Results for 'Philosophical Method'

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  1.  83
    Philosophical Method and Intuitions as Assumptions.Kevin Patrick Tobia - 2015 - Metaphilosophy 46 (4-5):575-594.
    Many philosophers claim to employ intuitions in their philosophical arguments. Others contest that no such intuitions are used frequently or at all in philosophy. This article suggests and defends a conception of intuitions as part of the philosophical method: intuitions are special types of philosophical assumptions to which we are invited to assent, often as premises in argument, that may serve an independent function in philosophical argument and that are not formed through a purely inferential (...)
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  2. The Moral Dimension of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Method.Chrysoula Gitsoulis - 2007 - Analysis and Metaphysics (Special Issue on Wittgenstein) 6:452-467.
    Wittgenstein wrote: 'Working in philosophy … is really more a working on oneself. On one's own interpretation. On one's own way of seeing things.' In what sense, for Wittgenstein, is work in philosophy 'work on oneself'? This paper will be devoted to answering this question, and to delineating the moral aspects of this work.
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  3. Sexual Orientation, Ideology, and Philosophical Method.Matthew Andler - 2020 - Journal of Social Ontology 5 (2):205-227.
    Here, I examine the epistemic relation between beliefs about the nature of sexual orientation (e.g., beliefs concerning whether orientation is dispositional) and beliefs about the taxonomy of orientation categories (e.g., beliefs concerning whether polyamorous is an orientation category). Current philosophical research gives epistemic priority to the former class of beliefs, such that beliefs about the taxonomy of orientation categories tend to be jettisoned or revised in cases of conflict with beliefs about the nature of sexual orientation. Yet, considering the (...)
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  4. The Myth of the Intuitive: Experimental Philosophy and Philosophical Method, by Max Deutsch (MIT Press, 2015). [REVIEW]Kevin Lynch - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (7):1088-1091.
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  5. Paperless Philosophy as a Philosophical Method.David Bourget - 2010 - Social Epistemology 24 (4):363-375.
    I discuss the prospects for novel communication methods in academic research. I describe communication tools which could enhance the practice of conceptual analysis.
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  6.  27
    The Philosophical Basis of the Method of Antilogic.Zbigniew Nerczuk - 2019 - Folia Philosophica 42:5-19.
    The paper is devoted to the sophistic method of "two-fold arguments" (antilogic). The traditional understanding of antilogic understood as an expression of agonistic and eristic tendencies of the sophists has been in recent decades, under the influence of G.B. Kerferd, replaced by the understanding of antilogic as an independent argumentative technique, having its own sources, essence, and goals. Following the interpretation of G.B. Kerferd, according to which the foundation of the antilogic is the opposition of two logoi resulting from (...)
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  7. Philosophical Conceptual Analysis as an Experimental Method.Michael T. Stuart - 2015 - In Thomas Gamerschlag, Doris Gerland, Rainer Osswald & Wiebke Petersen (eds.), Meaning, Frames, and Conceptual Representation. Düsseldorf University Press. pp. 267-292.
    Philosophical conceptual analysis is an experimental method. Focusing on this helps to justify it from the skepticism of experimental philosophers who follow Weinberg, Nichols & Stich. To explore the experimental aspect of philosophical conceptual analysis, I consider a simpler instance of the same activity: everyday linguistic interpretation. I argue that this, too, is experimental in nature. And in both conceptual analysis and linguistic interpretation, the intuitions considered problematic by experimental philosophers are necessary but epistemically irrelevant. They are (...)
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  8.  40
    Philosophical Sagacity as Conversational Philosophy and its Significance for the Question of Method in African Philosophy.Diana-Abasi Ibanga - 2017 - Filosofia Theoretica: Journal of African Philosophy, Culture and Religions 6 (1):69-89.
    In this study, I aimed to carry out a comparative analysis of the methods of conversational philosophy and sage philosophy as contributions towards overcoming the problem of methodology in African philosophy. The purpose was to show their points of convergence and probably, if possible, their point of divergence as well. I did not intend to show that the method of one is superior or inferior to the other. The objective was to provide an analysis to show that the two (...)
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  9.  24
    The Role of Logic and the Scientific Method in Philosophical Inquiry.Avik Mukherjee - 2013 - INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL CONGRESS 88.
    The clamour for scientific reasoning in philosophy is born out of a belief that scientific reasoning is infallible and universal. This paper argues that while scientific reasoning is infallible, it is so only with regard to the objects of knowledge in science. And because objects of knowledge are not the same across disciplines, claims that scientific reasoning is universal in its application are patently misplaced. -/- The belief in the universality of scientific reasoning has its genesis in what may be (...)
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  10. Wittgenstein’s Method: The Third Phase of Its Development (1933–36).Nikolay Milkov - 2012 - In Marques Antonio (ed.), Knowledge, Language and Mind: Wittgenstein’s Early Investigations. de Gruyter.
    Wittgenstein’s interpreters are undivided that the method plays a central role in his philosophy. This would be no surprise if we have in mind the Tractarian dictum: “philosophy is not a body of doctrine but an activity” (4.112). After 1929, Wittgenstein’s method evolved further. In its final form, articulated in Philosophical Investigations, it was formulated as different kinds of therapies of specific philosophical problems that torment our life (§§ 133, 255, 593). In this paper we follow (...)
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  11. Lingering Stereotypes: Salience Bias in Philosophical Argument.Eugen Fischer & Paul E. Engelhardt - forthcoming - Mind and Language.
    Many philosophical thought experiments and arguments involve unusual cases. We present empirical reasons to doubt the reliability of intuitive judgments and conclusions about such cases. Inferences and intuitions prompted by verbal case descriptions are influenced by routine comprehension processes which invoke stereotypes. We build on psycholinguistic findings to determine conditions under which the stereotype associated with the most salient sense of a word predictably supports inappropriate inferences from descriptions of unusual (stereotype-divergent) cases. We conduct an experiment that combines plausibility (...)
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  12.  25
    Philosophical Puzzles Evade Empirical Evidence: Some Thoughts and Clarifications Regarding the Relation Between Brain Sciences and Philosophy of Mind.Işık Sarıhan - 2017 - In Jon Leefmann & Elisabeth Hildt (eds.), Human Sciences after the Decade of the Brain. San Diego: Elsevier. pp. 14-23.
    This chapter analyzes the relation between brain sciences and philosophy of mind, in order toclarify in what ways how philosophy can contribute to neuroscience and how neuroscience cancontribute to philosophy. Especially since 1980s and the emergence of “neurophilosophy”, more and more philosophers have been bringing home morals from neuroscience to settle philosophicalissues. I mention examples from the problem of consciousness and philosophy of perception, andI argue that such attempts are not successful in trying to settle questions like whether psychology can (...)
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  13. Investigating Emotions Philosophically.Michael McEachrane - 2006 - Philosophical Investigations 29 (4):342-357.
    This paper is a defense of investigations into the meanings of words by reflecting on their use as a philosophical method for investigating the emotions. The paper defends such conceptual analysis against the critique that it is short of empirical grounding and at best reflects current “common-sense beliefs.” Such critique harks back to Quine’s attack on the analytic/synthetic distinction, his idea that all language is theory dependent and the subsequent critique of “linguistic philosophy” as sanctifying our ordinary use (...)
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  14. The Analogy Between Psychoanalysis and Wittgenstein's Later Philosophical Methods.Paul Muench - 1993 - Dissertation, University of Oxford
    Wittgenstein’s analogy between psychoanalysis and his later philosophical methods is explored and developed. Historical evidence supports the claim that Wittgenstein characterized an early version of his general remarks on philosophy (§§89-133 in the Philosophical Investigations) as a sustained comparison with psychoanalysis. A non-adversarial, therapeutic interpretation is adopted towards Wittgenstein which emphasizes his focus on dissolving the metaphysical puzzlement of particular troubled individuals. A “picture” of Freudian psychoanalysis is sketched which highlights several features of Freud’s therapeutic techniques and his (...)
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  15. Perceived Weaknesses of Philosophical Inquiry: A Comparison to Psychology.Wesley Buckwalter & John Turri - 2016 - Philosophia 44 (1):33-52.
    We report two experiments exploring the perception of how contemporary philosophy is often conducted. We find that (1) participants associate philosophy with the practice of conducting thought experiments and collating intuitions about them, and (2) that this form of inquiry is viewed much less favourably than the typical form of inquiry in psychology: research conducted by teams using controlled experiments and observation. We also found (3) an effect whereby relying on intuition is viewed more favorably in the context of team (...)
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  16. Against Adversarial Discussion.Maarten Steenhagen - 2016 - Collingwood and British Idealism Studies 22 (1):87-112.
    Why did R.G. Collingwood come to reject the adversarial style of philosophical discussion so popular among his Oxford peers? The main aim of this paper is to explain that Collingwood came to reject his colleagues’ specific style of philosophical dialogue on methodological grounds, and to show how the argument against adversarial philosophical discussion is integrated with Collingwood’s overall criticism of realist philosophy. His argument exploits a connection between method and practice that should be taken seriously even (...)
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  17. Corpus Analysis in Philosophy.Roland Bluhm - 2016 - In Martin Hinton (ed.), Evidence, Experiment and Argument in Linguistics and the Philosophy of Language. Peter Lang. pp. 91-109.
    The experimental philosophy movement advocates the use of empirical methods in philosophy. The methods most often discussed and in fact employed in experimental philosophy are appropriated from the experimental paradigm in psychology. But there is a variety of other (at least partly) empirical methods from various disciplines that are and others that could be used in philosophy. The paper explores the application of corpus analysis to philosophical issues. Although the method is well established in linguistics, there are only (...)
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  18.  87
    Intuitions About Cases as Evidence (for How We Should Think).James Andow - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    Much recent work on philosophical methodology has focused on whether we should accept evidence: the claim that philosophers use intuitive judgments about cases as evidence for/against philosophical theories. This paper outlines a new way of thinking about the philosophical method of appealing to cases such that evidence is true but not as it is typically understood. The idea proposed is that, when philosophers appeal to cases, they are engaged in a project of conceptual engineering and that, (...)
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  19. Wittgenstein and Surrealism.Chrysoula Gitsoulis - 2012 - Essays in Philosophy 13 (1):74-84.
    There are two aspects to Wittgenstein’s method of deconstructing pseudo-philosophical problems that need to be distinguished: (1) describing actual linguistic practice, and (2) constructing hypothetical ‘language-games’. Both methods were, for Wittgenstein, indispensable means of clarifying the ‘grammar’ of expressions of our language -- i.e., the appropriate contexts for using those expressions – and thereby dissolving pseudo-philosophical problems. Though (2) is often conflated with (1), it is important to recognize that it differs from it in important respects. (1) (...)
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  20. Un perfil intelectual de Nicolai Hartmann (1882-1950). Parte I.Paulo Velez Leon - 2016 - Disputatio. Philosophical Research Bulletin 5 (6):457-538.
    [ES] Nicolai Hartmann es uno de los filósofos más significativos en la filosofía contemporánea; empero, en la actualidad es poco conocido por nuestro mundo filosófico, posiblemente debido a que el esplendor de su filosofía coincidió con el naciente giro lingüístico y con el apogeo del existencialismo, los cuales, como se sabe, absorbieron gran parte de la atención y del quehacer filosófico de la época. Lo anterior, de una u otra manera ha dificultado el conocimiento objetivo de su obra. Es por (...)
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  21.  47
    More Than a Reductio: Plato's Method in the Parmenides and Lysis.Evan Rodriguez - 2019 - Études Platoniciennes 15.
    Plato’s Parmenides and Lysis have a surprising amount in common from a methodological standpoint. Both systematically employ a method that I call ‘exploring both sides’, a philosophical method for encouraging further inquiry and comprehensively understanding the truth. Both have also been held in suspicion by interpreters for containing what looks uncomfortably similar to sophistic methodology. I argue that the methodological connections across these and other dialogues relieve those suspicions and push back against a standard developmentalist story about (...)
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  22. Does the Method of Cases Rest on a Mistake?Moti Mizrahi - 2014 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (2):183-197.
    In this paper, I argue that the method of cases (namely, the method of using intuitive judgments elicited by intuition pumps as evidence for and/or against philosophical theories) is not a reliable method of generating evidence for and/or against philosophical theories. In other words, the method of cases is unlikely to generate accurate judgments more often than not. This is so because, if perception and intuition are analogous in epistemically relevant respects, then using intuition (...)
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  23. Don't Believe the Hype: Why Should Philosophical Theories Yield to Intuitions?Moti Mizrahi - 2015 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 34 (3):141-158.
    In this paper, I argue that, contrary to common opinion, a counterexample against a philosophical theory does not amount to conclusive evidence against that theory. Instead, the method of counterexamples allows for the derivation of a disjunction, i.e., ‘either the theory is false or an auxiliary assumption is false’, not a negation of the target theory. This is so because, whenever the method of counterexamples is used in an attempt to refute a philosophical theory, there is (...)
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  24.  46
    Knowledge and Assertion in “Gettier” Cases.John Turri - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (5):759-775.
    Assertion is fundamental to our lives as social and cognitive beings. By asserting we share knowledge, coordinate behavior, and advance collective inquiry. Accordingly, assertion is of considerable interest to cognitive scientists, social scientists, and philosophers. This paper advances our understanding of the norm of assertion. Prior evidence suggests that knowledge is the norm of assertion, a view known as “the knowledge account.” In its strongest form, the knowledge account says that knowledge is both necessary and sufficient for assertability: you should (...)
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  25.  66
    Finding Treasures: Is the Community of Philosophical Inquiry a Methodology?Magda Costa Carvalho & Walter Kohan - 2019 - Studies in Philosophy and Education 38 (3):275-289.
    In the world of Philosophy for Children, the word “method” is found frequently in its literature and in its practitioner’s handbooks. This paper focuses on the idea of community of philosophical inquiry as P4C’s methodological framework for educational purposes, and evaluates that framework and those purposes in light of the question, what does it mean to bring children and philosophy together, and what methodological framework, if any, is appropriate to that project? Our broader aim is to highlight a (...)
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  26.  71
    Reflections on Metaphysical Explanation.Rognvaldur Ingthorsson - 2019 - In Robin Stenwall & Tobias Hansson Wahlberg (eds.), Maurinian Truths. Lund: pp. 135-142.
    The nature of metaphysical explanation is a question that should be constantly on every metaphysician’s mind, and yet it is rare to see explicit statements about the methodological approach that writers take. We tend to just enter the flow of ideas and words in a particular ‘discourse’ and see where it leads us. It is easier that way but can lead us astray. I can’t claim to be a role-model in this respect. I have offered a comment here, a remark (...)
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  27. Interpreting Intuitions.Marcus McGahhey & Neil Van Leeuwen - 2018 - In Julie Kirsch Patrizia Pedrini (ed.), Third-Person Self-Knowledge, Self-Interpretation, and Narrative. Springer Verlag.
    We argue that many intuitions do not have conscious propositional contents. In particular, many of the intuitions had in response to philosophical thought experiments, like Gettier cases, do not have such contents. They are more like hunches, urgings, murky feelings, and twinges. Our view thus goes against the received view of intuitions in philosophy, which we call Mainstream Propositionalism. Our positive view is that many thought-experimental intuitions are conscious, spontaneous, non-theoretical, non-propositional psychological states that often motivate belief revision, but (...)
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  28.  17
    How to Do Better: Toward Normalizing Experimentation in Epistemology.John Turri - 2016 - In Jennifer Nado (ed.), Advances in experimental philosophy and philosophical methodology. London, England: Bloomsbury Academic. pp. 35-51.
    Appeals to ordinary thought and talk are frequent in philosophy, perhaps nowhere more than in contemporary epistemology. When an epistemological theory implies serious error in “commonsense” or “folk” epistemology, it is counted as a cost of the view. Similarly, when an epistemological theory respects or vindicates deep patterns in commonsense epistemology, it is viewed as a benefit of the view. Philosophers typically rely on introspection and anecdotal social observation to support their characterizations of commonsense epistemology. But recent experimental research shows (...)
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  29.  79
    Before and Beyond Leibniz: Tschirnhaus and Wolff on Experience and Method.Corey W. Dyck - manuscript
    In this chapter, I consider the largely overlooked influence of E. W. von Tschirnhaus' treatise on method, the Medicina mentis, on Wolff's early philosophical project (in both its conception and execution). As I argue, part of Tschirnhaus' importance for Wolff lies in the use he makes of principles gained from experience as a foundation for the scientific enterprise in the context of his broader philosophical rationalism. I will show that this lesson from Tschirnhaus runs through Wolff's earliest (...)
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  30. Why Should We Study the History of Philosophy?Ryan Nichols - 2006 - Metaphilosophy 37:34-52.
    Assume for the sake of argument that doing philosophy is intrinsically valuable, where ‘doing philosophy’ refers to the practice of forging arguments for and against the truth of theses in the domains of metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, etc. The practice of the history of philosophy is devoted instead to discovering arguments for and against the truth of ‘authorial’ propositions, i.e. propositions that state the belief of some historical figure about a philosophical proposition. I explore arguments to think that doing history (...)
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  31. Exclusion in Descartes's Rules for the Direction of the Mind: The Emergence of the Real Distinction.Joseph Zepeda - 2016 - Intellectual History Review 26 (2):203-219.
    The distinction between the mental operations of abstraction and exclusion is recognized as playing an important role in many of Descartes’ metaphysical arguments, at least after 1640. In this paper I first show that Descartes describes the distinction between abstraction and exclusion in the early Rules for the Direction of the Mind, in substantially the same way he does in the 1640s. Second, I show that Descartes makes the test for exclusion a major component of the method proposed in (...)
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  32. A Critique of Saul Kripke's "Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language".Chrysoula Gitsoulis - 2008 - Dissertation, Graduate Center, City University of New York
    In Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Saul Kripke presents a controversial skeptical argument, which he attributes to Wittgenstein’s interlocutor in the Philosophical Investigations [PI]. The argument purports to show that there are no facts that correspond to what we mean by our words. Kripke maintains, moreover, that the conclusion of Wittgenstein’s so-called private language argument is a corollary of results Wittgenstein establishes in §§137-202 of PI concerning the topic of following-a-rule, and not the conclusion of an independently developed (...)
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  33. Daniel Dennett's Intuition Pumps. [REVIEW]Brendan Shea - 2015 - Reason Papers 37 (2).
    A review of Daniel Dennett's Intuition Pumps (W.V. Norton: 2013).
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  34.  28
    Knowledge Attributions and Lottery Cases: A Review and New Evidence.John Turri - forthcoming - In Igor Douven (ed.), The lottery problem. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
    I review recent empirical findings on knowledge attributions in lottery cases and report a new experiment that advances our understanding of the topic. The main novel finding is that people deny knowledge in lottery cases because of an underlying qualitative difference in how they process probabilistic information. “Outside” information is generic and pertains to a base rate within a population. “Inside” information is specific and pertains to a particular item’s propensity. When an agent receives information that 99% of all lottery (...)
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  35. Defending the Evidential Value of Epistemic Intuitions: A Reply to Stich.Jennifer Nagel - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):179-199.
    Do epistemic intuitions tell us anything about knowledge? Stich has argued that we respond to cases according to our contingent cultural programming, and not in a manner that tends to reveal anything significant about knowledge itself. I’ve argued that a cross-culturally universal capacity for mindreading produces the intuitive sense that the subject of a case has or lacks knowledge. This paper responds to Stich’s charge that mindreading is cross-culturally varied in a way that will strip epistemic intuitions of their evidential (...)
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  36. Gettier Cases: A Taxonomy.Peter Blouw, Wesley Buckwalter & John Turri - 2017 - In R. Borges, C. de Almeida & P. Klein (eds.), Explaining Knowledge: New Essays on the Gettier Problem. Oxford University Press. pp. 242-252.
    The term “Gettier Case” is a technical term frequently applied to a wide array of thought experiments in contemporary epistemology. What do these cases have in common? It is said that they all involve a justified true belief which, intuitively, is not knowledge, due to a form of luck called “Gettiering.” While this very broad characterization suffices for some purposes, it masks radical diversity. We argue that the extent of this diversity merits abandoning the notion of a “Gettier case” in (...)
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  37.  21
    Experimental Epistemology and "Gettier" Cases.John Turri - 2019 - In Stephen Hetherington (ed.), The Gettier Problem. Cambridge University Press. pp. 199-217.
    This chapter reviews some faults of the theoretical literature and findings from the experimental literature on “Gettier” cases. Some “Gettier” cases are so poorly constructed that they are unsuitable for serious study. Some longstanding assumptions about how people tend to judge “Gettier” cases are false. Some “Gettier” cases are judged similarly to paradigmatic ignorance, whereas others are judged similarly to paradigmatic knowledge, rendering it a theoretically useless category. Experimental procedures can affect how people judge “Gettier” cases. Some important central tendencies (...)
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  38.  19
    The Non-Factive Turn in Epistemology: Some Hypotheses.John Turri - 2018 - In Veli Mitova (ed.), The factive turn in epistemology. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. pp. 219-228.
    I evaluate non-factive or truth-insensitive accounts of the ordinary concepts used to evaluate beliefs, evidence, assertions, and decisions. Recent findings show that these accounts are mistaken. I propose three hypotheses regarding how philosophers defending these accounts got things so wrong. I also consider one potential consequence for the discipline.
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  39.  19
    Virtue Epistemology and Abilism on Knowledge.John Turri - 2019 - In Heather Battaly (ed.), Routledge handbook of virtue epistemology. Routledge. pp. 209-316.
    Virtue epistemologists define knowledge as true belief produced by intellectual virtue. In this paper, I review how this definition fails in three important ways. First, it fails as an account of the ordinary knowledge concept, because neither belief nor reliability is essential to knowledge ordinarily understood. Second, it fails as an account of the knowledge relation itself, insofar as that relation is operationalized in the scientific study of cognition. Third, it serves no prescriptive purpose identified up till now. An alternative (...)
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  40. The Philosophical Foundations of Cognitive Behavioral Therapy: Stoicism, Buddhism, Taoism, and Existentialism.Kim Diaz & Edward Murguia - 2015 - Journal of Evidence-Based Psychotherapies 15 (1):39-52.
    In this study, we examine the philosophical bases of one of the leading clinical psychological methods of therapy for anxiety, anger, and depression, Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (CBT). We trace this method back to its philosophical roots in the Stoic, Buddhist, Taoist, and Existentialist philosophical traditions. We start by discussing the tenets of CBT, and then we expand on the philosophical traditions that ground this approach. Given that CBT has had a clinically measured positive effect on (...)
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  41.  69
    An Open and Shut Case: Epistemic Closure in the Manifest Image.John Turri - 2015 - Philosophers' Imprint 15.
    The epistemic closure principle says that knowledge is closed under known entailment. The closure principle is deeply implicated in numerous core debates in contemporary epistemology. Closure’s opponents claim that there are good theoretical reasons to abandon it. Closure’s proponents claim that it is a defining feature of ordinary thought and talk and, thus, abandoning it is radically revisionary. But evidence for these claims about ordinary practice has thus far been anecdotal. In this paper, I report five studies on the status (...)
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  42. Animalism and Deferentialism.Chris Daly & David Liggins - 2013 - Dialectica 67 (4):605-609.
    Animalism is the theory that we are animals: in other words, that each of us is numerically identical to an animal. An alternative theory maintains that we are not animals but that each of us is constituted by an animal. Call this alternative theory neo-Lockean constitutionalism or Lockeanism for short. Stephan Blatti (2012) offers to advance the debate between animalism and Lockeanism by providing a new argument for animalism. In this note, we present our own objection to Blatti's argument, and (...)
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  43.  69
    Mythology of the Factive.John Turri - 2011 - Logos and Episteme 2 (1):143-152.
    It’s a cornerstone of epistemology that knowledge requires truth – that is, that knowledge is factive. Allan Hazlett boldly challenges orthodoxy by arguing thatthe ordinary concept of knowledge is not factive. On this basis Hazlett further argues that epistemologists shouldn’t concern themselves with the ordinary concept of knowledge, or knowledge ascriptions and related linguistic phenomena. I argue that either Hazlett is wrong about the ordinary concept of knowledge, or he’s right in a way that leaves epistemologists to carry on exactly (...)
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  44.  19
    Joel Pust, Intuitions as Evidence. [REVIEW]Jennifer Nagel - 2001 - Philosophy in Review 21 (4):282-285.
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  45. Comprehending the Whole: Methodological Principles Governing Aristotelian Metaphysics and Ethics.Jason Costanzo - 2016 - In Dôdôni, the Annuaire Scientifique of the Department of Philosophy of the University of Ioannina:29-39.
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  46. As razões de Aristóteles. [REVIEW]Lucas Angioni - 2000 - Educacao E Filosofia 14.
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  47.  96
    Self-Criticism in a Broken Mirror.David Kolb - 1990 - In Postmodern Sphistications: Philosophy, Architecture, and Tradition. Chicago: University of Chicago press. pp. 51 - 60.
    If we have no transparent access to our self, what kind of self-criticism is possible? Neither modernists nor postmodernists yet this pragmatic issue correct.
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  48.  70
    The "Double Sense" of Fichte's Philosophical Language - Some Critical Reflections on the Cambridge Companion to Fichte.David W. Wood - 2017 - Revista de Estud(I)Os Sobre Fichte 15:1-12.
    The principal thesis in this review-essay is that the key linguistic terms in Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre especially have two main meanings that appear at first sight to be almost in contradiction or opposed to each other. The reader of Fichte therefore has to work hard to overcome any apparent conflicts in the “double sense” of his philosophical terminology. Accordingly, I argue that Fichte’s linguistic method and use of language should be seen as part of his chief philosophical (...) of synthesis, where we have to carry out a similar procedure and attempt to reconcile opposites using the power of the imagination. This thesis is put forward by means of a number of practical examples and in the context of some critical reflections on the recently published Cambridge Companion to Fichte, eds. David James and Günter Zöller. Review essay published in Volume 15 (December, 2017) of the journal Revista de Estud(i)os sobre Fichte (ed. Emiliano Acosta). (shrink)
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  49.  80
    Socrates and the Story of Inquiry.David Kolb - 1990 - In Postmodern Sphistications: Philosophy, Architecture, and Tradition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. pp. 11-17.
    Argument and myth, historical figure and archetype, Socrates dominates our image of inquiry. How did this come about and should it continue?
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  50.  47
    Reid and Priestley on Method and the Mind.Alan Tapper - 2002 - Philosophical Quarterly 52 (209):511-525.
    Reid said little in his published writings about his contemporary Joseph Priestley, but his unpublished work is largely devoted to the latter. Much of Priestley's philosophical thought- his materialism, his determinism, his Lockean scientific realism- was as antithetical to Reid's as was Hume's philosophy in a very different way. Neither Reid nor Priestley formulated a full response to the other. Priestley's response to Reid came very early in his career, and is marked by haste and immaturity. In his last (...)
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