Every day, thousands of polls, surveys, and rating scales are employed to elicit the attitudes of humankind. Given the ubiquitous use of these instruments, it seems we ought to have firm answers to what is measured by them, but unfortunately we do not. To help remedy this situation, we present a novel approach to investigate the nature of attitudes. We created a self-transforming paper survey of moral opinions, covering both foundational principles, and current dilemmas hotly debated in the media. This (...) survey used a magic trick to expose participants to a reversal of their previously stated attitudes, allowing us to record whether they were prepared to endorse and argue for the opposite view of what they had stated only moments ago. The result showed that the majority of the reversals remained undetected, and a full 69% of the participants failed to detect at least one of two changes. In addition, participants often constructed coherent and unequivocal arguments supporting the opposite of their original position. These results suggest a dramatic potential for flexibility in our moral attitudes, and indicates a clear role for self-attribution and post-hoc rationalization in attitude formation and change. (shrink)

Political candidates often believe they must focus their campaign efforts on a small number of swing voters open for ideological change. Based on the wisdom of opinion polls, this might seem like a good idea. But do most voters really hold their political attitudes so firmly that they are unreceptive to persuasion? We tested this premise during the most recent general election in Sweden, in which a left- and a right-wing coalition were locked in a close race. We asked our (...) participants to state their voter intention, and presented them with a political survey of wedge issues between the two coalitions. Using a sleight-of-hand we then altered their replies to place them in the opposite political camp, and invited them to reason about their attitudes on the manipulated issues. Finally, we summarized their survey score, and asked for their voter intention again. The results showed that no more than 22% of the manipulated replies were detected, and that a full 92% of the participants accepted and endorsed our altered political survey score. Furthermore, the final voter intention question indicated that as many as 48% (69.2%) were willing to consider a left-right coalition shift. This can be contrasted with the established polls tracking the Swedish election, which registered maximally 10% voters open for a swing. Our results indicate that political attitudes and partisan divisions can be far more flexible than what is assumed by the polls, and that people can reason about the factual issues of the campaign with considerable openness to change. (shrink)

Aggregating individuals’ consistent attitudes might produce inconsistent collective attitudes. Some groups therefore need the capacity to form attitudes that are irreducible to those of their members. Such groups, group-agent realists argue, are agents in control of their own attitude formation. In this paper, however, I show how group-agent realism overlooks the important fact that groups consist of strategically interacting agents. Only by eliminating group agency from our social explanations can we see how individuals vote strategically to gain control of their (...) groups and produce collective attitudes we cannot make sense of if we treat groups as agents. (shrink)

Dil felsefesi ilk bakışta XX. yüzyılda ortaya çıkmış oldukça yeni bir felsefe dalıymış gibi görünmekle birlikte, henüz felsefe dalları arasında bugünkü anlamda bir bölünmenin söz konusu olmadığı Platon ile Aristoteles'e dek uzanan "geleneksel felsefe"nin hemen bütün filozofları, dili felsefi araştırmanın es geçilemez, değme bir konusu olarak görmüşlerdir. Nitekim dil üstüne düşünüşün tarihi başta mantık tarihi olmak üzere bir bütün olarak felsefe tarihinden ayrılamaz.

John Rawls thinks republicanism is compatible with his political liberalism. Philip Pettit insists that the two conflict in important ways. In this paper, I make sense of this dispute by employing David Chalmers’s method of elimination to reveal the meaning underlying key terms in Rawls’s political liberalism and Pettit’s republicanism. This procedure of disambiguating terms will show how the two theories defend the same institutional arrangement on the same grounds. The procedure thus vindicates Rawls’s view of the two theories being (...) compatible. The reason for this compatibility is that both theories are politicized—that is, they are constructed to attract the compliance of all reasonable members of a modern, pluralistic society. (shrink)

Principles of justice, David Estlund argues, cannot be falsified by people’s unwillingness to satisfy them. In his Utopophobia, Estlund rejects the view that justice must bend to human motivation to deliver practical implications for how institutions ought to function. In this paper, I argue that a substantive argument against such bending of justice principles must challenge the reasons for making these principles sensitive to motivational limitations. Estlund, however, provides no such challenge. His dispute with benders of justice is therefore a (...) verbal one over the true meaning of justice, which need not worry those with the intuition that justice should perform a function that requires bending. By focusing on John Rawls’s reasons for bending his justice principles, I point towards a substantive critique of bent justice. (shrink)

The revival of republicanism was meant to challenge the hegemony of liberalism in contemporary political theory on the grounds that liberals show insufficient concern with institutional protection against political misrule. This article challenges this view by showing how neorepublicanism, particularly on Philip Pettit’s formulation, demands no greater institutional protection than does political liberalism. By identifying neutrality between conceptions of the good as the constraint on institutional requirements that forces neorepublicanism into the liberal framework, the article shows that neutrality is what (...) neorepublicans must jettison to offer a tenable critique of liberalism. Only then can neorepublicans ensure greater protection against misrule by demanding that citizens participate more actively in politics. They can then also criticize liberalism for failing to appreciate the importance of such protection. (shrink)

Institutions promoting republican freedom as non-domination are commonly believed to differ significantly from institutions promoting negative freedom as non-interference. Philip Pettit, the most prominent contemporary defender of this view, also maintains that these republican institutions are neutral between the different conceptions of the good that characterise a modern society. This paper shows why these two views are incompatible. By analysing the institutional requirements Pettit takes as constitutive of republican freedom, I show how they also promote negative freedom by reducing overall (...) interference. To avoid this result, republican institutions must be more restrictive and require that citizens conform to a life of political engagement. But then republican freedom will not be a neutral ideal. Rejecting negative freedom therefore means sacrificing neutrality. (shrink)

An influential view in the ethics of self-defence is that causal responsibility for an unjust threat is a necessary requirement for liability to defensive harm. In this article, I argue against this view by providing intuitive counterexamples and by revealing weaknesses in the arguments offered in its favour. In response, adherents of the causal view have advanced the idea that although causally inefficacious agents are not liable to defensive harm, the fact that they may deserve harm can justify harming them (...) in the course of defending oneself. I argue that this strategy is ad hoc and leads to more problems than it solves. Once we allow normative facts outside our account of liability to affect a person's moral protection against harm, the lieability verdicts cannot tell us whether there is a relevant moral asymmetry between the victim and the target of defence. In conclusion, the causal view is wrong and causal responsibility for an unjust threat is not a necessary requirement for liability to defensive harm. (shrink)

Verili bir durumu anlamayı, onu bir bütün olarak kurgulamak olarak düşünelim. Kurgu basit bir gösterge de olabilir, karmaşık bir yapı da olabilir; belli belirsiz bir iz veya izler toplamı da olabilir. Kurgunun işlevini yerine getirmesini sağlayan gerek ve yeter koşul verili olan durum ile kendi yapısı arasında bir karşılaştırma olanağını sağlamasıdır. Nitekim, en bilindik anlamda bir durumu kurgulamak onu bir başka durumla karşılaştırmaktır. Bu yüzden de karşılaştırma yapmayı anlama yetimiz için ön dayanak olan bir alt-yeti olarak tanımlayabiliriz. Bu alt-yetinin edimsel (...) doğasına ilişkin bazı sorulara yanıt aramak istersek, karşılaştırma dediğimiz edimin doğal koşullarını incelememiz gerekir. Bu bildiride karşılaştırma ediminin doğal koşullarını betimlemeyi amaçlayan bir çerçeve çizmeye ve böylelikle anlama yetimizin ön dayanaklarının edimsel doğasını uygun bir biçimde nasıl yorumlayabileceğimiz sorusuna yanıt vermeye çalışacağım. (shrink)

In the debate on how we ought to define political freedom, some definitions are criticized for implying that no one can ever be free to perform any action. In this paper, I show how the possibility of freedom depends on a definition that finds an appropriate balance between absence of interference and protection against interference. To assess the possibility of different conceptions of freedom, I consider the trade-offs they make between these two dimensions. I find that pure negative freedom is (...) clearly possible. Republican freedom might also be possible, though its protection requirement is too vague for a definitive verdict. Finally, the recently proposed ‘freedom as independence’ is impossible since it is an attempt to avoid the unavoidable trade-off. (shrink)

Can groups really be agents or is group agency just a fiction? Christian List and Philip Pettit argue influentially for group-agent realism by showing how certain groups form and act on attitudes in ways they take to be unexplainable at the level of the individual agents constituting them. Group agency is therefore considered not a fiction or a metaphor but a reality we must account for in explanations of certain social phenomena. In this paper, I challenge this defence of group-agent (...) realism by showing how it is undermined by individual-level analysis of how individuals interact within groups. While group agency can be a useful fiction, real agents are at the individual level, not the collective level. (shrink)

Public reason liberals expect individuals to have justificatory reasons for their views of certain political issues. This paper considers how groups can, and whether they should, give collective public reasons for their political decisions. A problem is that aggregating individuals’ consistent judgments on reasons and a decision can produce inconsistent collective judgments. The group will then fail to give a reason for its decision. The paper considers various solutions to this problem and defends a deliberative procedure by showing how it (...) incentivizes information sharing and leads to outcomes most acceptable to the group members. (shrink)

A brief outline for some alternative lines of thought on the general structure of how-possible reasoning and its implications for formally and informally conceivable things, and the concept of mathematical truth.

Aslına bakılırsa gündelik yaşam mücadelesi içinde hemen herkes anbean gündelik dilin mantıksızlığıyla da mücadele halindedir. Bu halin göstergesi olan tavır ve tutumlara odaklandığımızda ortak değerler üzerinden bir mücadele için, kendimize ve başkalarına yapabilirlikler yaratan alıştırmalar önerebiliyor muyuz? Başkalarının önerdiği yaratıcı ve yapabilirlikler belirleyen alıştırmaların farkına varabiliyor muyuz?

This literature review describes the current state of research on the Greek sophists. It draws on recent work on the beginnings of rhetoric, overviews of sophistic thought and case studies on Protagoras, Gorgias, Antiphon and Prodicus. It is shown that the traditional notion of a sophistic antithesis to philosophy has lost further ground: While earlier »rehabilitations« of sophistic thought still use the dichotomous distinction of philosophy und sophistic, now any generic talk of »the sophist« should better be regarded as misleading.

Electromagnetism is usually understood as a theory describing how charged particles and eletromagnetic fields interact. In this paper I argue that a double ontology comprising both particles and fields is problematic. Either we should think of electromagnetism as a theory about charged particles directly interacting with each other, or as theory of fields whose local interactions are manifested as field quanta, called "particles." From a purely theoretical point of view the choice between a particle and a field interpretation does not (...) matter much when it concerns classical electromagnetism; both interpretations are possible and, as shown by Quine, there is a general method for translating a theory about one kind of objects into a theory assuming another kind of objects, provided these theories are empirically equivalent. From an empiricist point of view, however, the particle interpretation is the choice, since some particles are directly observable. Testable predictions of electromagnetism are predictions of the motion of charged bodies, in theory represented as particles, so this must be the empiricists' choice of ontology. In quantum electrodynamics one is however forced to chose a field ontology, since a particle ontology for this theory is impossible. So called "quantum particles" are field quanta, which cannot be treated as individuals making up a domain of quantification. There is thus a tension regarding ontology between classical and quantum electrodynamics. But this tension is nothing else than the much debated measurement problem of quantum mechanics. (shrink)

If we regard discursive practice as constitutive for the way we relate to the world, ourselves and others, then it is vitally important to ask how this practice can be formed or cultivated. For this reason, rhetoric has always been closely connected to ethics. This article attempts to explicate this relationship. It revolves around ancient conceptions of rhetoric that do not aim at establishing a system or a theory of speech, but at cultivating speech as a practice of good life. (...) This “rhetorical ethics” of antiquity remains instructive for contemporary thinking, since it points to a way of reflecting discourse that accounts not only for the content of speech but also for how it shapes human life. In particular, it is instructive for modern ethics, since it reveals that moral discourse can be regarded as a rhetorical practice too: it is not ethically neutral but has to be reflected upon as a practice of life. (shrink)

In this article I argue for an empiricist view on laws. Some laws are fundamental in the sense that they are the result of inductive generalisations of observed regularities and at the same time in their formulation contain a new theoretical predicate. The inductive generalisations simul- taneously function as implicit definitions of these new predicates. Other laws are either explicit definitions or consequences of other previously established laws. I discuss the laws of classical mechanics, relativity theory and electromagnetism in detail. (...) Laws are necessary, whereas acciden- tal generalisations are not. But necessity here is not a modal concept, but rather interpreted as short for the semantic predicate “... is necessarily true”. Thus no modal logic is needed. The neces- sity attributed to law sentences is in turn interpreted as “necessary condition for the rest of the the- ory”, which is true since fundamental laws are implicit definitions of theoretical predicates use in the theory. (shrink)

Mantık, yirminci yüzyıldaki gelişimi bakımından ele alındığında, matematik, bilgisayar bilimi, dilbilim ve felsefe gibi alanlarla sıkı kavramsal bağlantılar kuran bir disiplin haline gelmiştir. Tüm bu alanların gündelik dilde izi sürülen anlamalar, anlaşmalar, anlatmalar vb. edimler için birşeyler söyleyebileceğini ya da yapabileceğini varsayabiliriz. Ancak bu varsayım gündelik dilin mantığıyla ya da mantıksızlıklarıyla doğrudan başedebilecek bir anlama yetisi kazanmanın kolay bir yolu olduğu anlamına gelmez. Modern mantık matematikseldir ve gündelik dilde bir kolaylık sağlamaz; aksine işleri olduğundan da karmaşık hale getirir.

This article argues that Kant’s attack on the ars oratoria in §53 of the Critique of the Power of Judgement is directed against eighteenth-century school rhetoric, in particular against the ‘art of speech’ (Redekunst) of Johann Christoph Gottsched. It is pointed out that Kant suggests a revision of Gottsched’s conception of ‘true eloquence’, which was the predominant rhetorical ideal at the time. On this basis, and in response to recent discussions on ‘Kantian rhetoric’, Kant’s own ideal of speech is adressed. (...) It emerges that he favours a culture of speech embedded in moral cultivation, which excludes any disciplinary form of rhetoric. (shrink)

The article argues that the doctrine of Gorgias of Leontinoi, as expressed in his "Encomion of Helen", is not a rhetorical technique but a practice of moral education. The medium of this "ethical speech practice" is perceptual forms, its basic mode being the practice of showing or epideictic speech. The crucial standard of this practice is "epideictic rightness", which is identical to Gorgias’ conception of "truth.". According to this conception, speech is true if it exemplifies morally right conduct and moral (...) beauty. True speech in this sense must also be effective speech, since it will promote right behaviour in the future. (shrink)

This introduction presents an overview of the key concepts discussed in the subsequent chapters of this book. The book explores, inter alia, the strategy employed by Augustine in using Plato as a pseudo-prophet against later Platonists and explores Eusebius’ reception of Porphyry’s daemonology. It examines Plotinus’ claim that matter is absolute badness and focuses on Maximus the Confessor’s doctrine of creation and asks whether one may detect any influence on Maximus from Philoponus. The book addresses Christian receptions of Platonic metaphysics (...) and also examines the philosophy of number in Augustine’s early works. It argues that the aspect of Augustine’s philosophy must be read in context with the intellectual problems that occupied him at the beginning of his career as a writer. It draws on a number of sources to investigate the development of the doctrine and the various intellectual issues it confronted, including Plato’s Timaeus, Philo of Alexandria, Clement of Alexandria, Origen, Plotinus and, finally, Athanasius. (shrink)

Buradaki yazılar farklı zamanlarda farklı amaçlarla yazılanların bir derlemesi.. Örneğin, ilk bölüm 2012'den.. Son bölüm 90'lardan. Tümünü bir araya toplamamın basit bir nedeni var; bir ölçüye kadar sürekliliği olan bir anlatı oluşturmak istedim.. Yazılarda ortak bir akışın içinde olan noktaların, izlerin vbg. toplamı için, düşüncenin --belki de yalnızca çağrışımsal anlamıyla düşüncenin-- çevresel koşulları üzerine bir deneme olduğu söylenebilir. Bu anlamda bu taslak dosya bir felsefeye giriş denemesi olarak da görülebilir; ya da bir metafelsefe çalışması olarak...

Deneycilerin deneyimden anladığı genellikle duyu organları aracılığıyla gerçekleştirilen deneyimdir. Gizemci deneyim, estetik deneyim vb. deneycinin başvurmayı tercih etmeyeceği bilgi edinme yollarıdır. Deneyci düşüncenin en belirgin özelliği deneyime önsel (a priori) bilgiyi yadsımasıdır.

In his late ‘A Plea for Excuses’, John L. Austin suggests labelling his philosophy ‘linguistic phenomenology’. This article examines which idea of phenomenology Austin had in mind when he coined this term and what light this sheds on his method. It is argued that the key to answering this question can be found in Merleau-Ponty’s 'Phenomenology of Perception', which Austin must have been familiar with. Merleau-Ponty presents phenomenology in a way Austin could embrace: it is a method, it aims at (...) description and uses reduction, it is a non-idealistic study of essence, and interprets intentionality as ‘operative’. In this light, Austin’s method can be appreciated more fully. (shrink)

2011-2020 yılları arasında yazdıklarım arasından seçip derlediğim bu dosyada farklı amaçlarla yazılıp bütünsel bir anlatı oluşturmak arzusuyla bir araya getirilmiş yazılar var. İçindeki yazıların başlıkları sırasıyla şöyle: 1. Maddesiz ama manalı ufuklar; 2. Wittgenstein'ın ölümsüz dünyasında kim öle, kim kala?; 3. Hilbert izlencesinin izinde; 4. Adcılık adına yeni bulgular; 5. Doğa ile oynanan oyunlarda hakikat arayışı; 6. Hakikat-sonrası hakikat araştırmaları; 7. Ekolojik bir etik arayışı: hakikat-sonrası, yalan, dolan; peki ya daha sonrası? Söz konusu yazılarla arzulanan bütünsel anlatıya göre bu çalışma (...) zihin-beden ikiliği, özdeşleştirme dizgeleri, adcılık, kamusal akıl yürütme ve çevre etiği gibi konularda felsefece değinilerden oluşan bir doğa felsefesine giriş denemesi olarak değerlendirilebilir. (shrink)

What are the justifications for and constraints on the use of force in self-defense? In his book The Morality of Defensive Force, Jonathan Quong presents the moral status account to address this and other fundamental questions. According to the moral status account, moral liability to defensive harm is triggered by treating others with less respect than they are due. At the same time, Quong rejects the relevance of culpability to the morality of defensive harming. In this article I argue that (...) this rejection of culpability is unfounded and that Quong fails to establish his account as superior to the culpability account of liability to defensive harm. (shrink)

A moralised conception of freedom is based on a normative theory. Understanding it therefore requires an analysis of this theory. In this paper, I show how republican freedom as non-domination is moralised, and why analysing this concept therefore involves identifying the basic components of the republican theory of justice. One of these components is the non-moralised pure negative conception of freedom as non-interference. Republicans therefore cannot keep insisting that their freedom concept conflicts with, and is superior to, this more basic (...) concept. I demonstrate how we can use pure negative freedom to formulate the republican theory more precisely. This exercise is more fruitful than the common focus on the alleged conflict between the two freedom concepts. (shrink)

Notes mainly on model-oriented vs. deduction-oriented conceptions of axiomatic reasoning.

Wittgenstein’ın bir yaşam olayı olarak görmediği ölümün ne anlama geldiğine ilişkin düşüncesi açımlanıyor. Wittgenstein’ın düşüncesinin varlık-bilimsel dayanağı olan tek bir dünyanın var sayılması birden çok dünya varsayılan bir yaklaşımla karşılaştırılıyor.

Hilbert's axiomatic approach was an optimistic take over on the side of the logical foundations. It was also a response to various restrictive views of mathematics supposedly bounded by the reaches of epistemic elements in mathematics. A complete axiomatization should be able to exclude epistemic or ontic elements from mathematical theorizing, according to Hilbert. This exclusion is not necessarily a logicism in similar form to Frege's or Dedekind's projects. That is, intuition can still have a role in mathematical reasoning. Nevertheless, (...) this role is to be given a structural orientation with the help of explications of the underlying logic of axiomatization. (shrink)

Kimi zaman akademik hayatımızı doğrudan etkileyen kararların kimler tarafından nerede ve nasıl alındığını bilemeyebiliriz. Kimi zaman da bilsek bile bu akademik toplumun şeffaf olduğu anlamına gelmeyebilir. Doktora sonrası yurda dönmeden önce, tezimi okuyan hocalarımdan “Orada seni anlayan birilerini bulabilecek misin?” gibi bir soru gelmişti. Sorunun doğru yanıtının ne olduğundan emin değildim; hala da değilim.

Can a group be morally responsible instead of, or in addition to, its members? An influential defense of corporate responsibility is based on results in social choice theory suggesting that a group can form and act on attitudes held by few, or even none, of its members. The members therefore cannot be (fully) responsible for the group’s behavior; the group itself, as a corporate agent, must be responsible. In this paper, I reject this view of corporate responsibility by showing how (...) it pays insufficient attention to individual agency. By accounting for group members’ strategic behavior, we shall see how they control collective attitude formation and are therefore responsible for their group’s behavior. (shrink)

In this work I study the main tenets of the logicist philosophy of mathematics. I deal, basically, with two problems: (1) To what extent can one dispense with intuition in mathematics? (2) What is the appropriate logic for the purposes of logicism? By means of my considerations I try to determine the pros and cons of logicism. My standpoint favors the logicist line of thought. -/- .

Matematiğe, mantığa ve bilimlere gereğinde başvuran çözümleyici felsefenin en temel amacı herhangi bir dilsel anlam bulanıklığından arınmış şekilde felsefe yapmak ve felsefede varolan anlam bulanıklıklarını ortadan kaldırmaktır.

Hilbert izlencesinin kanıt kuramsal amacı tarihsel gelişimi içinde özetlendikten sonra arka plandaki model-kuramsal motivasyonu belirtilmektedir. Hilbert'in nihai hedefinin matematiğin temellerine ilişkin tüm epistemolojik ve ontolojik varsayımlardan arındırılmış bir matematik kuramı geliştirmek olduğu savunulmaktadır. Yakın geçmişte mantıktaki bazı gelişmelerin Hilbert izlencesinin yalnızca adcı varsayımlar temelinde sürdürülebileceğine ilişkin yeni bir bakış açısı sağladığı öne sürülmektedir.

Bu kısa yazıda, Wittgenstein'ın felsefesinin gerçekçiliğinden söz açıp konuyu başlıktaki yirmi birinci yüzyıl vurgusuna bağlamaya çalışacağım. Tabii bunu Wittgenstein'ın düşüncelerinin gelişimini özetleyerek yapmaya çalışacağım.

Mantık tarihi ondokuzuncu yüzyılın ikinci yarısından bu yana matematiğin temelleriyle ilgili soruların yanıtlanmasına sahne olmuştur. Bugün tarihsel gelişiminin bir sonucu olarak mantık bilgisayar kullanımı aracılığıyla yaşam ile etkileşmektedir. Bu yazıda söz konusu etkileşimin geleceğine ilişkin bilgisel ufukların geçmişte hangi soruları yanıtlamak amacıyla belirlendiği çok kısaca özetlenmektedir.

Positive political theorists typically deny the possibility of collective agents by understanding aggregation problems to imply that groups are not rational decision-makers. This view contrasts with List and Pettit’s view that such problems actually imply the necessity of accounting for collective agents in explanations of group behaviour. In this paper, I explore these conflicting views and ask whether positive political theorists should alter their individualist analyses of groups like legislatures, political parties, and constituent assemblies. I show how we fail to (...) appreciate the significance of strategic voting and agenda control by treating groups as agents. I, therefore, conclude that positive political theorists should cling to their individualist approach and maintain that groups are not agents. (shrink)

Inductive thinking is a universal human habit; we generalise from our experiences the best we can. The induction problem is to identify which observed regularities provide reasonable justification for inductive conclusions. In the natural sciences, we can often use strict laws in making successful inferences about unobserved states of affairs. In the social sciences, by contrast, we have no strict laws, only regularities which most often are conditioned on ceteris paribus clauses. This makes it much more difficult to make reliable (...) inferences in the social sciences. In particular, we want knowledge about general causal relations in order to be able to determine what to do in order to achieve a certain state of affairs. Knowledge about causal relations that are also valid in the future requires experiments or so called ‘natural experiments’. Only knowledge derived from such experiences enable us to draw reasonably reliable inferences about how to act in order to achieve our goals. (shrink)

The foundational ideas of David Hilbert have been generally misunderstood. In this dissertation prospectus, different aims of Hilbert are summarized and a new interpretation of Hilbert's work in the foundations of mathematics is roughly sketched out. Hilbert's view of the axiomatic method, his response to criticisms of set theory and intuitionist criticisms of the classical foundations of mathematics, and his view of the role of logical inference in mathematical reasoning are briefly outlined.

İletişimsel eylem kuramı stratejik eylemi dışlamakla bizi gerçekçi bir doğruluk kavramı geliştirmekten alıkoyar. Halbuki, gerçekçi bir doğruluk kavramı, kuramın öndayanaklarından biridir. O halde, yeni bir mantık aracılığıyla, stratejik eylemi de bünyesine alan, yeni bir iletişimsel eylem anlayışının olanaklılığı sorgulanabilir. Bu bildiride böyle bir anlayışın nasıl geliştirilebileceği üzerinde duracağım.