencowe, Maureen Kelley, Joy E. Lawn, Anthony Costello & Tim Colbourn - 2015 - British Medical Journal 351:h4620.
    Stillbirths are largely excluded from international measures of mortality and morbidity. Zeshan Qureshi and colleagues argue that stillbirth should be higher on the global health agenda.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  15. Being Given: Towards a Phenomenology of Givenness, by Jean-Luc Marion, Trans. Jeffrey L. Kossky. [REVIEW]Cynthia Nielsen - 2005 - Ars Disputandi 5.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  16. The Soul (An Inaugural Lecture Given at University College London on May 13th, 2004).Tim Crane - manuscript
    Michael Dummett says in the preface to his book on Frege that he is always disappointed when a book lacks a preface. ‘it is like arriving at someone’s house for dinner’ Dummett says ‘and being conducted straight into the dining room’. I feel the same way about inaugural lectures. To give an inaugural lecture is in part an acknowledgement of a professional honour, and in part an opportunity to pay a personal tribute to the institution which has honoured you in (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  17.  27
    Genius Fluxus: The Spirit of Change (a Talk Given at a Conference in Denmark, 2002).David Kolb - manuscript
    We need to give up single visions that are supposed to embrace social and place totalities. We live in overlapping nets rather than single places. We cannot plan unlimited geometrical vistas a la Versailles; but that was always an illusion, and today it would be an oppression. Can we still plan like Sixtus at Rome? Only if we also encourage other modes of organization at the same time. The whole may often end up more like Tokyo, with corners of design (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  18.  68
    What is Distinctive About Human Thought? (An Inaugural Lecture Given at the University of Cambridge, December 2010).Tim Crane - manuscript
    Descartes famously argued that animals were mere machines, without thought or consciousness. Few would now share this view. But if other animals have conscious lives, what are they like, how do they differ from ours, and how would we ever know anything about them? This lecture will address this question by looking at the kinds of thoughts we might share with animals, and looking at philosophical and empirical arguments for how our thoughts might differ from theirs.
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  19. What Decision Theory Provides the Best Procedure for Identifying the Best Action Available to a Given Artificially Intelligent System?Samuel A. Barnett - 2018 - Dissertation, University of Oxford
    Decision theory has had a long-standing history in the behavioural and social sciences as a tool for constructing good approximations of human behaviour. Yet as artificially intelligent systems (AIs) grow in intellectual capacity and eventually outpace humans, decision theory becomes evermore important as a model of AI behaviour. What sort of decision procedure might an AI employ? In this work, I propose that policy-based causal decision theory (PCDT), which places a primacy on the decision-relevance of predictors and simulations of agent (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  20. When Should Co-Authorship Be Given to AI?G. P. Transformer Jr, End X. Note, M. S. Spellchecker & Roman Yampolskiy - manuscript
    If an AI makes a significant contribution to a research paper, should it be listed as a co-author? The current guidelines in the field have been created to reduce duplication of credit between two different authors in scientific articles. A new computer program could be identified and credited for its impact in an AI research paper that discusses an early artificial intelligence system which is currently under development at Lawrence Berkeley National. One way to imagine the future of artificial intelligence (...)
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  21.  34
    New Twist to Political Corruption in 4th Republic Nigeria Given Non-Human Animals Stealing Millions: A Case for the Defense of Animal Rights.Amaobi Nelson Osuala - 2018 - GNOSI: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Human Theory and Praxis 1 (2).
    Corruption has assumed a new turn in 4th Republic Nigeria, particularly where non-human animals are alleged by human animals to deep their hands into the public tilt for their selfish non-human animal purposes. This is a clear case of hypocrisy on the part of human animals in that, at one instance we contend that non-human animals are inferior to human beings and at the other instance, we affirm though inadvertently that non-human animals are not inferior but equal since they have (...)
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  22.  93
    A Silenced Cry: Should Stillbirth Be Given Greater Priority on the Global Health Agenda?Z. U. Qureshi - 2015 - British Medical Journal 351 (h4620).
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  23.  34
    How Pragmatist Was Sellars? Reflections on an Analytic Pragmatism.James O'Shea - 2020 - In Stefan Brandt & Anke Breunig (eds.), Wilfrid Sellars and Twentieth-Century Philosophy. New York: Routledge. pp. 110–29.
    ABSTRACT: In this chapter I argue that Sellars’s philosophy was deeply pragmatist both in its motivation and in its content, whether considered conceptually, historically, or in his own estimation, and that this is the case even in the important respects in which his views differ from most pragmatists. However, this assessment has been rejected by many recent pragmatists, with “classicalist” pragmatists frequently objecting to Sellars’s analytic-pragmatist privileging of language at the alleged expense of experience, while many analytic pragmatists themselves emphasize (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  24. Peirce and Sellars on Nonconceptual Content.Catherine Legg - 2018 - In Luca Corti & Antonio Nunziante (eds.), Sellars and the History of Modern Philosophy. New York, USA: Routledge. pp. 125-143.
    Whereas Charles Peirce’s pragmatist account of truth has been much discussed, his theory of perception still offers a rich mine of insights. Peirce presented a ‘two-ply’ view of perception, which combines an entirely precognitive ‘percept’ with a ‘perceptual judgment’ that is located in the space of reasons. Having previously argued that Peirce outdoes Robert Brandom in achieving a hyper-inferentialism (“Making it Explicit and Clear”, APQ, 2008), I now wish to examine his philosophy in the light of inferentialism’s ‘original fount’ – (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  25. Mind as Conceptual Structure: On Ethical Theory of C. I. Lewis’s Conceptual Pragmatism.Cheongho Lee - 2017 - Journal of Ethics 1 (113):73-89.
    Clarence I. Lewis (1883-1964) delineated the structure of mind based on his “conceptual pragmatism.” Human mind grounds itself on the ongoing dynamic interaction of relational processes, which is essentially mediated and structural. Lewis’s pragmatism anchors itself on the theory of knowledge that has the triadic structure of the given or immediate data, interpretation, and the concept. Lewis takes the a priori given as a starting point of meaningful experience. The interpretative work of mind is the mediator of the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  26. On the Objective and Subjective Grounding of Knowledge.Paul Natorp - 1981 - Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 12 (3):245-266.
    As well as its intrinsic interest as an argument against psychologism and what has come to be called "the myth of the given," the essay translated here possesses considerable historical significance both for itself and as a representative of its school. Husserl cites this particular essay as having helped stimulate his thoughts against psychologism. Natorp's resolute defense of transcendental analysis grounding empirical and psychological science helped Natorp's Allgemeine Psychologie towards admitting the pure transcendental ego. Read with Husserl in mind (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  27. A More 'Exact Grasp' of the Soul? Tripartition of the Soul in Republic IV and Dialectic in the Philebus.Mitchell Miller - 2010 - In Kurt Pritzl (ed.), Truth. Catholic University of America Press. pp. 57-135.
    At Republic 435c-d and again at 504b-e, Plato has Socrates object to the city/soul analogy and declare that a “longer way” is necessary for gaining a more “exact grasp” of the soul. I argue that it is in the Philebus, in Socrates’ presentation of the “god-given” method of dialectic and in his distinctions of the kinds of pleasure and knowledge, that Plato offers the resources for reaching this alternative account. To show this, I explore (1) the limitations of the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  28.  29
    Colloquium 9.Mitchell Miller - 1990 - Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium of Ancient Philosophy 6 (1):323-359.
    A close exegesis of the principles of the so-called "god-given method" of dialectic in the Philebus (16bff., 23cff.) and an account of the division of the fifteen kinds of art that "care" for the well-formed city in the Statesman (287bff., 303cff.). I show how this division conforms to and, so, illustrates the "god-given method.".
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  29. Sobre a possibilidade de pensarmos o mundo: o debate entre John McDowell e Donald Davidson.Marco Aurelio Sousa Alves - 2008 - Dissertation, Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais
    The thesis evaluates a contemporary debate concerning the very possibility of thinking about the world. In the first chapter, McDowell's critique of Davidson is presented, focusing on the coherentism defended by the latter. The critique of the myth of the given (as it appears in Sellars and Wittgenstein), as well as the necessity of a minimal empiricism (which McDowell finds in Quine and Kant), lead to an oscillation in contemporary thinking between two equally unsatisfactory ways of understanding the empirical (...)
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  30.  21
    'William James on Percepts, Concepts, and the Function of Cognition'.James O'Shea - 2019 - In Alexander Klein (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of William James.
    ABSTRACT: Central to both James’s earlier psychology and his later philosophical views was a recurring distinction between percepts and concepts. The distinction evolved and remained fundamental to his thinking throughout his career as he sought to come to grips with its fundamental nature and significance. In this chapter, I focus initially on James’s early attempt to articulate the distinction in his 1885 article “The Function of Cognition.” This will highlight a key problem to which James continued to return throughout his (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  31. Eliminating Prudential Reasons.Alex Worsnip - 2018 - Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 8:236-257.
    I argue, contrary to the consensus of most contemporary work in ethics, that there are no (fundamentally, distinctively) prudential reasons for action. That is to say: there is no class of reasons for action that is distinctively and fundamentally about the promotion of the agent’s own well-being. Considerations to do with the agent’s well-being can supply the agent with reasons only in virtue of her well-being mattering morally or in virtue of her caring about her own well-being. In both of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  32. On an “Unintelligible” Idea: Donald Davidson’s Case Against Experiential Foundationalism.Daniel Howard-Snyder - 2002 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 40 (4):523-555.
    Donald Davidson’s epistemology is predicated on, among other things, the rejection of Experiential Foundationalism, which he calls ‘unintelligible’. In this essay, I assess Davidson’s arguments for this conclusion. I conclude that each of them fails on the basis of reasons that foundationalists and antifoundationalists alike can, and should, accept.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  33. Gupta’s Gambit.Selim Berker - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 152 (1):17-39.
    After summarizing the essential details of Anil Gupta’s account of perceptual justification in his book _Empiricism and Experience_, I argue for three claims: (1) Gupta’s proposal is closer to rationalism than advertised; (2) there is a major lacuna in Gupta’s account of how convergence in light of experience yields absolute entitlements to form beliefs; and (3) Gupta has not adequately explained how ordinary courses of experience can lead to convergence on a commonsense view of the world.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  34. Whither Higher-Order Evidence?Daniel Whiting - forthcoming - In Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen & Mattias Skipper (eds.), Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays. Oxford University Press.
    First-order evidence is evidence which bears on whether a proposition is true. Higher-order evidence is evidence which bears on whether a person is able to assess her evidence for or against a proposition. A widespread view is that higher-order evidence makes a difference to whether it is rational for a person to believe a proposition. In this paper, I consider in what way higher-order evidence might do this. More specifically, I consider whether and how higher-order evidence plays a role in (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  35. Knowledge and Justification of the First Principles.Miguel Garcia-Valdecasas - 2014 - In Niels Öffenberger & Alejandro Vigo (eds.), Iberoamerikanische Beiträge zur modernen Deutung der Aristotelischen Logik. Hildesheim, Germany: G. Olms.
    The claim that knowledge is grounded on a basic, non-inferentially grasped set of principles, which seems to be Aristotle’s view, in contemporary epistemology can be seen as part of a wider foundationalist account. Foundationalists assume that there must be some premise-beliefs at the basis of every felicitous reasoning which cannot be themselves in need of justification and may not be challenged. They provide justification for truths based on these premises, which Aristotle unusually call principles (archái). Can Aristotle be considered a (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  36. Foundationalism.Daniel Howard-Snyder - 2012 - In Andrew Cullison (ed.), The Continuum Companion to Epistemology. Continuum. pp. 37.
    Foundationalists distinguish basic from nonbasic beliefs. At a first approximation, to say that a belief of a person is basic is to say that it is epistemically justified and it owes its justification to something other than her other beliefs, where “belief” refers to the mental state that goes by that name. To say that a belief of a person is nonbasic is to say that it is epistemically justified and not basic. Two theses constitute Foundationalism: (a) Minimality: There are (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  37.  70
    An Actionist Approach to the Justificational Role of Perceptual Experience.Eros Carvalho - 2016 - Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 72 (2-3):545-572.
    In this paper, I defend an account of how perceptual experience can bear rational relation to our empirical thought. In the first part, I elaborate two claims that are central for the justificational role of perceptual experience, namely, the claim that perception and belief share the same kind of content, and the claim that perception is independent from belief. At first sight, these claims seem not to be compatible, since the first one seems to require the truth of content conceptualism, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  38.  37
    Internismo Sem Intelectualismo E Sem Reflexividade.Eros Moreira De Carvalho - 2014 - Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 55 (129):153-172.
    In his book, "Perception as a Capacity for Knowledge" (2011), John McDowell advocates that the warrant provided by perception is infallible. For such, it is necessary to understand the role reason plays in the constitution of genuine perceptual states. Based on reason, we situate these states in the logical space of reasoning. So, we not only make the perceptual state into an episode of knowledge, but we also acquire knowledge of how we arrived to that knowledge. McDowell argues that this (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  39. Em Defesa da Justificação Perceptiva: Desmistificando o Mito do Dado.Eros Carvalho - 2007 - Dissertation, Federal University of Minas Gerais
    Since Wilfrid Sellars' attack on sense-date theories, it became hard to understand the role of perceptual experience in the justification of beliefs about the world. Many philosophers have started to sustain that experience only causes beliefs, never justifies them. In this thesis, I defend that experience justifies empirical beliefs non-inferentially. I work out three senses of 'justification': basement, reason and warrant. The idea is that experience can be a reason to believe. The subject can base upon his experience in order (...)
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  40. Empirismo senza fondamenti - Cinque lezioni su "Empirismo e filosofia della mente".Andrea Guardo - 2007 - Milano: CUEM.
    Five introductory lectures on Wilfrid Sellars’ “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind”.
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  41.  85
    The Autonomy of the Sensible and the De-Subjectification of the Apriori by Stumpf.Dominique Pradelle - 2015 - In Denis Fisette & Riccardo Martinelli (eds.), Philosophy from an Empirical Standpoint. Boston, USA - Leiden, The Netherlands: Rodopi - Brill. pp. 229-262.
    Au-delà de l’intérêt purement historiographique, nous tentons ici de dégager l’intérêt proprement philosophique de thèses fondamentales du philosophe Carl Stumpf : l’appel à une méthode intuitionniste, c’est-à-dire au retour à ce qui est effectivement donné ; le principe fondamental de l’autonomie de la sphère du sensible ou (dans la terminologie husserlienne) du domaine hylétique, c’est-à-dire son indépendance vis-à-vis des activités noétiques ; le dégagement d’un concept non purement empiriste et non atomiste de la sensibilité ; le principe anti-associationniste et anti-kantien (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  42.  82
    Conceptuality of Unreflective Actions in Flow: McDowell-Dryfus Debate.Ali Far - 2015 - GSTF Journal of General Philosophy 1 (2).
    The objective of this paper is to supplement Gottlieb’s challenge to Dryfus who claims that concepts are not operative in expert’s unreflective actions. First, concepts that an agent develops over time with practice, starting from the stage of novelty, become deeply rooted and persist through his expertise stage, according to common sense. It is unlikely that such rooted concepts become inoperative just when it is time for the agent to put them to use during the time that he is in (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  43. Intuition and the Autonomy of Philosophy.George Bealer - 1998 - In Michael DePaul & William Ramsey (eds.), Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and Its Role in Philosophical Inquiry. Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 201-240.
    The phenomenology of a priori intuition is explored at length (where a priori intuition is taken to be not a form of belief but rather a form of seeming, specifically intellectual as opposed to sensory seeming). Various reductive accounts of intuition are criticized, and Humean empiricism (which, unlike radical empiricism, does admit analyticity intuitions as evidence) is shown to be epistemically self-defeating. This paper also recapitulates the defense of the thesis of the Autonomy and Authority of Philosophy given in (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   145 citations  
  44. Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions.Selim Berker - 2013 - Philosophical Review 122 (3):337-393.
    When it comes to epistemic normativity, should we take the good to be prior to the right? That is, should we ground facts about what we ought and ought not believe on a given occasion in facts about the value of being in certain cognitive states (such as, for example, the value of having true beliefs)? The overwhelming answer among contemporary epistemologists is “Yes, we should.” This essay argues to the contrary. Just as taking the good to be prior (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   98 citations  
  45. Kant and Lying to the Murderer at the Door... One More Time: Kant's Legal Philosophy and Lies to Murderers and Nazis.Helga Varden - 2010 - Journal of Social Philosophy 41 (4):403-4211.
    Kant’s example of lying to the murderer at the door has been a cherished source of scorn for thinkers with little sympathy for Kant’s philosophy and a source of deep puzzlement for those more favorably inclined. The problem is that Kant seems to say that it’s always wrong to lie – even if necessary to prevent a murderer from reaching his victim – and that if one does lie, one becomes partially responsible for the killing of the victim. If this (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  46. Duties Regarding Nature: A Kantian Approach to Environmental Ethics.Toby Svoboda - 2012 - Kant Yearbook 4 (1):143-163.
    Many philosophers have objected to Kant’s account of duties regarding non-human nature, arguing that it does not ground adequate moral concern for non-human natural entities. However, the traditional interpretation of Kant on this issue is mistaken, because it takes him to be arguing merely that humans should abstain from animal cruelty and wanton destruction of flora solely because such actions could make one more likely to violate one’s duties to human beings. Instead, I argue, Kant’s account of duties regarding nature (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  47. There Must Be A First: Why Thomas Aquinas Rejects Infinite, Essentially Ordered, Causal Series.Caleb Cohoe - 2013 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 21 (5):838 - 856.
    Several of Thomas Aquinas's proofs for the existence of God rely on the claim that causal series cannot proceed in infinitum. I argue that Aquinas has good reason to hold this claim given his conception of causation. Because he holds that effects are ontologically dependent on their causes, he holds that the relevant causal series are wholly derivative: the later members of such series serve as causes only insofar as they have been caused by and are effects of the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  48. Time-Slice Rationality.Brian Hedden - 2015 - Mind 124 (494):449-491.
    I advocate Time-Slice Rationality, the thesis that the relationship between two time-slices of the same person is not importantly different, for purposes of rational evaluation, from the relationship between time-slices of distinct persons. The locus of rationality, so to speak, is the time-slice rather than the temporally extended agent. This claim is motivated by consideration of puzzle cases for personal identity over time and by a very moderate form of internalism about rationality. Time-Slice Rationality conflicts with two proposed principles of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   48 citations  
  49. Paradoxes and Failures of Cut.David Ripley - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (1):139 - 164.
    This paper presents and motivates a new philosophical and logical approach to truth and semantic paradox. It begins from an inferentialist, and particularly bilateralist, theory of meaning---one which takes meaning to be constituted by assertibility and deniability conditions---and shows how the usual multiple-conclusion sequent calculus for classical logic can be given an inferentialist motivation, leaving classical model theory as of only derivative importance. The paper then uses this theory of meaning to present and motivate a logical system---ST---that conservatively extends (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   74 citations  
  50. Grounding Practical Normativity: Going Hybrid.Ruth Chang - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (1):163-187.
    In virtue of what is something a reason for action? That is, what makes a consideration a reason to act? This is a metaphysical or meta-normative question about the grounding of reasons for action. The answer to the grounding question has been traditionally given in ‘pure’, univocal terms. This paper argues that there is good reason to understand the ground of practical normativity as a hybrid of traditional ‘pure’ views. The paper 1) surveys the three leading ‘pure’ answers to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   60 citations  
1 — 50 / 1000