Transactive memory theory describes the processes by which benefits for memory can occur when remembering is shared in dyads or groups. In contrast, cognitive psychology experiments demonstrate that social influences on memory disrupt and inhibit individual recall. However, most research in cognitive psychology has focused on groups of strangers recalling relatively meaningless stimuli. In the current study, we examined social influences on memory in groups with a shared history, who were recalling a range of stimuli, from word lists to personal, (...) shared memories. We focused in detail on the products and processes of remembering during in-depth interviews with 12 older married couples. These interviews consisted of three recall tasks: (1) word list recall; (2) personal list recall, where stimuli were relevant to the couples’ shared past; and (3) an open-ended autobiographical interview. We conducted these tasks individually and then collaboratively two weeks later. Across each of the tasks, although some couples demonstrated collaborative inhibition, others demonstrated collaborative facilitation. We identified a number of factors that predicted collaborative success, in particular, group-level strategy use. Our results show that collaboration may help or hinder memory, and certain interactions are more likely to produce collaborative benefits. (shrink)

Kant begins his Lectures on Pedagogy by stating, “[t]he human being is the only creature that must be educated” (Kant, 2007, 9:441), and he argues that it is through education that we can transform our initial “animal nature into human nature” (ibid. 2007, 9:441). Kant understands education as involving an ordered process of care, discipline, instruction and formation through enculturating, civilizing and moralizing (Formosa 2011). Further, Kant envisages that we should pursue as a species the “moral perfection” that is the (...) “final destiny of the human race” through education (Collins, 1997, 27:470; see Dean, 2014). However, to engage in this pursuit Kant believes that, through education and social change, we have to regulate our “animal nature” and counter the moral corruption of our species, which he calls the “radical innate evil in human nature (not any the less brought upon us by ourselves)” (Kant, 1998, 6:32). If humanity is to pursue its final destiny of moral perfection, then education will need to respond responsibly to the propensity to evil that is deeply rooted in us as finite and imperfect rational beings living in imperfect and at times even in morally corrupted social conditions. This paper outlines some of the relevant issues. (shrink)

For some years now, Michael Bergmann has urged a dilemma against internalist theories of epistemic justification. For reasons I explain below, some epistemologists have thought that Michael Huemer’s principle of Phenomenal Conservatism can split the horns of Bergmann’s dilemma. Bergmann has recently argued, however, that PC must inevitably, like all other internalist views, fall prey to his dilemma. In this paper, I explain the nature of Bergmann’s dilemma and his reasons for thinking that PC cannot escape it before arguing that (...) he is mistaken: PC can indeed split its horns. (shrink)

A characterization result of dilation in terms of positive and negative association admits an extremal counterexample, which we present together with a minor repair of the result. Dilation may be asymmetric whereas covariation itself is symmetric. Dilation is still characterized in terms of positive and negative covariation, however, once the event to be dilated has been specified.

I begin with a distinction between narrow and broad defenses to the logical problem of evil. The former is simply an attempt to show that God and evil are not logically incompat-ible whereas the latter attempts the same, but only by appealing to beliefs one takes to be true in the actual world. I then argue that while recent accounts of original sin may be consistent with a broad defense, they are also logically incoherent. After considering potential replies, I conclude (...) by proposing an account of original sin that is both logically coherent and consistent with a broad defense. (shrink)

In this paper, I shall defend two main claims. First, Friedman’s famous paper “On the methodology of positive economics” (“F53”) cannot be properly understood without taking into account the influence of three authors who are neither cited nor mentioned in the paper: Max Weber, Frank Knight, and Karl Popper. I shall trace both their substantive influence on F53 and the historical route by which this influence took place. Once one has understood these ingredients, especially Weber’s ideal types, many of F53’s (...) astonishing sentences like “the more significant the theory, the more unrealistic the assumptions”, make good sense. Second, I shall claim that the much-discussed question whether Friedman’s essay espouses an instrumentalist or a realist position, is the wrong question to be asked. I shall illustrate that by a comparison with examples from physics in which also unrealistic assumptions are made. Also there, the question whether these assumptions are indicators of instrumentalism or realism is not appropriate. Cleared from these misunderstandings, F53 presents itself as an interesting and reasonable but much less controversial contribution to the methodology of economics. (shrink)

In this chapter, we argue for a phenomenal conservative perspective on religious epistemology and attempt to answer some common criticisms of this perspective.

Primarily, this article emphasises that while conducting research, especially one involving human subjects, researchers are expected to comply with applicable global and national ethical standards. Should a researcher fail to do so, he/she stands the risk of breaching research ethics, and this is capable of rendering his/her research unacceptable. Accordingly, this article, making reference to relevant ethical theories, critically examines and analyses the actions of a researcher who set out to investigate treatment recommendations for diarrhoea. Ultimately, a number of ethical (...) pitfalls in the stated research are x-rayed and some recommendations for subsequent studies are provided in this paper. (shrink)

Sexual abuse of minors by Catholic priests has been a persistent and widespread problem in the Church. Although more than 80 percent of victims have been boys, prior studies have rejected the idea that the abuse is related to homosexuality among priests. Available data show, however, that the proportion of homosexual men in the priesthood is correlated almost perfectly with the percentage of male victims and with the overall incidence of abuse. Data also show that while the incidence of abuse (...) is lower today than it was three decades ago, it has not declined as much as is commonly believed, and has recently begun to rise amid signs of episcopal complacency about procedures for the protection of children. (shrink)

Recent authors, emphasizing Newman’s distaste for natural theology—especially William Paley’s design argument—have urged us to follow Newman’s lead and reject design arguments. But I argue that Newman’s own argument for God’s existence (his argument from conscience) fails without a supplementary design argument or similar reason to think our faculties are truth-oriented. In other words, Newman appears to need the kind of argument he explicitly rejects. Finding Newman’s rejection of natural theology to stem primarily from factors other than worries about cogency, (...) however, I further argue that there is little reason not to pursue design arguments in order to save the argument from conscience. (shrink)

Epistemologists have long believed that epistemic luck undermines propositional knowledge. Action theorists have long believed that agentive luck undermines intentional action. But is there a relationship between agentive luck and epistemic luck? While agentive luck and epistemic luck have been widely thought to be independent phenomena, we argue that agentive luck has an epistemic dimension. We present several thought experiments where epistemic luck seems to undermine both knowledge-how and intentional action and we report experimental results that corroborate these judgments. These (...) findings have implications for the role of knowledge in a theory of intentional action and for debates about the nature of knowledge-how and the significance of knowledge representation in folk psychology. (shrink)

The role of certitude in our mental lives is, to put it mildly, controversial. Many current epistemologists (including epistemologists of religion) eschew certitude altogether. Given his emphasis on certitude, some have maintained that John Henry Newman was an infallibilist about knowledge. In this paper, we argue that a careful examination of his thought (especially as seen in the Grammar of Assent) reveals that he was an epistemic fallibilist. We first clarify what we mean by fallibilism and infallibilism. Second, we explain (...) why some have read Newman as an infallibilist. Third, we offer two arguments that Newman is at least a fallibilist in a weak sense. In particular, the paradox he seeks to resolve in the Grammar and his dispute with John Locke both indicate that he is at least a weak fallibilist. We close with a consideration of whether Newman is a fallibilist in a much stronger sense as well. (shrink)

In this chapter, Gage and McAllister respond to various objections to the phenomenal conservative position in religious epistemology. In particular, they respond to the objections that seemings are the ultimate source of justification, that PC makes epistemic justification too easy, that PC involves conceptual circularity, and that PC lacks an objective connection to truth.

So much value is ascribed to human life. This is so because life is generally regarded as a precious gift to humanity, which should be cherished and protected, as failure to cherish and protect life will bring about the inevitable extinction of the entire human race. Abortion is one of the numerous contemporary issues that undermine the sanctity and value of human life; for it involves terminating a pregnancy by removing a fetus or embryo before it can survive independent of (...) the uterus, or killing the fetus inside the uterus. The issue of abortion is highly controversial; for while some individuals permit it, some others condemn it totally, as evident in the 'pro-life' versus 'pro-choice' controversy. 'Pro-life' advocates condemn abortion because it is an outright disrespect for the dignity and value of human life, and hold that there should be sustained discussions on it, to expose its danger and fatal consequences. 'Pro-choice' advocates are simply indifferent to the issue of abortion; for them, getting involved in abortion is a matter of choice for an individual - that is, one is at liberty to accept or reject abortion so that in the final analysis, abortion should not be an issue for discussion. This article explores several arguments and bioethical concerns on abortion, approaches to the issue of abortion, and Nigeria's abortion provisions, which are evident in the Criminal and Penal Codes, respectively. Ultimately, this article recommends that beyond merely stating punishments for those involved in abortion, the following should be done: (a) Correcting the disparity between the Criminal and Penal Codes by ensuring that both Codes have the same penalty stated, or completely reducing them into a single Code that will be applied across the country, (b) Modifying the Criminal and Penal Codes by including information that will serve the purpose of educating Nigerians on the bioethical issues associated with abortion, and (c) Designating a body charged with ensuring compliance with and implementation of the abortion laws. (shrink)

Blending the qualitative and analytic research methods, this article critically examines the nature and limitations of inductive arguments within the field of logic. Inductive arguments, unlike their deductive counterparts, provide conclusions that extend beyond the premises, thus offering probabilistic rather than certain conclusions. This critique emphasises the weak inferential connections inherent in inductive reasoning, where premises give only partial or probable support to conclusions. The analysis highlights the ampliative value of inductive arguments, illustrating how they broaden conceptual knowledge by introducing (...) new information. However, the article also delves into reasons for their limited acceptance in logic, focusing on their probabilistic nature, contingency, experiential basis, and susceptibility to fallacies such as hasty generalisation, composition, false cause, and appeal to authority. Despite these criticisms, the article recognises that inductive arguments hold significant merit in scientific inquiry and everyday reasoning, contrasting with the firm, analytic nature of deductive arguments used in formal logic and philosophical analysis. The article concludes by advocating for a balanced approach in argumentation, underscoring the need to appreciate the contextual strengths and limitations of both inductive and deductive reasoning in the pursuit of effective logical analysis. (shrink)

The world today is marked by linguistic diversity. It has nonetheless been described as a global village. Consequently, there is a growing interest in understanding issues across cultures and languages. This has necessitated the translation of texts and thoughts into languages that can reach out to a greater number of people. The challenge, however, has been to retain the originally intended meaning in the new language into which a text is translated. The concern of this paper is to elucidate the (...) concept of translation and the views of philosophers on the concept, with a view to understanding the problem of translation, especially as it relates to African Philosophy. Ultimately, this research establishes that the problem of translating African philosophical thought can be addressed through (a) improved capacity building of African translators, (b) better access to resources and increased collaboration between African and non-African scholars, and (c) use of a “third language” as a medium of communication, which can help bridge cultural and linguistic gaps between African and non-African philosophical thoughts. (shrink)

This paper offers a thorough appraisal of Peter David Klein's epistemological infinitism, emphasising his treatment of scepticism and the issue of infinite regress in epistemic justification. Klein, a prominent figure in contemporary epistemology, advocates for infinitism; a theory that argues justification is an unending process where each belief requires further reasons indefinitely. The study critically evaluates how Klein's defense of infinitism provides a distinctive response to the infinite regress problem, a core concern in scepticism. By contextualising Klein's theory within the (...) broader framework of epistemology, the research explores its implications for ongoing debates on justification and scepticism. The methodology includes a thematic analysis of Klein's key philosophical contributions, coupled with a critical examination of competing justification theories such as foundationalism, coherentism, and contextualism. Employing a comparative approach, the study assesses Klein's infinitism alongside these rival theories by drawing on primary texts and relevant secondary literature. The paper is divided into five sections: an introduction to scepticism and epistemic justification, an analysis of Klein's infinite regress argument, an exploration of traditional solutions to the regress problem, criticisms of infinitism, and an appraisal of Klein's contributions. The findings reveal that, despite its innovative approach, Klein's infinitism encounters significant theoretical and practical challenges. The conclusion assesses whether infinitism can adequately address the regress problem and considers its relevance to real-world epistemic practices. (shrink)

Are human beings actually free beings? The doctrine of determinism gives a negative response to this question. Determinism therefore claims that humans are not free to act or make choices, since they are always constrained in some way. By so doing, determinism denies human freedom and human moral responsibility. It rejects the idea that humans act freely, or that humans can be regarded as responsible for their actions and inactions. This outright denial of human freedom and human moral responsibility is (...) certainly pregnant with several implications, which this article is aimed at exposing. This article adopts the expository, analytic and critical methods. It begins with a clarification of the concept of determinism and then goes on to discuss five types of determinism, namely: (a) physical, (b) psychological, (c) historical, (d) ethical and (e) theological determinism, respectively. Also, this article discusses two categories of determinism known as soft and hard determinism. Furthermore, this article exposes some implications of determinism for events and humanity. Finally, adopting eclecticism as its theoretical framework, this article proposes that it is best to approach the doctrine of determinism by simply recognising and accepting the fact that there are aspects of humans that are determined, and there are equally aspects of humans that are not determined. By so doing, this article establishes that approaching the doctrine of determinism eclectically is the surest way of accommodating the opposing doctrines of determinism and 'freewillism.’. (shrink)

This chapter attempts to establish an understanding of the concept of logic. Since there is no unanimous definition of logic, we shall consider some definitions which will facilitate our development of a working definition. This will be followed by a historical trajectory of logic as a discipline, and thereafter, an exposition of the scope and subject matter of logic, as well as the laws of thought shall be given. The aspects or divisions of logic shall also be examined here-in. This (...) chapter shall also include an overview of arguments in logic. This will be done by means of some definitions which will facilitate an understanding of the concept of argument. Since arguments are constituted by sentences which are called propositions, a distinction shall be made between sentences in the ordinary sense and in the propositional sense. This will be followed by a quick glance at the components of arguments. Inference, a term which denotes the relationship between the components of arguments, namely, premises and conclusions, shall also be considered. Also to be discussed in this chapter are: types and kinds of arguments, some instantiations of arguments, truth-value of propositions, validity and invalidity of arguments as well as sound and unsound arguments. A briefing on the usefulness of arguments to man shall also be given in this chapter. The end-point of this chapter shall be a discourse on the relevance or value of logic as it applies to our daily living. (shrink)

This chapter attempts to establish an understanding of the concept of logic. Since there is no unanimous definition of logic, we shall consider some definitions which will facilitate our development of a working definition. This will be followed by a historical trajectory of logic as a discipline, and thereafter, an exposition of the scope and subject matter of logic, as well as the laws of thought shall be given. The aspects or divisions of logic shall also be examined here-in. This (...) chapter shall also include an overview of arguments in logic. This will be done by means of some definitions which will facilitate an understanding of the concept of argument. Since arguments are constituted by sentences which are called propositions, a distinction shall be made between sentences in the ordinary sense and in the propositional sense. This will be followed by a quick glance at the components of arguments. Inference, a term which denotes the relationship between the components of arguments, namely, premises and conclusions, shall also be considered. Also to be discussed in this chapter are: types and kinds of arguments, some instantiations of arguments, truth-value of propositions, validity and invalidity of arguments as well as sound and unsound arguments. A briefing on the usefulness of arguments to man shall also be given in this chapter. The end-point of this chapter shall be a discourse on the relevance or value of logic as it applies to our daily living. (shrink)

This chapter attempts to establish an understanding of the concept of logic. Since there is no unanimous definition of logic, we shall consider some definitions which will facilitate our development of a working definition. This will be followed by a historical trajectory of logic as a discipline, and thereafter, an exposition of the scope and subject matter of logic, as well as the laws of thought shall be given. The aspects or divisions of logic shall also be examined here-in. This (...) chapter shall also include an overview of arguments in logic. This will be done by means of some definitions which will facilitate an understanding of the concept of argument. Since arguments are constituted by sentences which are called propositions, a distinction shall be made between sentences in the ordinary sense and in the propositional sense. This will be followed by a quick glance at the components of arguments. Inference, a term which denotes the relationship between the components of arguments, namely, premises and conclusions, shall also be considered. Also to be discussed in this chapter are: types and kinds of arguments, some instantiations of arguments, truth-value of propositions, validity and invalidity of arguments as well as sound and unsound arguments. A briefing on the usefulness of arguments to man shall also be given in this chapter. The end-point of this chapter shall be a discourse on the relevance or value of logic as it applies to our daily living. (shrink)

A brief review of John Polkinghorne's 2011 book Science and Religion in Quest of Truth (Yale University Press).

A review of Robert. B. Stewart's edited volume concerning a discussion between William Dembski and Michael Ruse. Further contributions are included from William Lane Craig and others.

What was René Girard’s attitude towards philosophy? What philosophers influenced him? What stance did he take in the philosophical debates of his time? What are the philosophical questions raised by René Girard’s anthropology? In this interview, Paul Dumouchel sheds light on these issues.

Proponents of public reason views hold that the exercise of political power ought to be acceptable to all reasonable citizens. This article elucidates the common structure shared by all public reason views, first by identifying a set of questions that all such views must answer and, second, by showing that the answers to these questions stand in a particular relationship to each other. In particular, we show that what we call the ‘rationale question’ is fundamental. This fact, and the common (...) structure more generally, are often overlooked or distorted within the literature. As a result, we argue, several prominent argumentative moves made by both critics and defenders of public reason are unsuccessful. Our overall conclusion is that discussions of public reason views would be more fruitful if they made consistent use of the common structure we identify. (shrink)

This is a contribution to a Book symposium on The Limits of Free Will: Selected Essays by Paul Russell. Russell provides replies to three critics of The Limits of Free Will. The first reply is to Robert Wallace and focuses on the question of whether there is a conflict between the core compatibilist and pessimist components of the "critical compatibilist" position that Russell has advanced. The second reply is to Angela Smith's discussion of the "narrow" interpretation of moral responsibility (...) responsibility (as defended by R. Jay Wallace) and how best to respond to it. The third and last reply is concerned with Christopher Bennett's criticism of Russell's views concerning "motivational scepticism" and the possibility of pure practical reasons. (shrink)

Public shaming plays an important role in upholding valuable social norms. But, under what conditions, if any, is it morally justifiable? Our aim in this paper is systemically to investigate the morality of public shaming, so as to provide an answer to this neglected question. We develop an overarching framework for assessing the justifiability of this practice, which shows that, while shaming can sometimes be morally justifiable, it very often is not. In turn, our framework highlights several reasons to be (...) concerned about the increasingly widespread phenomenon of online public shaming. (shrink)

In the replies to my critics that follow I offer a more detailed account of the specific papers that they discuss or examine. The papers that they are especially concerned with are: “The Material World and Natural Religion in Hume’s Treatise” (Ryan) [Essay 3], “Hume’s Skepticism and the Problem of Atheism” (Fosl) [Essay 12], and “Hume’s Philosophy of Irreligion and the Myth of British Empiricism (Gautier) [Essay 16].

ABSTRACTWhat conditions must be satisfied if a group is to count as having a justified belief? Jennifer Lackey has recently argued that any adequate account of group justification must be sensitive to both the evidence actually possessed by enough of a group's operative members as well as the evidence those members should have possessed. I first draw attention to a range of objections to Lackey's specific view of group justification and a range of concrete case intuitions any plausible view of (...) group justification must explain. I then offer an alternative view of group justification where the basic idea is that group justification is a matter of groups responsibly responding to their total evidence. This view both avoids the problems facing Lackey's account and also explains the relevant concrete case intuitions. (shrink)

Recasting Hume and Early Modern Philosophy is a collection of essays that are all concerned with major figures and topics in the early modern philosophy. Most of the essays are concerned, more specifically, with the philosophy of David Hume (1711-1776). The sixteen essays included in this collection are divided into five parts. These parts are arranged under the headings of: (1) Metaphysics and Epistemology; (2) Free Will and Moral Luck; (3) Ethics, Virtue and Optimism; (4) Skepticism, Religion and Atheism; and (...) (5) Irreligion and the Unity of Hume’s Thought. A particularly important theme running through many of these essays is the subject of Hume’s irreligious aims and intentions. The fifth and final part of the collection is devoted to an articulation and defence of this specific understanding of Hume’s philosophical thought. (shrink)

Opponents of the computational theory of mind have held that the theory is devoid of explanatory content, since whatever computational procedures are said to account for our cognitive attributes will also be realized by a host of other ‘deviant’ physical systems, such as buckets of water and possibly even stones. Such ‘triviality’ claims rely on a simple mapping account of physical implementation. Hence defenders of CTM traditionally attempt to block the trivialization critique by advocating additional constraints on the implementation relation. (...) However, instead of attempting to ‘save’ CTM by constraining the account of physical implementation, I argue that the general form of the triviality argument is invalid. I provide a counterexample scenario, and show that SMA is in fact consistent with empirically rich and theoretically plausible versions of CTM. This move requires rejection of the computational sufficiency thesis, which I argue is scientifically unjustified in any case. By shifting the ‘burden of explanatory force’ away from the concept of physical implementation, and instead placing it on salient aspects of the target phenomenon to be explained, it’s possible to retain a maximally liberal and unfettered view of physical implementation, and at the same time defuse the triviality arguments that have motivated defenders of CTM to impose various theory-laden constraints on SMA. (shrink)

The Limits of Free Will presents influential articles by Paul Russell concerning free will and moral responsibility. The problems arising in this field of philosophy, which are deeply rooted in the history of the subject, are also intimately related to a wide range of other fields, such as law and criminology, moral psychology, theology, and, more recently, neuroscience. These articles were written and published over a period of three decades, although most have appeared in the past decade. Among the (...) topics covered: the challenge of skepticism; moral sentiment and moral capacity; necessity and the metaphysics of causation; practical reason; free will and art; fatalism and the limits of agency; moral luck, and our metaphysical attitudes of optimism and pessimism. (shrink)

In the 6th century, Paul the Persian used his own pen to write a summary of Aristotle's Peri Hermeneias in the Persian language. Severus Sebokht translated it into Syriac. This book is a transcription and translation of the Syriac manuscript of Paul the Persian's Peri Hermeneias and a comparison of it with Aristotle's original Greek text.

Réponses à Juliette Grange sur ses remises en cause peu argumentées d'une partie de la philosophie en France.

Should a principle of charity be applied to the interpretation of the colour concepts exercised in visual experience? We think not. We shall argue, for one thing, that the grounds for applying a principle of charity are lacking in the case of colour concepts. More importantly, we shall argue that attempts at giving the experience of colour a charitable interpretation either fail to respect obvious features of that experience or fail to interpret it charitably, after all. Charity to visual experience (...) is therefore no motive for resisting the natural, Galilean response to a scientific understanding of light and vision. The best interpretation of colour experience ends up convicting it of widespread and systematic error. (shrink)

THE PRINCIPLE OF SUPERPOSITION. The need for a quantum theory Classical mechanics has been developed continuously from the time of Newton and applied to an ...

This paper argues that, given a certain apparently inevitable thesis about content, we could not know our own minds. The thesis is that the content of a thought is determined by its relational properties.

It is one thing to hold that merely statistical evidence is _sometimes_ insufficient for rational belief, as in typical lottery and profiling cases. It is another thing to hold that merely statistical evidence is _always_ insufficient for rational belief. Indeed, there are cases where statistical evidence plainly does justify belief. This project develops a dispositional account of the normativity of statistical evidence, where the dispositions that ground justifying statistical evidence are connected to the goals (= proper function) of objects. There (...) are strong intuitive motivations for doing this. For we can turn almost any case of _non-justifying_ merely statistical evidence into a case of _justifying_ merely statistical evidence by adding information about the dispositions and goals of the objects involved. The resulting view not only helps us understand when and why merely statistical evidence is normatively significant, but it also helps us understand how statistical evidence relates to more standard forms of evidence (perceptual, testimonial). The emerging view also has surprising applications, as it imposes limitations on the epistemic value of fine-tuning arguments for theism as well as undermines a standard class of case-based arguments for moral encroachment. (shrink)

We are witnessing increasing use of the Internet, particular social media, to criticize (perceived or actual) moral failings and misdemeanors. This phenomenon of so-called ‘online public shaming’ could provide a powerful tool for reinforcing valuable social norms. But it also threatens unwarranted and severe punishments meted out by online mobs. This paper analyses the dangers associated with the informal enforcement of norms, drawing on Locke, but also highlights its promise, drawing on recent discussions of social norms. We then consider two (...) crucial conditions that online public shaming must meet in order to be justifiable: proportionality and accountability. We argue that these requirements are in fact frequently violated, rendering most cases of online public shaming unjustified. While the use of online public shaming against others’ vices has some apparent virtues, it is currently rarely justified, given its own vices. (shrink)

Knowledge implies the presence of a positive relation between a person and a fact. Factual ignorance, on the other hand, implies the absence of some positive relation between a person and a fact. The two most influential views of ignorance hold that what is lacking in cases of factual ignorance is knowledge or true belief, but these accounts fail to explain a number of basic facts about ignorance. In their place, we propose a novel and systematic defense of the view (...) that factual ignorance is the absence of awareness, an account that both comes apart from the dominant views and overcomes their deficiencies. Given the important role that ignorance plays in moral and legal theory and our understanding of various epistemic injustices, a precise and theoretically unproblematic account of the nature of ignorance is important not only for normative epistemology, but also for law, ethics, and applied epistemology. (shrink)

This paper focuses on Elizabeth Anderson’s application of the epistemological idiom of mētis to the debate over the equal status of indigenous knowledge and scientific knowledge in the academic curriculum. Against the denial of this equal status by critics of indigenous knowledge or science, Anderson defends what one might term a conciliatory view, the view, roughly, that indigenous knowledge meets the criteria of scientific knowledge presupposed by the critics of the equal status of indigenous knowledge and scientific knowledge in the (...) academic curriculum, and it is continuous with agroecological form of mainstream scientific inquiry. I argue that the conciliatory view does not rest substantively on mētis as an epistemological idiom since the view is based on the direct conceptual relation between the notion of indigenous knowledge and the notion of scientific knowledge or inquiry. More importantly, the view amounts to appealing to the critics of the equal status of indigenous knowledge on the terms of those critics and leaves unchallenged those very core assumptions that ground their denial of the equal status of indigenous knowledge in the first place. Building on her fruitful analysis of mētis, I attempt a sketch of an alternative view that vindicates the equal status of indigenous knowledge and scientific knowledge in the academic curriculum, but which avoids those drawbacks. (shrink)

an inquiry into recent animal experimentation at Sick Kids Hospital, including detailed accounts of pain research and fear conditioning on neonatal rodents, induced lung trauma on piglets, and the infection of impregnated mice with malaria. -/- appended with three 2018 Press Releases that provoked Sick Kids to contact Toronto police and ban me from their premises and from contacting their researchers.

Plato's _Republic_ divided subsequent study of justice in two, as a virtue of people and of institutions. Here, the start of a reunification is attempted. Justice is first understood personally as the virtuous mean between arrogance and servility, where just people properly respect themselves and others. Because justice requires that like cases be treated alike and self-respect is a special instance of respect generally, justice requires a single standard for self and others. In understanding justice in terms of respect, structural (...) analogies become apparent between “recognition” and “appraisal” respect, on the one hand, and Rawls' two principles of justice on the other. The present view is then compared to “social egalitarian” theories of justice and the essay concludes with a discussion of how mercy is related to justice and an explanation of why just people always look for reasons to mitigate blame and punishment but never to aggravate them. (shrink)

the Cathedral's central prop as a war trophy, tribute from the client state Judea. also: the First Folio as Royalist propaganda.

Many of our most important goals require months or even years of effort to achieve, and some never get achieved at all. As social psychologists have lately emphasized, success in pursuing such goals requires the capacity for perseverance, or "grit." Philosophers have had little to say about grit, however, insofar as it differs from more familiar notions of willpower or continence. This leaves us ill-equipped to assess the social and moral implications of promoting grit. We propose that grit has an (...) important epistemic component, in that failures of perseverance are often caused by a significant loss of confidence that one will succeed if one continues to try. Correspondingly, successful exercises of grit often involve a kind of epistemic resilience in the face of failure, injury, rejection, and other setbacks that constitute genuine evidence that success is not forthcoming. Given this, we discuss whether and to what extent displays of grit can be epistemically as well as practically rational. We conclude that they can be (although many are not), and that the rationality of grit will depend partly on features of the context the agent normally finds herself in. In particular, grit-friendly norms of deliberation might be irrational to use in contexts of severe material scarcity or oppression. (shrink)