This is the report on the XVI BRAZILIAN LOGIC CONFERENCE (EBL 2011) held in Petrópolis, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil between May 9–13, 2011 published in The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic Volume 18, Number 1, March 2012. -/- The 16th Brazilian Logic Conference (EBL 2011) was held in Petro ́polis, from May 9th to 13th, 2011, at the Laboratório Nacional de Computação o Científica (LNCC). It was the sixteenth in a series of conferences that started in 1977 with the aim of (...) congregating logicians from Brazil and abroad, furthering interest in logic and its applications, stimulating cooperation, and contributing to the development of this branch of science. EBL 2011 included more than one-hundred and fifty participants, all of them belonging to prominent research institutes from Brazil and abroad, especially Latin America. The conference was sponsored by the Academia Brasileira de Ciências (ABC), the As- sociation for Symbolic Logic (ASL), Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP), Centre for Logic, Epistemology and the History of Sciences (CLE), Laboratório Nacional de Computação o Científica (LNCC), Pontif ́ıcia Universidade Cato ́lica do Rio de Janeiro (PUC- Rio), Sociedade Brasileira de Lógica (SBL), and Universidade Federal Fluminense (UFF). Funding was provided by Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Cient ́ıfico e Tecnolo ́ gico (CNPq), Fundac ̧a ̃o de Amparo `a Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP), Fundação Euclides da Cunha (FEC), and Universidade Federal Fluminense (UFF). The members of the Scientific Committee were: Mário Folhadela Benevides (COPPE- UFRJ), Fa ́bio Bertato (CLE-IFCH-UNICAMP), Jean-Yves Béziau (UFRJ), Ricardo Bianconi (USP), Juliana Bueno-Soler (UFABC), Xavier Caicedo (Universidad de Los An- des), Walter Carnielli (CLE-IFCH-UNICAMP), Oswaldo Chateaubriand Filho (PUC-Rio), Marcelo Esteban Coniglio (CLE-IFCH-UNICAMP), Newton da Costa (UFSC, President), Antonio Carlos da Rocha Costa (UFRG), Alexandre Costa-Leite (UnB), I ́tala M. Loffredo D’Ottaviano (CLE-IFCH-UNICAMP), Marcelo Finger (USP), Edward Hermann Haeusler (PUC-Rio), Décio Krause (UFSC), João Marcos (UFRN), Ana Teresa de Castro Martins (UFC), Maria da Paz Nunes de Medeiros (UFRN), Francisco Miraglia (USP), Luiz Car- los Pereira (PUC-Rio and UFRJ), Elaine Pimentel (UFMG), and Samuel Gomes da Silva (UFBA). The members of the Organizing Committee were: Anderson de Araujo (UNICAMP), Walter Carnielli (CLE-IFCH-UNICAMP), Oswaldo Chateaubriand Filho (PUC-Rio, Co- chair), Marcelo Correa (UFF), Renata de Freitas (UFF), Edward Hermann Haeusler (PUC- RJ), Hugo Nobrega (COPPE-UFRJ), Luiz Carlos Pereira (PUC-Rio e IFCS/UFRJ), Leandro Suguitani (UNICAMP), Rafael Testa (UNICAMP), Leonardo Bruno Vana (UFF), and Petrucio Viana (UFF, Co-chair). (shrink)

RESUMO O presente trabalho mostra as atividades realizadas do período de 01 de julho a 01 de novembro na JRM Agropecuária. As atividades foram desenvolvidas na área de bovinocultura de leite, este trabalho foi desenvolvido sob orientação do professor mestre Rodrigo Dorneles Tortorella e supervisão do médico veterinário André Ricardo, em conjunto com o médico veterinário Breno. Durante o período de estágio foi acompanhado as atividades realizadas no setor de manejo, reprodução, bezerreiro e recria da fazenda, além de acompanhar (...) as consultorias quinzenais realizadas pelos médicos veterinários. Este trabalho é composto pela descrição de estágio, referencial bibliográfico e relato de caso. O manejo reprodutivo pode trazer muito impactos econômicos se não for realizado de forma adequado, para trazer melhores resultados biotécnicas da reprodução foram criadas, como por exemplo a inseminação artificial, juntamente com ela, protocolos de inseminação são usados, para isso é necessário conhecer a anatomia do animal e a fisiologia do ciclo estral, trazendo então melhores resultados adequando a necessidade da propriedade. O relato de caso consiste na avaliação da taxa de concepção ao primeiro serviço de vacas leiteiras primíparas e multíparas no pós-parto em anestro, submetidas a uma pré-sincronização anterior a um protocolo de IATF, o qual obteve resultado e a maioria dos animais responderam a pré-sincronização, e as taxas de concepção foram superiores comparadas apenas a utilização de IATF, obtendo 37% de animais gestantes ao primeiro serviço. Palavras-chave: Anestro; Bovinos; Concepção; Pré-Sincronização. -/- REFERÊNCIAS BIBLIOGRÁFICAS ALMEIDA, Í.C.; SOBREIRA, R.R.; OLIVEIRA, F.A.; GARCIA, Y.L.; MADUREIRA, A.P.; BARIONI, G.; SIQUEIRA, J.B. Protocolo de pré-sincronização hormonal em vacas mestiças no período pós-parto. Revista Brasileira de Medicina Veterinária, v.38 n.4, p. 353-357, 2016. AYRES, H; FERREIRA, R. M; CUNHA, A. P; ARAÚJO, R. R; WILTBANK, M. C. Double-Ovsynch in high-producing dairy cows: effects on progesterone concentrations and ovulation to GnRH treatments. Theriogenology. v. 79, n. 1, p. 159-164, 2013 AZEVEDO, C; CANADA, N; SIMÕES, J. O protocolo hormonal Ovsynch e suas modificações em vacas leiteiras de alta produção: uma revisão. Arquivos de zootecnia, v.63, n.244, p. 173-187, 2014. BERGAMASCHI, M.A.C.M; MACHADO, R; BARBOSA, R.T. Eficiência reprodutiva das vacas leiteiras. Circular Técnica- Embrapa. São Paulo, 2010. CAMPOS, C.C; RESENDE, E.V; CARNEIRO, L.C; MUNHOZ, A.K; SANTOS, R.M. Condição ovariana de vacas holandesas no início do programa reprodutivo. Vet. Not, v.18, n. 2, p. 145-147, 2012. CARVALHO, B.C; PIRES, M.F.A; ARBEX, W; SANTOS, G.B. Uso de Tecnologias de Precisão na Reprodução de Bovinos Leiteiros. Cadernos Técnicos de Veterinária e Zootecnia. n.79. 2015. CARVALHO, V.S. Avaliação morfológica do aparelho reprodutor de novilhas pertencentes a três grupos raciais. Universidade de Brasília - Faculdade de Agronomia e Medicina Veterinária. Brasília, 2017. CONSENTINI, C. E. C; WILTBANK, M.C; SARTORI, R. Fatores que otimizam a eficiência reprodutiva em rebanhos leiteiros com ênfase em programas de inseminação artificial cronometrada. Animais, 2021. DA SILVA, Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro. Anatomia e Fisiologia do Sistema Reprodutivo dos Animais Domésticos. Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva, 2020. DA SILVA, Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro. Anestro em Vacas Leiteiras: Fisiologia e Manejo. 2021. DA SILVA, Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro. Fisiologia Clínica do Ciclo Estral de Vacas Leiteiras: Desenvolvimento Folicular, Corpo Lúteo e Etapas do Estro. 2020. DA SILVA, Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro. Fisiologia da Reprodução Animal: Ovulação, Controle e Sincronização do Cio. 2020. DA SILVA, Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro. Fisiologia da Reprodução de Bovinos Leiteiros: Aspectos Básicos e Clínicos. Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva, 2022. DA SILVA, Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro. Fisiologia do ciclo estral dos animais domésticos. Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva, 2021. DA SILVA, Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro. Fisiologia do estro e do serviço na reprodução bovina. Belo Jardim: EICS, 2021. FAILS, A.D; MAGEE, C. Frandson- Anatomia e Fisiologia dos Animais de Produção. 8 ed. Rio de Janeiro: Guanabara Koogan Ltda, 2019. FERREIRA, A.M. Reprodução da Fêmea Bovina: Fisiologia Aplicada e Problemas mais comuns (causas e tratamentos). Juiz de Fora, MG: Edição do Autor, 2010. FRANCO, V. M. Efeitos da pré-sincronização antes da primeira IATF pós-parto em vacas girolando. Uberlândia, MG, 2021. HERLIHY, M. M; GIORDANO, J. O; SOUZA, A. H; FERREIRA, R. M; KESTIN, A; NASCIMENTO, A. B; GUENTHER, J. N; GASKA, J. M; KACUBA, S. J; CROWE, M. A; MORDOMO, S. T; WILTBANK, M. C; Presynchronization with Double-Ovsynch improves fertility at first postpartum artificial insemination in lactating dairy cows. Journal of Dairy Science, v. 95, n. 12, p. 7003-7014, 2012. JÚNIOR, M.F.D; ZERVOUDAKIS, L.K.H; ZERVOUDAKIS, J.T; KOCHECK, J.F.W; FILHO, R.S.F; FREITAS, L.D. Aspectos relacionados à fisiologia do anestro pós-parto em bovinos. Colloquium Agrariae, v. 9, n.2. Mato Grosso, 2013. MABA, M.M. Revisão Bibliográfica: Bases Fisiológicas e Dados Sobre a Inseminação Artificial em Tempo Fixo (IATF). Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina - Centro de Ciências Rurais. Curitibanos, 2018. MACEDO, G.G; OLIVEIRA, M; ROCHA, C.D; Sincronização da ovulação: como amenizar ainda mais a fisiologia da reprodução para obter melhores resultados?. Revista Brasileira de Reprodução Animal. Belo Horizonte, v.39, n.1, p. 41-46, 2015. OLIVEIRA, A.P., OLIVEIRA FILHO, J.P. e MEIRA, C. Dinâmica folicular ovariana comparativa entre as espécies bovina e equina. PUBVET, Londrina, V. 4, N. 8, Ed. 113, Art. 763, 2010. PANSANI, M.A; BELTRAN, M.P. Anatomia e Fisiologia do Aparelho Reprodutor de Fêmeas Bovinas. Revista Cientifica Eletrônica de Medicina Veterinária. São Paulo, n.12, 2009. PAZ, S. Taxa de prenhez e concepção: o que é e como medir na sua propriedade. Prodap, 2021. Disponível em:. REECE, W.O; ROWE, E.W. Anatomia Funcional e Fisiologia dos Animais Domésticos. 5 ed. Rio de Janeiro: Guanabara Koogan Ltda, 2020. ROCHE, J. R; FRIGGENS, N. C; KAY, J. K; FISHER, M. W; STAFFORD, K. J; BERRY, D. P. Invited review: Body condition score and its association with dairy cow productivity, health, and welfare. Journal of Dairy Science, v.92, p.5769-5801, 2009. SANTOS, J. P. C; LEAL, S. D. C. B. S; MADEIRA, E.M; SCHWEGLER, E; PINO, F.A.B.D; BIANCHI, I; CORRÊA, M.N. Balanço Energético Negativo no Período de Periparto em Vacas de Aptidão Leiteira. NUPEEC – Núcleo de Pesquisa, Ensino e Extensão em Pecuária. Pelotas, 2009. SENAR. Inseminação Artificial: Bovinos / Serviço Nacional de Aprendizagem Rural. 3 ed. Brasília, 2011. SILVA, L. A. C. Pré-sincronização com folículo persistente em protocolos de sincronização da ovulação a base de GnRH em vacas de leite em lactação. Dissertação (Mestrado) - Curso de Ciências Veterinárias, Universidade Federal de Lavras, Lavras, 2017. Disponível em:. Acesso em: 24 de outubro de 2022. SOARES, P.H.A. Métodos de sincronização de estro e ovulação em bovinos: revisão de literatura. Conexão Ci, v.14 n.2, p. 66-72, 2019. SOUZA, V.L. Avaliação da fertilidade do rebanho bovino de Rondônia e o uso de detecção de cio e do GnRH para aumentar a eficiência de programas de IATF. Fundação Universidade Federal de Rondônia. Porto Velho, 2019. Veja informações úteis sobre a taxa de prenhez. Ideagri, 2022. Disponível em:. (shrink)

O objetivo deste artigo é mostrar como Kant aplicou uma estrutura cognitiva mais abstrata aos objetos da experiência. É possível observar, a partir de um exemplo _in concreto,_ a aplicação dos princípios do entendimento puro, desenvolvidos e estruturados na_ Crítica da Razão Pura_, aos objetos da experiência, neste caso, as proposições empíricas da mecânica newtoniana. Assim, apresentamos a configuração dos argumentos kantianos, sustentando que há uma relação explícita entre os princípios do entendimento puro, e os princípios metafísicos da ciência da (...) natureza, estes desenvolvidos na obra de mesmo nome – _Princípios Metafísicos de Ciência da Natureza_ – e mostramos que essa relação se dá por meio de uma estrutura argumentativa em que os princípios gerais e abstratos da primeira _Crítica_ são premissas para os princípios metafísicos aplicados dos PMCN. Buscamos, assim, provar que a estrutura da filosofia da ciência kantiana é dada, principalmente, por meio das duas obras supracitadas, e é uma teoria que tem como principal objetivo, fundamentar filosoficamente a mecânica newtoniana, a fim de explicar como um conhecimento objetivamente válido dos fenômenos do mundo é possível. (shrink)

Why is gauge symmetry so important in modern physics, given that one must eliminate it when interpreting what the theory represents? In this paper we discuss the sense in which gauge symmetry can be fruitfully applied to constrain the space of possible dynamical models in such a way that forces and charges are appropriately coupled. We review the most well-known application of this kind, known as the 'gauge argument' or 'gauge principle', discuss its difficulties, and then reconstruct the gauge argument (...) as a valid theorem in quantum theory. We then present what we take to be a better and more general gauge argument, based on Noether's second theorem in classical Lagrangian field theory, and argue that this provides a more appropriate framework for understanding how gauge symmetry helps to constrain the dynamics of physical theories. (shrink)

What is the status of the claims which make up Kant’s arguments in the Critique of Pure Reason? This question seemed to Kant’s contemporaries to require a metacritique. Strawson’s criticisms of Kant should be understood in this context: as raising a metacritical challenge about Kant’s grounds for the claims which make up his arguments. What about the claims which make up Strawson’s own arguments in The Bounds of Sense? I argue in this chapter, against what I take to be the (...) general consensus, that Strawson did not and should not have understood these claims to be analytic. Rather he is somewhat puzzlingly committed to our possessing non-analytic but still a priori knowledge of his claims. What could such knowledge consist in? I’ll extract from G.E. Moore’s early writings on Kant a model for understanding such knowledge, one which enables us to better appreciate the way in which Strawson’s methodology dovetails with Kant’s own. (shrink)

Early twentieth-century philosophers of perception presented their naïve realist views of perceptual experience in anti-Kantian terms. For they took naïve realism about perceptual experience to be incompatible with Kant’s claims about the way the understanding is necessarily involved in perceptual consciousness. This essay seeks to situate a naïve realist account of visual experience within a recognisably Kantian framework by arguing that a naïve realist account of visual experience is compatible with the claim that the understanding is necessarily involved in the (...) perceptual experience of those rational beings with discursive intellects. The resultant view is middle way between recent conceptualist and non-conceptualist interpretations of Kant, holding that the understanding is necessarily involved in the kind of perceptual consciousness that we, as rational beings, enjoy whilst allowing that the relations of apprehension which constitute perceptual consciousness are independent of acts of the understanding. (shrink)

Quassim Cassam has recently defended a perceptual model of knowledge of other minds: one on which we can see and thereby know that another thinks and feels. In the course of defending this model, he addresses issues about our ability to think about other minds. I argue that his solution to this 'conceptual problem' does not work. A solution to the conceptual problem is necessary if we wish to explain knowledge of other minds.

El Realismo Científico Estándar sostiene el enfoque metafísico de que el mundo es como es independiente de la mente. Sin embargo, el presente artículo demuestra cómo esta postura es incompatible con todas las teorías no-eliminativistas sobre la mente, lo cual hace que la postura sea inconsistente, incompatible con la ciencia, elimina la consciencia, la intencionalidad, la causación mental y la ética. Se propone una tesis realista alternativa que conserva la idea de que el mundo en general es de la forma (...) que es, independiente de lo que pensemos sobre él, compatible con la mente como parte real del mundo. Este cambio restaura la posibilidad de consistencia, la mente, la consciencia, la intencionalidad, la ciencia y la ética. -/- Standard Scientific Realism holds the metaphysical view that the world is the way it is independent of the mind. However, this paper demonstrates how this view is incompatible with all non-eliminativist theories of mind, leading it to be inconsistent, incompatible with science, and eliminating consciousness, intentionality, mental causation and ethics. An alternative realist thesis is proposed which preserves the idea that generally the world is the way it is independent of what we think of it, compatible with mind as a real part of the world. This reform restores the possibility of consistency, mind, consciousness, intentionality, science and ethics, while at the same time preserving the theoretical advantages over non-realist competitors. (shrink)

According to non-conceptualist interpretations, Kant held that the application of concepts is not necessary for perceptual experience. Some have motivated non-conceptualism by noting the affinities between Kant's account of perception and contemporary relational theories of perception. In this paper I argue (i) that non-conceptualism cannot provide an account of the Transcendental Deduction and thus ought to be rejected; and (ii) that this has no bearing on the issue of whether Kant endorsed a relational account of perceptual experience.

In the section ‘Unity and Objectivity’ of The Bounds of Sense, P. F. Strawson argues for the thesis that unity of consciousness requires experience of an objective world. My aim in this essay is to evaluate this claim. In the first and second parts of the essay, I explicate Strawson's thesis, reconstruct his argument, and identify the point at which the argument fails. Strawson's discussion nevertheless raises an important question: are there ways in which we must think of our experiences (...) if we are to self-ascribe them? In the third part of the essay, I use Kant's remarks concerning the passivity of experience to suggest one answer to this question: in self-ascribing experiences, we must be capable of thinking of them as passive to their objects. This can be used to provide an alternative route from unity to objectivity. (shrink)

Any plausibly just market exchange must balance two conflicting moral considerations: non-worseness (Wertheimer, 1999) and euvoluntariness (true voluntariness; Munger, 2011). We propose an analytical theory of just market exchange that partly resolves this conflict.

In a recent paper, Gray, Knickman, and Wegner present three experiments which they take to show that people perceive patients in a persistent vegetative state to have less mentality than the dead. Following on from Gomes and Parrott, we provide evidence to show that participants' responses in the initial experiments are an artifact of the questions posed. Results from two experiments show that, once the questions have been clarified, people do not ascribe more mental capacity to the dead than (...) to PVS patients. There is no reason to think that people perceive PVS patients as more dead than dead. (shrink)

Nesta comunicação exploro aquele que deve ser o objecto e o âmbito de uma teoria de justiça. Da resposta a estas duas questões depende a possibilidade de definir princípios de justiça que concebam uma sociedade justa. Assim, tenho em consideração as propostas sobre o objecto e o âmbito da justiça presentes nas teorias de Nozick (libertária), de Rawls (igualitária) e de Walzer (comunitária) e avalio topicamente cada uma das posições. Concluo tentando responder à questão: qual deve ser o objecto e (...) o âmbito de uma teoria de justiça? (shrink)

In this paper I try to answer four basic questions: (1) How the concept of God is to be represented? (2) Are there any logical principles governing it? (3) If so, what kind of logic lies behind them? (4) Can there be a logic of the concept of God? I address them by presenting a formal-logical account to the concept of God. I take it as a methodological desideratum that this should be done within the simplest existing logical formalism. I (...) start with first-order logic (FOL) with identity, and then show that its simplest modal extension (SQML, or the simplest quantified modal logic) is enough for us to formalize a minimally satisfactory theory of the concept of God. I focus exclusively on the monotheistic concept of God. (shrink)

For Kant, the human cognitive faculty has two sub-faculties: sensibility and the understanding. Each has pure forms which are necessary to us as humans: space and time for sensibility; the categories for the understanding. But Kant is careful to leave open the possibility of there being creatures like us, with both sensibility and understanding, who nevertheless have different pure forms of sensibility. They would be finite rational beings and discursive cognizers. But they would not be human. And this raises a (...) question about the pure forms of the understanding. Does Kant leave open the possibility of discursive cognizers who have different categories? Even if other discursive cognizers might not sense like us, must they at least think like us? We argue that textual and systematic considerations do not determine the answers to these questions and examine whether Kant thinks that the issue cannot be decided. Consideration of his wider views on the nature and limits of our knowledge of mind shows that Kant could indeed remain neutral on the issue but that the exact form his neutrality can take is subject to unexpected constraints. The result would be an important difference between what Kant says about discursive cognizers with other forms of sensibility and what he is in a position to say about discursive cognizers with other forms of understanding. Kantian humility here takes on a distinctive character. (shrink)

This paper introduces the special issue on Formal Approaches to the Ontological Argument of the Journal of Applied Logics (College Publications). The issue contains the following articles: Formal Approaches to the Ontological Argument, by Ricardo Sousa Silvestre and Jean-Yves Béziau; A Brief Critical Introduction to the Ontological Argument and its Formalization: Anselm, Gaunilo, Descartes, Leibniz and Kant, by Ricardo Sousa Silvestre; A Mechanically Assisted Examination of Begging the Question in Anselm’s Ontological Argument, by John Rushby; A Tractarian Resolution (...) to the Ontological Argument, by Erik Thomsen; On Kant’s Hidden Ambivalence Toward Existential Generalization in his Critique of the Ontological Argument, by Giovanni Mion; The Totality of Predicates and the Possibility of the Most Real Being, by Srećko Kovač; An Even More Leibnizian Version of Gödel’s Ontological Argument, by Kordula Świętorzecka and Marcin Łyczak; A Case Study On Computational Hermeneutics: E. J. Lowe’s Modal Ontological Argument, by David Fuenmayor. (shrink)

Our purpose in this paper is to contribute to the project of meta-theodicy, understood here as the elucidation of the concept of theodicy through the analysis of its adequacy. In our case, the analysis shall be made inside a framework including a taxonomical view of the theodical adequacy conditions which allows for a rigorously acceptable description of them as well as for a natural appraisal of the role, importance and intra-logical relations holding between them. The result of the analysis shall (...) be used to introduce definitions minimally precise of the notions of theodicy, satisfactory theodicy, plausible theodicy, ideal theodicy, and the like. (shrink)

This paper investigates whether 'even if A, B' is pragmatically polysemic, so that a nonconcessive conditional may have 'even if', and whether concessive conditionals, pragmatically defined, can fail to have 'even if' or a non-temporal 'still'. Different paraphrases are used to help elucidate pragmatic meanings. A theory of the pragmatic meanings of concessive and implicative conditionals is presented. The semantic meaning of 'even if' and the question of whether concessive conditionals imply the truth of their consequents are also discussed.

Libet's (2000) arguments in defense of his interpretation of his experimental results are insufficient. The claims of my critical review (Gomes, 2008) do not suffer with his new statements.

The so-called theory of karma is one of the distinguishing aspects of Hinduism and other non-Hindu south-Asian traditions. At the same time that the theory can be seen as closely connected with the freedom of will and action that we humans supposedly have, it has many times been said to be determinist and fatalist. The purpose of this paper is to analyze in some deepness the relations that are between the theory of karma on one side and determinism, fatalism and (...) free-will on the other side. In order to do that, I shall use what has been described as the best formal approach we have to indeterminism: branching time theory. More specifically, I shall introduce a branching time semantic framework in which, among other things, statements such as “state of affairs e is a karmic effect of agent a”, “a wills it to be the case that e” and “e is inevitable” could be properly represented. (shrink)

This paper introduces the special issue on the Concept of God of the Journal of Applied Logics (College Publications). The issue contains the following articles: Logic and the Concept of God, by Stanisław Krajewski and Ricardo Silvestre; Mathematical Models in Theology. A Buber-inspired Model of God and its Application to “Shema Israel”, by Stanisław Krajewski; Gödel’s God-like Essence, by Talia Leven; A Logical Solution to the Paradox of the Stone, by Héctor Hernández Ortiz and Victor Cantero; No New Solutions (...) to the Logical Problem of the Trinity, by Beau Branson; What Means ‘Tri-’ in ‘Trinity’ ? An Eastern Patristic Approach to the ‘Quasi-Ordinals’, by Basil Lourié; The Éminence Grise of Christology: Porphyry’s Logical Teaching as a Cornerstone of Argumentation in Christological Debates of the Fifth and Sixth Centruies, by Anna Zhyrkova; The Problem of Universals in Late Patristic Theology, by Dirk Krasmüller; Intuitionist Reasoning in the Tri-unitrian Theology of Nicolas of Cues, by Antonino Drago. (shrink)

James Van Cleve has argued that Kant’s Transcendental Deduction of the categories shows, at most, that we must apply the categories to experience. And this falls short of Kant’s aim, which is to show that they must so apply. In this discussion I argue that once we have noted the differences between the first and second editions of the Deduction, this objection is less telling. But Van Cleve’s objection can help illuminate the structure of the B Deduction, and it suggests (...) an interesting reason why the rewriting might have been thought necessary. (shrink)

Phenomenal particularism is the view that particular external objects are sometimes part of the phenomenal character of perceptual experience. It is a central part of naïve realist or relational views of perception. We consider a series of recent objections to phenomenal particularism and argue that naïve realism has the resources to block them. In particular, we show that these objections rest on assumptions about the nature of phenomenal character that the naïve realist will reject, and that they ignore the full (...) resources that naïve realism has to offer in explaining phenomenal character. (shrink)

In this chapter, Ricardo Silvestre and Alan Herbert offer a reconstruction of the Gītā’s concept of God with a focus on the relationship between God and the world. They try to explain the claim that the Gītā is panentheistic. This is done with the help of some key notions of contemporary metaphysics (such as ontological dependence and fundamentality) along with the Indic notion of prakṛti, considered as a metaphysical primitive denoting the intimate relationship that exists between matter and conscious (...) living beings on the one hand, and God on the other. (shrink)

An extended examination of Libet's works led to a comprehensive reinterpretation of his results. According to this reinterpretation, the Minimum Train Duration of electrical brain stimulation should be considered as the time needed to create a brain stimulus efficient for producing conscious sensation and not as a basis for inferring the latency for conscious sensation of peripheral origin. Latency for conscious sensation with brain stimulation may occurafterthe Minimum Train Duration. Backward masking with cortical stimuli suggests a 125-300 ms minimum value (...) for the latency for conscious sensation of threshold skin stimuli. Backward enhancement is not suitable for inferring this latency. For determining temporal relations between stimuli that correspond to subjects' reports, theendof cerebral Minimum Train Duration should be used as reference, rather than its onset. Results of coupling peripheral and cortical stimuli are explained by a latency after the cortical Minimum Train Duration, having roughly the same duration as the latency for supraliminal skin stimuli. Results of coupling peripheral stimuli and stimuli to medial lemniscus (LM) are explained by a shorter LM latency and/or a longer peripheral latency. This interpretation suggests a 230 ms minimum value for the latency for conscious sensation of somatosensory near-threshold stimuli. The backward referral hypothesis, as formulated by Libet, should not be retained. Long readiness potentials preceding spontaneous conscious or nonconscious movements suggest that both kinds of movement are nonconsciously initiated. The validity of Libet's measures of W and M moments (Libet et al., 1983a) is questionable due to problems involving latencies, training, and introspective distinction of W and M. Veto of intended actions may be initially nonconscious but dependent on conscious awareness. (shrink)

It is argued that contraposition is valid for a class of natural language conditionals, if some modifications are allowed to preserve the meaning of the original conditional. In many cases, implicit temporal indices must be considered, making a change in verb tense necessary. A suitable contrapositive for implicative counterfactual conditionals can also usually be found. In some cases, the addition of certain words is necessary to preserve meaning that is present in the original sentence and would be lost or changed (...) in the contrapositive without them. A distinction is made between adding new meaning and adding new words to preserve existing meaning. For concessive conditionals and relevance conditionals, however, no valid contrapositive can be found. They do not belong to the class of contraposable conditionals, which can be independently defined. Difficult cases are also discussed in which the contradictory of the consequent semantically entails the truth of the antecedent. In such cases the content of the antecedent is implicit in the meaning of the consequent. Contraposition becomes possible if what is implicit in the original consequent is made explicit in the contrapositive antecedent. (shrink)

In this paper I distinguish two ways of raising a sceptical problem of others' minds: via a problem concerning the possibility of error or via a problem concerning sources of knowledge. I give some reason to think that the second problem raises a more interesting problem in accounting for our knowledge of others’ minds and consider proposed solutions to the problem.

In the essays which make up The Sovereignty of Good, Iris Murdoch gives us a picture of moral life in which ‘the metaphor of vision [is] almost irresistibly suggested’. This chapter aims to clarify the role played by the metaphor of vision in Murdoch’s philosophical thinking. I’ll examine two different things which might be meant by the term ‘moral vision’: vision of moral things or vision which is itself moral. The suggestion will be that whilst both capture something important about (...) Murdoch’s work, each may mislead about what is distinctive in her views. For Murdoch, I shall suggest, there is no distinctively moral vision. There is only vision: a loving gaze directed upon the reality of others. (shrink)

Panentheism has seen a revival over the past two decades in the philosophical literature. This has partially triggered an interest in Indian models of God, which have traditionally been seen as panentheistic. On the other hand, panentheism has been often associated with panpsychism, an old ontological view that sees consciousness as fundamental and ubiquitous in the natural world and which has also enjoyed a renaissance in recent decades. Depending on where one places fundamentality (whether on the microlevel or on the (...) cosmic-level) there will be two types of panpsychism: micropsychism and cosmopsychism. Despite the apparently rich connection between Indian traditions and panpsychism, especially in its cosmopsychist version, recent work within cross-cultural analytic philosophy of mind seems to be mostly focused on atheistic traditions, such as Advaita Vedānta and Buddhism. My goal in this paper is to contribute to the cross-cultural debate over panentheism and Indian models of God, as well as to the debate on the connections between panpsychism, cosmopsychism and Indian traditions, by examining one of the most important and often quoted texts in Indian religious and philosophical traditions: the theistic Bhavagad Gītā. From a more specific standpoint, the paper has a threefold goal: to offer a panentheistic reconstruction of the Gītā’s concept of God, to show how this panentheistic model of God entails a form of theistic cosmopsychism, and to locate the Gītā’s cosmopsychism within a broader map of cosmopsychist views. Based on this reconstructive analysis of the Gītā’s cosmopsychism, I also outline some few reflections on the philosophical prospects of theistic cosmopsychism. (shrink)

In this paper I defend the claim that testimony can serve as a basic source of knowledge of other people’s mental lives against the objection that testimonial knowledge presupposes knowledge of other people’s mental lives and therefore can’t be used to explain it.

Inspired by the early Wittgenstein’s concept of nonsense (meaning that which lies beyond the limits of language), we define two different, yet complementary, types of nonsense: formal nonsense and pragmatic nonsense. The simpler notion of formal nonsense is initially defined within Tarski’s semantic theory of truth; the notion of pragmatic nonsense, by its turn, is formulated within the context of the theory of pragmatic truth, also known as quasi-truth, as formalized by da Costa and his collaborators. While an expression will (...) be considered formally nonsensical if the formal criteria required for the assignment of any truth-value (whether true, false, pragmatically true, or pragmatically false) to such sentence are not met, a (well-formed) formula will be considered pragmatically nonsensical if the pragmatic criteria (inscribed within the context of scientific practice) required for the assignment of any truth-value to such sentence are not met. Thus, in the context of the theory of pragmatic truth, any (well-formed) formula of a formal language interpreted on a simple pragmatic structure will be considered pragmatically nonsensical if the set of primary sentences of such structure is not well-built, that is, if it does not include the relevant observational data and/or theoretical results, or if it does include sentences that are inconsistent with such data. (shrink)

The aim of this work is to understand the retraction phenomenon in the arts and humanities domain through an analysis of the retraction notices – formal documents stating and describing the retraction of a particular publication. The retractions and the corresponding notices are identified using the data provided by Retraction Watch. Our methodology for the analysis combines a metadata analysis and a content analysis (mainly performed using a topic modeling process) of the retraction notices. Considering 343 cases of retraction, we (...) found that many retraction notices are neither identifiable nor findable. In addition, these were not always separated from the original papers, introducing ambiguity in understanding how these notices were perceived by the community (i.e., cited). Also, we noticed that there is no systematic way to write a retraction notice. Indeed, some retraction notices presented a complete discussion of the reasons for retraction, while others tended to be more direct and succinct. We have also reported many notices having similar text while addressing different retractions. We think a further study with a larger collection should be done using the same methodology to confirm and investigate our findings further. (shrink)

Scepticism is sometimes expressed about whether there is any interesting problem of other minds. In this paper I set out a version of the conceptual problem of other minds which turns on the way in which mental occurrences are presented to the subject and situate it in relation to debates about our knowledge of other people's mental lives. The result is a distinctive problem in the philosophy of mind concerning our relation to other people.

In the first part of this chapter, I summarise some of the issues in the philosophy of mind which are addressed in Kant’s Critical writings. In the second part, I chart some of the ways in which that discussion influenced twentieth-century analytic philosophy of mind and identify some of the themes which characterise Kantian approaches in the philosophy of mind.

This paper introduces the special issue on Logic and Philosophy of Religion of the journal Sophia: International Journal of Philosophy and Traditions (Springer). The issue contains the following articles: Logic and Philosophy of Religion, by Ricardo Sousa Silvestre and Jean-Yvez Béziau; The End of Eternity, by Jamie Carlin Watson; The Vagueness of the Muse—The Logic of Peirce’s Humble Argument for the Reality of God, by Cassiano Terra Rodrigues; Misunderstanding the Talk(s) of the Divine: Theodicy in the Wittgensteinian Tradition, by (...) Ondřej Beran; On the Concept of Theodicy, by Ricardo Sousa Silvestre; The Logical Problem of the Trinity and the Strong Theory of Relative Identity, by Daniel Molto; Thomas Aquinas on Logic, Being, and Power, and Contemporary Problems for Divine Omnipotence, by Errin D. Clark. -/- . (shrink)

The essays in this volume explore those aspects of Kant’s writings which concern issues in the philosophy of mind. These issues are central to any understanding of Kant’s critical philosophy and they bear upon contemporary discussions in the philosophy of mind. Fourteen specially written essays address such questions as: What role does mental processing play in Kant’s account of intuition? What kinds of empirical models can be given of these operations? In what sense, and in what ways, are intuitions object-dependent? (...) How should we understand the nature of the imagination? What is inner sense, and what does it mean to say that time is the form of inner sense? Can we cognize ourselves through inner sense? How do we self-ascribe our beliefs and what role does self-consciousness play in our judgments? Is the will involved in judging? What kind of knowledge can we have of the self ? And what kind of knowledge of the self does Kant proscribe? These essays showcase the depth of Kant’s writings in the philosophy of mind, and the centrality of those writings to his wider philosophical project. Moreover, they show the continued relevance of Kant’s writings to contemporary debates about the nature of mind and self. Contents: 0. Introduction Anil Gomes and Andrew Stephenson 1. Kant, The Philosophy Of Mind, And Twentieth Century Analytic Philosophy Anil Gomes 2. Synthesis And Binding Lucy Allais 3. Understanding Non-Conceptual Representation Of Objects: Empirical Models Of Sensibility’s Operation Katherine Dunlop 4. Are Kantian Intuitions Object-Dependent? Stefanie Grüne 5. Intuition And Presence Colin McLear 6. Imagination And Inner Intuition Andrew Stephenson 7. Inner Sense And Time Ralf M. Bader 8. Can’t Kant Cognize Himself? Or, A Problem For (Almost) Every Interpretation Of The Refutation Of Idealism Andrew Chignell 9. A Kantian Critique Of Transparency Patricia Kitcher 10. Judging For Reasons: On Kant And The Modalities Of Judgment Jessica Leech 11. Kant On Judging And The Will Jill Vance Buroker 12. Self and Selves Ralph C. S. Walker 13. Subjects Of Kant’s First Paralogism Tobias Rosefeldt 14. The Lessons Of Kant’s Paralogisms Paul Snowdon. (shrink)

Chapter 4 of Dennis Schulting’s book Kant’s Radical Subjectivism targets those commentators who take there to be a gap in the transcendental deduction of the categories, arguing instead that there is no gap between the necessary application of the categories and their exemplification in the object of experience. In these comments on the chapter, I suggest a minimal sense in which the fact that there is a gap is non-negotiable. The interesting question is not whether there is a gap which (...) needs to be bridged, but how and why Kant makes the step from subjectivity to objectivity. (shrink)

In this essay, I focus on Lugones’s relatively lesser explored notion of playfulness. I weigh in on the debate about whether playfulness is necessary for what Lugones calls “world-traveling,” which enables one to recognize another person as a full subject. I argue that although the attribute of playfulness may not be necessary for world-traveling, it is necessary for collaborative world-making––creating a new, shared world that is opened through the activity of play.

Despite the importance of human blood to clinical practice and research, hematology and blood transfusion data remain scattered throughout a range of disparate sources. This lack of systematization concerning the use and definition of terms poses problems for physicians and biomedical professionals. We are introducing here the Blood Ontology, an ongoing initiative designed to serve as a controlled vocabulary for use in organizing information about blood. The paper describes the scope of the Blood Ontology, its stage of development and some (...) of its anticipated uses. (shrink)

What method should we use to determine the nature of perceptual experience? My focus here is the Kantian thought that transcendental arguments can be used to determine the nature of perceptual experience. I set out a dilemma for the use of transcendental arguments in the philosophy of perception, one which turns on a comparison ofthe transcendental method with the first-personal method of early analytic philosophy, and with the empirical methods of much contemporary philosophy of mind. The transcendental method can avoid (...) this dilemma only if it commits to our possessing a capacity for imaginative reflection, one which is capable of identifying certain formal properties of experience.This result indicates some of the commitments which must be made if transcendental arguments are to be used in the philosophy of perception, and it has implications for those views that take the philosophy of perception to be autonomous of the empirical science of perception. (shrink)

1. Introduction The readiness potential was found to precede voluntary acts by about half a second or more (Kornhuber & Deecke, 1965). Kornhuber (1984) discussed the readiness potential in terms of volition, arguing that it is not the manifestation of an attentional processes. Libet discussed it in relation to consciousness and to free will (Libet et al. 1983a; 1983b; Libet, 1985, 1992, 1993). Libet asked the following questions. Are voluntary acts initiated by a conscious decision to act? Are the physiological (...) facts compatible with the belief that free will determines our voluntary acts? What is the role of consciousness in voluntary action? In this paper I will discuss these questions and the answers that Libet gave to them. (shrink)

No artigo “O vegetarianismo como obrigação ética” (Crítica, 10 de Setembro de 2015), Moutinho defende que o vegetarianismo é uma obrigação moral. Fá-lo argumentando por duas vias: que o estatuto moral dos animais é incompatível com serem usados pelos humanos para alimentação; e que o vegetarianismo é consequência do nosso dever em preservar o equilíbrio ecológico do planeta. O meu objectivo neste artigo é mostrar que os argumentos apresentados são insuficientes para estabelecer o vegetarianismo como obrigação moral.

The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, it aims at introducing the ontological argument through the analysis of five historical developments: Anselm’s argument found in the second chapter of his Proslogion, Gaunilo’s criticism of it, Descartes’ version of the ontological argument found in his Meditations on First Philosophy, Leibniz’s contribution to the debate on the ontological argument and his demonstration of the possibility of God, and Kant’s famous criticisms against the (cartesian) ontological argument. Second, it intends to critically examine (...) the enterprise of formally analyzing philosophical arguments and, as such, contribute in a small degree to the debate on the role of formalization in philosophy. My focus will be mainly on the drawbacks and limitations of such enterprise; as a guideline, I shall refer to a Carnapian, or Carnapian-like theory of argument analysis. (shrink)

Claims that necessary and sufficient conditions are not converse relations are discussed, as well as the related claim that If A, then B is not equivalent to A only if B . The analysis of alleged counterexamples has shown, among other things, how necessary and sufficient conditions should be understood, especially in the case of causal conditions, and the importance of distinguishing sufficient-cause conditionals from necessary-cause conditionals. It is concluded that necessary and sufficient conditions, adequately interpreted, are converse relations in (...) all cases. (shrink)

Lucy Allais seeks to provide a reading of the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories which is compatible with a nonconceptualist account of Kant’s theory of intuition. According to her interpretation, the aim of the Deduction is to show that a priori concept application is required for empirical concept application. I argue that once we distinguish the application of the categories from the instantiation of the categories, we see that Allais’s reconstruction of the Deduction cannot provide an answer to Hume’s problem (...) about our entitlement to use a priori concepts when thinking about the objects of empirical intuition. If the Deduction is to provide a response to Hume, Allais’s interpretation must be rejected. (shrink)

Can the experience of great art play a role in our coming to understand the ethical framework of another person? In this article I draw out three themes from Iris Murdoch’s ‘The Sovereignty of Good’ in order to show the role that communal attention to works of art can play in our ethical lives. I situate this role in the context of Murdoch’s wider philosophical views.