Peter van Inwagen has given an answer to the question ‘Why is there something rather than nothing?’. His answer is: Because there being nothing is as improbable as anything can be: it has probability 0. Here I shall examine his argument for this answer and I shall argue that it does not work because no good reasons have been given for two of the argument’s premises and that the conclusion of the argument does not constitute an answer to the question (...) van Inwagen wanted to answer. (shrink)

FDE is a logic that captures relevant entailment between implication-free formulae and admits of an intuitive informational interpretation as a 4-valued logic in which “a computer should think”. However, the logic is co-NP complete, and so an idealized model of how an agent can think. We address this issue by shifting to signed formulae where the signs express imprecise values associated with two distinct bipartitions of the set of standard 4 values. Thus, we present a proof system which consists of (...) linear operational rules and only two branching structural rules, the latter expressing a generalized rule of bivalence. This system naturally leads to defining an infinite hierarchy of tractable depth-bounded approximations to FDE. Namely, approximations in which the number of nested applications of the two branching rules is bounded. (shrink)

This bulletin contains a summary of the main topics of discussion in truthmaker theory, namely: the definition of truthmakers, problems with Truthmaker Necessitarianism and Truthmaker Maximalism, the ontological burden of truthmakers and the recalcitrant topic of truthmakers for negative truths.

The paper argues that grounding is neither irreflexive, nor asymmetric, nor transitive. In arguing for that conclusion the paper also arguesthat truthmaking is neither irreflexive, nor asymmetric, nor transitive.

Consider a certain red rose. The proposition that the rose is red is true because the rose is red. One might say as well that the proposition that the rose is red is made true by the rose’s being red. This, it has been thought, does not commit one to a truthmaker of the proposition that the rose is red. For there is no entity that makes the proposition true. What makes it true is how the rose is, and how (...) the rose is is not an entity over and above the rose. It is against this view that I shall argue in this paper. I shall argue that a significant class of true propositions, including inessential predications like the proposition that the rose is red, are made true by entities. "No truthmaking without truthmakers" is my slogan. Although I have my view about what kinds of entities are truthmakers, I shall not argue for or presuppose that view here. All I shall argue for here is that if a proposition is made true by something, it is made true by some thing, but my argument will leave it open what kind of thing that thing is: it could be a fact or state of affairs, a trope, or any other sort of entity. (shrink)

1. The Bundle Theory I shall discuss is a theory about the nature of substances or concrete particulars, like apples, chairs, atoms, stars and people. The point of the Bundle Theory is to avoid undesirable entities like substrata that allegedly constitute particulars. The version of the Bundle Theory I shall discuss takes particulars to be entirely constituted by the universals they instantiate.' Thus particulars are said to be just bundles of universals. Together with the claim that it is necessary that (...) particulars have constituents, the fundamental claim of the Bundle Theory is: (BT) Necessarily, for every particular x and every entity y, y constitutes x if and only ify is a universal and x instantiates y. 2 The standard and supposedly devastating objection to the Bundle Theory is that it entails or is committed to a false version of the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles (Armstrong 1978: 91, Loux 1998: 107), namely: (Pll) Necessarily, for all particulars x and y and every universal z, if z is instantiated by x if and only if z is instantiated byy, then x is numerically identical with y. The most famous counterexample to the Identity of Indiscernibles is that put forward by Max Black, consisting of a world where there are only two iron spheres two miles apart from each other, having the same diameter, temperature, colour, shape, size, etc (Black 1952: 156). Let us from now on think of the properties of the spheres in this world as universals. The possibility of this world, which I shall hereafter refer to as 'Black's world', makes (Pll) false.' And according to common philosophical opinion this means that the Bundle Theory is false.. (shrink)

This paper is a response to replies by Dan López de Sa and Mark Jago to my ‘Truthmaking, Entailment, and the Conjuction Thesis’. In that paper, my main aim was to argue against the Entailment Principle by arguing against the Conjunction Thesis, which is entailed by the Entailment Principle. In the course of so doing, although not essential for my project in that paper, I defended the Disjunction Thesis. López de Sa has objected both to my defence of the Disjunction (...) Thesis and my case against the Conjunction Thesis. I shall show that his objections are unfounded and based on serious misunderstandings of my position, what the relevant debate is, and some fundamental notions of Truthmaker Theory. Jago argues that accepting the Disjunction Thesis and rejecting the Conjunction Thesis is hard to maintain. But I show that Jago has not shown that accepting the Disjunction Thesis while rejecting the Conjunction Thesis is impossible or even hard to maintain. Jago believes that, to accept the Disjunction Thesis while rejecting the Conjunction Thesis, one needs to reject his axiom (T3), which says that all the truthmakers for <P&P> are truthmakers for <P>. I argue that there are reasons to reject such a principle, and the version of it that says that what makes <P&P> true makes <P> true. (shrink)

In the 1750s Optimism, the Leibnizian doctrine that the actual world is the best possible world, popularised by Pope in 1733 in his Essay on Man, was a hot topic. In 1759 Kant wrote and published a brief essay defending Optimism, Attempt at some Reflections on Optimism. Kant’s aim in this essay is to establish that there is one and only one best possible world. In particular, he argues against the claim that, for every possible world, there is a possible (...) world better than it and against the claim that there are two or more equally good possible worlds that are better than all the rest. Although it is not clear why, Kant was later dissatisfied with his essay. In this article I shall reconstruct, discuss, and evaluate Kant’s arguments. My evaluation will be negative, and so I think Kant had reasons to be dissatisfied with his essay. (shrink)

The object of this paper is to provide a solution to Nelson Goodman’s Imperfect Community difficulty as it arises for Resemblance Nominalism, the view that properties are classes of resembling particulars. The Imperfect Community difficulty consists in that every two members of a class resembling each other is not sufficient for it to be a class such that there is some property common to all their members, even if ‘x resembles y’ is understood as ‘x and y share some property’. (...) In the paper I explain and criticise several solutions to the difficulty. Then I develop my own solution, which is not subject to the objections I make to the other solutions, and which accords completely with the basic tenets of Resemblance Nominalism. (shrink)

Bertrand Russell argued that any attempt to get rid of universals in favor of resemblances fails. He argued that no resemblance theory could avoid postulating a universal of resemblance without falling prey to a vicious infinite regress. He added that admitting such a universal of resemblance made it pointless to avoid other universals. In this paper I defend resemblance nominalism from both of Russell's points by arguing that (a) resemblance nominalism can avoid the postulation of a universal of resemblance without (...) falling into a vicious infinite regress, and (b) even if resemblance nominalism had to admit a universal of resemblance, this would not make it pointless to avoid postulating other universals. (shrink)

The subtraction argument, originally put forward by Thomas Baldwin (1996), is intended to establish Metaphysical Nihilism, the thesis that there could have been no concrete objects. Some modified versions of the argument have been proposed in order to avoid some difficulties faced by the original argument. In this paper I shall concentrate on two of those versions, the so-called subtraction argument* (presented and defended in Rodriguez-Pereyra 1997, 2000, 2002), and Efird and Stoneham’s recent version of the argument (Efird and (...) Stoneham 2005). I shall defend the subtraction argument* from Alexander Paseau’s (2006) objection that because a crucial premise of the subtraction argument* may have no plausibility independent from Metaphysical Nihilism, the subtraction argument* is not suasive. Although Paseau focuses on the subtraction argument*, I shall point out that Efird and Stoneham could reply to Paseau’s objection in the same way. Thus there are (at least) two suasive versions of the subtraction argument that establish Metaphysical Nihilism. But are those two arguments equally good? I shall argue that the subtraction argument* is preferable to Efird and Stoneham’s argument. (shrink)

Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra offers a fresh philosophical account of properties. How is it that two different things (such as two red roses) can share the same property (redness)? According to resemblance nominalism, things have their properties in virtue of resembling other things. This unfashionable view is championed with clarity and rigor.

According to one of Leibniz's theories of contingency a proposition is contingent if and only if it cannot be proved in a finite number of steps. It has been argued that this faces the Problem of Lucky Proof , namely that we could begin by analysing the concept ‘Peter’ by saying that ‘Peter is a denier of Christ and …’, thereby having proved the proposition ‘Peter denies Christ’ in a finite number of steps. It also faces a more general but (...) related problem that we dub the Problem of Guaranteed Proof . We argue that Leibniz has an answer to these problems since for him one has not proved that ‘Peter denies Christ’ unless one has also proved that ‘Peter’ is a consistent concept, an impossible task since it requires the full decomposition of the infinite concept ‘Peter’. We defend this view from objections found in the literature and maintain that for Leibniz all truths about created individual beings are contingent. (shrink)

Resemblance Nominalism is the view that denies universals and tropes and claims that what makes F-things F is their resemblances. A famous argument against Resemblance Nominalism is Russell's regress of resemblances, according to which the resemblance nominalist falls into a vicious infinite regress. Aristocratic Resemblance Nominalism, as opposed to Egalitarian Resemblance Nominalism, is the version of Resemblance Nominalism that claims that what makes F-things F is that they resemble the F-paradigms. In this paper I attempt to show that a recently (...) advocated strategy to stop Russell's regress by using paradigms does not succeed. (shrink)

Leibniz was a philosopher of principles: the principles of Contradiction, of Sufficient Reason, of Identity of Indiscernibles, of Plenitude, of the Best, and of Continuity are among the most famous Leibnizian principles. In this article I shall focus on the first three principles; I shall discuss various formulations of the principles (sect. 1), what it means for these theses to have the status of principles or axioms in Leibniz’s philosophy (sect. 2), the fundamental character of the Principles of Contradiction and (...) Sufficient Reason (sect. 3), some attempts to demonstrate the Principles of Contradiction and Sufficient Reason (sect. 4), and one attempt to demonstrate the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles (sect. 5). The main results of the chapter are summarized in a short conclusion (sect. 6). (shrink)

In my book *Resemblance Nominalism* I argued that the truthmakers of ´a and b resemble each other´ are just a and b. In his "Resemblance Nominalism and counterparts" Alexander Bird objects to my claim that the truthmakers of ´a and b resemble each other´ are just a and b. In this paper I respond to Bird´s objections.

In this chapter I shall reply to a pair of articles in which the main contention of my “Why truthmakers” – namely, that an important class of synthetic true propositions have entities as truth-makers – is rejected. In §§1–5 I reply to Jennifer Hornsby’s “Truth without Truthmaking Entities” (2005) and in §§6–7 I reply to Julian Dodd’s “Negative Truths and Truthmaker Principles” (2007).

El presente artículo analiza la etapa denominada arqueológica de Michel Foucault. Puntualizando principalmente cómo en esta etapa es entendido el concepto de libertad desde la noción foucaultiana de discurso. Se aborda, en este sentido, la etapa arqueológica de Foucault desde tres áreas. La primera, nos habla de cómo se erige lo diferente, lo anormal. La segunda, expone cómo se construye lo aparente, lo indiscutible. Por último, a partir de un marco teórico previamente expuesto, reflexionamos respecto del concepto de libertad.

This note argues that research in analytical philosophy broadly conceived should be published exclusively in English. Reasons are given for this and the thesis is defended against thirteen objections.

In this paper I present what I call the 'Metaphysical Problem of Truth', which consists in explaining in virtue of what all true sentences are true, and argue that a version of the Correspondence Theory of Truth is the most plausible solution to this problem.

FDE, LP and K3 are closely related to each other and admit of an intuitive informational interpretation. However, all these logics are co-NP complete, and so idealized models of how an agent can think. We address this issue by shifting to signed formulae, where the signs express imprecise values associated with two bipartitions of the corresponding set of standard values. We present proof systems whose operational rules are all linear and have only two structural branching rules that express a generalized (...) Principle of Bivalence. Each of these systems leads to defining an infinite hierarchy of tractable approximations to the respective logic, in terms of the maximum number of allowed nested applications of the two branching rules. Further, each resulting hierarchy admits of an intuitive 5-valued non-deterministic semantics. (shrink)

In the Discourse on Metaphysics Leibniz put forward his famous complete-concept definition of substance. Sometimes this definition is glossed as stating that a substance is an entity with a concept so complete that it contains all its predicates, and it is thought that it follows directly from Leibniz’s theory of truth. Now, an adequate definition of substance should not apply to accidents. But, as I shall point out, if Leibniz’s theory of truth is correct then an accident is an entity (...) with a concept so complete that it contains all its predicates. The aim of this paper is to clarify Leibniz’s notion of substance in the Discourse with a view to explaining how that definition successfully distinguishes between substances and accidents. (shrink)

The Razor says: do not multiply entities without necessity! The Laser says: do not multiply fundamental entities without necessity! Behind the Laser lies a deep insight. This is a distinction between the costs and the commitments of a theory. According to the Razor, every commitment is a cost. Not so according to the Laser. According to the Laser, derivative entities are an ontological free lunch: that is, they are a commitment without a cost. Jonathan Schaffer (2015) has argued that the (...) Laser should replace the Razor. In Sections 2-4 we shall discuss and argue against Schaffer’s arguments for replacing the Razor with the Laser. Schaffer considers several objections to his views, and in Sections 5-7 we shall argue that Schaffer does not deal successfully with two of them. In Section 8 we shall present a probabilistic argument for the Laser. However, the argument has a limitation and does not support the replacement of the Razor with the Laser. Indeed, it supports only the claim that, given certain assumptions, the multiplication of explanatorily relevant derivative entities does not matter; but, as we argue in the same section, there is an argument that multiplying explanatorily superfluous derivative entities does makes a theory less rationally acceptable. Our conclusion is that the Laser cannot replace the Razor and that derivative entities are not an ontological free lunch. (shrink)

Peter Milne has tried to refure Truthmaker Maximalism. the thesis that every truth has a truthmaker, by producing a simple and direct counterexample to it, the sentence M: This sentence has no truthmaker. I argue that, contrary to what Milne argues, on Truthmaker Maximalism M is equivalent to the Liar, which gives the truthmaker maximalist a way to defend his position from Milne's counterexample: to argue that M expresses no proposition.

In this paper, I argue that if one is already an advocate of scientific realism, then one would be also a realist about laws of nature. To show this, I argue that only scientific realists would accept that non-accidental regularities require explanation and that their genuine explanation is given by laws of nature. Then, from this conclusion, it seems that scientific realists have reason to believe that there are laws of nature in an objective sense. If this is correct, the (...) conclusion is that there are no reasons for advocates of scientific realism to be skeptics about laws of nature. (shrink)

Causation was an important topic of philosophical reflection during the Seventeenth Century. This reflection centred around certain particular problems about causation, one of which was the problem of causation between mind and body. The doctrine of the pre-established harmony is Leibniz's response to the problem of causation between mind and body. In this chapter I shall (a) explain the problem of mind-body causation; (b) explain Leibniz's pre-established harmony; and (c) assess his case for it.

In this paper I argue that Ancient Greek Sceptics implicitly presupposed a Parmenidean ontology.

In this paper I discuss a passage from *Naming and Necessity* where Kripke assumes that the essential properties by means of which a definite description designates are a sufficient condition of its rigidity. I put forward two examples that show the falsity of this assumption. Then I examine the non-rigid character of definite descriptions that designate by means of properties that are sufficient conditions of identity of the objects designated by those descriptions. I conclude that the properties by means of (...) which rigid descriptions designate must be both necessary and sufficient conditions of the identity of the designated objects. (shrink)

The concern of this paper is a version of Resemblance Nominalism according to which resemblance classes, i.e. classes of resembling things, are determined by paradigms. I show that the theory is false, since paradigms do not generally determine resemblance classes. Although I concentrate upon the version of the theory which was delineated by H. H. Price, my results apply to any other theory constructing resemblance classes out of paradigms.

The paper clarifies the sense of remark 202 of Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* with respect to its relation to the private language argument. It argues, against what some have maintained, that remark 202 is not meant to reject the possibility of a private language as this is defined in remark 243.

The Vehicle Routing Problem (VRP) has been extensively studied by different researchers from all over the world in recent years. Multiple solutions have been proposed for different variations of the problem, such as Capacitive Vehicle Routing Problem (CVRP), Vehicle Routing Problem with Time Windows (VRP-TW), Vehicle Routing Problem with Pickup and Delivery (VRPPD), among others, all of them with deterministic times. In the last years, researchers have been interested in including in their different models the variations that travel times may (...) experience when exposed to all kind of phenomena, mainly vehicle traffic. This article addresses the VRP from this perspective, proposing the design and implementation of a genetic algorithm based on neutrosophic theory for calculating the fitness function of each route, considering the variability and uncertainty present in travel times. A deterministic genetic algorithm is also implemented with the average travel times to compare it with the neutrosophic algorithm using simulation. As conclusion, a deterministic algorithm does not necessarily generate the best solution in the real world, full of uncertainty. Also, the quantification of uncertainty using neutrosophic theory can be used in route planning, opening a broad and interesting field of research for future investigations. (shrink)

The depth-bounded approach seeks to provide realistic models of reasoners. Recognizing that most useful logics are idealizations in that they are either undecidable or likely to be intractable, the approach accounts for how they can be approximated in practice by resource-bounded agents. The approach has been applied to Classical Propositional Logic (CPL), yielding a hierarchy of tractable depth-bounded approximations to that logic, which in turn has been based on a KE/KI system. -/- This Thesis shows that the approach can be (...) naturally extended to useful nonclassical logics such as First-Degree Entailment (FDE), the Logic of Paradox (LP), Strong Kleene Logic (K3 ) and Intuitionistic Propositional Logic (IPL). To do this, we introduce a KE/KI-style system for each of those logics such that: is formulated via signed formulae, consist of linear operational rules and branching structural rule(s), can be used as a direct-proof and a refutation method, and is interesting independently of the approach in that it has an exponential speed-up on its tableau system counterpart. The latter given that we introduce a new class of examples which we prove to be hard for all tableau systems sharing the V/& rules with the classical one, but easy for their analogous KE-style systems. Then we focus on showing that each of our KE/KI-style systems naturally yields a hierarchy of tractable depth-bounded approximations to the respective logic, in terms of the maximum number of allowed nested applications of the branching rule(s). The rule(s) express(es) a generalized rule of bivalence, is (are) essentially cut rule(s) and govern(s) the manipulation of virtual information, which is information that an agent does not hold but she temporarily assumes as if she held it. Intuitively, the more virtual information needs to be invoked via the branching rule(s), the harder the inference is for the agent. So, the nested application the branching rule(s) provides a sensible measure of inferential depth. We also show that each hierarchy approximating FDE, LP, and K3 , admits of a 5-valued non-deterministic semantics; whereas, paving the way for a semantical characterization of the hierarchy approximating IPL, we provide a 3-valued non-deterministic semantics for the full logic that fixes the meaning of the connectives without appealing to “structural” conditions. -/- Moreover, we show a super-polynomial lower bound for the strongest possible version of clausal tableaux on the well-known class of “truly fat” expressions (which are easy for KE), settling a problem left open in the literature. Further, we investigate a hierarchy of tractable depth-bounded approximations to CPL based only on KE. Finally, we propose a refinement of the p-simulation relation which is adequate to establish positive results about the superiority of a system over another with respect to proof-search. (shrink)

Philosophy can be regarded as a type of conceptual research subjected to the usual standards of rationality. However, there seems to be no objective and accepted criteria for evaluating and comparing philosophical theories. From a heuristic- and erotetic-based approach, philosophy is here considered a set of second-order reflections that are presupposed by more specific theories; and evaluated by their informativeness, adequateness, cogency, generality, novelty, and presuppositional nature. As a practice, one can proceed upwards (from problems to presuppositions) or downwards (from (...) presuppositions as meaning conditions for assertions under question). But as a product, a philosophical theory is to be assessed as how it helps foster knowledge and assists in learning, posing, and solving new queries. (shrink)

ES: La economía tradicional explica la evolución de los individuos y del conocimiento de forma muy parcial. Los nuevos medios exigen una reconsideración del papel del individuo y del valor comunal del conocimiento que permita una reorientación del sentido económico y las acciones individuales. Frente a la teoría de juegos tradicional de suma 0, es posible encontrar formulaciones cooperativas que muestran su robustez y pertinencia. EN: Classical economics explains the evolution of individuals and knowledge in a very partial way. New (...) technological means require a reconsideration of the role of individuals and communal value of knowledge. This rethinking allows a reorientation of both the economic sense and individual actions to become a reality. Against a classical theory of zero-sum games, it is possible to reshape cooperative ways that show their robustness and pertinence. (shrink)

In this note we shall argue that Milne’s new effort does not refute Truthmaker Maximalism. According to Truthmaker Maximalism, every truth has a truthmaker. Milne has attempted to refute it using the following self-referential sentence M: This sentence has no truthmaker. Essential to his refutation is that M is like the Gödel sentence and unlike the Liar, and one way in which Milne supports this assimilation is through the claim that his proof is essentially object-level and not semantic. In Section (...) 2, we shall argue that Milne is still begging the question against Truthmaker Maximalism. In Section 3, we shall argue that even assimilating M to the Liar does not force the truthmaker maximalist to maintain the ‘dull option’ that M does not express a proposition. There are other options open and, though they imply revising the logic in Milne’s reasoning, this is not one of the possible revisions he considers. In Section 4, we shall suggest that Milne’s proof requires an implicit appeal to semantic principles and notions. In Section 5, we shall point out that there are two important dissimilarities between M and the Gödel sentence. Section 6 is a brief summary and conclusion. (shrink)

(Relato breve de ideas). [...] Algo atormenta a María, mi más admirada científica. El tesoro que custodia es tan grande, que la mínima irregularidad hace saltar todas las alarmas. Las nuevas arrugas de su frente se expanden en ondas concéntricas y hacen subir la tensión. [...].

A la fecha, la academia hispanohablante ha abordado el pensamiento de Stefan Lorenz Sorgner analizando, casi exclusivamente, su intento de comprender a Nietzsche como un precursor del transhumanismo. Más allá de los alegatos a favor o en contra de tal lectura, este debate olvida que el pensamiento de Sorgner efectivamente se ha apropiado de varias intuiciones nietzscheanas, hasta el punto de crear su propio transhumanismo nietzscheano débil o bien, Metahumanismo. Con este contexto en mente, el presente artículo tiene tres objetivos (...) específicos:(1) ofrecer una caracterización que diferencia al Metahumanismo de Sorgner tanto del trans-como del post-humanismo;(2) señalar cómo se modulan las ideas de Nietzsche en el metahumanismo de Sorgner; y finalmente (3) ilustrar cuáles son algunas de las propuestas con las que el metahumanismo enfrenta los debates contemporáneos—una perspectiva anti utópica y una propuesta por una educación metahumanista—. De esta manera, el objetivo general de este artículo es ofrecer una introducción al pensamiento del filósofo metahumanista Stefan Lorenz Sorgner. (shrink)

The resemblance nominalist says that the truthmaker of 〈Socrates is white〉 ultimately involves only concrete particulars that resemble each other. Furthermore he also says that Socrates and Plato are the truthmakers of 〈Socrates resembles Plato〉, and Socrates and Aristotle those of 〈Socrates resembles Aristotle〉. But this, combined with a principle about the truthmakers of conjunctions, leads to the apparently implausible conclusion that 〈Socrates resembles Plato and Socrates resembles Aristotle〉 and 〈Socrates resembles Plato and Plato resembles Aristotle〉 have the same truthmakers, (...) namely, Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. I shall argue that the resemblance nominalist can say that those conjunctions have the same truthmakers but these truthmakers make them true in different ways. I shall also use this view to account for the truthmakers of propositions like 〈Socrates is white〉, and respond to previous objections by Cian Dorr and Jessica Wilson. (shrink)

Leibniz’s short letter to the mathematician and physicist Ludovico Casati of 1689 is a short but interesting text on the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles, to which it is entirely dedicated. Since there is no watermark in the paper of the letter, the letter is difficult to date, but it is likely that it was written during Leibniz’s stay in Rome, sometime between April and November of 1689 (A 2 2 287–8). When addressing the letter, Leibniz wrote ‘Casani’, but this (...) seems to be a mistake and the real addressee is thought to be Ludovico Casati, nephew of Paolo Casati, the Jesuit mathematician. The letter, reproduced in the Berlin’s Academy edition of Leibniz’s works, was first published by Gerhardt in the Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie in 1892 (Gerhardt 1892: 53–54). It also appears in Robinet’s Iter Italicum (Robinet 1988: 134–35). But neither Gerhardt nor Robinet provide a philosophical discussion of the letter, and I am not aware of any other philosophical discussion of it. Furthermore, as far as I know, the letter has never been translated into any language. Thus I shall here provide a transcription (from A 2 2 288–89) and a translation of the letter into English, and a philosophical discussion of its treatment of the Identity of Indiscernibles. (shrink)

El presente artículo se enmarca en el contexto de la alternativa ofrecida por Quentin Meillassoux a la cuestión de la pregunta canónica ¿por qué hay algo y no más bien nada? (2018f) y pretende reflexionar sobre las condiciones que posibilitan la solución del dilema espectral (2016b) en el marco de una ontología extra científica (2020). Concebir el advenimiento de una entidad divina implicaría comprender, al menos, tres conceptos claves para el pensamiento del filósofo, a saber, el correlacionismo, factualidad y contingencia (...) absoluta. De esta manera, el objetivo principal de este artículo es esbozar una lectura introductoria a los cimientos de la filosofía de Meillassoux a fin de comprenderla como una ontología capaz de dar cuenta de la inexistencia divina. -/- The present article takes place in the context of the alternative offered by Quentin Meillas-soux to the question of the canonical question “why is there something and not rather nothing?” (2018f) and aims to reflect on the conditions that make the solution of the spectral dilemma possible (2016b) within the framework of an extra-scientific ontology (2020). To conceive of the advent of a divine entity would imply understanding at least three key concepts for the philos-opher’s thought, namely, correlationism, factuality and absolute contingency. Thus, the main objec-tive of this article is to outline an introductory reading of the fundamentals of Meillassoux’s phi-losophy in order to understand it as an ontology capable of accounting for divine non-existence. -/- . (shrink)

Mellor´s theory of causation has two components, one according to which causes raise their effects´ chances, and one according to which causation links facts. I argue that these two components are not independent from each other and, in particular, that Mellor´s thesis that causation links facts requires his thesis that causes raise their effects´ chances, since without the latter thesis Mellor cannot stop the slingshot argument, an argument that is a threat to any theory postulating facts as the relata of (...) causation. (shrink)

El estallido social en Chile desafı́a a las humanidades a abordar un fenómeno social inédito por sus formas, a través de un ejercicio reflexivo situado más allá de las tomas de posición en el debate público. Si bien, ha habido un sinnúmero de académicos del espectro nacional que han asumido posturas claras en esta coyuntura, las respuestas y justificaciones contingentes dejan incólumes otras dudas sobre cuestiones de principio. Sabı́amos que Chile vivı́a en una democracia de baja intensidad, con instituciones ancladas (...) al orden constitucional diseñado durante la dictadura cı́vico-militar y continuado por los gobiernos democráticos, con enormes áreas institucionales corrompidas por el fuero de la impunidad, con una clase polı́tica acostumbrada a los privilegios y bajo un modelo estructuralmente desigual en lo económico, social y cultural. Sabı́amos que todo lo anterior, en alguna medida, fue horadando las bases de las instituciones democráticas. Por eso, para muchos, las protestas que comenzaron en octubre son la continuidad de un dilatado proceso de acumulación del malestar que, debido a lo agudas de sus causas, tardaron más de lo que muchos imaginaron en llegar. (shrink)

This paper aims to answer the question: what does the realism of laws of nature consist of? To achieve this, in the first part, three philosophical accounts of laws of nature are presented and examined: the universalist, the dispositionalist and the counter-factualist. The presentation and examination focuses on the answer given by each of these accounts to the question: what is a law of nature? Later, in the second part, convergences and divergences between these three accounts are shown. Finally, in (...) the third section, the points of agreement between them are put together to advance the fundamental thesis that encompasses each of these accounts as realist accounts of laws of nature. This thesis, I argue, is at the end the core of the general realist stance on laws of nature that I name “Realism of Laws of Nature”. (shrink)

Scientism has more notoriety than history proper for it has been identified with “positivism”, “reductionism”, “materialism” or “Marxism”, or even held responsible for the enforcement of science at the expense of other human affairs. The idea that scientific research yields the best possible knowledge lies at the very definition of “scientism”. However, even when science has shown a considerable amount of theoretical and practical successes, a rational confidence put on it as a mean for solving any factual problem has been (...) denounced as illegitimate, defective, or dogmatic. Thereby, after revisiting the varieties of the meaning of scientism, I argue for a reasonable defense of scientism against some of its prevailing criticisms. Hence, it will be sustained that science is the most reliable approach for attaining knowledge without detriment of other valuable human activities insofar these do not address factual or cognitive questions nor are at odds with a scientific worldview. (shrink)

Le scientisme a plus de notoriété que l’histoire proprement dite, car il a été identifié avec le « positivisme », le « réductionnisme », le « matérialisme » ou le « marxisme », ou même tenu responsable de la domination de la science sur leur autres activités humaines. L’idée que la recherche scientifique produit les meilleures connaissances possible réside dans la définition même du « scientisme ». Cependant, alors même que la science peut se prévaloir d’un nombre considérable de succès (...) théoriques et pratiques, une confiance rationnelle envers elle comme moyen de résoudre tout problème factuel a été dénoncée comme illégitime, discutable ou dogmatique. Ainsi, après avoir passé en revue les diverses conceptions du scientisme, je défends une position raisonnable du scientisme contre certaines de ses critiques dominantes. Ainsi, on soutiendra que la science est l’approche la plus fiable pour acquérir des connaissances sans nuire à d’autres activités importantes dans la mesure où celles-ci ne traitent pas de questions factuelles ou cognitives ni ne sont en contradiction avec une vision du monde scientifique. (shrink)

Fibers have the characteristics to enhance the endurance of concrete. One of them is carbon fiber. These carbon fibers have superb mechanical properties and maybe utilized more effectively. This study is focused towards analyzing the variation in strength of carbon fiber concrete at variable fiber contents and to establish it with that of conventional concrete. The mechanical properties analyzed are compressive strength, split tensile strength, flexural strength of carbon fiber concrete at (0%, 0.25%, 0.5%, 0.75%, 1%, 1.25%) percentages by volume (...) of concrete. Result data clearly shows percentage increase in compressive strength, split tensile strength and flexural strength for M25 grade of concrete in 7 days and 28 days with respect to the variation in % addition of carbon fibers. Maximum increase in strength was achieved at 1% addition of fiber content and it can be considered as optimum dosage. (shrink)

El presente ensayo fue publicado por su amigo ı́ntimo y editor Richard Royston mientras el autor vivı́a en 1652 y republicado en la emergencia sucedida por la fama de Patriarcha a partir de 1679. Las Observaciones... es un ensayo derivado del Patriarcha en los que reelabora y afirma sus comentarios sobre Aristóteles; se establecen ası́ numerosas citas y argumentos paralelos entre los dos textos, sobre todo en los capı́tulos IX, XI, XV, pero en especial en el XII del Patriarcha. Con (...) respecto al tema central del ensayo, Filmer mismo resume sus objetivos en la conclusión. En cuanto a la lectura de los libros de la Polı́tica de Aristóteles, Filmer establece una conexión misteriosa: reconoce su utilidad como comentario al texto bı́blico. Toda la evidencia necesaria sobre el origen de la sociabilidad del hombre es tomada de la figura de Adán. Es por esto que, siguiendo a Laslett (1949: 20), se puede sintetizar los temas tratados en las siguientes seis proposiciones negativas: 1. No hay ninguna forma de gobierno efectiva, excepto la monarquı́a. 2. No hay ninguna monarquı́a sino la paternalista. 3. No hay ninguna monarquı́a paternalista sino es absolutista. 4. No existen las formas de gobierno aristocrática ni democrática. 5. No existe tal forma de gobierno como la tiranı́a. 6. Ningún individuo nace libre por naturaleza. Sin embargo, puede hacerse notar otra división. En primer lugar, desde 90-119 se ocupará de investigar sobre los términos aristotélicos; y en segundo lugar, desde 120-150, en refutar la tesis de Jean Bodin que establecı́a que el pueblo romano tuvo un gobierno popular, con el fin de evidenciar la imposibilidad de existencia de cualquier forma de gobierno a excepción de la monárquica, para concluir con una extensa cita del mismo Bodin a favor de la tesis central de Filmer. (shrink)