This article examines two questions about scientists’ search for knowledge. First, which search strategies generate discoveries effectively? Second, is it advantageous to diversify search strategies? We argue pace Weisberg and Muldoon, “Epistemic Landscapes and the Division of Cognitive Labor”, that, on the first question, a search strategy that deliberately seeks novel research approaches need not be optimal. On the second question, we argue they have not shown epistemic reasons exist for the division of cognitive labor, identifying the errors that led (...) to their conclusions. Furthermore, we generalize the epistemic landscape model, showing that one should be skeptical about the benefits of social learning in epistemically complex environments. (shrink)

Coherence and correspondence are classical contenders as theories of truth. In this paper we examine them instead as interacting factors in the dynamics of belief across epistemic networks. We construct an agent-based model of network contact in which agents are characterized not in terms of single beliefs but in terms of internal belief suites. Individuals update elements of their belief suites on input from other agents in order both to maximize internal belief coherence and to incorporate ‘trickled in’ elements (...) of truth as correspondence. Results, though often intuitive, prove more complex than in simpler models (Hegselmann & Krause 2002, 2006; Grim, Singer, Reade & Fisher 2015). The optimistic finding is that pressures toward internal coherence can exploit and expand on small elements of truth as correspondence is introduced into epistemic networks. Less optimistic results show that pressures for coherence can also work directly against the incorporation of truth, particularly when coherence is established first and new data is introduced later. (shrink)

The Homeostatic Property Cluster (HPC) account of natural kinds has become popular since it was proposed by Richard Boyd in the late 1980s. Although it is often taken as a defining natural kinds as such, it is easy enough to see that something's being a natural kind is neither necessary nor sufficient for its being an HPC. This paper argues that it is better not to understand HPCs as defining what it is to be a natural kind but instead as (...) providing the ontological realization of (some) natural kinds. (shrink)

Elimination controversies are ubiquitous in philosophy and the human sciences. For example, it has been suggested that human races, hysteria, intelligence, mental disorder, propositional attitudes such as beliefs and desires, the self, and the super-ego should be eliminated from the list of respectable entities in the human sciences. I argue that eliminativist proposals are often presented in the framework of an oversimplified “phlogiston model” and suggest an alternative account that describes ontological elimination on a gradual scale between criticism of (...) empirical assumptions and conceptual choices. (shrink)

People suffering from Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD) do things they do not want to do, and/or they think things they do not want to think. In about 10 percent of OCD patients, none of the available treatment options is effective. A small group of these patients is currently being treated with deep brain stimulation (DBS). Deep brain stimulation involves the implantation of electrodes in the brain. These electrodes give a continuous electrical pulse to the brain area in which they are implanted. (...) It turns out that patients may experience profound changes as a result of DBS treatment. It is not just the symptoms that change; patients rather seem to experience a different way of being in the world. These global effects are insufficiently captured by traditional psychiatric scales, which mainly consist of behavioural measures of the severity of the symptoms. In this article we aim to capture the changes in the patients’ phenomenology and make sense of the broad range of changes they report. For that we introduce an enactive, affordance-based model that fleshes out the dynamic interactions between person and world in four aspects. The first aspect is the patients’ experience of the world. We propose to specify the patients’ world in terms of a field of affordances, with the three dimensions of broadness of scope (‘width’ of the field), temporal horizon (‘depth’), and relevance of the perceived affordances (‘height’). The second aspect is the person-side of the interaction, that is, the patients’ self-experience, notably their moods and feelings. Thirdly, we point to the different characteristics of the way in which patients relate to the world. And lastly, the existential stance refers to the stance that patients take towards the changes they experience: the second-order evaluative relation to their interactions and themselves. With our model we intend to specify the notion of being in the world in order to do justice to the phenomenological effects of DBS treatment. (shrink)

Previous research in Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI) suggests that a main aim of explainability approaches is to satisfy specific interests, goals, expectations, needs, and demands regarding artificial systems (we call these “stakeholders' desiderata”) in a variety of contexts. However, the literature on XAI is vast, spreads out across multiple largely disconnected disciplines, and it often remains unclear how explainability approaches are supposed to achieve the goal of satisfying stakeholders' desiderata. This paper discusses the main classes of stakeholders calling for explainability (...) of artificial systems and reviews their desiderata. We provide a model that explicitly spells out the main concepts and relations necessary to consider and investigate when evaluating, adjusting, choosing, and developing explainability approaches that aim to satisfy stakeholders' desiderata. This model can serve researchers from the variety of different disciplines involved in XAI as a common ground. It emphasizes where there is interdisciplinary potential in the evaluation and the development of explainability approaches. (shrink)

The CRISPR system for gene editing can break, repair, and replace targeted sections of DNA. Although CRISPR gene editing has important therapeutic potential, it raises several ethical concerns. Some bioethicists worry CRISPR is a prelude to a dystopian future, while others maintain it should not be feared because it is analogous to past biotechnologies. In the scientific literature, CRISPR is often discussed as a revolutionary technology. In this paper we unpack the framing of CRISPR as a revolutionary technology and contrast (...) it with framing it as a value-threatening biotechnology or business-as-usual. By drawing on a comparison between CRISPR and the Ford Model T, we argue CRISPR is revolutionary as a product, process, and as a force for social change. This characterization of CRISPR offers important conceptual clarity to the existing debates surrounding CRISPR. In particular, conceptualizing CRISPR as a revolutionary technology structures regulatory goals with respect to this new technology. Revolutionary technologies have characteristic patterns of implementation, entrenchment, and social impact. As such, early identification of technologies as revolutionary may help construct more nuanced and effective ethical frameworks for public policy. (shrink)

The main foundations of the standard \CDM model of cosmology are that: the redshifts of the galaxies are due to the expansion of the Universe plus peculiar motions; the cosmic microwave background radiation and its anisotropies derive from the high energy primordial Universe when matter and radiation became decoupled; the abundance pattern of the light elements is explained in terms of primordial nucleosynthesis; and the formation and evolution of galaxies can be explained only in terms of gravitation within a (...) inflation + dark matter + dark energy scenario. Numerous tests have been carried out on these ideas and, although the standard model works pretty well in fitting many observations, there are also many data that present apparent caveats to be understood with it. In this paper, I offer a review of these tests and problems, as well as some examples of alternative models. (shrink)

Small MGS (microgrid systems) are capable of decreasing energy losses. Long-distance power transmission lines are constructed by integrating distributed power sources with energy storage subsystems, which is the current trend in the development of RES (renewable energy sources). Although energies produced by RES do not cause pollution, they are stochastic and hence challenging to manage. This disadvantage makes high penetration of RES risky for the stability, dependability, and power quality of main electrical grids. The energies obtained from RES must thus (...) be integrated in the best possible way. To provide maximum energy sustainability and best energy usage, hybrid energy systems must manage energy efficiently. In order to improve power management and make better use of RES, this study offers a hybrid energy power management controller based on hybrid MABC (modified artificial bee colony) and ANN (artificial neural network) for MGS, PVS (photovoltaic system), and WT (wind turbine). Controlling power flows between grids and energy sources is the suggested approach for power control. D/R (demands/responses), customer reactions, offering priorities, D/R properties like COE (cost of energies), and sizes (lengths) are considered in this work. Along with current techniques, a suggested model is implemented in the MATLAB/Simulink platform. (shrink)

In this paper, I propose a new way of defining sport that I call a ‘core-periphery’ model. According to a core-periphery model, sport comes in degrees – what I refer to as ‘sport-likeness’ – and the aim of the philosopher of sport is to chart those dimensions along which an activity can be more or less a sport. By introducing the concept of sport-likeness, the core-periphery model complicates the picture of what is or is not a sport (...) and encourages philosophers interested in defining sport to engage with the social sciences in exploring the extension of the term sport in common usage. In this paper I present the results of a small survey about attitudes to sport, and use it to illustrate how a core-periphery definition of sport would proceed. (shrink)

In this paper I offer a model-theoretic interpretation of Autonomy Theory as defended by Moreno, Mossio, Montévil and Bich. I address accusations that Autonomy Theory is excessively liberal, such as those made by Garson (2017), arguing that these misunderstand the role of strategic abstractions and generalizations in theory construction. Conceiving of closure of constraints as a model-building effort that emphasizes generality – in the spirit of Levins (1966) – also clarifies its potential for application in empirical contexts.

It has been known for long time that most of the existing cosmology models have singularity problem. Cosmological singularity has been a consequence of excessive symmetry of flow, such as “Hubble’s law”. More realistic one is suggested, based on Newtonian cosmology model but here we include the vertical-rotational effect of the whole Universe. We review a Riccati-type equation obtained by Nurgaliev, and solve the equation numerically with Mathematica. It is our hope that the new proposed method can be verified (...) with observation data. (shrink)

This paper builds a nine-step method for determining whether a straw man fallacy has been committed in a given case or not, by starting with some relatively easy textbook cases and moving to more realistic and harder cases. The paper shows how the type of argument associated with the fallacy can be proved to be a fallacy in a normative argumentation model, and then moves on to the practical task of building a hands-on method for applying the model (...) to real examples of argumentation. Insights from linguistic pragmatics are used to distinguish the different pragmatic processes involved in reconstructing what is said and what is meant by an utterance, and to differentiate strong and weak commitments. In particular, the process of interpretation is analyzed in terms of an abductive pattern of reasoning, based on co-textual and contextual information, and assessable through the instruments of argumentation theory. (shrink)

There is growing concern that a global economic system fueled predominately by financial incentives may not maximize human flourishing and social welfare externalities. If so, this presents a challenge of how to get economic actors to adopt a more virtuous motivational mindset. Relying on historical, psychological, and philosophical research, we show how such a mindset can be instilled. First, we demonstrate that historically, financial self-interest has never in fact been the only guiding motive behind free markets, but that markets themselves (...) are representations of our individual and collective moral identities. Building on this understanding, we review the research on how economic incentives crowd out virtue-oriented concerns. We then introduce the concept of moral self-awareness (MSA), an evolving mindset informed by reflection on moral identity, namely what one’s actions say about oneself given the impacts on others or society that one’s action may effect. MSA comprises three fundamental aspects of virtue-oriented reasoning: pride, shame, and guilt. Finally, we offer a four-stage model anchored in systems theory, yielding ever more refined motivating strategies for maximizing human flourishing and social welfare externalities. (shrink)

Current approaches used in educational research and practice to evaluate the quality of written arguments often rely on structural analysis. In such assessments, credit is awarded for the presence of structural elements of an argument, such as claims, evidence, and rebuttals. In this article, we discuss limitations of such approaches, including the absence of criteria for evaluating the quality of the argument elements. We then present an alternative framework, based on the Rational Force Model (RFM), which originated from the (...) work of a Nordic philosopher Næss. Using an example of an argumentative essay, we demonstrate the potential of the RFM to improve argument analysis by focusing on the acceptability and relevance of argument elements, two criteria widely considered to be fundamental markers of argument strength. We outline possibilities and challenges with using the RFM in educational contexts and conclude by proposing directions for future research. (shrink)

Sripada has recently advanced a new account for asymmetries that have been uncovered in folk judgments of intentionality: the ?Deep Self model,? according to which an action is more likely to be judged as intentional if it matches the agent's central and stable attitudes and values (i.e., the agent's Deep Self). In this paper, we present new experiments that challenge this model in two ways: first, we show that the Deep Self model makes predictions that are falsified, (...) then we present cases that it cannot account for. Finally, we discuss how the Deep Self model could be modified to accommodate these new data. (shrink)

A technical artefact is often described in two ways: by means of a physicalistic model of its structure and dynamics, and by a functional account of the contributions of the components of the artefact to its capacities. These models do not compete, as different models of the same phenomenon in physics usually do; they supplement each other and cohere. Coherence is shown to be the result of a mapping of role-contributions on physicalistic relations that is brought about by the (...) concept of function. It results a sandwich-like structure of the two models, which can be reconstructed as a two-sorted theory element. (shrink)

Using as case studies two early diagrams that represent mechanisms of the cell division cycle, we aim to extend prior philosophical analyses of the roles of diagrams in scientific reasoning, and specifically their role in biological reasoning. The diagrams we discuss are, in practice, integral and indispensible elements of reasoning from experimental data about the cell division cycle to mathematical models of the cycle’s molecular mechanisms. In accordance with prior analyses, the diagrams provide functional explanations of the cell cycle and (...) facilitate the construction of mathematical models of the cell cycle. But, extending beyond those analyses, we show how diagrams facilitate the construction of mathematical models, and we argue that the diagrams permit nomological explanations of the cell cycle. We further argue that what makes diagrams integral and indispensible for explanation and model construction is their nature as locality aids: they group together information that is to be used together in a way that sentential representations do not. (shrink)

This dissertation may be divided into two parts. The first is about the Extended Gricean Model of information transmission. This model, introduced here, is meant to better explain how humans communicate and understand each other. It has been developed to apply to cases that were left unexplained by the two main models of communication found in contemporary philosophy and linguistics, i.e. the Gricean (pragmatic) model and the code (semantic) model. I discuss cases involving emotional reactions, ways (...) of clothing, speaking, or behaving that are not intended for communication but whose effects on the audience are controllable to some extent. I show why prevailing code and Gricean models cannot explain them and how my Extended Gricean Model does. The second part of the dissertation is about what emotional signs mean, in various senses of the term ‘mean'. I review existing theories of meaning and see how they apply to emotional signs, i.e. signs which give us information about the affective state of the sign producer. (shrink)

Reflective equilibrium (RE) is often regarded as a powerful method in ethics, logic, and even philosophy in general. Despite this popularity, characterizations of the method have been fairly vague and unspecific so far. It thus may be doubted whether RE is more than a jumble of appealing but ultimately sketchy ideas that cannot be spelled out consistently. In this paper, we dispel such doubts by devising a formal model of RE. The model contains as components the agent’s commitments (...) and a theory that tries to systematize the commitments. It yields a precise picture of how the commitments and the theory are adjusted to each other. The model differentiates between equilibrium as a target state and the dynamic equilibration process. First solutions to the model, obtained by computer simulation, show that the method allows for consistent specification and that the model’s implications are plausible in view of expectations on RE. In particular, the mutual adjustment of commitments and theory can improve one’s commitments, as proponents of RE have suggested. We argue that our model is fruitful not only because it points to issues that need to be dealt with for a better understanding of RE, but also because it provides the means to address these issues. (shrink)

Understanding the pervasiveness of sin is central to Christian theology. The question of why humans are so sinful given an omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent God presents a challenge and a puzzle. Here, we investigate Friedrich Schleiermacher’s biocultural evolutionary account of sin. We look at empirical evidence to support it and use the cultural Price equation to provide a naturalistic model of the transmission of sin. This model can help us understand how sin can be ubiquitous and unavoidable, even (...) though it is not biologically transmitted, and even if there is no historical Fall that precipitated the tendency to sin. (shrink)

One striking feature of the contemporary modeling practice is its interdisciplinarity: the same function forms and equations, and mathematical and computational methods are being transferred across disciplinary boundaries. Within philosophy of science this interdisciplinary dimension of modeling has been addressed by both analogy and template-based approaches that have proceeded separately from each other. We argue that a more fully-blown account of model transfer needs both perspectives. We examine analogical reasoning and template application through a detailed case study on the (...) transfer of the Ising model from physics into neuroscience. Our account combines the analogy and template-based approaches through the notion of a model template that highlights the conceptual side of model transfer. (shrink)

Patient RB has a peculiar memory impairment wherein he experiences his memories in rich contextual detail, but claims to not own them. His memories do not feel as if they happened to him. In this paper, I provide an explanatory model of RB’s phenomenology, the self-attentional model. I draw upon recent work in neuroscience on self-attentional processing and global workspace models of conscious recollection to show that RB has a self-attentional deficit that inhibits self-bias processes in broadcasting the (...) contents of episodic memories to the global workspace. Typically, self-related contents enjoy a higher salience level than other-related contents. Elimination of bias toward self-related contents diminishes the salience of those contents to the level of other-related contents. Because the typical high salience of self-related content is necessary for the feeling of ownership, RB lacks the feeling of ownership. I also discuss potential applications of the self-attentional model to other psychopathological cases. (shrink)

Panpsychism is a solution to the mind-body problem that presumes that consciousness is a fundamental aspect of reality instead of a product or consequence of physical processes (i.e., brain activity). Panpsychism is an elegant solution to the mind-body problem: it effectively rids itself of the explanatory gap materialist theories of consciousness suffer from. However, many theorists and experimentalists doubt panpsychism can ever be successful as a scientific theory, as it cannot be empirically verified or falsified. In this paper, I present (...) a panpsychist model based on the controversial idea that consciousness may be a so called higher physical dimension. Although this notion seems outrageous, I show that the idea has surprising explanatory power, even though the model (as most models) is most likely wrong. Most importantly, though, it results in a panpsychist model that yields predictions that can be empirically verified or falsified. As such, the model's main purpose is to serve as an example how a metaphysical model of consciousness can be specified in such a way that they can be tested in a scientifically rigorous way. (shrink)

In this paper, we propose a mathematical model of subjective experience in terms of classes of hierarchical geometries of representations (“n-awareness”). We first outline a general framework by recalling concepts from higher category theory, homotopy theory, and the theory of (infinity,1)-topoi. We then state three conjectures that enrich this framework. We first propose that the (infinity,1)-category of a geometric structure known as perfectoid diamond is an (infinity,1)-topos. In order to construct a topology on the (infinity,1)-category of diamonds we then (...) propose that topological localization, in the sense of Grothendieck-Rezk-Lurie (infinity,1)-topoi, extends to the (infinity,1)-category of diamonds. We provide a small-scale model using triangulated categories. Finally, our meta-model takes the form of Efimov K-theory of the (infinity,1)-category of perfectoid diamonds, which illustrates structural equivalences between the category of diamonds and subjective experience (i.e.its privacy, self-containedness, and self-reflexivity). Based on this, we investigate implications of the model. We posit a grammar (“n-declension”) for a novel language to express n-awareness, accompanied by a new temporal scheme (“n-time”). Our framework allows us to revisit old problems in the philosophy of time: how is change possible and what do we mean by simultaneity and coincidence? We also examine the notion of “self” within our framework. A new model of personal identity is introduced which resembles a categorical version of the “bundle theory”: selves are not substances in which properties inhere but (weakly) persistent moduli spaces in the K-theory of perfectoid diamonds. (shrink)

In this article, I firstly discuss the person-affecting view of harm, distinguishing between the liability and the structural models of responsibility, and also explaining why it is unsatisfactory, from a moral point of view, to interpret a given harm as a loss with respect to a diachronic baseline. Then, I take sweatshops as an example and I entertain two further issues that are related to the assessment of harm and that are necessary for operationalising a comprehensive model of responsibility, (...) that takes into account both liability and structural injustice. The first one is how to interpret harm when it is coexistent with a diachronic benefit and/or the parties involved in the social structures leading to harm seek to unload their responsibility by hiding behind a cooperative deadlock. The second one is how far along the chain of actions leading to harm can structural responsibility be extended. (shrink)

The "myside bias'' in evaluating arguments is an empirically well-confirmed phenomenon that consists of overweighting arguments that endorse one's beliefs or attack alternative beliefs while underweighting arguments that attack one's beliefs or defend alternative beliefs. This paper makes two contributions: First, it proposes a probabilistic model that adequately captures three salient features of myside bias in argument evaluation. Second, it provides a Bayesian justification of this model, thus showing that myside bias has a rational Bayesian explanation under certain (...) conditions. (shrink)

Here is a puzzle about aesthetic education. In a variety of contexts, we commit significant time, energy, and resources to aesthetic education. We teach (and in many cases publicly subsidize) university courses and degrees that have aesthetic education as their primary aim; we also invest public resources into museums, including enrichment programs that are also designed to afford aesthetic education. It would seem that if our commitment to aesthetic education is rational, then aesthetic appreciation is something that can be done (...) better or worse. However, we also, in a variety of contexts (oddly enough, some of them being the same sorts of contexts that are designed to abet aesthetic education), act as if it is true that there is no disputing taste. We may try to persuade students to come around to particular judgments, but we do not penalize students for judging one way or another. The aim of this paper is to dissolve the apparent puzzle of aesthetic education by clarifying its aims and advancing a conception of it that deemphasizes the role of taste. I claim that, pace “the default view of aesthetic education” (as I shall call it), the primary purpose of aesthetic education is not to educate taste. It is, rather, to facilitate the development of certain perceptual-cognitive capacities so as to enhance aesthetic experience and improve aesthetic appreciation. Thus, I call the view of aesthetic education advanced here “a perceptual-cognitive model”. (shrink)

It is not necessarily the case that we ever have experiences of self, but human beings do regularly report instances for which self is experienced as absent. That is there are times when body parts, mental states, or actions are felt to be alien. Here I sketch an explanatory framework for explaining these alienation experiences, a framework that also attempts to explain the “mental glue” whereby self is bound to body, mind, or action. The framework is a multi-dimensional model (...) that integrates personal and sub-personal components, psychological and neural processes. I then proceed to show how this model can be applied to explain the action-related passivity experiences of persons suffering from schizophrenia. I argue that a distinctive phenomenological mark of these experiences is that they are vividly felt, unlike ordinary actions (those taken to belong to self), and I seek to explain these heightened sensory experiences from within the proposed framework. I also propose hypotheses concerning such phenomena as thought insertion and anarchic hand syndrome that are motivated by this framework. Finally, I argue that the proposed model and view of self-experiences is consistent with several aspects of and theories of consciousness, especially theories which indicate that consciousness is more likely to be engaged when we are dealing with novelty or error—e.g. when self seems to have gone missing. I conclude by recommending that if we wish to learn about self, we would be well advised to attend closely to those times when it seems absent. (shrink)

One of the most conspicuous features of contemporary modeling practices is the dissemination of mathematical and computational methods across disciplinary boundaries. We study this process through two applications of the Ising model: the Sherrington-Kirkpatrick model of spin glasses and the Hopfield model of associative memory. The Hopfield model successfully transferred some basic ideas and mathematical methods originally developed within the study of magnetic systems to the field of neuroscience. As an analytical resource we use Paul Humphreys's (...) discussion of computational and theoretical templates. We argue that model templates are crucial for the intra- and interdisciplinary theoretical transfer. A model template is an abstract conceptual idea associated with particular mathematical forms and computational methods. (shrink)

Artificial intelligence (AI) is increasingly expected to disrupt the ordinary functioning of society. From how we fight wars or govern society, to how we work and play, and from how we create to how we teach and learn, there is almost no field of human activity which is believed to be entirely immune from the impact of this emerging technology. This poses a multifaceted problem when it comes to designing and understanding regulatory responses to AI. This article aims to: (i) (...) defend the need for a novel conceptual model for understanding the systemic legal disruption caused by new technologies such as AI; (ii) to situate this model in relation to preceding debates about the interaction of regulation with new technologies (particularly the ‘cyberlaw’ and ‘robolaw’ debates); and (iii) to set out a detailed model for understanding the legal disruption precipitated by AI, examining both pathways stemming from new affordances that can give rise to a regulatory ‘disruptive moment’, as well as the Legal Development, Displacement or Destruction that can ensue. The article proposes that this model of legal disruption can be broadly generalisable to understanding the legal effects and challenges of other emerging technologies. (shrink)

To evaluate and compare the “Decreasing Universe theory” with the LCDM model, I created a potentially falsifiable prediction and the data was extracted and analyzed.

In his article Banicki proposes a universal model for all forms of philosophical therapy. He is guided by works of Martha Nussbaum, who in turn makes recourse to Aristotle. As compared to Nussbaum’s approach, Banicki’s model is more medical and less based on ethical argument. He mentions Foucault’s vision to apply the same theoretical analysis for the ailments of the body and the soul and to use the same kind of approach in treating and curing them. In his (...) interpretation of philosophical therapy, there are, however, some controversial issues, to which we would like to call attention: -/- Is restoring health by a philosophical method of treatment – health understood as a person’s ability to reach his/her vital goals – a convincing explication of philosophical therapy in general? In order to answer this question, it may be useful to look at Plato. It is not only Platonism (and especially Neo-platonism since Plotinus) that questions the idea that therapy is necessarily connected with „vital goals“. Buddhist and Gnostic philosophies are questioning „the vital“ in general. The immense effort in the history of philosophy to liberate the mind from the body casts doubt on the project to explain philosophical therapy solely in analogy to medical therapy. -/- According to Banicki a therapeutic philosophy has to identify the diseases it attempts at curing. There are, however, reasons for associating the term therapy with suffering/risk rather than disease. If a therapy aims at reducing the fear of death, as for example many classical philosophical therapies do, then there is no disease to be cured. A model based on chances and risks also has the advantage that the Buddhist and Stoic reinterpretation of desires/emotions as “diseases” can be dropped in contemporary philosophical therapy. -/- Banicki mentions the comparison of therapies as one of the primary goals of modelling. Methods should be verified by a statistical correlation between method and therapeutic success and/or by a theory which justifies the method. Some forms of therapies, however, avoid theory-specific terms and concepts in favor of an unprejudiced interpretation of the patient’s statements. Others share the (Nietzschean) aspiration to explore and change measures of value. If the therapeutic process is seen as a unique phenomenon, then there can be no theory and no statistics with co-occurrences. -/- According to Banicki philosophical therapy has to describe techniques which qualify as genuinely philosophical. Techniques like maieutics and hermeneutics, however, are antique philosophical “inventions”, which were later adopted by psychotherapy. If meditation is accepted as a therapeutic tool – as it was in ancient times – then there is not only a methodical but also an emotional relation to religion. If finally, the Socratic search for a good life is seen as one of the characteristics of philosophical therapy, then delimitation even turns into a criterion for non-philosophical therapies. The search for a good life requires an interdisciplinary approach. -/- For the concretization of the formal structure, we suggest a typology of therapies, which is based on chances and risks. Such a typology has the advantage, that it can model conflicting (and even opposing) forms of therapies. The variety of therapeutic goals and methods is a consequence of the historical development towards conceptual freedom. (shrink)

The problem of immigrant migration risk analysis is deeply studied and there are number of issues identified in the selection of country. There exists number of approaches available in the selection of countries towards migration. However, the methods do not produce effective results in the selection of migrant country. To handle this issue, an efficient real-time migrant risk analysis model (RMAM) is presented in this article. The method uses the traces of previos migration histories and data set maintained by (...) the model. Using the migration data set, the method preprocesses the data set for noise removal and normalization. With the normalized data set, the method applies Nation Centric Religious Support Analysis and Psychological Support Analysis. The nation centric religious support analysis algorithm measure the risk factors on religious features by computing National Religious Support (NRS) and the Psychological Support Analysis algorithm computes the value of Psychological Support (PS) for different countries. Based on the result of different analysis, the method computes Migration Support (MS) for various countries towards the selection of migration countries. The proposed model improves the performance of risk analysis and migration control. (shrink)

The Protagoras is the touchstone of Socrates’ moral intellectualist stance. The position in a nutshell stipulates that the proper reevaluation of a desire is enough to neutralize it.[1] The implication of this position is that akrasia or weakness of will is not the result of desire (or fear for that matter) overpowering reason but is due to ignorance. -/- Socrates’ eliminativist position on weakness of will, however, flies in the face of the common-sense experience regarding akratic action and thus Aristotle (...) was at pains to render Socrates’ account of moral incontinence intelligible. The key improvement Aristotle makes to Socrates’s model is to underscore that the conditioning of the akratic’s body plays a critical role in determining the power of one’s appetites and, accordingly, the capacity of one to resist the temptations these appetites present for rational evaluation. As Aristotle puts it, “For the incontinent man is like the people who get drunk quickly and on little wine, i.e., on less than most people.” (1151a 3-4). Aristotle presents what I shall call a somatic paradigm (i.e. the drunkard analogy) in order to tackle the problem of akrasia and it is this somatic solution that marks a significant improvement over Socrates’s intellectualist or informational model or so the tradition tells us. -/- In this paper, I wish to push back on the above Aristotelian explanation. I argue that when one fully examines Socrates’ account of weakness of will that Aristotle’s solution is less effective than is traditionally thought. In fact, Socrates can bring Aristotle’s model into his own; just as Aristotle absorbs what is right about Socrates’s model, namely, that akratic action utilizes reason but to a limited degree, Socrates in Meno (77C-78A) develops his own somatic model of weakness of will that connects to the intellectualist paradigm of the Protagoras. To achieve this rapprochement between the two models, I zero in on the description provided by Socrates of those individuals who desire bad things knowing they are bad as “ill-starred” or “bad spirited” (κακοδαίμων ). The “bad-spirited” is the coward and, in contrast to Aristotle’s drunkard, becomes fearful quickly from little danger. This additional somatic component, when connected to Socrates’s position on akrasia in Protagoras adds a new twist to Socrates’s model in the following way: while no one wishes to be ill-starred such that more harm than good will befall one, one may become so as a result of the bad choices one knowingly makes. -/- -/- [1] “After him came Socrates, who spoke better and further about this subject, but even he was not successful. For he used to make the virtues into sciences, and this is impossible. For the sciences all involve reason, and reason is to be found in the intellectual part of the soul. So that all the virtues, according to him arise in the rational part of the soul. The result is that in making the virtues into sciences he is doing away with the nonrational part of the soul and is thereby doing away with passion and character…” (Aristotle, Magna Moralia 1.1. 1182 a15-26). (shrink)

What is the connection between modelling thought and modelling the brain? In a model (as understood here), we strip away from the modelled system some non-essential features and retain some essential ones. What are the essential features of thought that are to be re- tained in the model, and conversely, what are its inessential features, that may be stripped away in the model? According to a prevalent view in contemporary science and philoso- phy, thought is a computation, (...) and therefore its essential features are its computational features. A necessary part of the computational view of thought is the idea that the same computation can be realised by, or implemented in, physically heterogeneous systems, an idea known as “Multiple Realizability” of the computational features or properties by the physical ones. I will describe why the very idea of Multiple Realizability, especially in the case of mental computation, entails mind-body dualism, and explore some implications of this conclusion concerning the question of which are the essential features of thought to be retained in modeling it. (shrink)

Models as Make-Believe offers a new approach to scientific modelling by looking to an unlikely source of inspiration: the dolls and toy trucks of children's games of make-believe.

In this article, I will reconstruct the monocausal model and argue that modern 'multifactorial diseases' are not monocausal by definition. 'Multifactorial diseases' are instead defined according to a constitutive disease model. On closer analysis, infectious diseases are also defined using the constitutive model rather than the monocausal model. As a result, our classification models alone cannot explain why infectious diseases have a universal etiology while chronic and noncommunicable diseases lack one. The explanation is instead provided by (...) the nineteenth-century germ theorists. (shrink)

The discovery of so-called ‘mirror neurons’ - found to respond both to own actions and the observation of similar actions performed by others - has been enormously influential in the cognitive sciences and beyond. Given the self-other symmetry these neurons have been hypothesized as underlying a ‘mirror mechanism’ that lets us share representations and thereby ground core social cognitive functions from intention understanding to linguistic abilities and empathy. I argue that mirror neurons are important for very different reasons. Rather than (...) a symmetric ubiquitous or context- independent mechanism, I propose that these neurons are part of broader sensorimotor circuits, which help us navigate and predict the social affordance space that we meet others in. To develop both the critical and positive project I analyze the interpretive choices and the debate surrounding the mirror neuron research and show how the field is marred by highly questionable assumptions about respectively motor and social cognition. The discovery of mirror neurons - and the sensorimotor circuits of which these neurons are a part – actually empirically challenge many of these tacit assumptions. Findings of sensorimotor goal representations at levels of abstraction well beyond actual sensory information and kinetic movements challenge the idea of motor cognition as primarily output production. Additionally, the focus on 3rd person mindreading of hidden mental states is misguiding the field of social cognition. Much ‘mind-reading’ seems rooted in sensorimotor representations and a developmentally primary 2nd person understanding of actions and the mental lives of others, which precisely breaks the assumed dichotomy between mind and behavior. I propose a Social Affordance model where parallel fronto-parietal sensorimotor circuits support representations not just of other people’s actions but of the overall social affordance space. It is a process that monitors concrete goals and teleological possibilities that the environment affords respectively oneself and other present agents. With this model I hypothesize that the complex spectrum of sensorimotor integrations are indeed essential not only to normal action choice calibration but also to social cognitive abilities, as the sensorimotor teleological representations let us relate to others and understand their action choices in a shared pragmatic and intentional context. (shrink)

How much does stimulus input shape perception? The common-sense view is that our perceptions are representations of objects and their features and that the stimulus structures the perceptual object. The problem for this view concerns perceptual biases as responsible for distortions and the subjectivity of perceptual experience. These biases are increasingly studied as constitutive factors of brain processes in recent neuroscience. In neural network models the brain is said to cope with the plethora of sensory information by predicting stimulus regularities (...) on the basis of previous experiences. Drawing on this development, this chapter analyses perceptions as processes. Looking at olfaction as a model system, it argues for the need to abandon a stimulus-centred perspective, where smells are thought of as stable percepts, computationally linked to external objects such as odorous molecules. Perception here is presented as a measure of changing signal ratios in an environment informed by expectancy effects from top-down processes. (shrink)

In the present paper we discuss: a) how Hilbert’s unification program failed completely, and b) we outline a new electron model based on Helmholtz’s electron vortex and Kolmogorov theory of turbulence. Novelty aspect: we discuss among other things, electron capture event, and von Karman vortex street. We also discuss a new model of origination of charge and matter. This paper is a sequel to a preceding paper on similar theme.

Machine learning (ML) systems are vulnerable to performance decline over time due to dataset shift. To address this problem, experts often suggest that ML systems should be regularly updated to ensure ongoing performance stability. Some scholarly literature has begun to address the epistemic and ethical challenges associated with different updating methodologies. Thus far, however, little attention has been paid to the impact of model updating on the ML-assisted decision-making process itself, particularly in the AI ethics and AI epistemology literatures. (...) This article aims to address this gap in the literature. It argues that model updating introduces a new sub-type of opacity into ML-assisted decision-making – update opacity – that occurs when users cannot understand how or why an update has changed the reasoning or behaviour of an ML system. This type of opacity presents a variety of distinctive epistemic and safety concerns that available solutions to the black box problem in ML are largely ill-equipped to address. A variety of alternative strategies may be developed or pursued to address the problem of update opacity more directly, including bi-factual explanations, dynamic model reporting, and update compatibility. However, each of these strategies presents its own risks or carries significant limitations. Further research will be needed to address the epistemic and safety concerns associated with model updating and update opacity going forward. (shrink)

Smarandache Hypothesis states that there is no speed limit of anything, including light and particles. While the idea is quite simple and based on known hypothesis of quantum mechanics, called Einstein-Podolski-Rosen paradox, in reality such a superluminal physics seems still hard to accept by majority of physicists. Here we review some experiments to support superluminal physics and also findings to explain Smarandache Quantum Paradoxes and Quantum Sorites Paradox. We also touch briefly on new experiment on magneton, supporting SubQuantum Kinetic (...) class='Hi'>Model of Electron. (shrink)

In a recent paper, we describe how a model of quantum communication based on combining consciousness experiment and entanglement can serve as impetus to stop 5G-caused diseases. Therefore, in this paper we will discuss how entanglement can be explained in terms of quantum theory. This short review may be considered as an effort to bring QM into real problem solving, i.e. telecommunication.

Does AI conform to humans, or will we conform to AI? An ethical evaluation of AI-intensive companies will allow investors to knowledgeably participate in the decision. The evaluation is built from nine performance indicators that can be analyzed and scored to reflect a technology’s human-centering. When summed, the scores convert into objective investment guidance. The strategy of incorporating ethics into financial decisions will be recognizable to participants in environmental, social, and governance investing, however, this paper argues that conventional ESG frameworks (...) are inadequate for AI-intensive companies. To fully account for contemporary technology, the following categories of evaluation will be developed and featured as vital investing criteria: autonomy, dignity, privacy, performance. With these priorities established, the larger goal is a model for humanitarian investing in AI-intensive companies that is intellectually robust, manageable for analysts, useful for portfolio managers, and credible for investors. (shrink)

In response to an impasse, articulated in the late 1980s, the cognitive capacities of ordinary people assumed central place in contemporary critical social theory. The participants’ perspective gained precedence over scientific standards branded as external. The notion of cognition, however, went unchallenged. This article continues the move away from external standards, and discusses two models of critique, which differ based on their underlying notions of cognition. The representational model builds on cognitive content, misrecognition and normativity; three features which are (...) illustrated with positions adopted by prominent exponents of critical social theory. An alternative understanding relies on action-oriented disclosure and the participants’ basic familiarity with the social world. On this reading, what clashes with unequal structures is skilful coping, rather than representations and normative standards. The action-oriented approach may overcome the dilemma of understanding both the impact and the possible transcendence of unequal structures, although it cannot ultimately replace representational critique. (shrink)

The Fundamental Sequence of Reality: Awareness as the First Cause Abstract The nature of reality has long been debated in philosophy, physics, and cosmology. The dominant paradigm suggests that physical reality emerged through energy interactions following the Big Bang. However, this paper proposes a fundamental shift in perspective: that awareness is the first cause of existence, preceding time, action, energy, and matter. This model aligns with modern quantum mechanics, neuroscience, and ancient metaphysical thought, providing a framework that unifies scientific (...) and philosophical inquiries. This paper explores how awareness initiates creation, the role of time as a coordination system rather than a force, the activation of energy as a response to directed motion, and the emergence of physical reality as the final effect. 1. Introduction The current scientific model postulates that the universe began with a singularity—an infinitely dense state that expanded to form all matter and energy. However, this theory does not explain what existed before the singularity or what caused it to activate. Additionally, the problem of consciousness remains unresolved in science, with competing theories about whether it is emergent or fundamental. This paper presents a new model where awareness exists as the first cause, setting the foundation for all subsequent phenomena. 2. Awareness as the First Cause 2.1 Defining Awareness as a Pre-Physical Reality Awareness, in this model, is not an emergent property of matter but an intrinsic state of existence. This idea is supported by: Orchestrated Objective Reduction (Orch-OR) Theory (Penrose & Hameroff, 2014): It suggests that consciousness exists in a quantum superposition before neural activity occurs, meaning it is fundamental rather than a byproduct of brain processes. The Observer Effect in Quantum Mechanics: The Double-Slit Experiment demonstrates that particles behave as waves until observed, implying that awareness plays a role in the formation of reality (Wheeler, 1983). Philosophical Idealism: Thinkers like Kant, Berkeley, and Chalmers have suggested that perception structures reality rather than reality existing independently. 2.2 Awareness Preceding Physical Existence Since awareness exists independently of time and space, it does not require a cause. The fundamental realization of awareness results in self-questioning, which initiates the unfolding of structured existence. 3. Time as a Coordination System, Not a Primary Force 3.1 Julian Barbour’s “End of Time” Hypothesis Barbour (1999) argues that time is not fundamental but is an emergent property of change. This aligns with: Einstein’s relativity, which shows that time is relative and can be influenced by motion and gravity. Quantum mechanics, which demonstrates that quantum events do not require a linear passage of time. 3.2 Time as a Measurement, Not a Cause This model suggests that time exists to coordinate the unfolding of awareness into structured phenomena, not as a force that causes motion. 4. Energy Release as a Reaction, Not a Primary Cause 4.1 Feynman’s Quantum Electrodynamics (QED) Feynman (1985) demonstrated that energy exists in a probability state until an interaction forces it into action. This means: Energy is not a first principle; it is activated through directed action. The vacuum state of the universe holds dormant energy that is only triggered when conditions allow it. 4.2 The Activation of Energy Energy is released only when awareness initiates action. Without awareness directing the process, energy remains in an unmanifested state. 5. Physical Reality as the Last Step 5.1 The Holographic Principle Physicists such as Gerard ‘t Hooft and Leonard Susskind propose that the universe is a projection of lower-dimensional information. This means: Matter is not fundamental; it emerges as a consequence of deeper, pre-physical structures. Awareness shapes reality at a fundamental level before material existence. 5.2 Consciousness & Quantum Gravity Penrose suggests that wave function collapse is influenced by gravitational effects, implying a connection between consciousness and spacetime itself. 6. Addressing Contradictory Theories 6.1 The Standard Big Bang Model The Big Bang assumes energy was the first principle, but it does not explain why energy became active. This model fixes that issue by proposing that awareness initiates energy release. 6.2 The Copenhagen Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics The Copenhagen Interpretation states that wave function collapse occurs when observed but does not define the observer. This model proposes that awareness is the ultimate observer, explaining why quantum states collapse into defined reality. 7. Implications for Science & Human Understanding This model unifies: Quantum Mechanics & Consciousness: Awareness as a fundamental principle aligns with quantum observation. Physics & Philosophy: Idealism meets empirical research in a coherent framework. Cosmology & Metaphysics: The origin of the universe is explained beyond materialist assumptions. 8. Conclusion By placing awareness as the first cause, we create a framework that bridges science, philosophy, and quantum mechanics. This model explains the missing elements in modern physics and provides a foundation for future exploration. 9. References Barbour, J. (1999). The End of Time: The Next Revolution in Physics. Bohr, N. (1928). "The Quantum Postulate and the Recent Development of Atomic Theory." Nature. Chalmers, D. J. (1995). "Facing up to the problem of consciousness." Journal of Consciousness Studies. Einstein, A. (1915). "General Theory of Relativity." Feynman, R. P. (1985). QED: The Strange Theory of Light and Matter. Guth, A. H. (1981). "Inflationary universe: A possible solution to the horizon and flatness problems." Physical Review D. Penrose, R. & Hameroff, S. (2014). "Consciousness in the universe: A review of the ‘Orch OR’ theory." Physics of Life Reviews. Susskind, L. (1995). "The World as a Hologram." Journal of Mathematical Physics. Wheeler, J. A. (1983). "Law without law." Quantum Theory and Measurement. (shrink)

It has been known for long time that the cosmic sound wave was there since the early epoch of the Universe. Signatures of its existence are abound. However, such an acoustic model of cosmology is rarely developed fully into a complete framework from the notion of space, cancer therapy up to the sky. This paper may be the first attempt towards such a complete description of the Universe based on classical wave equation of sound. It is argued that one (...) can arrive at a consistent description of space, elementary particles, Sachs-Wolfe acoustic theorem, up to a novel approach for cancer therapy, starting from this simple classical wave equation of sound. We also discuss a plausible extension of Acoustic Sachs-Wolfe theorem based on its analogue with Klein-Gordon equation to become Acoustic Sachs-Wolfe-Christianto-Smarandache-Umniyati (ASWoCSU) equation. It is our hope that the new proposed equation can be verified with observation data. But we admit that our model is still in its infancy, more researches are needed to fill all the missing details. (shrink)

AI and the Universal Law of Economic Balance: A Homeostatic Model for Sustainable Prosperity -/- Introduction -/- Modern economies are primarily driven by the profit motive, which, while encouraging innovation and efficiency, often leads to wage stagnation, wealth inequality, and resource exploitation. The imbalance between corporate profits, wages, purchasing power, and market demand has resulted in recurring economic crises, social unrest, and environmental degradation. -/- To resolve these systemic issues, economic policies must align with the universal law of balance (...) in nature, ensuring that financial systems function as self-regulating ecosystems rather than unstable, profit-driven markets. Achieving this balance requires both gradual reform and fundamental restructuring, first at the national level and then integrated into a global economic framework. -/- The key to Implementing and maintaining this balance lies in artificial intelligence (AI), which can analyze economic conditions in real time and adjust wages, prices, taxation, and resource distribution to maintain stability. However, to prevent AI from becoming a tool of economic control for powerful entities, it must be open-source, decentralized, and governed by ethical principles. -/- This essay explores how AI-driven economic balance can replace market-driven instability with a self-regulating, sustainable model that ensures fair wages, stable prices, and equitable wealth distribution. -/- The Problem: Profit Motive and Economic Imbalance -/- The traditional economic system relies on profit margins to sustain businesses. However, when companies focus on maximizing profits, several imbalances emerge: -/- 1. Lower Wages Reduce Purchasing Power -/- When businesses lower costs to remain competitive, wages stagnate. -/- Lower wages mean consumers cannot afford the products they produce. -/- 2. Weaker Demand Forces Businesses to Cut Costs Further -/- If people cannot buy goods, businesses cut jobs and wages further, deepening the problem. -/- Economic growth becomes dependent on debt, leading to financial instability. -/- 3. Wealth Concentration Creates Social and Political Instability -/- Extreme profit accumulation among a small elite leads to economic inequality. -/- Governments either increase taxes (which businesses resist) or cut social services (which leads to public unrest). -/- This cycle of imbalance proves that unregulated profit-seeking is unsustainable. Instead, an economy must be structured to self-regulate, ensuring a balance between wages, prices, profits, and demand. -/- A Homeostatic Economic Model: Balancing Wages, Prices, and Profits -/- A homeostatic economic model ensures that all components of the economy—wages, prices, profit margins, taxation, and demand—adjust dynamically to maintain stability. The following reforms would create this balance: -/- 1. Wage-Price Equilibrium -/- Wages must be indexed to productivity and inflation, ensuring purchasing power remains stable. -/- Profit-sharing incentives should be standardized, allowing workers to benefit from company success. -/- 2. Profit Regulation Without Killing Innovation -/- Essential industries (e.g., healthcare, food, energy) should have profit caps to prevent price exploitation. -/- Businesses that reinvest in worker wages, technology, or sustainability should receive tax breaks. -/- 3. Market Demand and Supply Stability -/- Governments and businesses must collaborate to prevent artificial scarcity and price manipulation. -/- Tax policies should support lower-income groups, ensuring their purchasing power remains intact. -/- 4. Dynamic Feedback Mechanism for Economic Stability -/- Economic decisions must be based on real-time data, avoiding speculation-based policies. -/- Policies should be adjustable based on changes in market conditions, preventing booms and busts. -/- These policies require both national reforms and global cooperation, ensuring that no single country or corporation can disrupt the balance for personal gain. -/- AI as the Key to Homeostatic Economic Balance -/- Maintaining economic balance in real time is too complex for human policymakers alone. This is where artificial intelligence (AI) can play a critical role in: -/- 1. Real-Time Wage and Price Adjustments -/- AI can analyze inflation, productivity, and cost of living to dynamically adjust wages and prices. -/- 2. Profit Optimization Without Exploitation -/- AI can track corporate profits and suggest profit-reinvestment policies that benefit workers and society. -/- 3. Smart Taxation and Wealth Redistribution -/- AI-driven progressive taxation models ensure fair wealth distribution while preventing economic stagnation. -/- 4. Market Demand and Supply Optimization -/- AI can predict consumer demand shifts and help businesses adjust production to prevent shortages or oversupply. -/- 5. Global Trade and Resource Management -/- AI can analyze trade patterns to ensure fair pricing and sustainable resource allocation worldwide. -/- 6. Public Awareness and Education -/- AI can identify economic misconceptions and suggest educational initiatives to promote financial literacy. -/- For AI to function effectively in this role, it must operate under ethical and decentralized governance to serve humanity rather than corporate or political interests. -/- Ensuring AI Remains Open-Source and Decentralized -/- To prevent AI from being misused as a tool of economic control, its development and governance must follow these principles: -/- 1. Open-Source AI for Economic Balance -/- AI models should be transparent and publicly auditable to prevent hidden biases. -/- Developers from multiple disciplines should contribute to ensure fairness and accuracy. -/- 2. Decentralized Governance Model -/- AI should be managed through global economic councils, not a single government or corporation. -/- Blockchain technology can ensure transparency in AI-driven economic decisions. -/- 3. Ethical Safeguards Against Manipulation -/- AI decisions should prioritize sustainability and human well-being over profit. -/- Economic policies should be auditable in real-time by independent researchers and civil organizations. -/- Failsafe mechanisms must prevent AI from implementing harmful policies due to data misinterpretation. -/- By ensuring AI-driven economic balance is open-source, decentralized, and ethically governed, it can create a self-correcting system that prevents economic crises, stabilizes wealth distribution, and ensures long-term prosperity. -/- Implementation Strategy: Gradual Reform Leading to Systemic Change -/- Since economic transition cannot happen overnight, a phased approach is necessary: -/- Phase 1: National-Level Reforms -/- 1. Implement wage-price indexing and profit-sharing policies. -/- 2. Reduce corporate taxes for businesses that reinvest in workers and sustainability. -/- 3. Introduce regulated price stabilization for essential goods. -/- Phase 2: Global Economic Integration -/- 1. Establish international economic councils to guide balance-driven policies. -/- 2. Reform global trade agreements to prioritize fair wages and sustainability. -/- 3. Create a universal economic sustainability index to track progress. -/- Phase 3: AI-Governed Dynamic Economic System -/- 1. Develop real-time AI monitoring for wage-price adjustments. -/- 2. Implement AI-driven smart taxation to prevent wealth inequality. -/- 3. Ensure AI operates under decentralized, transparent governance. -/- Conclusion: The Future of an AI-Driven Balanced Economy -/- By integrating AI with economic policy, we can create a self-regulating economic system that follows the universal law of balance, preventing both extreme poverty and extreme wealth accumulation. This homeostatic economic model ensures that profits, wages, prices, and demand remain in equilibrium, fostering sustainable prosperity for all. -/- . (shrink)

Should models of consciousness be detailed _mechanistic_ models of particular types of systems, or should they be _minimal_ models that abstract away from the underlying mechanistic details and provide generalisations? Detailed mechanistic models may afford a complete and precise account of consciousness in human beings and other, physiologically similar mammals. But they do not provide a good model of consciousness in other animals, such as non-vertebrates, let alone artificial systems. Minimal models can be applicable to a wide range of (...) different conscious systems. But do they provide genuine explanations that are autonomous from explanations by detailed mechanistic models? This paper provides a taxonomy of minimal models and measures of consciousness, clarifies their relation to detailed mechanistic models, and highlights benefits of different minimalist approaches to consciousness. (shrink)