This paper aims to evidence the meaning of “ontology of present”, a concept elaborated by Michel Foucault, and intends to elucidate the philosopher’s idea that subjectivity is historically formed. The context of the concept’s emergence will be analyzed, considering Foucault’s studies on the ancient greco-roman moral, in which he discuss the role of liberty and autonomy in the development of citizens. To the philosopher, the ontology of present consists in a critic of the domination and subjugation mechanisms, produced by disciplinary (...) and control societies. With this critic, Foucault pictures theoric tools to analyze the actuality, making possible to transform the historical processes of subjectification. Keywords: ontology of the present; subjectivity; history; Michel Foucault; actuality. (shrink)

Durante as últimas décadas, pesquisas empíricas em psicologia social têm mostrado uma influência significativa de vieses implícitos sobre o modo como pessoas negras são percebidas e categorizadas. Ainda não é claro, no entanto, que a mesma metodologia possa ser empregada para aferir a presença de vieses implícitos na percepção espacial. O objetivo deste artigo será argumentar que a percepção do espaço é também racialmente enviesada, embora não no mesmo sentido pressuposto por grande parte da psicologia empírica. De acordo com a (...) presente proposta, vieses implícitos serão entendidos como hábitos perceptuais corporificados. Tais hábitos são moldados por categorias raciais e podem tomar a forma do que chamaremos de “expansividade branca”, em que o espaço é percebido em termos de expansão e permissibilidade. Essa permissibilidade, no entanto, é uma marca de privilégio e não de competência, constituindo-se em uma percepção racialmente enviesada do espaço. Confrontar a racialidade implícita desses espaços demanda o que o filósofo George Yancy chama de “de-suturação”, uma abertura afetiva e epistêmica que expõe a ilusão de neutralidade do espaço e a reconceitualiza como opressora para os não brancos que ocupam esses mesmos espaços. (shrink)

Neste artigo propomos uma reconceitualização do amor como um modo de engajamento intersubjetivo normativamente guiado pela busca constante do equilíbrio entre a sub- e a sobredeterminação de seu objeto, que se efetiva em relações deconfiança marcadas pelo cuidado com o(a) outro(a). Esta reconceitualização permite que o amor participe da epistemologia como uma virtude intelectual responsabilista, que nos torna membros mais confiáveis de nossas comunidades epistêmicas e nos aproxima de descrições verdadeiras sobre o mundo, ao deixar que diversos pontos de vista (...) sobre esses objetos sejam reconhecidos e valorizados. (shrink)

O objetivo deste artigo é sugerir que os ensinamentos Buddhistas sobreanattā(não-eu) não devem ser entendidos como uma negação categórica do eu, mas fazem parte de uma estratégia soteriológica comumente empregada pelo Buddha, de utilizar algo como ferramenta para o seu próprio fim. Tomando o kamma(ação) como o elemento central que estrutura todos os ensinamentos, podemos pensar na identificação do eu como um tipo de ação. Algumas instâncias desta ação serão hábeis e condutoras à libertação, e outras inábeis e condutoras ao (...) sofrimento. Com isso em mente, este artigo irá analisar algumas ações inábeis do eu e do não-eu em suttasselecionados do Cânone Pali, mostrando como se encaixam na estratégia do Buddha de se utilizar de elementos como ferramentas para o abandono desses próprios elementos. Nessa perspectiva, o eu não é negado em absoluto desde o início do caminho, mas aprende-se a usa-lo de forma hábil como um meio de abandoná-lo. (shrink)

Na década de 1980, um programa de pesquisa se popularizou no campo da filosofia e psicologia das emoções. Esse programa, denominado construcionismo social, afirmava que emoções eram produtos de fatores sociais e não poderiam ser compreendidas em um vocabulário adaptacionista. No entanto, ao longo do tempo essas teorias perderam grande parte de sua força e popularidade, e praticamente desapareceram da filosofia das emoções contemporânea. O objetivo do presente artigo será diagnosticar esse predicamento, e perguntar se o construcionismo social ainda poderia (...) ser uma via teórica interessante para o estudo das emoções. Para isso, iremos clarificar o significado da metáfora da “construção” e examinar algumas das principais teorias construcionistas de emoções. Embora nossas conclusões sejam negativas em relação ao rótulo da construção social, elas podem ainda assim trazer algum alívio para aqueles que se simpatizam com suas pretensões teóricas, prescrições metodológicas e foco de análise. (shrink)

Na era das tecnologias digitais, entender vieses algorítmicos por meio das teorias da verdade ajuda a fazer perguntas cujas respostas facilitam a filtragem da informação de forma mais eficaz. O ganho é a compreensão aprofundada da realidade.

Niche construction theory highlights the active role of organisms in modifying their environment. A subset of these modifications is the developmental niche, which concerns ecological, epistemic, social and symbolic legacies inherited by organisms as resources that scaffold their developmental processes. Since in this theory development is a situated process that takes place in a culturally structured environment, we may reasonably ask if implicit cultural biases may, in some cases, be responsible for maladaptive developmental niches. In this paper we wish to (...) argue for an affirmative answer. In order to do so, we first propose to conceptualize implicit bias as embodied perceptual habits, and then proceed to show that these habits are at least partially responsible for maladaptive developmental niches of children with Down syndrome and autism. With this framework we thus hope to bring together two fields of research that haven’t been explicitly connected: implicit bias and niche construction theory. Linking these two theories may bring benefits both to implicit bias researchers, who can extend this concept to characterize other sets of processes as biased, as well as to niche construction theorists, who will have a useful theoretical tool to diagnose maladaptive features of niches brought about by sociocultural biases. (shrink)

*Winner of the American Philosophical Association's 2020 Essay Prize in Latin American Thought* This essay offers a novel account of the secularity of Latin American liberation philosophy. It challenges the accepted notion that liberation philosophy applies the methods and approaches of Latin American liberation theology to the philosophical arena, thus putting liberation theology on secular grounds. While this formulation is true insofar as liberation philosophy is not bound by the hermeneutics of any particular religious tradition, this formulation could be misconstrued (...) given that liberation philosophy does not premise such secularization in an undialectical understanding of secularity as secularism that disavows religion. Rather, liberation philosophy’s secularity is dialectical in that it requires constant engagement with re-ligion, not in the hermeneutics of any specific tradition but with “the traditional question of the Absolute.” Due to this often-misunderstood element of liberation philosophy, it has frequently been “ghettoized and relegated to the ‘safe’ area of theological studies,” as Eduardo Mendieta argues. However, I contend that liberation philosophy’s secular grounds offer an original contribution to philosophy as a decolonial and postsecularist liberation philosophy, one that conceives of secularism as an aspect of coloniality to be overcome, an obstacle rather than a benefit for Latin American philosophers seeking to gain a better understanding of our historical conditions. (shrink)

A mudança da concepção do critério geral da significação que tinha Wittgenstein no seu período intermediário para a concepção dos critérios de significação do seu período posterior justifica que se fale numa correlativa mudança na aplicabilidade do conceito de ‘uso’. Acompanhar esta mudança é importante para se caracterizar o âmbito do pragmático tal como Wittgenstein o concebe, e bem assim o tipo de investigação sobre os fundamentos do simbolismo linguístico e sobre a ligação entre linguagem e mundo que esse filósofo (...) advoga como adequada. Este artigo pretende circunscrever algumas das novas questões que, no período intermediário de Wittgenstein , conduziriam a tal mudança conceptual. (shrink)

Autonomy has been central to moral and political philosophy for millenia, and has been positioned as a critical aspect of both justice and wellbeing. Research in psychology supports this position, providing empirical evidence that autonomy is critical to motivation, personal growth and psychological wellness. Responsible AI will require an understanding of, and ability to effectively design for, human autonomy (rather than just machine autonomy) if it is to genuinely benefit humanity. Yet the effects on human autonomy of digital experiences are (...) neither straightforward nor consistent, and are complicated by commercial interests and tensions around compulsive overuse. This multi-layered reality requires an analysis that is itself multidimensional and that takes into account human experience at various levels of resolution. We borrow from HCI and psychological research to apply a model (“METUX”) that identifies six distinct spheres of technology experience. We demonstrate the value of the model for understanding human autonomy in a technology ethics context at multiple levels by applying it to the real-world case study of an AI-enhanced video recommender system. In the process we argue for the following three claims: 1) There are autonomy-related consequences to algorithms representing the interests of third parties, and they are not impartial and rational extensions of the self, as is often perceived; 2) Designing for autonomy is an ethical imperative critical to the future design of responsible AI; and 3) Autonomy-support must be analysed from at least six spheres of experience in order to approriately capture contradictory and downstream effects. (shrink)

Paraconsistency is the study of logical systems with a non-explosive negation such that a pair of contradictory formulas (with respect to such negation) does not necessarily imply triviality, discordant to what would be expected by contemporary logical orthodoxy. From a purely logical point of view, the significance of paraconsistency relies on the meticulous distinction between the general notions of contradictoriness and triviality of a theory—respectively, the fact that a given theory proves a proposition and its negation, and the fact that (...) a given theory proves any proposition (in the language of its underlying logic). Aside from this simple rationale, the formal techniques and approaches that meet the latter definitional requirement are manifold. Furthermore, it is not solely the logical-mathematical properties of such systems that are open to debate. Rather, there are several foundational and philosophical questions worth studying, including the very question about the nature of the contradictions allowed by paraconsistentists. This entry aims to advance a brief account of some distinct approaches to paraconsistency, providing a panorama on the development of paraconsistent logic. (shrink)

This article explores Axel Honneth’s attempts to reconnect the struggles of workers with the normative content of modernity through Hegel’s intersubjective account of recognition. The importance of Honneth’s writings lies in his attempt to extend Habermas’ account of normative self-constitution to labor via the morally motivated struggles of workers to correct the modern maldistribution of social worth. To this extent, the expansion of ethical life is predicated on the struggles of excluded participants to gain inclusion within the normative content of (...) modernity. From this perspective Habermas’ attempt to legitimate the exclusion of labor (by the system) from the normative content of modernity appears unjust and unjustified. Unfortunately, Honneth shares with Habermas a tendency to locate the economic system beyond the (culturally defined) limits of ethical life. He thereby fails to acknowledge the extent to which workers play a major role in re-moralizing the former via the de-reification of the latter. (shrink)

Este artigo explora o uso de metodologias lúdicas, como gamificação e narrativas, para tornar o ensino de Lógica mais dinâmico e acessível no Ensino Médio. Através de enigmas como os do tipo Cavaleiros e Patifes, abordam-se tanto a lógica proposicional clássica quanto as não-clássicas (notadamente, as lógicas paraconsistentes e modal),proporcionando um aprendizado ativo e colaborativo. O artigo oferece ferramentas práticas para educadores, com ênfase no desenvolvimento de competências críticas e na criação de um ambiente inclusivo, acessível a todos os alunos.

This article considers the historical tension in conceptualising Marx's materialism (dialectical and historical) as either a break from, or a fidelity to, Hegelian dialectics, and the methods by which this tension is itself subsumed under an insistence on vindicating the radical irreducibility of Marxist thought. Ultimately, however, it is argued that the question of whether Marx should or should not be framed alongside Hegel is the wrong question. It is not a question of 'Marx by himself' or 'Marx and... [Hegel]', (...) but rather of 'Marx without himself': as with any radical event in the history of ideas, it is a benefit to Marx's innovativeness that he can be retrospectively articulated according to historical traditions whilst simultaneously breaking from them. -/- . (shrink)

The article treats again the question of whether «the Idea of the Good is a Reality in the Universe, or beyond it. Is it immanent or transcendent ?» (Rufus Jones, 1863 1948). Plato scholars such as Matthias Baltes (1940 2003) and Luc Brisson have defended the thesis that Plato’s Idea of the Good is, on the one hand, beyond being (epekeina tês ousias) in dignity and power, but on the other, is nevertheless not transcendent over being. The article delivers first (...) (I.) the most important arguments for the thesis of Baltes and Brisson. Then (II.), it gives two counterarguments against the thesis. Third (III.), it concludes with some general questions concerning the deflationist interpretation of Plato’s Republic 509b9 10 and defends again the transcendence of the Idea of the Good. (shrink)

A Revisão de Crenças estuda como agentes racionais mudam suas crenças ao receberem novas informações. O sistema AGM, trabalho mais influente desta área apresentado por Alchourrón, Gärdenfos e Makinson, postula critérios de racionalidade para os diferentes tipos de mudança de crenças e oferece construções explícitas para tais - a equivalência entre os postulados e operações é chamado de teroema da representação. Trabalhos recentes mostram como o paradigma AGM pode ser compatível com diferentes lógicas não-clássicas, o que é chamado de AGM-compatibilidade (...) - este é o caso da família de lógicas paraconsistentes que analisamos, as Lógicas da Inconsistência Formal (LFIs, da sigla em inglês). A despeito da AGM-compatibilidade, ao se partir de uma nova lógica sua racionalidade subjacente deve ser entendida e sua linguagem deve ser efetivamente usada. Propomos assim novas construções que de fato capturam a intuição presente na LFIs - é o que chamamos de sistema AGMo. Com isso, possibilitamos a estas lógicas uma nova interpretação, na esteira da epistemologia formal. Em uma abordagem alternativa, ao se partir da AGM-compatibilidade os resultados AGM podem ser diretamente aplicados às LFIs - o que chamamos de sistema AGMp. Em ambas abordagens, provamos os respectivos teoremas da representação sempre que necessário. (shrink)

Plato scholars such as Matthias Baltes (1940-2003) and Luc Brisson have defended the thesis that Plato‘s Idea of the Good is on the one hand beyond being (epekeina tês ousias) in dignity and power, but is nevertheless not transcendent over being. The article gives first (I.), an introduction into the status questionis. Second (II.), it delivers the most important arguments for the thesis of Baltes and Brisson. Third (III.), it gives two counterarguments against the thesis. Fourth (IV), it deals with (...) the translation of L. Brisson "Apollon, quelle merveilleuse emphase" of 509c1-2. Fifth (V.), it concludes with some general questions concerning the deflationist interpetation of Plato‘s Republic, 509b9-10. (shrink)

By Belief Revision it is understood a system that logically explains the rational process of changing beliefs by taking into account a new piece of information. The most influential approach in this field of study, the AGM system, proposed by Alchourrón, Gärdenfors, and Makinson, postulates rationality criteria for different types of belief change. In this paper I shall assess the relationship between those criteria and argue for an opposition between the principles of Information Economy and Consistency. Furthermore, I shall argue (...) that Paraconsistent Belief Revision manages to minimise this friction in the best possible way. (shrink)

A doutrina do renascimento transmite a ideia de uma perspectiva temporal mais extensa, que abarca múltiplas vidas. Mas a medida em que o buddhismo chega à modernidade, outras interpretações começam a aparecer. Um exemplo é a interpretação psicológica de Ajahn Buddhadāsa, segundo a qual o termo “renascimento" se refere ao surgimento sucessivo da ideia do “eu" a cada instante de consciência. Esta interpretação diminui consideravelmente a extensão da perspectiva temporal ligada ao renascimento. Contra esta interpretação, Thānissaro Bhikkhu argumentou que uma (...) perspectiva temporal mais extensa é necessária para a compreensão de conceitos centrais do buddhismo como kamma ou dukkha. O objetivo principal deste artigo será investigar o papel da temporalidade na compreensão desses conceitos. Aliviando as preocupações de Thānissaro Bhikkhu, irei argumentar que uma perspectiva temporal mais restrita parece ser igualmente capaz de prover os elementos necessários para a compreensão profunda e completa dos principais ensinamentos buddhistas. (shrink)

De todos os aspectos do comportamento não-verbal, a face é sem dúvida uma das mais ricas e importantes fontes de informação sobre o estado inter- no do outro. Mas expressões faciais são raramente percebidas de forma isolada. Ao contrário, são tipicamente inseridas em contextos sociais ricos e dinâmicos, que incluem gestos e posturas corporais, conhecimento situacional, etc. Com base nessas observações, podemos nos perguntar se o contexto no qual uma expressão é percebida pode influenciar a percepção de emoções nesta expressão. (...) No caso de uma resposta afirmativa, de que modo se daria essa influência contextual, e quais seriam os seus limites? O propósito desse artigo é explorar algumas possibilidades sobre o papel do contexto na percepção de emoções, desde a teoria das emoções básicas, que defende que categorias discretas de emoções podem ser lidas diretamente da face de forma invariável, a abordagens mais contemporâneas, que atribuem um papel constitutivo para o contexto na percepção de emoções. Embora o debate esteja longe de ser resolvido, as conclusões deste artigo apontam para um novo modo de se pensar sobre fenômenos emocionais, onde a díade de interação torna-se a unidade básica de análise, e onde emoções são concebidas como propriedades emergentes de relações em contextos particulares de interação social. (shrink)

Abordagens pós-cognitivistas mais recentes têm lançado duras críticas à noção de representação mental, procurando ao invés disso pensar a mente e a cognição em termos de ações corporificadas do organismo em seu meio. Embora concordemos com essa concepção, não está claro que ela implique necessariamente a rejeição de qualquer tipo de vocabulário representacional. O objetivo deste artigo é argumentar que representações podem nos comprar uma dimensão explicativa adicional não disponível por outros meios e sugerir que, ao menos em alguns casos, (...) elas podem participar da explicação de performances ou capacidades cognitivas. A noção de representação apresentada, como deixaremos claro ao longo do artigo, não viola os preceitos metodológicos mais caros à cognição 4E em geral e ao enativismo em particular, podendo, portanto, ser utilizada como uma ferramenta teórica útil em investigações sobre a natureza corporificada e situada da mente. (shrink)

In this paper two systems of AGM-like Paraconsistent Belief Revision are overviewed, both defined over Logics of Formal Inconsistency (LFIs) due to the possibility of defining a formal consistency operator within these logics. The AGM° system is strongly based on this operator and internalize the notion of formal consistency in the explicit constructions and postulates. Alternatively, the AGMp system uses the AGM-compliance of LFIs and thus assumes a wider notion of paraconsistency - not necessarily related to the notion of formal (...) consistency. (shrink)

"Paraconsistent Belief Revision Based on a Formal Consistency Operator" delves into Belief Revision—a significant area of research in Formal Philosophy that uses logic to model the ways in which human and artificial agents modify their beliefs in response to new information and examines how these changes can be considered rational. -/- Originally authored as a PhD thesis (previously published in Portuguese), this work provides a novel epistemic interpretation of Paraconsistency through Paraconsistent Belief Revision systems. It explores the concept of paraconsistency (...) from the standpoint of epistemic attitudes of acceptance and rejection. -/- This work challenges the traditional notion that accepting a new belief requires retracting its negation from the current epistemic state. The author contends that such reflexive retraction goes against the principle of informational economy, which is a crucial aspect of rationality in the context of belief change. Consequently, the phenomenon of paraconsistency is further examined from this fresh perspective of belief change, shedding light on the complexities of the Logics of Formal Inconsistency (LFIs). These LFIs provide the foundational logic, offering a comprehensive framework for understanding and implementing paraconsistent principles within belief revision systems. -/- This thesis was supervised by Marcelo Esteban Coniglio and co-supervised by Márcio Moretto Ribeiro, as part of Rafael Rodrigues Testa's doctoral studies at the University of Campinas (Unicamp), Brazil. (shrink)

The first chapter, "Der Hintergrund von Gadamers 'Phänomenologischen Interpretationen' in Sein und Zeit" traces the origins of Gadamer’s interpretation of the Philebus in Sein und Zeit. Especially important is that Dasein is, thanks to speech , already outside of itself in the world. The second chapter "Gadamers Dialektische Ethik" gives a short summary of the main points of Gadamer's interpretation of the Philebus. The third chapter "Davidsons reinterpretation of von Gadamer's Dialektischer Ethik" 222-231), points especially to the fact that Davidson (...) sees the "Socrates post Vlastos" in the interpretation of Gadamer at work: Because every man is already in possession of some basic truths, coherence is enough to lead to substantive truths. Davidson concludes that only in “interpersonal communication” "can be thought, a grasping of the fact of an objective, that is, a shared world". Thus, Davidson sees in Gadamer's interpretation of the Philebus his own theory of triangulation anticipated. (shrink)

Hegel insists that the category ‘nature’, expressed in relation to the ideal of aesthetic beauty, is not nature as such but a supplementary deviation coloured by the subjective position from which this ‘nature’ is posited. We cannot distinguish nature ‘in itself’ from the ideological-artistic conditions of the distorted ‘use’ of nature. Nature exists to us only by reference to what is subjectively treated as non-natural. A similar relation is posited by Lacan in his famous assertion that ‘there is no sexual (...) relation’. For Freud and Lacan, the ‘all too human’ sexual drive derives from a deviated/distorted enjoyment of the initial failure to enjoy a purely natural sexual relation: an inevitably castrated enjoyment, where ‘natural’ sexuality is revealed as impossible. In other words, sexuality is for Lacan and Freud its own distortion of the category of ‘natural’. Sexuality is a perpetually distorted and abnormal form of enjoyment, for which the alternative is not ‘normal/natural enjoyment’, but rather the negative state of a fundamental lack of any relation. Through Hegel and sexuality, this paper argues that the unavoidable misuse of nature is not caused by improper application/categorisation, but instead reflects an internal incompleteness or indeterminacy in nature as a category. (shrink)

The anthropologist James Frazer investigates the ritual gesture in search of be- liefs about the physical world by the native. Wittgenstein considers this a case of aspect- blindness, one that is disruptive of the conditions for understanding the native’s most triv- ial gestures. Unable to cast his glance from within the native situation, this methodological view from nowhere has an arresting effect on experience – in particular, the experience of speaking. This interruption is to be examined by means of a (...) thought experiment. Then, through the interplay of the concepts of Spirit and Aspect, a philosophical tool is described to assess the problem that can also serve as practical guide back to ordinary experience. The next step is to examine this way out in a particularly sensitive kind of experience of meaning: the aesthetic experience, also seen as a ritual. We conclude by alluding to a pos- sibly mutual illumination between aesthetic experience, translation studies and a Cavellian take on ordinary language. (shrink)

In The moral problem (1994), Michael Smith tries to link three conflicting theories that alone are intuitively plausible, nevertheless, they do not seem to work well together. The first proposes that moral judgments are in fact beliefs about objective matters. The second states the concept of “practicality requirement”. The third is a humean belief-desire psychology, i.e. if a moral judgment is sufficient to explain actions, then it must involve a desire. If that is the case, it cannot be simply a (...) belief. For Smith, any attempt to solve the moral problem must find a way to hold all three doctrines. I will argue that his solution rests on two false assumptions. The first, a rationalist one which supports that what we have reason to do is what we would desire to do if we were fully rational. The second is the internalist thesis about moral motivation according to which a person who believes she is morally required to do something is either necessarily motivated to do it or she is practically irrational. I will base my critics on four objections raised by Copp, Miller, Shafer-Landau, Brink and Sayre-McCord. (shrink)

One core question in contemporary political economy is whether economic liberties should be constitutionally protected as basic rights. In this article I do not provide a positive argument for the view that economic liberties are basic rights. Rather, I seek to provide a reason for not embracing the opposing view, i.e. that economic liberties should not be constitutionally protected as basic rights. Based on Hayek’s theory of price as signal, I argue that price control, a view usually associated with high (...) liberals, and sometimes endorsed by moderate welfarists, is environmentally sub-optimal. (shrink)

Esse volume consiste em traduções de verbetes da Enciclopédia Stanford de Filosofia que dizem respeito à Filosofia das Emoções. Trata-se de um volume de orientação história, que visa desfazer o mito de que emoções foram objetos menores de análise filosófica antes da contemporaneidade, resgatando assim a grande riqueza de teorias e reflexões sobre emoções e afetos na filosofia antiga, medieval, renascentista, moderna e indiana.

In the Appendix I of his "Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics", Wittgenstein elaborates a different interpretation of Gödel’s First Incompleteness Theorem, which we have come to refer to as "Gödel’s Theorem" or "Incompleteness Theorem". This nomenclature arises from the recognition that the so-called "Second Incompleteness Theorem" is essentially a corollary of the primary theorem. Wittgenstein aims to reassess Gödel’s conclusion that there exist true formulas not demonstrable within formal systems capable of representing a sufficient amount of arithmetic theory. Gödel’s (...) initial reaction, as well as other commentators, was that Wittgenstein had not understood the proof. Nevertheless, recent commentators view worthy commentaries in wittgensteinian writings: some commentators, such as Juliet Floyd and Hilary Putnam, distinguish between mathematical proof and philosophical prose that surrounds the theorem, making it possible to understand Wittgenstein’s remarks. Ultimately, Wittgenstein’s observations serve as a lens through which Gödel’s theorem can be reconsidered within the realm of non-classical logics, such as paraconsistent logic. (shrink)

One of the most pressing questions concerning singular demonstrative mental contents is what makes their content singular: that is to say, what makes it the case that individual objects are the representata of these mental states. Many philosophers have required sophisticated intellectual capacities for singular content to be possible, such as the possession of an elaborate scheme of space and time. A more recent reaction to this strategy proposes to account for singular content solely on the basis of empirical models (...) of visual processing. We believe both sides make good points, and offer an intermediate way of looking into singular content. Our suggestion is that singular content may be traced to psychological capacities to form flexible, abstract representations in the prefrontal cortex. This allows them to be sustained for increasingly longer periods of time and extrapolated beyond the context of perception, thus going beyond lowlevel sensory representations while also falling short of more sophisticated intellectual abilities. (shrink)

The paper deals with the beginning and the main properties of the science of nature (he peri physeos historiê). According to Themistius (DK 12 A 7), the founder of this kind of Ionic philosophy is Anaximander of Miletus because he was the first who wrote about nature (especially a cosmography and a cosmogony) and developed three main principles of nature: 1. Nature has a mathematical structure (Arist. De coelo I3 295b10-14.32); 2. nature has a physical structure (DK 12 A 10-11); (...) and 3. nature follows natural laws (DK 12 A 9). The origin of this introduction lies in the prolongation of primitive expectations of constancy. It is especially argued that the shift from mythos to logos is characterized by the depersonalization of nature and the introduction of theoretical terms. In fact, the "apeiron" of Anaximander seems to be something similar to a theoretical term, because Anaximander seems to have realized that the explanans of nature cannot be one of its explananda like water (Thales) or air (Anaximenes). (shrink)

This paper deals with the deuteros plous, literally ‘the second voyage’, proverbially ‘the next best way’, discussed in Plato’s Phaedo, the key passage being Phd. 99e4-100a3. I argue that (a) the ‘flight into the logoi’ can have two different interpretations, a standard one and a non-standard one. The issue is whether at 99e-100a Socrates means that both the student of erga and the student of logoi consider images (‘the standard interpretation’), or the student of logoi does not consider images but (...) that “consistency should suffice for truth” (‘the non-standard interpretation’); (b) the non-standard one implies the problem of the hypothesis, a problem analogous to the problem of the elenchus; (c) there is a structural analogy between Descartes’ ontological argument for the existence of God in his 5th Meditation and the final proof for the immortality of the soul in the Phaedo. (shrink)

Neste artigo fazemos uma discussão conceitual acerca da ferramenta de escolha por nós apresentada no trabalho “Solving Normative Conflicts using Preference Relations”, isto é, explicitamos a racionalidade subjacente a tal ferramenta, bem como as consequências práticas de sua aceitação.

Two systems of belief change based on paraconsistent logics are introduced in this article by means of AGM-like postulates. The first one, AGMp, is defined over any paraconsistent logic which extends classical logic such that the law of excluded middle holds w.r.t. the paraconsistent negation. The second one, AGMo , is specifically designed for paraconsistent logics known as Logics of Formal Inconsistency (LFIs), which have a formal consistency operator that allows to recover all the classical inferences. Besides the three usual (...) operations over belief sets, namely expansion, contraction and revision (which is obtained from contraction by the Levi identity), the underlying paraconsistent logic allows us to define additional operations involving (non-explosive) contradictions. Thus, it is defined external revision (which is obtained from contraction by the reverse Levi identity), consolidation and semi-revision, all of them over belief sets. It is worth noting that the latter operations, introduced by S. Hansson, involve the temporary acceptance of contradictory beliefs, and so they were originally defined only for belief bases. Unlike to previous proposals in the literature, only defined for specific paraconsistent logics, the present approach can be applied to a general class of paraconsistent logics which are supraclassical, thus preserving the spirit of AGM. Moreover, representation theorems w.r.t. constructions based on selection functions are obtained for all the operations. (shrink)

As the intuitions about moral phenomenology shows the metaphysical distinction between mind-dependent and mind-independent properties has set the metaethical distinction between normativity and objectivity in ethics. Traditionally, many arguments were built in order to show that moral realists cannot account, in naturalist vocabulary, for the process of determining moral reference due to the desiderative disposition taken to be necessarily part of the meaning of moral terms. This dissertation assess some anti-realists arguments like is-ought thesis, the argument from queerness, the argument (...) from relativity and the open question argument. In what follows I propose the semantics elaborated by Cornell realism in order to address these arguments, especially the open question argument. However, as Moral Twin Earth test shows us the semantic proposed by Boyd is incomplete. Therefore I also evaluate a second attempt taken by Cornell realists such as Brink and Copp, based on Putnan's notion of referential intentions. (shrink)

O propósito deste trabalho é analisar a estrutura e discutir a aplicação da(s) lógica(s) deôntica(s) na representação de normas jurídicas. Após uma apresentação desta(s) lógic(s) e, em particular, do sistema de von Wright e da SDL (Standard Deontic Logic), veremos as dificuldades de se aplicar uma lógica à análise do direito positivo: as regras da lógica devem permitir realizar sobre as normas formalizadas somente os tipos de inferência e operaçôes lógicas intuitivamente feitas pelos juristas, ou seja, a reconstrução lógica do (...) direito positivo não se trata de uma tarefa de criação do direito, mas uma tarefa de representação daquilo que o conceito de direito usual reconhece como tal. Para ilustrar estas dificuldades, abordaremos as propostas de Carlos Alchourrón em artigo de 1975, “Condicionalidad y la representación de las normas jurídicas”. (shrink)

La questione sulla verità del cristianesimo è fondamentale e ineludibile. In essa si trova uno dei filoni fondamentali del pensiero di Joseph Ratzinger – Benedetto XVI. In fondo si trovano coinvolti una serie di argomenti che si possono riassumere nel rapporto tra fede e ragione, tra il Dio della fede e il Dio dei filosofi. Nella visione cristiana ambedue non si contrappongono, ma s’incontrano. La “distinzione mosaica” s’incontra con la “distinzione socratica” . La pretesa di verità del cristianesimo conduce a (...) delle conseguenze sia nell’ambito della religione, sia in quello della filosofia e della morale. Per superare la crisi del cristianesimo abbiamo bisogno di recuperare la fiducia nela ragione e tornare alla ricerca della verità. (shrink)

Revision operation is the consistent expansion of a theory by a new belief-representing sentence. We consider that in a paraconsistent setting this desideratum can be accomplished in at least three distinct ways: the output of a revision operation should be either non-trivial or non-contradictory (in general or relative to the new belief). In this paper those distinctions will be explored in the constructive level by showing how the remainder sets could be refined, capturing the key concepts of paraconsistency in a (...) dynamical scenario. These are preliminaries results of a wider project on Paraconsistent Belief Change conduced by the authors. (shrink)

This is a review of lectures given by Eugen Fink at the University of Freiburg im Breisgau in the winter term of 1947/48, “Fundamental Questions of Ancient Philosophy,” edited by Franz A. Schwarz.

This is a report on the II Symposium Platonicum, which took place in Perugia, Italy, September 1-6, 1989, and on the founding of the International Plato Society, which took place in Bevagna, Province of Perugia, Umbria, Italy, September 3, 1989.

This is a review of: Wilhelm Vossenkuhl. Die Möglichkeit des Guten. Ethik im 21. Jahrhundert, München. C. H. Beck 2006.

This article proposes a general strategy to overcome normative conflicts, namely, paradoxes represented in Standard Deontic Logic. This solution is based on preference relations between norms that circumvent situations of conflict. Pragmatic justifications of the proposed method are also given.

Despite the fact that Aristotle and Frege/Russell differ in how to understand the ambiguity in the meaning of the word "is", their theories share a common feature: "is" does not have a normative meaning, but a constative meaning. This paper, however, shows (1) that there is a normative meaning of "is" (and correspondingly a constative meaning of the word "ought") and (2) that the ambiguity of "is" is itself ambiguous. Furthermore, the paper proposes (3) a performative criterion for making a (...) distinction between constative and normative "is". Thereby, it is possible to attack Searle's famous argument against Hume's law. (shrink)

A strange dialectical reversal characterizes the oppositions which psychoanalysis posits against philosophy and neuroscience: what psychoanalysis intervenes with as a unique and missing quality of these subjects, reveals itself upon enquiry as already having been a feature of said subjects. This article first discusses the failed intervention of psychoanalysis within the perceived totalities and absolutes of German idealism. Psychoanalysis, founded on an ontological division and internal inconsistency with a retroactive logic, finds this internal contradiction already reflected within the supposed totalities (...) of Schelling and Hegel. Schelling’s “blind act,” a decision with no prior foundation that grounds an abstract identity-in-itself, appears as the counterpart to what Badiou calls the strictly “analytic act.” Hegel’s Science of Logic, in which the inconclusive interpenetration of being and nothing presupposes its own conclusion in the transitions to essence, and in which an internal incompleteness and contradiction are retroactively constitutive of the concept, similarly nullifies the intervention of psychoanalysis. Finally, precisely such a reversal is presented in neuroscience, where the constitutive contradiction of contingently functional neuronal formations in the adaptive “multiple demand” model of executive functioning repeats the contingent and self-contradicting psychoanalytic subject as being its own deference within linguistic, discursive formations. (shrink)

This paper intends to show that Friedrich Nietzsche’s approach to morality or ‘immorality’ involves an attempt to see moral beliefs as a product of human psychology, rather than as a set of metaphysical ‘truths’ that are somehow given to, or discoverable by, us. Nietzsche wants to replace the metaphysical (or supernatural) account of morality with a natural one, and his treatment of moral belief-systems, from the perspective of this concern, can be divided into (a) a psychological analysis of the true (...) nature of moral action and agency, and (b) an historical/genealogical tracing of the real origins of moral values. In this paper I am going to focus on the second dimension of Nietzsche’s analysis through references from his polemical texts Beyond Good and Evil, Genealogy of Morals, Gay Science, and Will to Power. I will outline Nietzsche’s historical leitmotif on the morality of ressentiment or slave morality and will show how it figures as a point of departure for his revolutionary transvaluation of values, one that places a new order of morality which is disparagingly called ‘immoralism.’ Next, I will discuss Nietzsche’s treatment of bad conscience and posit that it involves two different stages: one is the present stage of the bad conscience as a feeling of guilt, and the other is an earlier stage. I shall argue that in order for this earlier stage to develop into the level of guilt, he needs another element, namely an indebtedness towards gods, which finds its most striking culmination in the Christian heritage of religious dogmatism. Finally, I will discuss how for Nietzsche Christianity as an ascetic ideal has promoted to preserve a declining life, i.e. a slave morality, for all of humanity. (shrink)

The book is an english translation with revisions and updates of the "Philosophische Grundbegriffe 1" and provides an introduction to six key concepts in philosophy - philosophy, language, knowledge, truth, being and good. At the same time, it aims to initiate its readers into the process of philosophical thinking. The book is addressed to students and laypeople, but also contains new ideas for specialists. It is written in a clear, accessible and engaging style, and its author 'shares, and manages to (...) convey, something of Plato's own commitment to philosophy'. (shrink)

The paper deals with the "deuteros plous", literally ‘the second voyage’, proverbially ‘the next best way’, discussed in Plato’s "Phaedo", the key passage being Phd. 99e4–100a3. The second voyage refers to what Plato’s Socrates calls his “flight into the logoi”. Elaborating on the subject, the author first (I) provides a non-standard interpretation of the passage in question, and then (II) outlines the philosophical problem that it seems to imply, and, finally, (III) tries to apply this philosophical problem to the "ultimate (...) final proof" of immortality and to draw an analogy with the ontological argument for the existence of God, as proposed by Descartes in his 5th "Meditation". The main points are as follows: (a) the “flight into the logoi” can have two different interpretations, a common one and an astonishing one, and (b) there is a structural analogy between Descartes’s ontological argument for the existence of God in his 5th "Meditation" and the "ultimate final proof" for the immortality of the soul in the "Phaedo". (shrink)